There is no single profile of the employee who is likely to betray an employer’s trust. However, clinical assessment of Americans arrested for espionage 1 and academic research findings on white-collar criminals in general 2 do identify a number of behavior patterns and personality characteristics that are commonly found among such persons. The following are discussed in this section.
| Antisocial Behavior | |
|---|---|
| Narcissism/Grandiosity | Paranoia |
| Impulsiveness/Immaturity | Risk-Seeking |
| Inability to Form a Commitment | |
Individuals who betray their employer's trust may have a propensity for violating rules and regulations. They may have a grossly inflated view of their own abilities, so that disappointment and bitterness against those who fail to recognize their special talents are inevitable. They may be inclined to regard criticism or disagreement as a personal insult that calls for revenge. They may be impulsive or immature, and predisposed to do whatever feels good at the moment. They may have drifted from one relationship or job to another, with little sense of purpose or loyalty to anyone or anything. They may engage in high-risk activities without thinking about the consequences.
Sometimes these weaknesses are so severe that they can be clinically diagnosed as symptoms of a mental, emotional, or personality disorder. More often, however, they are better described as behavioral or personality weaknesses rather than as psychological "disorders." When these behaviors are reported, consultation with a psychologist may be appropriate.
Because these weaknesses are also found to some degree in many good and loyal personnel, they are not specified in the Adjudicative Guidelines as disqualifying for access to classified information. However, they can and should be reported by investigators and used in the adjudicative process in the following ways.
As a basis for adverse action if the behavior meets the disqualifying criteria under the Psychological Conditions or Personal Conduct guidelines.
As part of a negative whole-person judgment. Financial problems, substance abuse and other issues are more significant when accompanied by some of the unfavorable behavioral or personality characteristics described here.
As a basis for requesting further investigation, psychological evaluation, or psychological testing.
Behavior that habitually violates the commonly accepted rules of society is called antisocial behavior. Psychologists sometimes call a person who exhibits such behavior a psychopath or sociopath. Manipulation of others and deceit are central features of this type of behavior. John Walker, the infamous Soviet spy in the U.S. Navy who is described below, epitomizes antisocial behavior.
Antisocial behavior is a serious security concern. Values that normally inhibit illegal or vindictive behavior are missing. This can lead to fraud, embezzlement, computer sabotage or espionage when an individual sees an easy opportunity for illicit gain or becomes disaffected with the organization. Selling secrets may be viewed as a simple business opportunity rather than as treason
Persons with antisocial personality disorder shamelessly take others for granted and manipulate them to serve their own self-interest or indulge their own desires. Such persons take pleasure in beating the system without getting caught. Lying to others is common, as is lack of gratitude. Stealing, shoplifting, cheating on taxes, failure to pay parking tickets, aggressive or reckless driving, failure to pay bills even though money is available, picking fights, extreme promiscuity, sexual harassment, cruelty to animals, and spouse, child, or elder abuse are examples of antisocial behaviors. There is little remorse about the adverse effects of one’s behavior on others.
At work, typical antisocial behaviors include padding travel vouchers or expense accounts; being consistently late to work or leaving earlier than is reasonable; abusing sick leave; lack of concern with meeting deadlines; taking classified information home; misusing the diplomatic pouch; pilfering office supplies; lying to cover up a mistake or to make oneself look good; maneuvering to undermine a colleague who is viewed as a competitor for promotion; drug use or any other violation of regulations by a government employee.
Antisocial persons tend to resent authority and dislike supervision, to attribute their lack of success to others "having it in for me," to think no one understands them and that life is giving them a raw deal. When antisocial individuals have a problem at work, they are likely to focus the blame on their supervisor. They may submit extensive written appeals in response to any criticism in their performance evaluation. When antisocial subjects feel offended or frustrated in their desires, they may be inclined to hold a grudge and to seek revenge.
