DAC-PSM Public Meeting

November 14, 2024

For tech support issues, contact Ms. Emma Groo

202-878-1691 or emma.w.groo.ctr@mail.mil

Please remain muted unless speaking

Agenda

- Roll Call

- Opening Remarks

- Public Comment Review

- Sessions
  - Vote: NDAA Study Topic on Exit Interviews
  - Discussion: DAC-IPAD Insights from Closed Case Data Analysis and Site Visits
  - Brief: FY25 Research Agenda
  - Brief: NDAA Study Topic on Recruit Pre-Screening
  - Vote: 2024 Study Recommendations

- Meeting Close

Roll Call and Opening Comments

- **Roll Call**
  - DAC-PSM Members

- **Quorum**
  - Confirm if quorum has been met

- **Opening Comments**

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DAC-PSM

Co-Chairs:
Ms. Gina Grosso (Lt Gen USAF (Ret))
Dr. Lindsay Orchowski

Members:
Dr. Antonia Abbey
Mr. Clem Coward (MG USA (Ret))
Dr. Dorothy Edwards
Dr. Armando Estrada
Ms. Stephanie Gattas
Dr. Sharyn Potter
Dr. John Pryor
Ms. Lynn Rosenthal
Ms. Jennifer Silva
Dr. Amy Slep
Ms. Glorina Stallworth
Dr. Michele Ybarra

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Public Comment Review

No public comments received regarding content of this specific meeting

- No statements were received by email or phone by the submission deadline specified in the Public Register Notice

Received submission with several recommendations for the Committee's consideration.

- Committee is now reviewing those recommendations and will publicly respond at future meeting

Today's Voting Process

Have several recommendations before the Committee today prior to their potential inclusion in any upcoming Committee documents

Today's process will be…

- Overview of issue provided by DAC-PSM Member

- Vote facilitated by DAC-PSM staff

  - "All those in favor"…"All those opposed"

  - Need majority to pass a recommendation for adoption, but will seek to capture input from anyone "opposed" so that can be reflected in Committee document.

See meeting handout "DAC-PSM Nov 14 Recommendations for Vote" for list of all recommendations to be considered today

NDAA Study Topics:

Recap on Status of All Topics
Exit Interviews and CATCH Program

FY21 NDAA-Directed Studies for DAC-PSM

FY21 NDAA directed DAC-PSM to undertake 4 studies. However, DAC-PSM only restarted in late 2022, and immediately started training study to support another NDAA provision

- In 2023, DAC-PSM staff and DoD OGC discussed options to address each provision

Topic 1: PME Review -- Assess sexual assault prevention and response training in leader professional military education (PME). *-- Subcommittee will present recommendations today*

Topic 2: Recruit Screening -- Assess the feasibility of screening recruits who may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment. *-- Will hear briefing on later today*

Topic 3: Exit Interviews and CATCH Program-- Assess the feasibility of conducting exit interviews during the discharge process to determine if Service members experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it, and assess the feasibility of combining such exit interviews in DoD's Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program. ***-- For vote on recommendations today***

Topic 4: Reporting Database Anonymization -- Assess whether DoD's sexual assault reporting databases are sufficiently anonymized to ensure privacy while still providing military leaders with select case details and administrative information. *-- Received info at June meeting, and considering way ahead*

Topic: Exit Interviews and CATCH Program

NDAA FY21 Study Requirement

- Assess the feasibility of conducting exit interviews during the discharge process to determine:

  ▪ If Service members experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it

  ▪ Feasibility of combining such exit interviews with DoD's Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program

Committee Efforts to Date

- June 27 briefed by Dept on approach to exit interviews (Health Affairs) and CATCH program (SAPRO)
- Resulting member discussions led to findings and proposed recommendations in meeting handout "Exit Interviews and CATCH Program"

Findings and Recommendations: Discussion

Finding: While likely feasible, the DAC-PSM supports DoD's current approach of not asking such questions during exit interviews due to potential negative impact on transitioning Service members. In addition, during its review, the DAC-PSM learned there is no DoD-wide policy preventing this questioning.

