

# Counterterrorism

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## *Introduction*

Participation in or association with any international terrorist group or activity can be adjudicated under one or more of the Foreign Influence, Foreign Preference, Allegiance to the United States, or Criminal Conduct guidelines. Participation in or association with any domestic terrorism group or activity is

adjudicated under the Allegiance to the United States, Criminal Conduct and/or Personal Conduct guidelines.

There are many ways to define terrorism. As used here, terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence against people or property in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. International terrorism refers to terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country. Counterterrorism is our national effort to eliminate or reduce the terrorist threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad.

This Counterterrorism module provides background information only on international terrorism -- specifically terrorism by militant Muslim extremists. Some background information on domestic right-wing and left-wing terrorist and extremist groups is found in the [Allegiance to the United States](#) module.

In April of each year, the Department of State publishes an annual report entitled *Country Reports on Terrorism*. This organizes information on terrorist activity by region and by country. A separate report that is updated annually identifies 45 foreign organizations that are formally designated by the U.S. Government as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Any association with one of these organizations is a security concern. This and other information about international terrorism is available on the State Department website at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>.

## ***International Terrorist Threat***

The global militant jihadist movement -- including but certainly not limited to al-Qaida -- is currently the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States, U.S. interests, and U.S. allies. It encompasses a variety of movements, groups, and sometimes *ad hoc* units or cells which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of radical interpretations of Islamic scripture. Other collective terms used to describe these groups include radical Islam and Islamists.

The meaning of the Islamic term "jihad" has changed and evolved over 14 centuries and is still avidly contested among Muslims. It comes from the Arabic root *jhd*, which means "to exert utmost effort, to strive, struggle." Meanings that Muslims attribute to this word today are quite diverse. For example, some Muslims believe the term refers to an individual believer's inner spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith. Other Muslims believe it refers to a religious duty to engage in holy war against what they call the infidels (disbelievers). We are not concerned here with the true meaning of the word as used in the Quran, but only with how it is interpreted today by militant Muslim extremists.

The ideology of global militant jihad is expressed in public statements by al-Qaida leaders, such as the following: [1](#)

- "There is a clash of civilizations. Militant jihad is a religious duty before God, and therefore necessary for the salvation of one's soul as well as for the defense of the Muslim nation."
- "Only two camps exist. There can be no middle ground in an apocalyptic showdown between Islam and the forces of evil" (defined not merely as "the West" but also Muslims that do not share al-Qaida's vision of "true Islam.")
- "Violence by Muslims in the defense of Islam is the only solution. Peaceful existence with the West is a dangerous illusion."
- "Many of the theological and legal restrictions on the use of violence by Muslims do not apply to this war. Given that the stakes are high, compunctions against violence only assist the infidel."
- "U.S. power is based on its economy. Therefore, large-scale, mass-casualty attacks -- especially focused on U.S. and other Western economic targets -- are a primary goal."
- "'Apostate' regimes must go. Muslim governments that cooperate with the West and that have not imposed Sharia (Islamic) law are religiously unacceptable and must be violently overthrown."

Al-Qaida is the most prominent organization in the militant jihadist movement, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are its best known leaders. However, militant jihadism predates and transcends al-Qaida. The belief that jihad has been a "neglected duty" among Muslims, and that there is a duty mandated by God to kill or destroy all "unbelievers" comes from Egyptian philosophers of the 1950-60s.<sup>2</sup> A group called Egyptian Islamic Jihad assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 after he attempted to make peace with Israel. Jemaah Islamiya, which has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, dates back to about 1969.

Global counterterrorism operations since September 11, 2001, have degraded al-Qaida's central command and control infrastructure, limiting its ability to mount global acts of terrorism. Safe haven in Afghanistan has been largely denied, and many of the men in leadership positions have been killed or captured. The U.S. and coalition successes against al-Qaida have forced its remaining members and other militant jihadist groups to act more on their own and exercise greater local control over their strategic and tactical decisions. The al-Qaida senior leadership can still inspire terrorist activity through its ideological and propaganda activities, but it can no longer direct this activity as fully as in the past.<sup>3</sup>

Consistent with the changing role of al-Qaida's core leadership, there is evidence that al-Qaida's global networks are breaking up. What was once a relatively structured network appears to have become a more diffuse worldwide movement of like-minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not necessarily formally organized. While

trainers and other operatives linked to al-Qaida may still act as catalysts for terrorist activity, other self-sufficient cells have now emerged. The principal threat of terrorist attack now comes from groups that are only loosely affiliated with al-Qaida, or small, independent groups adhering to the same militant jihadist ideology. These groups remain intent on striking U.S. interests in the homeland and overseas. [3](#)

Examples of this trend include Salafiya Jihadia, a loosely-organized Moroccan movement involved in carrying out the bombings in Casablanca in May 2003. The terrorists who executed the March 2004 attack in Madrid and the July 2005 bombing in London also do not appear to have been acting directly on al-Qaida orders, although they were guided by the same militant jihadist ideology and targeting strategy. Jemaah Islamiyah groups in Southeast Asia look to their own spiritual leaders and operate independently, while maintaining close ideological ties with al-Qaida.

The U.S. Government estimates that terrorist capabilities for attacks will remain uneven, given the varying degrees of expertise and increasing decentralization within the movement. Most groups will be capable only of relatively unsophisticated, but still deadly small-scale attacks. Others, however, may seek to acquire or duplicate al-Qaida's expertise and material support for mass-casualty attacks. The explosive growth of media and the Internet, as well as the ease of travel and communication around the world, have made possible the rapid movement of operatives, expertise, money, and weapons. Terrorists increasingly will use media and the Internet to advance key messages or rally support, share jihadist experiences and expertise, and spread fear. [1](#)

### ***Challenge to Personnel Security***

The war on terrorism has greatly increased the demand for personnel with foreign language abilities and an understanding of foreign cultures and customs, especially in areas with large Arabic or Muslim populations. Many personnel have these skills only as a result of being born outside the United States, having friends and family who are not U.S. citizens, living in ethnic communities within the U.S., and other related factors.

Personnel with foreign ties may be more vulnerable to exploitation by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations, and other groups that are hostile to U.S. interests. Financial and emotional ties to a foreign country, or to persons residing in a foreign country, can create pressure to act against the interests of the United States. Persons with such ties may feel a compelling sense of duty to friends or family residing in the country of birth.

Most terrorists that threaten the security of the United States are Muslims. However, an overwhelming majority of Muslims are not terrorists and do not sympathize with terrorists. This is especially true of American Muslims. As

noted by one scholar, "the most powerful weapon in countering the radicals' violence is the goodwill and moderation of 95 percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. We must fight to keep it, and to use it, if we are, one day, to be free of fear and violence." [4](#)

"Most Muslims, like almost everyone else, want to live their lives in peace. But that fact doesn't change or mitigate another fact: that terrorists and militants around the world today are using the Quran and the teachings of Islam to recruit and motivate terrorists, making principal use of the doctrines surrounding the concept of jihad." [8](#)

The need to identify militant jihadists, while protecting the civil rights of all Americans (specifically, Muslim Americans) presents a serious challenge to the U.S. Government's personnel security system. It raises practical and legal issues regarding the proper adjudication and investigation of persons of the Muslim faith.

### **Civil Rights Concerns**

The basic personnel security form, the SF-86, does not ask about religion, and investigators are not authorized to ask about a subject's religious beliefs. However, militant jihadism is not a religion. It is a militant political ideology comparable to communism or fascism. The militant ideology is communicated using the rhetoric of religion, but an overwhelming majority of Muslims do not see it as a part of their faith. [7](#)

Militant jihadists are openly hostile to the United States and Western values. Any American who advocates or supports holy war against the West is a threat to the United States and is not eligible for access to classified information. Before approving a security clearance, the adjudicator needs some assurance that the subject supports the basic human and democratic values expressed in and protected by the U.S. Constitution.

Any of the following statements of belief would be potentially disqualifying:

- The Quran requires all good Muslims to participate in holy war against the West.
- The separation of church and state is a sin. Democratic laws are illegitimate and sinful, because they are "man-made" laws expressing the will of the electorate rather than God. The only true law is Sharia, the law sent down by God, which governs not only religious rituals, but many aspects of day-to-day life, family and social issues, politics, economics, banking, and business.
- Suicide bombings that kill noncombatants are justified. The extremist sees this as martyrdom in the service of God. The killing of innocent bystanders is permissible because they are infidels.

One pitfall that adjudicators and investigators must avoid is any assumption that the depth of a Muslim's religious beliefs is somehow related to whether or not that person holds extremist views. The fact that a Muslim complies strictly with all the dietary restrictions, prays consistently five times a day, or that a Muslim woman wears a head scarf indicates only that a person is a devout Muslim. *It is absolutely not an indicator of radical, extremist, or militant views.*

## **Avoiding Stereotypes**

Arab Americans and American Muslims are very diverse groups. There are significant differences between Arab Americans and other American Muslims whose heritage is in African, South Asian, or Southeast Asian. There are also significant differences in attitudes and culture between descendants of immigrants who are now thoroughly embedded in the mosaic of life in America, and more recent immigrants who continue to be heavily influenced by the culture of their native land. Further, Muslims with foreign heritage are different from the many native-born Americans who have converted to Islam.

