Participation in or association with any international terrorist group or activity can be adjudicated under one or more of the Foreign Influence, Foreign Preference, Allegiance to the United States, or Criminal Conduct guidelines. Participation in or association with any domestic terrorism group or activity is adjudicated under the Allegiance to the United States, Criminal Conduct and/or Personal Conduct guidelines.
There are many ways to define terrorism. As used here, terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence against people or property in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. International terrorism refers to terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country. Counterterrorism is our national effort to eliminate or reduce the terrorist threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad.
This Counterterrorism module provides background information only on international terrorism -- specifically terrorism by militant Muslim extremists. Some background information on domestic right-wing and left-wing terrorist and extremist groups is found in the Allegiance to the United States module.
In April of each year, the Department of State publishes an annual report entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. This organizes information on terrorist activity by region and by country. A separate report that is updated annually identifies 45 foreign organizations that are formally designated by the U.S. Government as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Any association with one of these organizations is a security concern. This and other information about international terrorism is available on the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/.
The global militant jihadist movement -- including but certainly not limited to al-Qaida -- is currently the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States, U.S. interests, and U.S. allies. It encompasses a variety of movements, groups, and sometimes ad hoc units or cells which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of radical interpretations of Islamic scripture. Other collective terms used to describe these groups include radical Islam and Islamists.
The meaning of the Islamic term "jihad" has changed and evolved over 14 centuries and is still avidly contested among Muslims. It comes from the Arabic root jhd, which means "to exert utmost effort, to strive, struggle." Meanings that Muslims attribute to this word today are quite diverse. For example, some Muslims believe the term refers to an individual believer's inner spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith. Other Muslims believe it refers to a religious duty to engage in holy war against what they call the infidels (disbelievers). We are not concerned here with the true meaning of the word as used in the Quran, but only with how it is interpreted today by militant Muslim extremists.
The ideology of global militant jihad is expressed in public statements by al-Qaida leaders, such as the following: 1
Al-Qaida is the most prominent organization in the militant jihadist movement, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are its best known leaders. However, militant jihadism predates and transcends al-Qaida. The belief that jihad has been a "neglected duty" among Muslims, and that there is a duty mandated by God to kill or destroy all "unbelievers" comes from Egyptian philosophers of the 1950-60s.2 A group called Egyptian Islamic Jihad assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 after he attempted to make peace with Israel. Jemaah Islamiya, which has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, dates back to about 1969.
Global counterterrorism operations since September 11, 2001, have degraded al-Qaida's central command and control infrastructure, limiting its ability to mount global acts of terrorism. Safe haven in Afghanistan has been largely denied, and many of the men in leadership positions have been killed or captured. The U.S. and coalition successes against al-Qaida have forced its remaining members and other militant jihadist groups to act more on their own and exercise greater local control over their strategic and tactical decisions. The al-Qaida senior leadership can still inspire terrorist activity through its ideological and propaganda activities, but it can no longer direct this activity as fully as in the past. 3
Consistent with the changing role of al-Qaida's core leadership, there is evidence that al-Qaida's global networks are breaking up. What was once a relatively structured network appears to have become a more diffuse worldwide movement of like-minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not necessarily formally organized. While trainers and other operatives linked to al-Qaida may still act as catalysts for terrorist activity, other self-sufficient cells have now emerged. The principal threat of terrorist attack now comes from groups that are only loosely affiliated with a-Qaida, or small, independent groups adhering to the same militant jihadist ideology. These groups remain intent on striking U.S. interests in the homeland and overseas. 3
Examples of this trend include Salafiya Jihadia, a loosely-organized Moroccan movement involved in carrying out the bombings in Casablanca in May 2003. The terrorists who executed the March 2004 attack in Madrid and the July 2005 bombing in London also do not appear to have been acting directly on al-Qaida orders, although they were guided by the same militant jihadist ideology and targeting strategy. Jemaah Islamiyah groups in Southeast Asia look to their own spiritual leaders and operate independently, while maintaining close ideological ties with al-Qaida.