- **Recommendation:** DAC-PSM recommends **implementation of DoD-wide policy** preventing transitioning Service Members from being asked during exit interviews whether they experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it.

Finding: Given existing DoD policy (from 2023), the DAC-PSM does not see the need for any additional recommendations regarding the role for the CATCH Program in such situations, but does encourage sharing as much information as appropriate on this new policy with those going through the military separation process.

- **Recommendation**: Any informational materials provided to Service members separating from the Service should **clearly reflect the 2023 DoD policy** allowing Service members to submit a CATCH report without having to make an official report of sexual assault.

Finding: Above topics and recs captured central parts of discussion topic

- **Recommendation:** Report that DAC-PSM sees need for **no further action** on topic

Recommendations: Vote

Recommendation 1:
- DAC-PSM recommends **implementation of DoD-wide policy** preventing transitioning Service Members from being asked during exit interviews whether they experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it.

Recommendation 2:
- Any informational materials provided to Service members separating from the Service should **clearly reflect the 2023 DoD policy** allowing Service members to submit a CATCH report without having to make an official report of sexual assault.

Recommendation 3:
- Report that DAC-PSM sees need for **no further action** on topic

Topic: Reporting Database Anonymization

NDAA Study Requirement

- Assess whether DoD's sexual assault reporting databases are sufficiently anonymized to ensure privacy, while still providing military leaders with necessary information, such as:

  - Length of time the victim and assailant were at the duty station where the sexual assault occurred

  - Percentage of sexual assaults occurring while the victim or assailant were on temporary duty, leave, or otherwise away from their permanent duty station

  - Number of sexual assaults that involve an abuse of power by a commander or supervisor

Efforts to Date

- June 27 briefed by Dept on database anonymity approaches
- Reviewing Dept feedback to questions to determine if additional inquiries required

Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD)

Insights from Closed Case Data Analysis and Site Visits

Why This Session?

Per DAC-PSM Charter:

- "…the DAC-PSM shall also **consult and coordinate** with the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces on matters of joint interest to the two advisory committees…"

  - DAC-PSM shall review "Closed cases involving allegations of sexual assault"

    Same detail not in the DAC-IPAD Charter but appreciate opportunity to discuss topics of shared interest

Presenters:

Ms. Meghan Peters, DAC-IPAD Deputy Director

Ms. Suzanne Goldberg, DAC-IPAD Member and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategic Operations and Outreach, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education

Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces
(DAC-IPAD)

Case Review Data & Site Visit Information

Ms. Suzanne Goldberg and Ms. Meghan Peters

Statutory Authority and Mission

- Section 546 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY15, as amended:

  The DAC-IPAD shall provide independent advice and recommendations on the investigation, prosecution, and defense of allegations of rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct involving members of the Armed Forces, based on its ongoing review of cases.

- The Committee can make recommendations for systemic change when, in the DAC-IPAD members' collective judgment, it will improve the investigation, prosecution, and defense of sexual misconduct.

Selecting Topics for Review

- Congressional Taskings

- Requests from the DoD General Counsel

- Committee Decision

DAC-IPAD Reports

- Six *Annual Reports to Congress*

- Individual Topic reports – Examples of topics explored by the DAC-IPAD:
  - *Exploring the Race, Ethnicity, and Gender of Military Panels at Courts-Martial, August 2024*
  - *Report on Reforming Pretrial Procedures*, June 2023
  - *Report on Victim Impact Statements*, March 2023
  - *Report on SVC Tour Lengths and Reporting Structure*, August 2022
  - *Report on Investigative Case File Reviews*, October 2020

Report on Investigative Case File Review

Reviewed 1, 900 case files:

- Investigative case files and courts-martial records (Report of Investigation, charge sheets, Art. 32 report, Result of Trial).

- Checklist used to record observations & 231 data points for every case.

- An independent criminologist performed data analysis.

- Members made qualitative assessments of the evidence.

Accused/Offender Characteristics

- 97.7% of reported cases have an accused male Servicemember.