Antisocial persons believe such improper behavior is commonplace and will not be punished. They have a high opinion of their ability to con their way out of trouble, and a low opinion of the astuteness of authorities who would catch them. The con man's self-confidence and ability to manipulate others may be very useful in certain occupations (intelligence operations officer, undercover police officer, sales person), so it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a valuable talent from a serious character defect.
In severe cases of antisocial personality, individuals are likely to have a criminal record that clearly disqualifies them for access to classified information. They are also unlikely to have the history of academic or career success that qualifies them to apply for a position of responsibility. Moderately antisocial personalities, however, may appear to be very desirable candidates for employment. Such candidates are able to manipulate people so effectively that they do exceptionally well in interviews and are evaluated favorably by casual acquaintances. Their true character is revealed only after prolonged or intimate contact.
If a series of incidents shows a pattern of untrustworthy and unreliable behavior, it may not qualify as a psychological "disorder," but it may be adjudicated adversely under the Personal Conduct guideline or be considered as part of the whole-person evaluation under any other adjudicative guideline.
Antisocial behavior usually begins in childhood or adolescence. The most flagrant antisocial behavior may diminish after age 30. However, inability to sustain lasting, close, and responsible relationships with family, friends, sexual partners, or employer may persist into late adult life. 3
As a youth, Navy spy John Walker rolled used tires down hills at cars passing below, threw rocks through school windows, stole money from purses and coats left unattended at school functions, stole coins from church donation boxes for the poor, set fires, and shot at the headlights of cars. When arrested for attempted burglary at age 17, Walker admitted to six other burglaries. He was pardoned on condition that he follow through on his plan to join the Navy. A childhood friend, who says he knew Walker like a brother, described him many years later as "cunning, intelligent, clever, personable, and intrinsically evil."
After his arrest as a Soviet spy, he enjoyed the publicity; he had no remorse. He rationalized involving his brother, son, and friend in espionage, and trying to recruit his daughter, as trying to help them be successful in life. He later criticized them for using him. He felt his only real mistake was allowing himself to be surrounded by weaker people who eventually brought him down. He concluded, "I am the real victim in this entire unpleasant episode."
One author who spent about 160 hours interviewing Walker after his conviction wrote: "He is totally without principle. There was no right or wrong, no morality or immorality, in his eyes. There were only his own wants, his own needs, whatever those might be at the moment." He betrayed his country, crippled his wife emotionally, corrupted his children, and manipulated his friends. Yet all the while, he didn't see himself as different from others, only a little smarter. In his view, "Everyone is corrupt...everyone has a scam." 4
A narcissistic personality is characterized by unwarranted feelings of self-importance or self-esteem (grandiosity), a sense of entitlement, and a lack of empathy for others. These characteristics are discussed separately below and then related to security issues.
Wholly unwarranted feelings of self-importance or self-esteem are referred to by psychologists as grandiosity. Grandiose persons grossly overestimate their abilities and inflate their accomplishments. They are often preoccupied with fantasies of success, power, beauty, or love. They may need constant reinforcement of this fantasy image of themselves. Grandiose persons expect to be viewed as "special" even without appropriate accomplishments.
Need for praise and sensitivity to criticism dominate relationships with others. Personal friendships, relationships with supervisors and coworkers, and amorous relationships turn quickly from love to hate, and vice versa, depending upon whether the relationship supports or undermines subject's self-esteem. The narcissist demands unconditional acceptance of his or her specialness, and relationships blossom only when this is given, and sour quickly when it is not.
Self-esteem is almost always fragile. An unreasonably high, overt self-evaluation masks inner doubts and insecurities. It is paradoxical that someone with such a crippling sense of inadequacy should act in such an arrogant, imperious, and grandiloquent manner.
Grandiose persons feel they are so smart or so important that the rules, which were made for ordinary people, do not apply to them. Rules and social values are not necessarily rejected as they are by the antisocial personality; it is just that one feels above the rules.
A sense of entitlement is characterized by unreasonable expectation of especially favorable treatment. Such persons expect to be given whatever they want or feel they need.