Arab Americans belong to many religions, including Islam, Christianity, Druze, Judaism and others. Due to historic immigration patterns, a majority of Arab Americans are Catholic, Eastern Orthodox Christians, or Protestant, not Muslim. Not all people from the Middle East are Arabs. The four main language groups in the Middle East are Arabic, Hebrew, Persian and Turkish. Other ethnic and cultural groups in the Middle East include Kurdish, Berber, Chaldean, and Assyrian, and many immigrants to the United States have come from these minority groups. [5](#)

According to the 2000 census, 1,200,000 Americans are of Arab descent. According to a survey by the Arab American Institute, only 24% of them are Muslim, and the Muslims are divided between the Sunni and Shia sects. Arab Americans are nearly twice as likely as the typical U.S. resident to possess a college degree, and the median income for a family of Arab ancestry is higher than the median income for all U.S. families. Intermarriage is extremely high -- about 75% of Arab Americans marry a person of a different faith. This indicates that the Arab American community is well-rooted and well-invested in the United States. [11](#)

Most Muslims are not Arabs and do not even live in the Middle East. There are more Muslims in Indonesia, for example, than in all other Arab countries combined. Muslims are spread throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia so that only about 12 percent of Muslims worldwide are Arabs. Islam has a strong Arab flavor, though, because the religion's holiest places are in the Middle East and the Quran was originally written in Arabic. [5](#)

Good statistics on the number of Muslims in the United States are not available, as the U.S. census does not ask questions about religion. Estimates vary widely from 1,886,000 to above six million.

However, various surveys have identified key demographic characteristics of American Muslims. According to a 2004 Zogby survey, about 33% are of South Asian descent, 26% are Arab, and another 20% are American blacks. Fifty-nine percent of American Muslims have at least an undergraduate education, making them the most highly educated religious group in America. Four out of five Muslim Americans earn over \$25,000 a year, and one in three earn more than \$75,000. Eighty-two percent are registered to vote. A study of Muslims in New York City found that twenty-one percent marry outside their religion. According to a separate study of mosque attendance in Detroit, the average mosque-goer is 34 years old, married with children, has at least a bachelor's degree, and earns about \$74,000 a year. [11](#)

These figures show that, like Arab Americans, most American Muslims are successful and well on their way toward blending into the great American melting pot. This differs markedly from Muslim communities in Europe that tend to be poor and socially marginalized. Culturally isolated and poor enclaves of Muslim immigrants do also exist in America, however. The Islamist militants who bombed the New York World Trade Center the first time, in 1993, came from such an enclave in Jersey City, NJ. (See the [Ali Mohamed](#) case.) The "Lackawanna Six" (described under [Other Case Summaries](#)) is a group of young Americans from a Yemeni community in upstate New York. On the other hand, there is also ample evidence that a good education and economic affluence are no obstacle to becoming a terrorist. Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders are prime examples.

## ***Assessing Competing Loyalties***

People live complex lives, and we often experience some conflict between our various obligations, such as the common conflict between the demands of family and job. In addition to family and employer, our friends, profession, religion, nationality, culture, and a U.S. Government security clearance for access to classified information all may be sources of conflicting values and obligations. Balancing these conflicting demands is a normal part of life, and occasionally we face a problem or crisis that triggers a reorganization of our priorities.

"Individuals who immigrate to the U.S. do so at very different times in their lives. They are born and raised in a country and culture that is often very different from ours. They seek a better life and pursue the American dream; however, they do not relinquish their identities when taking the oath for U.S. citizenship. Many immigrants today as in the past have struggled to find a compromise with being an American and not surrendering their heritage. As a result, many find themselves in conflict both in terms of their loyalty to

their culture and the family that they left behind. Although they profess loyalty to the U.S., the influence of family, culture, religion, and the early imprint of identity development often moderate that pledge of allegiance." [12](#)

The role of e-mail, instant messaging, and cheap telephone calls via the Internet has transformed the role that foreign relatives and friends play in the lives of immigrants to the United States. As a result of modern telecommunications, contact is immediate and frequent and one can maintain many more foreign contacts at minimal cost. This encourages continued identification with the cultural norms and values of a person's country of birth. "As a result, foreign-born individuals who immigrate to the U.S. may remain more closely tied to their country of origin, more identified with their country of origin's culture, politics and lifestyle, and thus can become more vulnerable to being influenced by individuals in their birth country." [12](#)

Access to classified or other protected information can create circumstances where an individual's willingness and ability to protect that information is put to the test. One may gain access to information that one knows would be of great value to a foreign family member, friend, corporation, or government. Or one may be pressured by family, friends, or the government to fulfill obligations that are contrary to U.S. interests. The ability to withstand such temptations and pressures depends in part on the extent to which one has assimilated American culture and values. This can be more of a problem with Arabs than with someone from a Western culture. In Arab culture, the family, clan, and tribe are more important than the individual. Individuals draw much of their identity and self-esteem from the status of their family and the larger collective of which they are a part, rather than from their individual accomplishments. [5](#)

When an individual has relatives, friends, and an ethnic or national heritage in a country where militant jihadist groups are active, there is a good deal of information that adjudicators need to know in order to make an informed judgment that approval for access to classified information is clearly in the national interest. This is discussed in the [Foreign Influence](#) module, but there are additional factors to be considered that relate specifically to potential terrorist connections.

### **Confirming Identity**

Arabic and other Middle Eastern and Asian languages use written characters and sounds that are very different from English, which means there is more than one way to transliterate the sounds and words. For example, several years ago the Associated Press changed its approved style for its spelling of Arabic words and names. Mohammed became Muhammad and the Koran became Quran. The latter is sometimes written as Qur'an. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's organization is spelled variously as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, and al Qaeda.

So just getting a subject's name right is not a simple matter. In order to conduct a thorough name check, it is necessary to have the full name, including the middle names as currently spelled by the subject and all alternative spellings the subject has used in the past. It is also necessary to know any other identities the subject has used either in the United States or in foreign countries. Using multiple different identities is common in Arab culture. Also, native-born Americans who convert to Islam typically adopt an Arabic name. The subject needs to provide dates and circumstances pertaining to use of each name.

The Almaliki Nour case, described under [Other Case Summaries](#), is an example of an individual who became a U.S. citizen under a false name. He subsequently obtained a security clearance without this being detected and worked for two years as an interpreter for the U.S. Army in Iraq. He is suspected of having helped the insurgents during that period.

Because of transliteration problems, some government agencies require subjects to write their name in the native language on paper that is submitted with the report of investigation. Some agencies also require subjects to provide all cell phone numbers and e-mail addresses they have used, along with the time period during which they were used. This facilitates checking against various investigative files.

### **Assimilation of U.S. Values**

The adjudicator often needs to assess the extent to which an individual with a foreign background has assimilated American values.<sup>12</sup> Some research shows that extent of assimilation is associated with length of residence in this country, age at time of immigration, and recency of visits to the homeland.<sup>9</sup> Other factors inevitably also play a role, and if this type of information was not developed during the subject interview, a second interview may be needed.

The adjudicator may need to understand the subject's life story. When did the subject or subject's family come to the United States and why did they come? Useful information might be inferred from the name of the subject's sponsor, any individuals or organizations that assisted the subject's immigration, or the government program under which the subject was allowed entry into the United States.

A person's motivation for coming to the United States may provide insight into the person's attitude toward the native country. Did the person come as a political refugee, to earn money to send back to the family in the homeland, for economic opportunity, and a more comfortable life, or did the entire family immigrate? Has the international situation changed since the person immigrated to the United States. If the person came from what was then a hostile country, is that country now potentially friendly (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia)? If the person came from what was then a friendly

country, is that country now hostile (e.g., Iran)? Such a reversal of political circumstances can increase one's desire to help his or her native country or increase vulnerability to being pressured by that country.

The age at which a person came to this country and how long the person has been in this country affect that person's ability to assimilate new values. The high school years are a formative period in a youth's life. An immigrant who has an American high school education is likely to have assimilated many American values, unless they were discriminated against and came to reject our values. If the first experience in America is for graduate school, or later, the values one learned as a child may be slow to change.

Most older immigrants and their children are well integrated into American society. However, a recent study of Arabic linguists recruited in the United States to support DoD military operations in Iraq found that many were younger immigrants who came from closed immigrant communities and had little real exposure to American life, culture, and values. Prior to being recruited, they had been afraid to attempt to interact outside of the immigrant communities in which they lived. One official who dealt with these linguists stated that "it is a fundamental mistake to assume that because these people live in America they have adopted American values and ideals." Other officials who dealt with these linguists observed that many of them appeared to have mixed loyalties. They felt as if they had "come home" to Iraq. Their primary motive for taking the employment was to be able to go home, and their loyalty to the United States was limited. Many regarded the United States invasion as "God's will," and felt that the United States was there to prepare the country for them to assume leadership positions. Others took the job only for the money, and some were opposed to the U.S. military operation in Iraq. [6](#)

When and why did the subject become a U.S. citizen? Did the subject apply for citizenship as soon as he or she was eligible, or only after some considerable delay? Delay in becoming a citizen may indicate some ambivalence about becoming a U.S. citizen or giving up citizenship of the country of birth. This may affect an individual's ability to commit to total loyalty to the United States under all circumstances. Are there circumstances under which the subject might return to the native country, for example, if there is a change of government, a good job offer, or for retirement?