The U.S. Government estimates that terrorist capabilities for attacks will remain uneven, given the varying degrees of expertise and increasing decentralization within the movement. Most groups will be capable only of relatively unsophisticated, but still deadly small-scale attacks. Others, however, may seek to acquire or duplicate al-Qaida's expertise and material support for mass-casualty attacks. The explosive growth of media and the Internet, as well as the ease of travel and communication around the world, have made possible the rapid movement of operatives, expertise, money, and weapons. Terrorists increasingly will use media and the Internet to advance key messages or rally support, share jihadist experiences and expertise, and spread fear. 1
The war on terrorism has greatly increased the demand for personnel with foreign language abilities and an understanding of foreign cultures and customs, especially in areas with large Arabic or Muslim populations. Many personnel have these skills only as a result of being born outside the United States, having friends and family who are not U.S. citizens, living in ethnic communities within the U.S., and other related factors.
Personnel with foreign ties may be more vulnerable to exploitation by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations, and other groups that are hostile to U.S. interests. Financial and emotional ties to a foreign country, or to persons residing in a foreign country, can create pressure to act against the interests of the United States. Persons with such ties may feel a compelling sense of duty to friends or family residing in the country of birth.
Most terrorists that threaten the security of the United States are Muslims. However, an overwhelming majority of Muslims are not terrorists and do not sympathize with terrorists. This is especially true of American Muslims. As noted by one scholar, "the most powerful weapon in countering the radicals' violence is the goodwill and moderation of 95 percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. We must fight to keep it, and to use it, if we are, one day, to be free of fear and violence." 4
"Most Muslims, like almost everyone else, want to live their lives in peace. But that fact doesn't change or mitigate another fact: that terrorists and militants around the world today are using the Quran and the teachings of Islam to recruit and motivate terrorists, making principal use of the doctrines surrounding the concept of jihad." 8
The need to identify militant jihadists, while protecting the civil rights of all Americans (specifically, Muslim Americans) presents a serious challenge to the U.S. Government's personnel security system. It raises practical and legal issues regarding the proper adjudication and investigation of persons of the Muslim faith.
The basic personnel security form, the SF-86, does not ask about religion, and investigators are not authorized to ask about a subject's religious beliefs. However, militant jihadism is not a religion. It is a militant political ideology comparable to communism or fascism. The militant ideology is communicated using the rhetoric of religion, but an overwhelming majority of Muslims do not see it as a part of their faith. 7
Militant jihadists are openly hostile to the United States and Western values. Any American who advocates or supports holy war against the West is a threat to the United States and is not eligible for access to classified information. Before approving a security clearance, the adjudicator needs some assurance that the subject supports the basic human and democratic values expressed in and protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Any of the following statements of belief would be potentially disqualifying:
One pitfall that adjudicators and investigators must avoid is any assumption that the depth of a Muslim's religious beliefs is somehow related to whether or not that person holds extremist views. The fact that a Muslim complies strictly with all the dietary restrictions, prays consistently five times a day, or that a Muslim woman wears a head scarf indicates only that a person is a devout Muslim. It is absolutely not an indicator of radical, extremist, or militant views.
Arab Americans and American Muslims are very diverse groups. There are significant differences between Arab Americans and other American Muslims whose heritage is in African, South Asian, or Southeast Asian. There are also significant differences in attitudes and culture between descendants of immigrants who are now thoroughly embedded in the mosaic of life in America, and more recent immigrants who continue to be heavily influenced by the culture of their native land. Further, Muslims with foreign heritage are different from the many native-born Americans who have converted to Islam.
Arab Americans belong to many religions, including Islam, Christianity, Druze, Judaism and others. Due to historic immigration patterns, a majority of Arab Americans are Catholic, Eastern Orthodox Christians, or Protestant, not Muslim. Not all people from the Middle East are Arabs. The four main language groups in the Middle East are Arabic, Hebrew, Persian and Turkish. Other ethnic and cultural groups in the Middle East include Kurdish, Berber, Chaldean, and Assyrian, and many immigrants to the United States have come from these minority groups. 5
According to the 2000 census, 1,200,000 Americans are of Arab descent. According to a survey by the Arab American Institute, only 24% of them are Muslim, and the Muslims are divided between the Sunni and Shia sects. Arab Americans are nearly twice as likely as the typical U.S. resident to possess a college degree, and the median income for a family of Arab ancestry is higher than the median income for all U.S. families. Intermarriage is extremely high -- about 75% of Arab Americans marry a person of a different faith. This indicates that the Arab American community is well-rooted and well-invested in the United States. 11
Most Muslims are not Arabs and do not even live in the Middle East. There are more Muslims in Indonesia, for example, than in all other Arab countries combined. Muslims are spread throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia so that only about 12 percent of Muslims worldwide are Arabs. Islam has a strong Arab flavor, though, because the religion's holiest places are in the Middle East and the Quran was originally written in Arabic. 5
Good statistics on the number of Muslims in the United States are not available, as the U.S. census does not ask questions about religion. Estimates vary widely from 1,886,000 to above six million.