They may feel entitled to a promotion or to a higher grade in school just because they worked hard for it, regardless of the quality of their performance; entitled to more money because housing or college costs are so high, even though they did not earn it; entitled to cut in front of the line because they are so busy or their time is so valuable. They may also feel entitled to punish others, to "give them what they deserve," because others failed to recognize their special abilities or frustrated their desires in some other way.
Instead of congratulating a colleague who receives a promotion, the narcissist may feel bitter and grouse that the promotion wasn't deserved. Several persons arrested for embezzlement have revealed that they started to take money only after someone on a par with them got a promotion that they did not receive. They felt entitled to take the money because they too should have been promoted.
Many people genuinely do get a raw deal, and may be justified in feeling they deserve better. Feelings of entitlement in such cases become a security problem only if the person is planning revenge or retaliation.
Narcissists generally view the world from the perspective of how it affects them, and them only. There is little empathy or ability to understand the feelings or problems of others. For example, when a coworker becomes seriously ill, a narcissist may be upset by the inconvenience caused by the worker's absence and relatively unconcerned about the welfare of the worker.
Narcissistic persons shamelessly take others for granted and manipulate or exploit them to achieve their own ends. They may be unusually aggressive and ambitious in seeking relationships with others in positions of power. In romantic relationships, the partner is often treated as an object to be used to bolster one's self-esteem.
In extreme cases, the narcissist who gains power over others, as in a relationship between supervisor and subordinate, may use this power in humiliating and cruel ways, sometimes just for what seems like personal amusement. 3
Narcissism should not be confused with the simple egotism found in many capable and loyal employees who progress to senior positions due to their strong abilities, self-confidence, and ambition. An unwarranted sense of self-importance is a concern only when self-evaluation is so far out of line with reality, and with how one is perceived by supervisors and colleagues, that disappointment and resentment are inevitable.
The narcissist's need for recognition is so strong that failure provokes a need for vindication and revenge. The compelling need to justify unwarranted self-esteem may cause a grandiose person with a grudge to seek recognition elsewhere -- with an opposition intelligence service or business competitor.
Feelings of entitlement are a security concern because they may be used to rationalize illegal behavior or may reduce the inhibitions that otherwise deter illegal behavior. When combined with antisocial attitudes, grandiosity, or desperate need or greed for money, a feeling of entitlement leads to easy rationalization of theft, fraud, or other illegal activity for monetary gain. "I'm only taking what I deserve." It is also an easy rationalization for revenge. "If they hadn't screwed me, I wouldn't be doing this, so it's their fault; they deserve it."
When narcissists fail to perform adequately at work, it is always someone else's fault. The many arrested spies who exhibited this characteristic blamed others for their treason. They blamed their behavior on the counterculture movement of the 1960s, on an insensitive and intrusive Intelligence Community, poor security practices, supervisors who failed to recognize their potential, spouses for not being understanding, or government for not taking the right political stance. Few saw themselves as traitors; they saw themselves as victims.
Self-deception and rationalization facilitate criminal behavior, as they enable an individual to consider such behavior in a more justifiable light. They also soothe an offender's conscience as the activity progresses. Narcissism is illustrated by the following example.
Jonathan Jay Pollard was a Naval Intelligence analyst arrested for espionage on behalf of Israel. From an early age, Pollard had a fantasy of himself as a master strategist and a superhero defending Israel from its enemies. He became obsessed with the threats facing Israel and a desire to serve that country.
In college, Pollard boasted that he had dual citizenship and was a Colonel in the Israeli Army. His Stanford senior yearbook photo listed him as "Colonel" Pollard, and he reportedly convinced almost everyone that Israeli Intelligence was paying his tuition. After his arrest, Pollard said this was all "fun and games," and "no one took it seriously." But most of his fellow students did not see it as a game.