It can be helpful to know how the subject spends his or her free time. Are the subject's activities rooted in American society in general, or are friends and activities exclusively within a tightly knit immigrant community? This can be a good indicator of the extent to which an individual has adopted American values.

Statements that an individual has made about the country of origin or the United States are of particular interest. This includes any statements that

degrade or devalue America, or that express a desire to eventually return and live in the country of origin.

### **Foreign Travel and Education**

When seeking to identify any potential association with terrorists, detailed information about foreign travel and/or foreign education is particularly important. Training of terrorists is generally provided overseas, so any travel to or near countries where such training is provided may be significant. It should not be written off as "just a tourist trip" or family visit. It is necessary to know the dates and exact purpose of any travel to such areas, especially if the individual is in a higher risk category due to foreign background or if the travel is unusual or out of character for that person.

Any contact with Islamic institutes, language schools, or cultural centers during travel abroad is potentially significant for two reasons. First, attendance at such schools is often used to assess and identify candidates for terrorist training. Second, claimed attendance at such schools is often used as a cover story to conceal attendance at a terrorist training camp. To evaluate such travel, it is necessary to know the individual's teachers, mentors and associates at the institution, how the individual became enrolled, and the specific course of study. It is also necessary to know who paid for the education, where the subject lived, the names of any roommates, and whether the individual has maintained contact with anyone from the institution.

### **Family, Friends, and Associations**

When a subject of investigation has relatives, friends, business associates, or financial interests in any Muslim country, or any non-Muslim country with a militant Muslim minority, it is important to know if any of the subject's contacts are associated with any form of political or extremist activity. The information that adjudicators need to have under these circumstances is discussed under the [Foreign Influence](#) guideline. One way to learn about a subject's vulnerability to pressure from family or friends is to ask if any of the subject's foreign contacts are aware that he or she is employed in a position that requires a U.S. Government security clearance. If so, why are they informed and how do they feel about this? (Ideally, they should not be informed.) If they are not informed, would they approve or disapprove if they found out about it? The answer to this question would provide a useful perspective on the foreign contacts and their potential influence on the subject.

### ***Potential Terrorism Indicators***

Individuals involved in terrorism or subversion sometimes engage in behaviors that are observable by others and give clues to what is going on.

Alert employees and military personnel who recognize and report these clues play a significant role in helping to protect our country against terrorist attacks and other subversive activities. This type of information is sometimes obtained during a personnel security investigation.

This section identifies a number of observable clues, or potential indicators of terrorist activity or support for terrorism. It is limited to indicators that are uniquely applicable to terrorism. They differ from espionage indicators, because the process for becoming a terrorist is usually different from the process for becoming a spy, and the observable behaviors in which the typical terrorist engages are different from the actions of a spy. The *Potential CI Risk Indicators* section of the [Counterintelligence](#) module includes a long list of espionage indicators as well as these terrorism indicators.

These indicators are called “potential” indicators because no single indicator constitutes evidence of terrorism, espionage, or any other unauthorized use of classified or other protected information. Most indicators are what might be called “soft” indicators. That is, each indicator only tells us that something might happen or might already be happening, not that it will happen or actually is happening. Each specific behavior has several possible explanations, and each particular condition or circumstance usually has several possible outcomes. Although a single indicator may have limited significance, it always does indicate that further inquiry may be appropriate to clarify the situation and determine if other indicators are also present.

### **Indicators of Terrorist Preparations**

Although a terrorist might also steal information like a spy, the typical terrorist is engaged in planning, preparing, supporting or executing some violent terrorist action. The range of behaviors that might indicate or reveal terrorist intentions is extremely broad. For example:

- Hani Hanjour, the pilot who flew into the Pentagon in the 9/11 attacks, attracted suspicion when he was in training learning how to fly a commercial jet. When using the flight simulator, he only wanted to fly in the air; he didn't want to practice the takeoff or landing program. (To complete his intended mission, he didn't need to know how to take off or land.) The school manager was also concerned about the fact that although he had a seemingly valid commercial pilot's license, he had only one-tenth the flying hours of a normal student, and he did not speak good English even though English is the global language of pilots. She advised the Federal Aviation Administration of her concerns, but no action was taken. As soon as she learned of the 9/11 attacks, she assumed that Hanjour was probably involved. [13](#)
- The al-Qaida terrorists who planned the three nearly simultaneous bomb explosions in the London subway in July 2005 used large quantities of commonly available materials to manufacture an

explosive called HMDT. The materials were easy to purchase, but the down side of using commonly available materials is that HMDT degrades at room temperature. The terrorists had to keep it refrigerated. To do this, they installed two commercial grade refrigerators in the rundown boarding house where they lived. This was very unusual, so it could have been a tip-off of some highly unusual activity. [14](#)

The following are potential indicators that an individual may be planning, may be aware of others who are planning, or may be motivated to assist in conducting a terrorist attack.

- Statement of intent to commit or threatening to commit a terrorist act, whether serious or supposedly as a “joke,” and regardless of whether or not you think the person intends to carry out the action. (All threats must be taken seriously.)
- Talking knowingly about a future terrorist event, as though the person has inside information about what is going to happen.
- Statements about having a bomb or biological or chemical weapon, about having or getting the materials to make such a device, or about learning how to make or use any such device—when this is unrelated to the person’s job duties.
- Handling, storing, or tracking hazardous materials in a manner that puts these materials at risk.
- Collection of unclassified information that might be useful to someone planning a terrorist attack, e.g., pipeline locations, airport control procedures, building plans, etc. when this is unrelated to the person’s job or other known interests.
- Physical surveillance (photography, videotaping, taking notes on patterns of activity at various times) of any site that is a potential target for terrorist attack (including but not limited to any building of symbolic importance to the government or economy, large public gathering, transportation center, bridge, power plant or line, or communication center).
- Deliberate probing of security responses, such as deliberately causing a false alarm, faked accidental entry to an unauthorized area, or other suspicious activity designed to test security responses without prior authorization.
- Possessing or seeking items that may be useful for a terrorist but are inconsistent with the person’s known hobbies or job requirements, such as: explosives, uniforms (to pose as police officer, security guard, airline employee), high-powered weapons, books and literature on how to make explosive, biological, chemical, or nuclear devices, multiple or fraudulent identification documents.

## **Indicators of Support for Terrorism**

As compared with espionage, which is usually conducted by individuals working alone, a terrorist attack is usually a group activity conducted by a small, clandestine cell which is often loosely associated with a larger network or organized group. Therefore, support for terrorism is most often indicated by an individual's association with known extremists, by certain public actions or Internet use, and/or by expressed support for a terrorist ideology.

Any support or advocacy of terrorism, or association or sympathy with persons or organizations that are promoting or threatening the use of force or violence, is a concern even if the individual is not directly involved in planning a terrorist attack. Any support of militant jihadist ideology is a particular concern.

- Knowing membership in, or attempt to conceal membership in, any group which: (1) advocates the use of force or violence to achieve political goals, (2) has been identified as a front group for foreign interests, or (3) advocates loyalty to a foreign interest over loyalty to the U.S. Government.
- Distribution of extremist publications or posting information on the Internet, including e-mail and on-line discussions, which support the militant jihadist ideology of holy war against the West. Frequent viewing of web sites that promote extremist or violent activity (unless this is part of one's job or academic study).
- Financial contribution to a charity or other foreign cause linked to support for a terrorist organization.
- Unexplained, or inadequately explained, travel to an area associated with terrorism or U.S. military action.
- Statements of support for the militant jihadist ideology of holy war against the West, such as:
  - Militant jihad against the West is a religious duty before God and, therefore, necessary for the salvation of one's soul. Peaceful existence with the West is a dangerous illusion. Only two camps exist. There can be no middle ground in an apocalyptic showdown between Islam and the forces of evil.
  - The separation of church and state is a sin. Democratic laws are illegitimate and sinful, because they are "man-made" laws expressing the will of the electorate rather than God. The only true law is Sharia, the law sent down by God, which governs not only religious rituals but many aspects of day-to-day life.
  - Muslim governments that cooperate with the West and that have not imposed Sharia (Islamic) law are religiously unacceptable and must be violently overthrown.
- Statements of support for suicide bombers even though they kill innocent bystanders.

- Statements of support for violence against U.S. military forces either at home or deployed abroad.
- Statements of belief that the U.S. Government is engaged in a crusade against Islam.
- For U.S. military personnel only: Any action that advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces of the United States.