- 93% of accused are enlisted Servicemembers and largely in the grade of E-3 and E-4.

- Majority of accused are white Servicemembers (66.5%).

- Only 55% of accused Servicemembers reported alcohol use.

Other Characteristics

- 75% of sexual assaults were reported in CONUS.

- 57% of victims reported alcohol use at the time of the assault.

- The top reported relationship between the subject and the victim, from the victim's perspective, was a friend followed by a current or former spouse.

- <u>Type of victim</u>:

  - 52.7% enlisted and 2.5% officer.

  - 94% of victims were in the pay grade of E-5 or below.

  - Civilian (21.7%)

  - DoD Spouse (22.8%). In 70.6% of these cases the subject was the spouse's husband.

Discussion

- Understanding the characteristics of military sexual assault offenders is crucial for developing effective and targeted prevention strategies, including education and training initiatives.

- These data should be compared with site visit feedback from both male and female junior enlisted Service members.

- Future coordination: DAC-PSM Member with expertise in development of case screening criteria could potentially capture prevention-related data in the DAC-IPAD's next case review project.

DAC-IPAD Site Visit Participants

- In 2024, DAC-IPAD Members visited 16 military installations world-wide.

  - 125 small focus group discussions with over 600 personnel regarding their perspectives on the military justice system.
  - Over 150 junior enlisted participants, in pay grades E-1 to E-4.
  - Range of locations, including JB Andrews, Camp Foster, FT Cavazos, and more.

- Gathered base-level perspectives on the Offices of Special Trial Counsel and on sexual assault and harassment awareness among junior enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, and commanders.

Goals

- Focus on observations from junior enlisted Service members about sexual assault and harassment prevention and unit climate.

- Identify shared and unique challenges faced by male and female Service members.

- Present feedback from the field on ways to improve the effectiveness of prevention training, unit culture, and reporting processes.

Site Visit Feedback Topics

- Training and awareness

- Accountability and fairness

- Reporting challenges

- Unit climate and culture

Training and Awareness

- Training is overly dependent on PowerPoint slides, often repetitive and viewed as ineffective.

- Training sessions are usually conducted in large groups, which limits engagement and personalization.

- Service members express a preference for small group sessions, scenario-based learning, and real-life role-playing exercises.

Training and Awareness

Gender-Specific Insights

- Female Service members: Highlight the importance of self-defense and predator-awareness training as additional components.

- Male Service members: Some report feeling unfairly generalized as potential aggressors, which can lead to disengagement during training.

Accountability and Fairness

- Junior enlisted personnel perceive a clear double standard, with leniency afforded to senior ranks in cases of misconduct.

- Both male and female Service members express frustration over perceived favoritism in disciplinary actions.

- Concerns over accountability are tied to mistrust in the reporting process and doubt that justice will be served.

Reporting

- Fear of retaliation is a primary barrier to reporting, with personnel concerned about social and career repercussions.

- Female service members are particularly hesitant to report incidents involving higher-ranking perpetrators.

- A lack of confidentiality and trust in the chain of command exacerbates underreporting.

- Cultural barriers to reporting persist for males who experience sexual harassment and assault.

Unit Climate and Culture

- Command intervention on harassment varies widely; some leaders address issues promptly, while others overlook or dismiss complaints.

- A "boys' club" culture is prevalent in male-dominated units, where inappropriate behavior can be normalized.

- Male and female participants describe a culture of "locker room" language and tolerance for off-color comments, which can make professional interactions uncomfortable.

- Barracks and dorm safety is top of mind.

Unit Climate and Culture

Gender-Specific Insights

• Female Service members: Report feeling isolated, stigmatized, and unsupported in male-dominated environments.

• Male Service members: Many express fear of accusations and avoid one-on-one interactions with female colleagues.

Recommendations from the Field

- Training: Shift to small-group, scenario-based, and role-playing training formats.

- Accountability: Create a feedback mechanism on case progress and publicize cases of senior personnel accountability to foster trust and transparency.

- Reporting: Ensure confidentiality and reinforce whistleblower protections.