However, various surveys have identified key demographic characteristics of American Muslims. According to a 2004 Zogby survey, about 33% are of South Asian descent, 26% are Arab, and another 20% are American blacks. Fifty-nine percent of American Muslims have at least an undergraduate education, making them the most highly educated religious group in America. Four out of five Muslim Americans earn over $25,000 a year, and one in three earn more than $75,000. Eighty-two percent are registered to vote. A study of Muslims in New York City found that twenty-one percent marry outside their religion. According to a separate study of mosque attendance in Detroit, the average mosque-goer is 34 years old, married with children, has at least a bachelor's degree, and earns about $74,000 a year. 11
These figures show that, like Arab Americans, most American Muslims are successful and well on their way toward blending into the great American melting pot. This differs markedly from Muslim communities in Europe that tend to be poor and socially marginalized. Culturally isolated and poor enclaves of Muslim immigrants do also exist in America, however. The Islamist militants who bombed the New York World Trade Center the first time, in 1993, came from such an enclave in Jersey City, NJ. (See the Ali Mohamed case.) The "Lackawanna Six" (described under Other Case Summaries) is a group of young Americans from a Yemeni community in upstate New York. On the other hand, there is also ample evidence that a good education and economic affluence are no obstacle to becoming a terrorist. Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders are prime examples.
People live complex lives, and we often experience some conflict between our various obligations, such as the common conflict between the demands of family and job. In addition to family and employer, our friends, profession, religion, nationality, culture, and a U.S. Government security clearance for access to classified information all may be sources of conflicting values and obligations. Balancing these conflicting demands is a normal part of life, and occasionally we face a problem or crisis that triggers a reorganization of our priorities.
"Individuals who immigrate to the U.S. do so at very different times in their lives. They are born and raised in a country and culture that is often very different from ours. They seek a better life and pursue the American dream; however, they do not relinquish their identities when taking the oath for U.S. citizenship. Many immigrants today as in the past have struggled to find a compromise with being an American and not surrendering their heritage. As a result, many find themselves in conflict both in terms of their loyalty to their culture and the family that they left behind. Although they profess loyalty to the U.S., the influence of family, culture, religion, and the early imprint of identity development often moderate that pledge of allegiance." 12
The role of e-mail, instant messaging, and cheap telephone calls via the Internet has transformed the role that foreign relatives and friends play in the lives of immigrants to the United States. As a result of modern telecommunications, contact is immediate and frequent and one can maintain many more foreign contacts at minimal cost. This encourages continued identification with the cultural norms and values of a person's country of birth. "As a result, foreign-born individuals who immigrate to the U.S. may remain more closely tied to their country of origin, more identified with their country of origin's culture, politics and lifestyle, and thus can become more vulnerable to being influenced by individuals in their birth country." 12
Access to classified or other protected information can create circumstances where an individual's willingness and ability to protect that information is put to the test. One may gain access to information that one knows would be of great value to a foreign family member, friend, corporation, or government. Or one may be pressured by family, friends, or the government to fulfill obligations that are contrary to U.S. interests. The ability to withstand such temptations and pressures depends in part on the extent to which one has assimilated American culture and values. This can be more of a problem with Arabs than with someone from a Western culture. In Arab culture, the family, clan, and tribe are more important than the individual. Individuals draw much of their identity and self-esteem from the status of their family and the larger collective of which they are a part, rather than from their individual accomplishments. 5
When an individual has relatives, friends, and an ethnic or national heritage in a country where militant jihadist groups are active, there is a good deal of information that adjudicators need to know in order to make an informed judgment that approval for access to classified information is clearly in the national interest. This is discussed in the Foreign Influence module, but there are additional factors to be considered that relate specifically to potential terrorist connections.