## ***Association with Terrorist Organizations***

The Department of State is required by law to provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism. Each annual report includes information on about 40 organizations that the Secretary of State has officially designated as foreign terrorist organizations. That designation means it is against the law for any American to provide funds or other material support to any of these organizations. This report also has information on many other smaller terrorist groups that are relevant to the global war on terrorism but are not on the official list of designated foreign terrorist organizations. Over time, variants of these groups sometimes dissolve and reassemble under different names. Many of these organizations, but certainly not all of them, are part of the global jihad. The most recent of the *Country Reports on Terrorism* is available on the State Department web site at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>

All subjects of personnel security investigations are typically asked if they have ever belonged to any group or attended any meeting or gathering where violence against the United States, its government, its facilities and/or its citizens has ever been advocated, discussed, planned, encouraged, or endorsed in any way. This type of association is usually adjudicated under the [Allegiance to the United States](#) guideline.

Membership in, or willful association or support for, any foreign or domestic terrorist organization or group is potentially disqualifying even if the subject has not participated in specific illegal actions. Denial or revocation of clearance based on membership alone would require evidence that the subject joined the group "knowingly" and "advocated" or "participated" in its activities.

If the organization engages in illegal activities, the key questions that need to be resolved during adjudication are: Was the subject aware at the time of joining the organization that its activity may be against the law? Did the subject help to advocate, fund, plan, organize, advertise, or participate in these unlawful activities? These distinctions are important because some organizations recruit members through broad appeals to furthering peace or social welfare. It may take a while before a new member understands the full extent or significance of the group's activities. Many front organizations have two agendas: a lawful and open agenda for the members and the public to

see, and a hidden agenda known only to the leadership. The lawful agenda may be used to raise funds and spot candidates to assist with the hidden agenda.

To fully assess the significance of an individual's association with or membership in an extremist group or organization that may be associated with terrorism (or violate Defense Department policy for military personnel), the adjudicator needs to have information such as the following:

- When, why, and under what circumstances the subject first became associated with or started contributing to the organization or activity.
- The inclusive dates and extent of affiliation (offices held; participation in meetings, demonstrations, parades, and/or social events; distribution of literature or subscription to literature; financial or material support; etc.). Was the subject ever asked to participate in or support any act or activity which may have violated the law?
- Whether the subject was aware, or should have been aware, that the organization's interests were unlawful. If subject was originally not aware of the unlawful nature of the activities, when and how did subject become aware and what did subject do then?
- Whether the subject received any training, especially training in paramilitary operations, weapons, explosives, or the casing of targets.
- If the subject claims any mitigating factors (e.g., he or she was not aware of the unlawful aims of the organization or activity, did not participate in the unlawful part of an organizations' activities, or joined only to write a school paper about the organization), the subject should be asked to identify sources who can confirm his or her account. Investigation should then seek to verify this story.

In the event of uncertainty, the case should be referred for legal and/or counterintelligence review. The bottom line should be a common sense, whole-person decision on whether access to classified information "is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security" and meets the other requirements of Section 3.1.(b) of Executive Order 12968.

### **Rules for Military Personnel**

Military personnel are held to a stricter standard of allegiance. Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits military personnel from uttering statements or taking other actions with the intent to promote disloyalty or disaffection among troops, such as praising the enemy, attacking the war aims of the United States, or otherwise denouncing the U.S. Government. Article 134 applies to the public utterance of such statements, not to the fact that the member privately holds controversial views.

DoD Directive 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," prohibits the following types of activities. The actions commanders take are discretionary, based on their perceptions of the impact of the prohibited conduct on their units.

- Actual or intended distribution through unofficial channels of publications that pose a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of their units.
- Visiting establishments that have been deemed off limits because activities taking place there may include counseling members to refuse to perform duty or to desert; pose a significant adverse effect on Service members' health, morale, or welfare; or otherwise present a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of a member or military unit.
- Publishing underground newspapers during duty hours or using U.S. government property or publishing publications off-duty that contain language punishable under federal law.
- Demonstration or activity on the installation or facility that could result in interference with or prevention of orderly accomplishment of the mission of the installation or facility, or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale of the troops.
- Participation in off-post demonstrations when soldiers are on duty, in a foreign country, when their activities constitute a breach of law and order, when violence is likely to result, or when they are in uniform in violation of DoD Directive 1334.1 (reference (d)).
- Participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocate the use of force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund-raising, recruiting and training members, organizing or leading such organizations, or otherwise engaging in activities in relation to such organizations or in furtherance of the objectives of such organizations that are viewed by command to be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the unit, is incompatible with military service, and is, therefore, prohibited.

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## ***Ali Mohamed Case Summary***

Ali Mohamed has an almost unbelievable resume: Major in the Egyptian Army Special Forces, then Sergeant in the U.S. Army Special Forces at Fort Bragg, long-time al-Qaida operative and trainer of terrorists who bombed the New York World Trade Center, chief of security for Osama bin Laden, CIA agent, FBI informant, and applicant for a Department of Defense security clearance. In addition to being a fascinating tale of intrigue and deception, the Ali Mohamed story has important lessons about vulnerabilities in the personnel security system.

### **Background**

Ali Abdelseoud Mohamed was born in Egypt in 1952. He received a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Alexandria. In testimony after his arrest in 1998, he claimed to have two bachelor's degrees and a master's degree – one of them perhaps from his two years of training at the Egyptian military academy. He joined the Egyptian Army in 1970 or 1971 and rose to the rank of Major in the Special Forces.[1](#)

In 1981, the Egyptian Army sent Mohamed to Fort Bragg for 4 months' training with the U.S. Special Forces. Working alongside Green Berets, he learned unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and how to command elite soldiers on difficult missions.[2,3](#) After that, he returned to Egypt and served in the Egyptian Army until 1984, when he left to work as a counterterrorism expert for EgyptAir.

Also in 1981, the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, was assassinated, largely because he had concluded peace negotiations with Israel. He was assassinated by members of Mohamed's Special Forces unit who were associated with the fundamentalist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad, of which Mohamed was also a member.[1](#) Since Mohamed was in Fort Bragg at the time, he was not directly involved with the assassination and avoided arrest by Egyptian authorities.[3](#) It is noteworthy, however, that the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad at this time was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was Mohamed's spiritual mentor. Later, Egyptian Islamic Jihad gradually merged with al-Qaida, and al-Zawahiri introduced Mohamed to Osama bin Laden. Today, al-Zawahiri is Osama bin Laden's right-hand man in hiding.[4](#)

After leaving the Egyptian Army in 1984, Mohamed volunteered his services to the CIA. This was a time when CIA was stepping up its operations against Muslim militants. Terrorists had bombed the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983. In March 1984, terrorists linked to Iran-backed Hezbollah kidnapped William F. Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut. It is not known whether Mohamed contacted CIA on his own initiative or on

instructions from Egyptian Islamic Jihad to penetrate CIA operations, but the latter explanation appears more likely.

CIA tasked Mohamed to go to Germany and establish contact with the Hezbollah, but within weeks discovered he had told the Hezbollah operatives he was a CIA agent. Thus, CIA considered him untrustworthy. Thinking he might try to reenter the United States, they put Mohamed on the State Department Watch List, which should have prevented him from obtaining a visa. CIA also warned other government agencies about him.[1](#), [5](#), [6](#)

## **Immigration to the United States**

In the early to mid-1980s, Mohamed's mentor and head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zawahiri, decided to send "sleeper agents" to the United States.[5](#) A sleeper agent is an agent who is planted in a target country or organization but remains inactive until needed for a mission. In 1985, Mohamed did immigrate to the United States as CIA had suspected he would, and it is reasonable to assume that he was at that time an agent for al-Zawahiri. The American Embassy in Cairo issued him a visa even though he was on their Watch List, perhaps because of confusion in the spelling of his name. There are many different ways to transliterate the Arabic name Mohamed into English. [7](#), [8](#)

Mohamed arrived in the United States in September 1985. On the flight to New York he met a divorcee returning from a vacation in Greece to her home in Santa Clara, CA. Within a few days after his arrival in New York, Mohamed phoned her and then came to Santa Clara. After a six-week courtship, they were married in Reno. With an American wife, he could get a green card and then become a naturalized citizen, an obvious goal for a sleeper agent. Although they lived apart for long periods, she remained loyal, corresponding with Mohamed and visiting him in prison after his arrest in 1998.[13](#)

In early 1986, Khalid Abu-al-Dahab, whom Mohamed had recruited into Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1984, arrived in America. Dahab was from a wealthy family and had been a medical student in Alexandria. He came to the United States on a student visa ostensibly to study medicine, and Mohamed helped him get settled in Santa Clara. Within weeks, he too married an American woman he met through Mohamed's wife, thus obtaining a green card for permanent residence in the United States.[12](#)

## **New Career in U.S. Army**

Mohamed described himself to his wife's friends as a former Egyptian Army officer who hoped to do intelligence work for the United States.[13](#) After having difficulty finding a job, this 34-year-old former Major, who was well educated and spoke Arabic, Hebrew, French and English, enlisted as a regular soldier in the U.S. Army in 1986. He was assigned to the U.S. Army

Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, home of the Green Berets and Delta Force (counterterrorism squad). This is the same place where, five years earlier as an Egyptian Army officer, Mohamed had trained for 4 months. Though officially a supply sergeant, he spent much of his time teaching soldiers about the Middle East in the JFK Special Operations Warfare School. As a naturalized citizen married to an American, Mohamed was eligible for and received a security clearance at the Secret level.<sup>9</sup>

Mohamed was extremely outspoken about being a fundamentalist Muslim. His commanding officer, Lt. Col. Robert Anderson, recalls Mohamed supporting the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. He said Sadat was "a traitor and he had to die."<sup>1</sup> In 1988, Mohamed informed Anderson that he was using his leave to fight in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. The Afghan war began in 1979 and ended 10 years later; during this time the United States was providing covert funding and military assistance to the mujihadeen, the Muslim guerilla force fighting the Russians.