- Unit culture: Emphasize the value of increasing gender diversity in leadership roles to model inclusive behavior and mitigate isolation.

Discussion

- When Service members feel respected and secure in their environment, they can recognize, prevent, and respond to behaviors that may constitute sexual harassment and assault.

- Lack of awareness and potential misperceptions about disciplinary action.

- The *Report on Investigative Case File Review* is narrower in scope and uses a different methodology than the discussions in site visit focus groups.

BREAK

**Public Meeting will resume at
11:15 AM ET**

Office of Force Resiliency

FY25 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda and Potential Future Topics

Integrated Prevention Research Agenda

Research & Translation
Office of Command Climate & Well-Being Integration
Office of Force Resiliency

14 November 2024

Dr. Jason Katz
Senior Research Psychologist

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Plan for Presentation

- Background and Requirements

- Context/Related Efforts

- FY25 & FY26 Integrated Prevention Research Agendas

- Discussion

Integrated Prevention Research Agenda

- Annual Primary Prevention Research Agenda

  o NDAA FY 2022, SEC 549:

    – Beginning on October 1, 2022, and annually on the first day of each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall publish a Department of Defense research agenda for that fiscal year, focused on the primary prevention of interpersonal and self-directed violence, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, domestic violence, child abuse and maltreatment, problematic juvenile sexual behavior, suicide, workplace violence, and substance misuse

      ▪ NDAA includes elements and guiding principles for the research agenda

  o NDAA FY 2023, Section 547:

    – Incorporation of Research and Findings – The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the findings and conclusions from the primary prevention research agenda […] are regularly incorporated, as appropriate, within the primary prevention workforce […]

  o Per DoDI 6400.11, "A research agenda that strengthens the DoD's primary prevention research portfolio by prioritizing research topics, ensuring collaboration across sectors and organizations, and reducing duplication of effort"

Integrated Prevention Research Agenda (cont.)

- DoD Guidance and IRC-SAM Recommendations Informing Research Agenda

Leadership · **Prevention Workforce** · **Military Community** · **Collaborative Relationships** · **Data** · **Resources** · **Policy**

PREVENTION SYSTEM

UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM · COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH · QUALITY IMPLEMENTATION · CONTINUOUS EVALUATION · IMPACT · DECREASED PREVALENCE

PREVENTION PROCESS

DoD Prevention Process and Prevention System as outlined in the Prevention Plan of Action 2.0

Integrated Prevention Research Agenda (cont.)

- DoD Guidance and IRC Recommendations Informing Research Agenda (cont.)
  - IRC Prevention and Climate Line of Effort Themes
    - Leadership development
    - Workforce development
    - Selected primary prevention
    - Climate assessment
    - Community level prevention strategies
    - Effective training and education
    - Perpetration of interpersonal violence
  - Essential Components of Prevention (DoDI 6400.09)
    - Skill development
    - Protective environments and healthy climates
    - Substance use
    - Military dependent support
    - Financial readiness
    - Selected primary prevention

Integrated Prevention Research Agenda (cont.)

- ## Annual Prevention Research Agenda Framework

Research Needs	Leaders		Prevention Workforce		Military Community	
	Short-Term	Long-Term	Short-Term	Long-Term	Short-Term	Long-Term
Understand the Problem						
Comprehensive Approach						
Quality Implementation						
Continuous Evaluation						

- In FY 2022, the framework was completed to provide a roadmap for annual research agendas

- Within those areas, research priorities are addressed through the annual research agenda

- The annual research agenda may also include priorities identified in the NDAA

Research Agenda Context/Related Efforts

| Integrated Prevention Research Agenda | → | DoD Clearinghouse for Primary Prevention Research and Evaluation | → | Incorporation of Research Findings within the Primary Prevention Workforce |

- DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6400.11, *DoD Integrated Primary Prevention Policy for Prevention Workforce and Leaders*, Section 2.1.c., establishes that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
  - "…develops and maintains a DoD clearinghouse on DoD-sponsored prevention research to catalog and disseminate, as appropriate, harmful behavior prevention research and evaluation findings to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DoD Components."
- The Clearinghouse is responsive to NDAA FY 2022, SEC 549A, which directs the need for improved dissemination of prevention research.