Arabic and other Middle Eastern and Asian languages use written characters and sounds that are very different from English, which means there is more than one way to transliterate the sounds and words. For example, several years ago the Associated Press changed its approved style for its spelling of Arabic words and names. Mohammed became Muhammad and the Koran became Quran. The latter is sometimes written as Qur'an. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's organization is spelled variously as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, and al Qaeda.
So just getting a subject's name right is not a simple matter. In order to conduct a thorough name check, it is necessary to have the full name, including the middle names as currently spelled by the subject and all alternative spellings the subject has used in the past. It is also necessary to know any other identities the subject has used either in the United States or in foreign countries. Using multiple different identities is common in Arab culture. Also, native-born Americans who convert to Islam typically adopt an Arabic name. The subject needs to provide dates and circumstances pertaining to use of each name.
The Almaliki Nour case, described under Other Case Summaries, is an example of an individual who became a U.S. citizen under a false name. He subsequently obtained a security clearance without this being detected and worked for two years as an interpreter for the U.S. Army in Iraq. He is suspected of having helped the insurgents during that period.
Because of transliteration problems, some government agencies require subjects to write their name in the native language on paper that is submitted with the report of investigation. Some agencies also require subjects to provide all cell phone numbers and e-mail addresses they have used, along with the time period during which they were used. This facilitates checking against various investigative files.
The adjudicator often needs to assess the extent to which an individual with a foreign background has assimilated American values.12 Some research shows that extent of assimilation is associated with length of residence in this country, age at time of immigration, and recency of visits to the homeland.9 Other factors inevitably also play a role, and if this type of information was not developed during the subject interview, a second interview may be needed.
The adjudicator may need to understand the subject's life story. When did the subject or subject's family come to the United States and why did they come? Useful information might be inferred from the name of the subject's sponsor, any individuals or organizations that assisted the subject's immigration, or the government program under which the subject was allowed entry into the United States.
A person's motivation for coming to the United States may provide insight into the person's attitude toward the native country. Did the person come as a political refugee, to earn money to send back to the family in the homeland, for economic opportunity, and a more comfortable life, or did the entire family immigrate? Has the international situation changed since the person immigrated to the United States. If the person came from what was then a hostile country, is that country now potentially friendly (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia)? If the person came from what was then a friendly country, is that country now hostile (e.g., Iran)? Such a reversal of political circumstances can increase one's desire to help his or her native country or increase vulnerability to being pressured by that country.
The age at which a person came to this country and how long the person has been in this country affect that person's ability to assimilate new values. The high school years are a formative period in a youth's life. An immigrant who has an American high school education is likely to have assimilated many American values, unless they were discriminated against and came to reject our values. If the first experience in America is for graduate school, or later, the values one learned as a child may be slow to change.
Most older immigrants and their children are well integrated into American society. However, a recent study of Arabic linguists recruited in the United States to support DoD military operations in Iraq found that many were younger immigrants who came from closed immigrant communities and had little real exposure to American life, culture, and values. Prior to being recruited, they had been afraid to attempt to interact outside of the immigrant communities in which they lived. One official who dealt with these linguists stated that “it is a fundamental mistake to assume that because these people live in America they have adopted American values and ideals.” Other officials who dealt with these linguists observed that many of them appeared to have mixed loyalties. They felt as if they had "come home" to Iraq. Their primary motive for taking the employment was to be able to go home, and their loyalty to the United States was limited. Many regarded the United States invasion as "God's will," and felt that the United States was there to prepare the country for them to assume leadership positions. Others took the job only for the money, and some were opposed to the U.S. military operation in Iraq. 6
When and why did the subject become a U.S. citizen? Did the subject apply for citizenship as soon as he or she was eligible, or only after some considerable delay? Delay in becoming a citizen may indicate some ambivalence about becoming a U.S. citizen or giving up citizenship of the country of birth. This may affect an individual's ability to commit to total loyalty to the United States under all circumstances. Are there circumstances under which the subject might return to the native country, for example, if there is a change of government, a good job offer, or for retirement?
It can be helpful to know how the subject spends his or her free time. Are the subject's activities rooted in American society in general, or are friends and activities exclusively within a tightly knit immigrant community? This can be a good indicator of the extent to which an individual has adopted American values.