Assisting the mujihadeen was consistent with U.S. policy at that time, but it was so irregular for an American soldier to fight in a foreign war without authorization that Anderson submitted a report to his supervisors two weeks before Mohamed departed. Anderson told Mohamed not to go, but Mohamed replied that he was going and planned to circumvent the Army's restrictions by flying to Paris on his American passport and then use other documents to travel to Afghanistan. <sup>6</sup>

When Mohamed returned a month later, he boasted of killing two Russian special forces soldiers and brought back their belts as souvenirs, giving one of them to Anderson. Anderson viewed Mohamed as a dangerous fanatic and thought Mohamed should be court-martialed and deported. He submitted a second report, but, like after the first report, got no response. To Anderson, the lack of reaction to his two reports was so incredible that he decided Mohamed must be sponsored by a U.S. intelligence service, probably CIA. <sup>7</sup>

However, not everyone agreed with Anderson. The director of Middle East studies at the Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, believed in Mohamed's loyalty. The director described Mohamed as "in many, many ways as loyal a soldier as you'd find coming off the farm in the Carolinas or out of New York City." <sup>6</sup>

In retrospect, we now know that Lt. Col. Anderson was correct. During the period 1988-89, Mohamed did betray his new country. While serving in the Army at Fort Bragg, he traveled on weekends to Jersey City, NJ, and to Connecticut to train other Islamic fundamentalists in surveillance, weapons and explosives. His trainees were so impressed with Mohamed's assimilation of American culture that they dubbed him "Abu Mohamed ali Amriki" -- Mohamed the American.<sup>1</sup> Telephone records show that while at Fort Bragg and later, Mohamed maintained a very close and active relationship with the Office of Services of the Mujihadeen, in Brooklyn, which at that time was

recruiting volunteers and soliciting funds for the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> This was the main recruitment center for the network that, after the Soviets left Afghanistan, became known as al-Qaida.

Mohamed was honorably discharged in November 1989, ironically with a commendation for patriotism, valor, fidelity, and professional excellence. The terrorists Mohamed trained went on to conduct terrorist actions in New York.

### **Contacts with the FBI, 1989 - 1994**

This section discusses what is known about Mohamed's connections with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies during the period 1989 to 1994. The following section describes what Mohamed was doing for al-Qaida during the same time period.

The FBI observed and photographed Mohamed giving weapons training to a group of New York area residents during four successive weekends in July 1989. They drove from the Farouq Mosque in Brooklyn to a shooting range in Calverton, Long Island, and they fired AK-47 assault rifles, semiautomatic handguns and revolvers during what appeared to be training sessions. For reasons that are unknown, the FBI then ceased its surveillance of the group. Peter Lance, author of *1000 Years for Revenge*, a book about international terrorism and the beginnings of al-Qaida, contends that the FBI failed to recognize that it was seeing the beginnings of a terrorist network whose members were later involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, plots to bomb bridges and tunnels, and the attacks of September 11.<sup>9</sup>

Investigative journalists who have written about this case believe Mohamed became an FBI informant in the early 1990s, but how early is not known. The most likely date seems to be some time in 1993.<sup>2,6</sup> According to Larry C. Johnson, a former deputy director in the State Department Office of Counterterrorism and a former CIA employee, Mohamed was "clearly a double agent.... It's possible that the FBI thought they had control of him and were trying to use him, but what's clear is that they did not have control.... The FBI assumed he was their source, but his loyalties lay elsewhere."<sup>7</sup>

One of the terrorists that Mohamed trained was el Sayyid Nosair, who in 1990 shot and killed Meir Kahane, an ultra-Zionist rabbi who headed the militant Jewish Defense League, after he spoke at a public meeting in New York. Nosair had immigrated to the America from Egypt in 1981.<sup>10</sup> This was the first al-Qaida-related terrorist attack in the United States.

In a search of Nosair's home, the police found U.S. Army training manuals, videotaped talks that Mohamed delivered at the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, operational plans for joint coalition exercises conducted in Egypt, and other materials marked Classified or Top Secret.<sup>1</sup> These documents belonged to Mohamed, who often stayed in New Jersey with

Nosair. The documents did not surface during Nosair's 1991 trial for the Kahane murder. It is not known if the FBI investigated Mohamed in connection with these documents. However, it is logical to assume that some action would be taken after classified documents associated with Mohamed were found in Nosair's apartment. This could have been the first time that Mohamed provided information to the FBI in order to buy protection for his own activities.

In 1992, Mohamed was detained by authorities at the airport in Rome, Italy. His luggage aroused suspicion as it had false compartments. Mohamed assured his interrogators that he was on their side in the war on terrorism, and claimed he was involved in security for the Summer Olympics in Spain.<sup>6</sup> Mohamed had a classified Defense Intelligence Agency document in his possession, and Italian authorities reported this to U.S. authorities. <sup>16</sup>

In early 1993, Mohamed was detained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) at the Vancouver, Canada, airport. He had come to the airport to meet an Egyptian who had arrived from Damascus but was found to be carrying two forged Saudi passports. When Mohamed was about to be arrested as well, he told the RCMP he was collaborating with the FBI and gave them a name and phone number to call to confirm this. The RCMP made the call and Mohamed was released immediately at the request of the FBI.<sup>11</sup> When the FBI subsequently questioned Mohamed about this incident, he offered information about a ring in California that was selling counterfeit documents to smugglers of illegal aliens.<sup>6</sup> This is the earliest hard evidence that is publicly available of Mohamed being an FBI informant.

September 11, 2001, was not the first time the New York World Trade Center was attacked by al-Qaida. In February 1993, the terrorist cell that Mohamed had trained exploded a truck bomb under the World Trade Center that killed six and injured about 1,000 persons. The perpetrators of this bombing included people Mohamed had trained, and Mohamed had been in close contact with the cell during the period leading up to the bombing. Mohamed's name appeared on a list of 118 potential un-indicted co-conspirators that was prepared by federal prosecutors.

Some time after the World Trade Center bombing, Mohamed went to the Sudan to work with bin Laden. In late 1994, while he was in Africa, Mohamed received a phone call from an FBI agent who said he wanted to speak with Mohamed about the upcoming trial of the World Trade Center bombers. Mohamed flew back to the United States and spoke with the FBI. After talking with the FBI, Mohamed was subpoenaed to testify at the upcoming trial, but was not called despite intense interest in his testimony by defense lawyers. He was also not arrested.<sup>5</sup> Some years later, after he was arrested, Mohamed testified that in speaking with the FBI he "did not disclose everything I knew" at that time about the World Trade Center bombing. <sup>14</sup>

According to government officials interviewed by one journalist, the relationship with the FBI gave Mohamed a de facto shield effectively insulating him from FBI scrutiny for his ties to bin Laden. The relationship also helped protect Mohamed from being scrutinized by other federal agencies. [2](#)

### **Working for al-Qaida, 1989 - 1994**

By 1989, Ayman al-Zawahiri's militant wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad was cooperating closely with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida. This section discusses Mohamed's work for al-Qaida during the period 1989 through 1994. As noted above, he was an FBI informant during at least the latter part of this period. Mohamed's U.S. passport and residence gave him a safe base from which to travel around the world on behalf of bin Laden. He continued his terrorist activities, shuttling between California, Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia and at least a dozen other countries. Much of the information about this period comes from Mohamed's own testimony after his arrest in 1999.

After his discharge from the Army in 1989, Mohamed moved back to Santa Clara, CA, his wife's home town. At that time, Mohamed established a base of operations together with his friend and fellow Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Khalid Abu-al-Dahab.

Beginning in 1990, El-Dahab's apartment was an important communications hub for al-Qaida and Islamic Jihad cells all over the world. For much of the 1990's, the Egyptian government cut direct phone links from Egypt to countries like Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan or Pakistan in an effort to disrupt communications between radical militants. One could phone from Egypt to America, however, so Dahab acted as a telephone operator for the Islamic Jihad network, using a three-way calling feature to connect operatives in far-flung countries. [12](#)

In 1991, after the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, Mohammed went to Afghanistan, met Osama bin Laden, and helped move bin Laden's operation from Afghanistan to Sudan. In 1992, he conducted military and basic explosives training for al-Qaida in Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> He also taught terrorists how to create cell structures that preserve secrecy and how to move undercover in Western countries. [1](#)

Mohamed set up a cell in Nairobi to support al-Qaida's activities in Somalia, a country in which the government had collapsed and opposing clans were fighting each other. The United States sent troops to Somalia to bring food to the starving population and try to pacify the country. Mohamed trained Somali clansmen in the months prior to the October 1993 gun battle that has been immortalized in the book and movie *Black Hawk Down*. [1,14](#) Two U.S. helicopters were shot down and 18 U.S. soldiers lost their lives in that battle.