Pollard kept his pro-Israeli views to himself while working for Naval Intelligence, but other tall tales about himself were more or less a joke in the office. He was unpopular among his colleagues, as they resented his bragging, his arrogance, and his know-it-all attitude.
At one point, Pollard received permission to establish a back-channel contact with South African Intelligence through a South African friend he had known in graduate school. Through a combination of circumstances, Pollard's story about his relationship with the South Africans began to unravel. After telling Navy investigators fantastic tales about having lived in South Africa and his father having been CIA Station Chief there, Pollard's security clearance was pulled and he was told to obtain psychiatric help. When the doctor concluded he was not mentally ill, Pollard filed a formal grievance and got his clearance and job back.
Pollard's need to feel important, and to have others validate that importance, led him to pass several classified political and economic analyses to three different friends whom he felt could use the information in their business. This was before he volunteered his services to Israel. Although he hoped to eventually get something in return, his principal motive was simply to impress his friends with his knowledge and the importance of his work.
Several years later, under a different supervisor, it was again Pollard's grandiosity that attracted adverse attention, contributing to his eventual compromise and arrest. The supervisor caught Pollard lying about his dealings with another government agency. The only purpose of the lie was apparently to make Pollard appear to be a more important person than he was.
The supervisor wondered why Pollard would make up stories like this and began paying much closer attention to Pollard's activities. He noticed that Pollard was requesting so many Top Secret documents concerning Soviet equipment being supplied to the Arab world that it was becoming a burden on the clerk who had to log them in. What triggered the espionage investigation leading to Pollard's arrest was a report by a coworker who observed Pollard leaving the office at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon with a wrapped package of classified material and then getting into a car with his wife.
The risk Pollard ran by requesting so many documents may also be explained by his grandiosity; grandiose persons often think they are too smart to be caught. 5
Impulsive and immature individuals lack self-control. They are a security concern because they may use poor judgment or be irresponsible or unpredictable in their behavior. A person who is impulsive or immature should usually also be assessed under the Personal Conduct guideline, as a pattern of dishonest, unreliable or rule-breaking behavior. Self-control, which is the opposite of impulsiveness or immaturity, is a favorable trait that may offset a variety of personal weaknesses.
Many of the immature, young military personnel who have volunteered their services to foreign intelligence services reported afterwards that they made an impulsive decision without thinking through the potential consequences. They did whatever gave them satisfaction or seemed to solve their financial problems at the moment, without considering the long-term effects on themselves or others.
Impulsive persons are motivated by the quick, easy gratification of desires and fail to consider the consequences of their actions. Goals or gains that can be achieved quickly are overvalued, while those that are more distant are undervalued. When a younger person exhibits this pattern, it is often described as immaturity.
Impulsive individuals may not be concerned about duties and obligations and may be careless or lazy. They cannot tolerate boredom and often require constant stimulation. Inability to tolerate frustration may lead to a sudden outburst of hostility or violence.
Immaturity is also characterized by propensity to take risks, susceptibility to peer pressure, and belief that one is invincible so nothing bad could happen. Although immature persons may be ambitious, they seldom appreciate the connection between current performance and long-term rewards. Excessive fascination with intrigue and clandestine intelligence tradecraft may be a sign of immaturity.
One of the prominent current theories of criminality argues that low self-control is the only personal characteristic that differentiates offenders from nonoffenders. According to this view, the necessary conditions for criminal acts are too little self-restraint and a desirable and conveniently accessible target. 6 Other persuasive theories of criminality focus on a wider range of social, biological and psychological variables.
Impulsiveness/immaturity and antisocial tendencies are a volatile mix. When combined with resentment, a desire for revenge, or judgment clouded by alcohol abuse, they comprise a recipe for trouble.
FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen spied for the Russians for over 20 years until his arrest in 2001. Although he was quiet and withdrawn both at home and at work, childhood friends described Hanssen's behavior as sporadically impulsive and immature. One friend noted, "When he got an idea to do something enormously risky, there was no stopping him." During his teenage years, such risks included reckless shooting and irresponsible driving. Once, while shooting at targets in a friend's basement, he suddenly began shooting at the wall as his friends watched in amazement. Frequently, he liked to scare his friends with erratic, fast, and reckless driving. He would challenge friends to street races on narrow, winding roads, or try to find the maximum speed his small car could reach while turning corners. His friends noted that he never warned them or asked them before he took off on an erratic driving spree, and that they often feared for their safety.
Hanssen's impulsivity and lack of self-control continued into his adult years, where it took on a more sexual nature. Within days of his marriage to his wife, he cheated on her with an ex-girlfriend. Twice during the early years of his marriage, he snuck up on his sister-in-law and touched her breast while she was breastfeeding, prompting suspicion from many of his relatives. He also liked to post erotic stories about himself and his wife on web sites, risking identification by using their real names and real situations. His most disturbing sexual adventure, unbeknownst to his wife, was asking his best friend to watch them having sex through the window of their bedroom, and later, on closed circuit TV wired from the bedroom into his very own living room.
There is evidence that Hanssen's first deal to sell classified information to the Russians was impulsive as well. From childhood, Robert Hanssen had been enthralled with KGB spycraft and fascinated with the spy game in general. When he joined the FBI he was idealistic. He was ready to nab Russian spies in what seemed the most exciting job of his life, especially considering his knowledge and understanding of the KGB. Unfortunately, his idealistic start turned to sour disregard, and even disdain, for his fellow FBI agents when he thought they did not share his enthusiasm for thwarting Russian Intelligence activities in the United States.
Lack of support and enthusiasm from his colleagues left Hanssen reeling. It also sparked an old fantasy--to become the best spy the world had ever seen. Hanssen had access to classified information that he knew was useful to the KGB. His first transaction, unfortunately, was not as glorious and well thought out as he would have hoped. When his wife walked in on him in the aftermath of the trade and discovered his first act of espionage, Hanssen was forced to rethink his means of operation, and to become a much more careful spy.
During the 20 years that Hanssen worked as a spy for the KGB, his impulsive behavior affected his spycraft. He would often not show up for "drops" or cancel a transaction without cause. He insisted that the KGB do things his way or no way. He felt this put him a step ahead of the KGB and ensured his personal anonymity and security. He believed that his intellectual superiority to both his fellow FBI agents and to the KGB rendered him untouchable. Although he knew the great risk of his spying, he was confident that he was invincible. 7
Inability to maintain healthy, long-term personal or work relationships is a serious security concern as it indicates a low capacity for loyalty. Because emotional, mental, and personality disorders often become apparent through their impact on interpersonal relationships, inability to form a commitment is a surrogate measure for a wide variety of suitability and mental health issues. It is often found together with antisocial behavior and/or narcissism.
Inability to make a commitment is not identified by a single event, such as a divorce. It refers to a pattern of poor relationships and an aimless or erratic life style or work history. Employment history may show a pattern of frequent job changes without corresponding career advancement (e.g., three or more jobs in five years not explained by the nature of job or economic or seasonal fluctuation; walking off several jobs without other jobs in sight). Relationships tend to be one-sided and often last less than one year. There may be a history of unhappy love affairs. Marriages are often unstable. After divorce, there may be no continuing contact with children. Inability to form enduring emotional commitments is often traced to abuse or neglect, split loyalties, or broken allegiances during childhood or adolescence.
Persons who are unable to form a commitment should be distinguished from the socially withdrawn individual who remains alone by choice. Most Americans who have been arrested for espionage were not loners. They had greater than average need for the attention, approval, and admiration of others, but many were unable to sustain long-term relationships because their behavior engendered resentment among family, friends, and coworkers.