Statements that an individual has made about the country of origin or the United States are of particular interest. This includes any statements that degrade or devalue America, or that express a desire to eventually return and live in the country of origin.
When seeking to identify any potential association with terrorists, detailed information about foreign travel and/or foreign education is particularly important. Training of terrorists is generally provided overseas, so any travel to or near countries where such training is provided may be significant. It should not be written off as "just a tourist trip" or family visit. It is necessary to know the dates and exact purpose of any travel to such areas, especially if the individual is in a higher risk category due to foreign background or if the travel is unusual or out of character for that person.
Any contact with Islamic institutes, language schools, or cultural centers during travel abroad is potentially significant for two reasons. First, attendance at such schools is often used to assess and identify candidates for terrorist training. Second, claimed attendance at such schools is often used as a cover story to conceal attendance at a terrorist training camp. To evaluate such travel, it is necessary to know the individual's teachers, mentors and associates at the institution, how the individual became enrolled, and the specific course of study. It is also necessary to know who paid for the education, where the subject lived, the names of any roommates, and whether the individual has maintained contact with anyone from the institution.
When a subject of investigation has relatives, friends, business associates, or financial interests in any Muslim country, or any non-Muslim country with a militant Muslim minority, it is important to know if any of the subject's contacts are associated with any form of political or extremist activity. The information that adjudicators need to have under these circumstances is discussed under the Foreign Influence guideline. One way to learn about a subject's vulnerability to pressure from family or friends is to ask if any of the subject's foreign contacts are aware that he or she is employed in a position that requires a U.S. Government security clearance. If so, why are they informed and how do they feel about this? (Ideally, they should not be informed.) If they are not informed, would they approve or disapprove if they found out about it? The answer to this question would provide a useful perspective on the foreign contacts and their potential influence on the subject.
Individuals involved in terrorism or subversion sometimes engage in behaviors that are observable by others and give clues to what is going on. Alert employees and military personnel who recognize and report these clues play a significant role in helping to protect our country against terrorist attacks and other subversive activities. This type of information is sometimes obtained during a personnel security investigation.
This section identifies a number of observable clues, or potential indicators of terrorist activity or support for terrorism. It is limited to indicators that are uniquely applicable to terrorism. They differ from espionage indicators, because the process for becoming a terrorist is usually different from the process for becoming a spy, and the observable behaviors in which the typical terrorist engages are different from the actions of a spy. The Potential CI Risk Indicators section of the Counterintelligence module includes a long list of espionage indicators as well as these terrorism indicators.
These indicators are called “potential” indicators because no single indicator constitutes evidence of terrorism, espionage, or any other unauthorized use of classified or other protected information. Most indicators are what might be called “soft” indicators. That is, each indicator only tells us that something might happen or might already be happening, not that it will happen or actually is happening. Each specific behavior has several possible explanations, and each particular condition or circumstance usually has several possible outcomes. Although a single indicator may have limited significance, it always does indicate that further inquiry may be appropriate to clarify the situation and determine if other indicators are also present.
Although a terrorist might also steal information like a spy, the typical terrorist is engaged in planning, preparing, supporting or executing some violent terrorist action. The range of behaviors that might indicate or reveal terrorist intentions is extremely broad. For example:
The following are potential indicators that an individual may be planning, may be aware of others who are planning, or may be motivated to assist in conducting a terrorist attack.
As compared with espionage, which is usually conducted by individuals working alone, a terrorist attack is usually a group activity conducted by a small, clandestine cell which is often loosely associated with a larger network or organized group. Therefore, support for terrorism is most often indicated by an individual's association with known extremists, by certain public actions or Internet use, and/or by expressed support for a terrorist ideology.
Any support or advocacy of terrorism, or association or sympathy with persons or organizations that are promoting or threatening the use of force or violence, is a concern even if the individual is not directly involved in planning a terrorist attack. Any support of militant jihadist ideology is a particular concern.