Bin Laden sent Mohamed to Nairobi in late 1993 to surveil American, British, French, and Israeli targets there. The goal was to select targets to retaliate against the United States for its involvement in Somalia. He went to Djibouti on the same type of mission in 1994.[14](#) Also in 1994, bin Laden reportedly sent Mohamed to Algeria to bribe Algerian officials to free an accused terrorist from jail.[15](#)

After an attempted assassination of bin Laden in 1994, Mohamed went to Sudan to train bin Laden's bodyguards. He trained those responsible for security of the interior of the compound, while Sudanese intelligence personnel were responsible for external security. He also did surveillance training for al-Quida.[14](#)

### **Application for Security Clearance**

In 1995, Westinghouse Electric Corp. in Sunnyvale, CA, submitted Mohamed for a Secret clearance. He was, at that time, working as a security guard at the front gate and needed a Secret clearance to conduct other duties. The application revealed certain financial and credit issues, so an interim clearance was denied and a Santa Clara DSS investigator was assigned to conduct investigative interviews.[16](#)

The investigator discovered, on examining Mohamed's military discharge papers, that Mohamed had exaggerated his role in the Army. Also, Mohamed's supervisor at Westinghouse told the investigator that Mohamed had told her that he had some type of affiliation with the FBI. This was interesting, because the previous National Agency Check (NAC) of FBI files had come back with no negative information.

The DSS investigator brought the reported FBI connection to his supervisor. The Santa Clara DSS office maintained a cooperative relationship with the local FBI office, so the investigator's supervisor called the FBI CI office in Palo Alto, which then called the counterterrorism office in San Francisco. It was at this point that the investigator learned the FBI had information about Mohamed that they were unwilling to disclose. The FBI did advise, however, that they had no active investigation of Mohamed at that time, but that the Egyptian government suspected Mohamed of being involved in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. The FBI asked the investigator to continue his investigation and provide the FBI with the results.

The investigator then conducted a subject interview with Mohamed that focused on foreign connections. During two subsequent interviews, Mohamed made no admission of terrorist activity, but the investigator was suspicious of his account and asked if he would be willing to take a polygraph test. Surprisingly, Mohamed agreed immediately. During this December 1995 test, Mohamed admitted to terrorist activity against Israel but not against the United States. When he failed the polygraph, DSS denied the clearance. [16](#)

While the clearance was in process, there were times when Mohamed would call in to work and say he was sick, and no one knew where he was.<sup>16</sup> Apparently he continued to travel on missions for al-Qaida during this period.

### **From 1996 to Arrest and Trial**

In May 1996, various circumstances including U.S. diplomatic pressure prompted the Sudanese government to require bin Laden and his entourage of about 150 men, women, and children to leave Sudan. Mohamed was called in to manage security for the move back to Afghanistan.

At some point after bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan, Mohamed and his friend Dahab traveled to Afghanistan to report to bin Laden on their success in recruiting 10 Americans. Bin Laden praised their efforts and emphasized the necessity of recruiting as many Muslims with American citizenship as possible. He wanted to be able to use their American passports to facilitate international travel by al-Qaida personnel. In 1995, Mohamed and Dahab had provided a fake passport and identity documents to al-Zawahiri when he came to the United States for a covert fund-raising tour. He reportedly raised about \$500,000, part of which financed the subsequent bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan in November of that year. This information comes from Dahab's confession after he was arrested in Egypt in 1998. <sup>12</sup>

After DSS denied his clearance, Mohamed went back to Africa and played a central role in planning the bombing of U.S. Embassies in East Africa.<sup>1</sup> In August 1998, Mohamed's al-Qaida associates succeeded in blowing up our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and injuring 4,500.

Two weeks after the Africa bombings, FBI agents entered Mohamed's apartment in Sacramento, CA, where he then lived, and found evidence of terrorist activities. After the bombings, Mohamed arranged to go back to Egypt and then Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden. Before he could leave, however, Mohamed was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury on September 10, 1998, and was arrested the same day as he planned to leave the country and fly to Egypt. Mohamed later admitted that he lied during the grand jury appearance.<sup>14</sup>

Mohamed's arrest was kept secret for eight months. No one knows exactly why, but the conventional wisdom is that prosecutors were trying to cut a deal. That apparently failed as the government indicted him in May 1999 along with four other suspects in the embassy bombings. He was handled differently from the other prisoners, remaining in solitary confinement after the others were allowed to rotate as cellmates. <sup>5, 8</sup>

In preparation for Mohamed's trial, the FBI investigator contacted the DSS investigator to arrange for the DSS polygraph operator who tested Mohamed to appear as a witness at the trial. Two days before the trial, the FBI called to advise that this testimony was no longer needed as Mohamed had agreed to

plead guilty and was going to receive a life sentence without parole.<sup>16</sup> Mohamed and the government struck a deal on October 13, 2000, in which Mohamed pled guilty to five counts of conspiracy.<sup>14</sup> He admitted to all the information described above concerning his al-Qaida activities from 1990 to 1994 and his role in planning the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania.

The trial of others involved in the embassy bombings began in January 2001. Mohamed had been expected to be a key government witness against his four co-conspirators, but—for reasons unknown—he never took the stand.<sup>8</sup>

Larry Johnson, the former State Department counterterrorism official, reportedly believes the government kept Mohamed off the stand because his testimony would have unearthed material extremely embarrassing to the government.<sup>1</sup> Mohamed's plea agreement with the government remains secret. As far as we can determine, there has been no public announcement of his sentence. There is speculation that he disappeared into a witness protection program.<sup>3</sup> According to the DSS investigator, however, Mohamed is presently serving a life sentence without possibility of parole.<sup>16</sup>

### **Reflections on Ali Mohamed as a Person**

One journalist who specializes in reporting on terrorist activities says that those who knew Ali Mohamed regarded him “with fear and awe for his incredible self-confidence, his inability to be intimidated, absolute ruthless determination to destroy the enemies of Islam, and his zealous belief in the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism.”<sup>2</sup> Another source close to Mohamed described him as “quiet, easy-going,” but “very charismatic.” To another source familiar with Mohamed's life in Egypt, his enlistment in the U.S. Army and subsequent overtures to FBI and CIA were not a surprise. “He just liked that kind of stuff—the danger, the intrigue. That's what he did in Egypt for 20 years.”<sup>3</sup>

An example of Mohamed's self-confidence was his immediate willingness to take a polygraph test on the occasion of his 1995 application for a security clearance. The DSS investigators believe he accepted with enthusiasm what he perceived as the challenge of participating in such a test. In the end, this self-confidence was mistaken, for he failed the test and did not receive a clearance.

A fellow soldier who was in training with Mohamed for three months described him as quiet, but with a ferocious temper and very religious. During training, Mohamed constantly compared the U.S. military with the Egyptian military, and always found the American military wanting. It seemed weird for Mohamed to be in the enlisted ranks when he had so much training, and it also seemed odd for him to be in the U.S. military and have so much hate toward the United States. He never referred to America as his country.<sup>1</sup>

## Lessons Learned

From a personnel security perspective, the Mohamed case offers several lessons. The first is how easy it is for a personnel security investigation to miss a huge amount of very relevant adverse information about terrorist activity. If Mohamed had not had minor credit problems, he would have been granted a Secret clearance with no questions asked.

Thanks to the credit issue, investigative interviews were required, and one interview determined that Mohamed had once mentioned to his supervisor that he had some affiliation with the FBI. A less conscientious investigator, or an investigator under pressure to work faster to reduce a backlog of investigations, might have limited the investigation to the identified credit issue, or might have assumed that an "affiliation" with the FBI was favorable and not even reported it. It was only because the DSS investigators in the case took the initiative to discuss the case with their office supervisor, and the office had cultivated good relations with the local FBI office, that the story of Ali Mohamed began to unravel. [16](#)

Today, with concern focused on the terrorist threat, local FBI offices and other law enforcement agencies are increasingly developing and indexing intelligence and investigative records on elements of the local Muslim community whose sympathies are questionable. These intelligence and investigative files may show, for example, if the subject of investigation is suspected of terrorist associations or sympathies, associates with persons who are under suspicion, or if the individual has attended "religious" education classes conducted by a radical fundamentalist. There are, however, still pitfalls that might cause such information to not be reported in response to a NAC. Confusion in the spelling of Arabic names is one problem. Another is the burden of additional work required when the FBI record does not have a positive identifier such as date of birth or Social Security number. On some occasions, withholding of information may be required for protection of the FBI source.

The Mohamed case also shows how easily even a top-level terrorist can operate in the United States. Presumably that is more difficult now than when Mohamed was active. However, the story of Mohamed's dual roles as bin Laden terrorist and FBI informant illustrates the problems still facing U.S. intelligence services as they attempt to penetrate terrorist groups in the United States and abroad.