Christopher Boyce compromised highly sensitive communications satellite programs to the former Soviet Union. He had been a model youth -- president of his middle school class and an altar boy who aspired to a career in the priesthood. In high school in the 1960s during the Vietnam War, he became deeply disillusioned with his religion and with the U.S. Government. 8
When Boyce was investigated and approved for special access program and cryptographic clearances at age 21, the only evidence of his inner turmoil was having dropped out of three colleges during the previous three years and holding six part-time jobs during the previous two years. Of the six positions, he left three positions without giving notice, being ineligible for rehire at one of them, eligible for rehire at the second, and questionable for rehire at the third. A former landlord indicated he failed to take care of his apartment and moved without notice. He was described as young, immature and unsettled, and his friends in his last college town were considered "hippies." His then-current supervisor questioned his abilities and initiative and said he showed up for work on Mondays with a hangover. 9
This information might have indicated to an astute observer that Boyce was not the type of person one could count on to make any form of long-term commitment involving access to some of the nation's most sensitive secrets.
Desire for revenge can trigger sabotage, espionage, violent attack, or other illegal behavior. Several well-known spies are known to have had a strong propensity toward vindictiveness.
Vindictiveness is often found in narcissists whose self-esteem is based on a grossly inflated opinion of their own abilities. They interpret criticism, disagreement, or failure to recognize their special talents as a personal insult that merits retribution. The retribution is a means of restoring injured self-esteem.
Vindictive behavior should be reported. Implied threats of vindictive behavior should be taken seriously. They merit management attention and careful security evaluation. This includes statements such as "You haven't seen the last of me; I'll be back." "I'll get even for that." "They can't treat me like that and get away with it." "Don't worry, I'll find my own way to get what they owe me." "If he does that one more time I’ll...." Even if the individual seems to be just blowing off steam, such statements indicate a level of frustration that should be dealt with proactively. Review of security and personnel files by a mental health professional may be an appropriate first step in some cases.
Navy spy John Walker's daughter reported that he had books on revenge and on dirty tricks, such as putting epoxy glue into locks of cars and homes. Walker once told a friend: "You never confront a person face to face. You get even. Maybe three years from now." 10
The paranoid personality is distinguished by a pervasive distrust and suspicion of other people. Such persons are preoccupied with unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates. They are reluctant to confide in others for fear that information they share will be used against them. They may refuse to answer personal questions, saying the information is "nobody’s business." They read hidden meanings that are demeaning or threatening into innocent remarks or unrelated events. They may interpret an innocent mistake by a store clerk as a deliberate attempt to shortchange them.
A supervisor's compliment on an accomplishment may be misinterpreted as an attempt to coerce more or better performance. An offer of help may be viewed as a criticism that the person is not doing well enough on his or her own. Minor slights arouse major hostility, and these slights are never forgiven or forgotten. Such persons often have unjustified suspicions that their spouse or sexual partner is unfaithful. They want to maintain complete control over intimate relationships to avoid being betrayed. They may gather trivial and circumstantial "evidence" to support their jealous beliefs.
Paranoid personalities may blame others for their own shortcomings. Because they are quick to counterattack in response to perceived threats, they may become involved in legal disputes. Such persons are attracted to simplistic black-and-white explanations of events, and are often wary of ambiguous situations. Paranoia often disrupts relationships with supervisors and coworkers. Severe paranoia is often a precursor of other mental disorders or found together with other disorders. 3
Paranoia is a serious security concern, as the paranoid can easily view his or her employer or the U.S. Government as the enemy, and act accordingly. Alternatively, what appears to be paranoia may have a factual basis. Seemingly extreme concern about being investigated or watched or searching for listening devices or hidden cameras may indicate that a person is engaged in illegal activity and fears detection.
Risk-seeking is one particularly significant form of impulsive, irresponsible behavior. Risk-seekers ignore or gloss over risks (impulsiveness or immaturity) or think the risks do not apply to them because they are so clever or talented (grandiosity). They are inclined to become involved in reckless driving, gambling, fighting, vandalism, use of drugs such as LSD and PCP, holding up the local 7-11 convenience store, or becoming a spy.