The Department of State is required by law to provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism. Each annual report includes information on about 40 organizations that the Secretary of State has officially designated as foreign terrorist organizations. That designation means it is against the law for any American to provide funds or other material support to any of these organizations. This report also has information on many other smaller terrorist groups that are relevant to the global war on terrorism but are not on the official list of designated foreign terrorist organizations. Over time, variants of these groups sometimes dissolve and reassemble under different names. Many of these organizations, but certainly not all of them, are part of the global jihad. The most recent of the Country Reports on Terrorism is available on the State Department web site at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
All subjects of personnel security investigations are typically asked if they have ever belonged to any group or attended any meeting or gathering where violence against the United States, its government, its facilities and/or its citizens has ever been advocated, discussed, planned, encouraged, or endorsed in any way. This type of association is usually adjudicated under the Allegiance to the United States guideline.
Membership in, or willful association or support for, any foreign or domestic terrorist organization or group is potentially disqualifying even if the subject has not participated in specific illegal actions. Denial or revocation of clearance based on membership alone would require evidence that the subject joined the group "knowingly" and "advocated" or "participated" in its activities.
If the organization engages in illegal activities, the key questions that need to be resolved during adjudication are: Was the subject aware at the time of joining the organization that its activity may be against the law? Did the subject help to advocate, fund, plan, organize, advertise, or participate in these unlawful activities? These distinctions are important because some organizations recruit members through broad appeals to furthering peace or social welfare. It may take a while before a new member understands the full extent or significance of the group's activities. Many front organizations have two agendas: a lawful and open agenda for the members and the public to see, and a hidden agenda known only to the leadership. The lawful agenda may be used to raise funds and spot candidates to assist with the hidden agenda.
To fully assess the significance of an individual's association with or membership in an extremist group or organization that may be associated with terrorism (or violate Defense Department policy for military personnel), the adjudicator needs to have information such as the following:
In the event of uncertainty, the case should be referred for legal and/or counterintelligence review. The bottom line should be a common sense, whole-person decision on whether access to classified information "is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security" and meets the other requirements of Section 3.1.(b) of Executive Order 12968.
Military personnel are held to a stricter standard of allegiance. Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits military personnel from uttering statements or taking other actions with the intent to promote disloyalty or disaffection among troops, such as praising the enemy, attacking the war aims of the United States, or otherwise denouncing the U.S. Government. Article 134 applies to the public utterance of such statements, not to the fact that the member privately holds controversial views.
DoD Directive 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," prohibits the following types of activities. The actions commanders take are discretionary, based on their perceptions of the impact of the prohibited conduct on their units.
See the Table of Contents for links to selected case studies in separate files.
2. Jansen, J. (1986).The neglected duty: The creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic resurgence in the Middle East. New York: Macmillan; Lewis, B. (2003). The crisis of Islam: Holy war and unholy terror. New York: Modern Library.
4. Burke, J. (2004, March 21). What exactly does al-Qaeda want? The Observer. Retrieved May 5, 2006, from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1174505,00.html
5. Nydell, M. (1996). Understanding Arabs: A guide for Westerners. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.
6. Kramer, L.A., Casey, E.P., Christman, D.W., Richmond, D.A., & Gonzalez J.L. (2006). Improving personnel security for CONUS-hired linguists with foreign backgrounds supporting DoD military operations in Iraq (Draft). Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.
7. Pipes, D. (2003). Militant Islam reaches America. New York: Norton.
8. Spencer, R. (2003). Onward Muslim soldiers: How Jihad still threatens America and the West, p. xiii. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, p. xiii.
9. Faragallah, M.H., Schumm, W.R., & Webb, F.J. (1997). Acculturation of Arab-American immigrants: An exploratory study. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 28, 182-203.
10. Armas, G.C. (2005, Mar. 8). Census: Arabs in U.S. tend to be affluent. Associated Press. Article no longer available on the Internet.
11. Stephens, B., & Rago, J. (2005, August 24). Stars, stripes and crescent. The Wall Street Journal, p. A10.
12. Krofcheck, J.L., & Gelles, M.G. (2006). Behavioral consultation in personnel security: Training and reference manual for personnel security professionals. (Appendix A). Fairfax, VA: Yarrow Associates.
13. Serrano, R. (2006, Mar. 22). Flight school operator tells court of 9/11 regrets. Los Angeles Times.
14. Hays, T. (2005, Aug. 4). NYPD reveals details of London attack. Associated Press. Retrieved August 4, 2005, from http://www.securityinfowatch.com/Homeland+Security/nypd-reveals-details-london-attacks-july-7