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## ***Other Case Summaries***

### **Introduction**

The following five cases have been selected from among many to show the variety of terrorist cases that might be encountered during the course of the personnel security process. Two were Muslim immigrants to the United States; two were native-born Americans who converted to Islam (one white, one black); and one involves a group of second or third generation Americans who grew up in a Muslim community in New York.

Almaliki Nour gained American citizenship under a false identity, worked as a linguist for an intelligence unit of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, and there are open questions about his true identity and what damage he may or may not have caused. Sgt. Hasan Akbar is a black convert to Islam who tried to kill as many members of his military unit as possible as they were getting ready to move into Iraq. The Lackawanna Six are Americans of Yemeni heritage from upper New York state who were recruited by an al-Qaida operative to train for jihad in Afghanistan. Lyman Faris fought with the mujihadeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan; after immigration to America, this Ohio truck driver was recruited by al-Qaida and tasked to assist in destroying the Brooklyn Bridge and causing a train wreck near Washington. Ryan Anderson, a white convert to Islam, was a tank ammunitions loader in the Army National Guard; he worked the Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards seeking contact with al-Qaida so he could explain how to damage the M1A1 Abrams tank and kill more American soldiers.

### **Almaliki Nour -False Identity**

The case of Almaliki Nour (aka Nouredine Malki) illustrates the difficulties involved in conducting security checks on individuals who have lived significant portions of their lives outside the United States. U.S. agencies are currently attempting to increase foreign language capacity by hiring naturalized citizens or other Americans who are native speakers of foreign languages, but for those who grew up abroad, their backgrounds are not easy to check. [1](#)

Almaliki Nour claimed to have been born in December, 1960, in Beirut, that he had never been married, and that his parents had been killed in Beirut when his family's house was shelled during the civil war there in the early 1980s.[1](#) He claimed to have fled Lebanon to escape religious persecution there because his mother was Roman Catholic and his father Muslim. He went first to Jordan, then to Canada before crossing illegally into the United States. He applied for political asylum in 1989, was granted permanent resident status in 1993 through an Immigration & Naturalization Service amnesty program, and became a naturalized citizen in Brooklyn, NY, on February 18, 2000. [2](#), [3](#)

Nour started work in August 2003 for a defense contractor, Titan Corporation, which provides the Army with about 4,000 Arabic language interpreters in Iraq. He received a security clearance and was assigned as a civilian translator and interpreter for an intelligence unit of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq. He worked in Iraq for two years. [2](#)

Apparently in response to security concerns, the FBI and military investigators interviewed Nour in Iraq in September 2005.[2](#) He was subsequently arrested, held without bail, and charged on October 17, 2005, in Brooklyn, NY, with lying to federal officials from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Department of Defense (DoD), and FBI on three occasions: his application for naturalization in 1998, his application for a security clearance in 2003, and in the September 2005 interviews. [1](#)

He was charged as FNU LNU -- First Name Unknown and Last Name Unknown -- because he had at various times used the names Abu Hakim, Almalik Nour Eddin, and Nouredine Malki, as well as the name Nour Almalik that is on his citizenship papers. After his arrest, he claimed his true identity to be Nouredine Malki, born in Morocco in November 1959, with a wife and parents still living in Morocco. Some Morocco connection appears to be confirmed by a Moroccan power of attorney found in searching his apartment and records that he wired large sums of money -- equivalent to one year's salary -- to a woman in Morocco believed to be his wife. [1](#), [3](#)

The search of Nour aka Malki's apartment also found a thick, classified document containing "detailed information about the insurgency [in Iraq] and the means for combating it." Monitoring of his telephone identified about 100 calls to numbers in Iraq that have been connected to the insurgency there,

including numbers that had been found in safe houses that may have been used by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaida's Iraq operations. [2](#)

Nour aka Malki has not been charged with terrorism or espionage, but he has also not yet been tried or sentenced for falsification of his identity, and there has been no announcement of his status since shortly after his arrest. It seems reasonable to conclude that investigation of this case, and the damage Nour aka Malki may have caused, might be ongoing.

### **Sgt. Hasan Akbar - Grenade Thrower**

Hasan Akbar (also spelled Asan Akbar) was arrested and convicted for a hand grenade and shooting attack that killed two U.S. officers and wounded 14 soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. The attack took place March 23, 2003, at a rear base camp, Camp Pennsylvania, in Kuwait. Akbar took grenades from a humvee he was guarding and threw them into a tent in the early morning when the majority of troops were sleeping. He also fired his rifle during the chaos that followed the grenade explosions.[4](#) The 101st was preparing to move into Iraq in support of the U.S. invasion when the incident occurred.

Akbar is an African-American who was born in 1971 and grew up largely in California. Originally named Mark Fidel Kools, his mother began calling him Hasan Karim Akbar when he was a boy after she converted to Islam and remarried. He was an A student in high school in Los Angeles.[5](#) He enrolled as Mark Kools at the University of California at Davis in 1988, where he participated in the Muslim Student Association. He enrolled in a joint major, aeronautical and mechanical engineering. It took him 9 years to finish his joint degree, because he drifted in and out of school, stopping and starting classes.[6](#) He graduated as Hasan Akbar in September 1997, having legally changed his name sometime during the 9-year period.[5](#) That year he enrolled in a Reserve Officers' Training Corps program, but left with the rank of sergeant, not lieutenant, as might have been expected. [6](#)

When asked why he committed the attack, Akbar said, "I did it because I'm Muslim. They were going to kill Muslims and rape Muslim women."[7](#) He also told his mother that he thought he was discriminated against because he was a Muslim.[8](#) Akbar was known to have an attitude problem, and just before the incident, he had been reprimanded for insubordination. In fact, his superiors were sufficiently alarmed about his attitude that they told him he would be left behind in Kuwait when his unit moved out to Iraq.[9](#) After the attack, Akbar's diary was found to have a notation that said, "I am going to try to kill as many of them as possible." [10](#)

Akbar was convicted by a military court martial on April 21, 2005, on two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted premeditated murder. The following week the court sentenced Akbar to death, a sentence that has been appealed. [4](#)

## Lackawanna Six - Terrorist Cell

The once-prosperous town of Lackawanna, just outside Buffalo, NY, used to be home to the world's largest steel works. Since Bethlehem Steel closed its plant in the 1980s, the area has become run down and many residents struggle to support themselves and their families. Of a population of some 19,000, at least 3,000 are Muslim Americans whose parents or grandparents immigrated from Yemen, attracted many years ago by the prospect of work in the mills. Many children and grandchildren of these original immigrants were born and raised in Lackawanna. [11](#)

Today, Lackawanna is known for its terrorist cell. Six young men from the town were arrested in September 2002 and charged with providing "material support or resources to designated terrorist organizations." They were not charged with actively engaging in any terrorist plot. Five of the six were born and raised in Lackawanna. They were educated in local public schools, captained soccer teams, and several had wives and children. [12](#)

The story of how these individuals found themselves in this position starts in 1998 when Kamal Derwish, born in Buffalo but raised in Saudi Arabia and steeped in that country's fundamentalist brand of Islam, came to Lackawanna and began giving informal talks between nighttime and evening prayers at the local mosque. He attracted a core group of followers with whom he also met in one of the members' home. This is the standard al-Qaida recruitment *modus operandi*. In early 2001, Juma al-Dosari, a charismatic preacher, also spoke at the Lackawanna mosque, although his militant tone resulted in his not being invited back.

After Derwish told this core group that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to defend their Muslim brothers, seven friends decided to travel in Spring 2001 to train for jihad in Afghanistan. Their cover story for family and friends was that they were going to Pakistan to study at a religious school as part of a quest for their Islamic faith. [12](#)

Only six actually made the trip. They were met in Pakistan by Derwish who took them to the Al Farooq training camp in Afghanistan. Here they trained in the use of automatic weapons, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and explosives. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, visited the camp. After the would-be terrorists left the United States, someone in Lackawanna's Yemeni community sent an anonymous letter to the FBI saying that a group has traveled to "meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for training...I can not give you my name because I fear for my life." [12](#)

The conditions and training at the camp were harsh, and only two of the group of six finished the 6-week course: the rest were allowed to return home early. One member of the group, Sahim Alwan, realized he was in over his head after only 10 days and feigned an ankle injury in order to return

home. He was interviewed by Osama bin Laden before he left, which was only a few months before the 9/11 attacks, and was asked, among other things, what he thought about martyrdom operations (suicide missions). On arrival home, Alwan was interviewed by the FBI but maintained the cover story that the group had gone for religious training. By the end of June, four of the men were back in Lackawanna and the other two returned in August. [12](#)

The Buffalo FBI office was suspicious of the group's cover story but had no hard evidence of a serious crime. They began to investigate allegations that the Lackawanna suspects were involved in criminal activity. There were allegations of a drug connection because the men, some hardly employed, lived and dressed quite comfortably. [12,14](#) But for the next year the case progressed slowly.