When risk-seeking is combined with other weaknesses such as antisocial attitudes and inability to make a commitment, it may contribute to illegal behavior. Such persons may be attracted by the excitement of espionage rather than repelled by the risk. Examples from actual espionage cases are discussed below.
Risk-seekers often consider conventional lifestyles beneath them. They are restless and impetuous and cannot tolerate boredom or inactivity. Since work is not always exciting, they find it hard to sustain consistent work behavior.
This type of person cannot turn down a dare. They may think it is fun to see how close they can come to breaking the rules without getting caught. Sex is often just another way of getting kicks, so it is impersonal and devoid of emotional attachment.
It is important to distinguish thoughtless risk from calculated risk. Persons involved in the riskier hobbies or occupations, such as a mountain climber, downhill ski racer, sky diver, or military specialties such as fighter pilot undergo considerable training. They learn to control their nerves and emotions, carefully calculate the level of risk, and take appropriate precautions to reduce the chances of adverse consequences. This is, in fact, good training in self-control.
In his CIA work, Aldrich Ames demonstrated the inconsistent performance typical of many thrill-seekers. He displayed what the CIA Inspector General's report on this case called "selective enthusiasm." According to this report: "With the passage of time, Ames increasingly demonstrated zeal only for those few tasks that captured his imagination while ignoring elements of his job that were of little personal interest to him."
In his espionage activity, Aldrich Ames ignored risks by conspicuous spending of his illegal income, carrying large packages of money across international borders, and leaving evidence of his espionage on his home computer and hidden elsewhere in his home. 11
Navy spy John Walker had a legendary reputation as a daredevil. For example, one night when returning to his submarine after some heavy drinking, he spotted a blimp tethered nearby. He led his colleagues in an effort to cut the blimp loose, but was scared off when a policeman shouted a warning and then fired a warning shot. 10
1. Several government agencies have conducted comprehensive psychological assessments of their employees arrested for espionage, and an Intelligence Community project has interviewed and administered psychological tests to a number of Americans serving jail terms for espionage. Most interviews and tests were conducted after conviction and incarceration and were subject to agreements that protect the privacy of the offenders. Privacy and security considerations preclude public release of these studies.
2. Gottfredson, M.R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Parker, J.P., & Wiskoff, M.F. (1992). Temperament constructs related to betrayal of trust (Technical Report 92-002). Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Collins, J.M., & Schmidt, F.L. (1993). Personality, integrity, and white collar crime: A construct validity study. Personnel Psychology, 46, 295-311. Brodsky, S.L., & Smitherman, H.O. (1983). Handbook of scales for research in crime and delinquency. New York: Plenum Press. Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (1989). How to measure employee reliability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 273-279. Collins, J.M., & Muchinsky, P.M. (1994). Fraud in the executive offices: Personality differentiation of white collar criminality among managers. Paper presented at 23rd International Congress of Applied Psychology, Madrid, Spain.
3. American Psychiatric Association. (1995). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.) (DSM-IV). Washington, DC: Author.
4. Kneece, J. (1986). Family treason: The Walker spy case. Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein & Day. And Earley, P. (1988). Family of spies: Inside the John Walker spy ring. New York: Bantam Books.
5. Blitzer, W. (1989). Territory of lies: The rise, fall, and betrayal of Jonathan Jay Pollard. New York: Harper & Row.
6. Gottfredson, M.R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
7. Vise, D.A. (2002). The bureau and the mole: The unmasking of Robert Philip Hanssen, the most dangerous double agent in FBI history. New York, NY: Grove Press.
8. Lindsey, R. (1980). The falcon and the snowman. New York: Pocket Books.
9. Declassified extracts from preemployment security investigation of Christopher Boyce.
10. Kneece, J. (1986). Family treason: The Walker spy case. Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein & Day.
11. Unclassified Abstract of the CIA Inspector General's Report on the Aldrich H. Ames Case.