In the fall of 2001, after 9/11, Juma al-Dosari, the charismatic preacher, was captured while fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and sent to Guantanamo Bay for interrogation. He provided information that stimulated interest in Derwish. Derwish had trained in Afghanistan in 1992 and fought with Muslims in Bosnia. In the Spring of 2002, U.S. intelligence learned Derwish's several aliases and realized that it had intercepted communications between him and two important al-Qaida figures, one of them involved in the USS Cole bombing. This recognition that Derwish was an important al-Qaida operative raised concerns that the Lackawanna group was a sleeper cell waiting for instructions to strike. Warrants were issued to conduct round-the-clock surveillance on members of the group. [12](#)

The FBI monitored phone calls from Derwish in Yemen to some members of the group that appeared to be intended to assess their status or availability. It also intercepted e-mails from one of the group, Mukhtar al-Bakri, who was then in Bahrain. One of them appeared particularly suspicious. The e-mail was entitled "Big Meal" and read in English translation as follows:

"How are you my beloved, God willing you are fine. I would like to remind you of obeying God and keeping him in your heart because the next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to withstand it except those with faith. There are people here who had visions and their visions were explained that this thing will be very strong. No one will be able to bear it." [12](#)

Al-Qaida uses code words in messages like these to communicate with its operatives. The phone calls and e-mails raised intense concern that the Lackawanna group was about to be activated for a major terrorist attack. At this point, the Buffalo FBI field office was required to send briefings on the results of their investigation to FBI Headquarters twice a day, and these were often passed on to the White House in the president's daily threat briefings.

At the request of the CIA, al-Bakri was detained by the Bahrain police, coincidentally on his wedding night. He admitted to having traveled to the Al

Farooq camp in late spring and early summer and also gave the names of the rest of the Lackawanna group. Based on al-Bakri's testimony, the six Lackawanna men were arraigned in September, 2002, and charged with providing material support to al-Qaida. The media immediately dubbed them the "Lackawanna Six." [12](#)

All six originally pleaded not guilty but later agreed to plead guilty to material support for terrorism, cooperated with the government, and were sentenced in December 2003 to between 7 and 10 years in prison. [12,15](#) It is widely believed that none of the six ever committed an actual terrorist act. However, the FBI special agent in charge of the Buffalo office noted afterwards that in addition to the convictions they gathered intelligence that helped the CIA. He said, "I believe truly that we prevented at least one terrorist attack, because we were able to use the [Lackawanna Six] to lead us to others." [16](#) One of the defendants in his plea bargain said he knew of a second group from Lackawanna that was considering traveling to the Afghan camp for jihad training. [13](#)

A seventh member of the original Lackawanna group, Jaber Elbaneh, had told others during their training that he was intent on becoming a martyr. [12](#) He was with al-Qaida in Yemen at the time of the arrests, and the United States offered a \$5 million reward for his capture. He was subsequently taken into custody by Yemeni authorities, but he was one of 32 prisoners who escaped from prison through a 150-yard tunnel to a nearby mosque in January 2006. [17](#) Kamal Derwish, the Saudi born in Buffalo who recruited the Lackawanna cell members to go to the training camp, was killed in November, 2002, by a CIA Predator drone missile attack on the al-Qaida leadership in Yemen. The drone was tracking one of planners of the bombing of the USS Cole, which had killed 17 U.S. sailors in a Yemeni port in October 2000. [12,18](#)

### **Iyman Faris - Reactivated Veteran**

Iyman Faris was an Ohio truck driver and al-Qaida agent tasked to investigate ways to bring down the Brooklyn bridge. Also known as Mohammad Rauf, he was born in Kashmir in 1969. Faris entered the United States in May 1994 on a student visa but never entered school. He married an American woman in 1995 and became a U.S. citizen in December 1999. Working as a truck driver from his home in Columbus, OH, he was licensed to haul flammable and poisonous chemicals, which gave him access to cargo planes at airports and to businesses. He pleaded guilty May 1, 2003, to charges of providing material support, and conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaida. [19](#)

Available unclassified sources do not provide information on Faris' early years or how he ended up in Ohio. We do know that he fought with the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war in the mid-1980s, and that Faris was subsequently visited in Ohio by a old friend from that time with whom he had

maintained a continuing relationship. In late 2000 Faris traveled with that friend to Pakistan and a training camp in Afghanistan where he met with Osama bin Laden. Court documents describe this friend as bin Laden's "right foot," a man who provides supplies and materials needed by al-Qaida.<sup>20</sup> Faris completed a number of jobs for al-Qaida in Pakistan. For example, he did some Internet searches on the subject of ultralight planes and provided them to al-Qaida for possible use as an escape plane.<sup>21</sup> He also helped procure 2,000 sleeping bags for use by al-Qaida. In late December 2001, he bought several airline tickets to Yemen for use by al-Qaida operatives.

In early 2002, and only months after 9/11, Faris again visited his old friend in Karachi, who introduced him to Osama bin Laden's No. 3 man, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 plan. Mohammed asked Faris what he could do for al-Qaida. There was a discussion about Faris's work as a truck driver and the fact that he had access to airport cargo planes. Mohammed said he was interested in cargo planes, because "they could hold more weight and more fuel." <sup>22</sup>

Mohammed then told Faris that al-Qaida is again planning attacks in New York and Washington. These were to be simultaneous attacks on the Brooklyn Bridge and on a train in the Washington, DC, area. Faris was tasked to research tools for cutting the bridge's suspension cables and for derailing trains. After returning to the United States in April 2002, Faris did check out the bridge and the possible tools that might be used. In early 2003, he sent a coded e-mail message to al-Qaida that "the weather is too hot," meaning that he did not think an attack on the bridge would be feasible. <sup>20</sup>

Shortly after Faris sent this e-mail, its recipient, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was arrested in Pakistan, and a search of his computer led the authorities to Faris.<sup>23</sup> After a period of surveillance, federal agents approached Faris about cooperating with the government.<sup>24</sup> Faris was installed for a brief period in a guarded safe house in Virginia from where, under the control of U.S. authorities, he sent messages to his terrorist commanders by cell phone and e-mail. <sup>25</sup>

Faris was sentenced on October 28, 2003, to 20 years in prison "for providing material support and resources to al-Qaida and conspiracy for providing the terrorist organization with information about possible U.S. targets for attack."<sup>26</sup> It is not known from open sources when Faris first started working for al-Qaida. In view of his previous service as a mujihadeen in Afghanistan, it is possible that he was dispatched to this country in 1994 as an al-Qaida sleeper agent.

### **Ryan G. Anderson - Wannabe Terrorist**

Ryan Gibson Anderson, 26, was arrested February 12, 2004, for attempting to pass information about military capabilities to al-Qaida over the Internet. A white, American-born, Muslim convert, Anderson was a Specialist (E-4) and

tank crewman with the 303rd Armor Battalion of the 81st Armor Brigade at Fort Lewis, WA.<sup>27</sup> He was raised in Everett, WA, and converted from his Lutheran upbringing to Islam in about 1998. He attended Washington State University where he studied Middle Eastern military history and graduated with a BA degree in 2002, after which he enlisted in the Army National Guard.<sup>28</sup>

A year later, Anderson was logging on to extremist Internet chat rooms, trying to get in touch with al-Qaida operatives to offer them information on U.S. military capabilities and weaponry. A tip to the FBI from a woman in Conrad, MT, began the investigation. The woman's hobby is to search for Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards frequented by radical Muslim and jihad warriors. It was she who discovered Anderson, in late 2003, using his Muslim name, Amir Tallah, and asking in e-mails how to defect to the other side. She began to realize after a four-month period of exchanges, in which she posed as an Algerian with ties to Algeria's outlawed Armed Islamic Group, that he was an American, in the National Guard, and about to be deployed to Iraq. He appeared willing to share information on American troop vulnerabilities with the enemy.<sup>29</sup> The February 2004 arrest occurred after a joint sting investigation by the U.S. Army, Justice Department, and FBI. Anderson's unit deployed to Iraq just weeks after his arrest.

During the sting operation, Anderson was clear about his intentions in cell-phone text messages, e-mails, and meetings with undercover agents.<sup>30</sup> He was monitored on tape saying the: "I wish to desert from the U.S. Army. I wish to defect from the United States. I wish to join al-Qaeda, train its members and conduct terrorist attacks."<sup>28</sup> He was arrested after offering to pass on to al-Qaida 800 pages of documents describing the armor being deployed in Iraq. He did not succeed in actually making contact with al-Qaida members.<sup>31</sup>

Anderson's defense was that he suffered from bipolar disorder and from a high-functioning form of autism that impairs cognitive and social functioning.<sup>28</sup> The defense claimed that Anderson could not form the criminal intent needed for a guilty verdict. The prosecution, in rebuttal, showed a clip from a secretly recorded videotape of a meeting with undercover agents in which Anderson told the men that he was a tank ammunition loader and explained how to damage the M1A1 Abrams, the Army's primary battle tank, and kill American soldiers. This, the prosecution asserted, was the "real Ryan Anderson," a person with "no empathy for others and [who] jeopardized his fellow soldiers."<sup>30</sup>

On September 2, 2004, the jury of nine commissioned officers at Fort Lewis, WA, found Anderson guilty on five counts of attempting to aid and provide intelligence to the enemy. He was given a demotion to the rank of private, a dishonorable discharge, and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole,<sup>28</sup>

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