FY 2025 & 2026 Research Agendas

- The FY 2025 Research Agenda was published on 1 October 2024 and is available on prevention.mil

- The Department is addressing the following focus areas in FY 2025:

  – Assess frequency and type of pre-military risk or protective factors

  – Identify interpersonal characteristics of prevention personnel that enhance work performance

  – Identify implementation science principles that support local prevention practice

- Potential focus areas for the FY 2026 Research Agenda (to be published on 1 October 2025)

Discussion

- # FY 2025 Research Agenda

  - Are any of the published focus areas for FY 2025 of particular interest to the DAC-PSM for a potential project?

- # FY 2026 Research Agenda

  - Thinking about the examples of potential focus areas for FY 2026, or any additional areas outlined in the research agenda framework, what would you like to see prioritized?

  - Within these areas, what are some of the key issues/considerations to emphasize?

Integrated Primary Prevention

- The Department is pursuing a holistic approach of integrated primary prevention aimed at preventing harmful behaviors, creating healthier command climates and safer environments for our military community.

- To implement this approach, DoD is creating and on-boarding an Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW).

- Leaders will work with the IPPW to overcome barriers to readiness and enhance protective factors in their organizations.

DoD Prevention Approach

- **Climate Focused**
  - Requires that leaders foster healthy climates to ensure through policy and oversight that the military community has skills to make healthy decisions and develop respectful, inclusive relationships and teams in and outside of the workplace

- **Integrated**
  - ➢ Mitigates risk and protective factors for multiple harmful behaviors using shared solutions

- **Comprehensive**
  - ➢ Uses a combination of programs (e.g., skills training), policies, and practices (e.g., bystander intervention) to reinforce healthy decision making across settings

- **Data-Driven**
  - ➢ Applies public health principles for data-informed decision making to develop, implement, and evaluate prevention activities that provide the maximum benefit for the largest number of people

This figure displays some of the risk and protective factors that have been found to be related to two or more of the harmful behaviors of interest based on previous research. An integrated approach to prevention is especially promising because of these shared risk and protective factors.

Harmful Behaviors

Risk Factors

Protective Factors

Everyday Stressors | Previous Trauma(s) | Poor Social Skills | Social Isolation | Aggressive Behavior | Unhealthy Climate | Mental Health | Positive Social Norms | Problem Solving Skills | Access to Services | Culture of Help-Seeking | Emotional Regulation

Suicide
Substance Misuse
Harassment
Sexual Assault
Domestic Abuse
Child Abuse

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Integrated Prevention Research Agenda

- The Research Agenda Framework

  o Framework collaboratively developed in FY 2022 to guide formation of annual research agendas:

  – Establishes method by which the annual agenda and priorities will be developed

  – Creates cohesive approach to building DoD prevention research portfolio over time

  – Ensures short- and long-term investments meet immediate and enduring prevention needs

  – Incorporates current DoD guidance for prevention and recommendations of the Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault in the Military

  – Achieves maximum benefit from research by focusing on efforts that have the potential to address 2+ forms of harmful behavior

    ▪ Sexual assault, harassment, domestic abuse, child abuse, workplace violence, problematic sexual behaviors among children and youth, suicide, and substance misuse

  o The framework will be reviewed and updated as appropriate as part of developing future research agendas

FY 2023 Research Agenda Progress

FY 2023 Priorities	Progress Updates
Understand Service members' activities and prevention needs within the cyber environment	DoD is working with Library of Congress Federal Research Division (FRD) to explore Service members' activities in the cyber environment (i.e., social media, internet sites including blogs and social networking sites, apps [e.g., dating apps, Jodel], and video games) to assess prevention needs, and will determine how to leverage the cyber environment to enhance prevention activities. To understand the landscape of the cyber environment, FRD began with reviewing Service-wide and Installation/Command/Unit- specific policies, procedures, and programming related to harmful behavior in the cyber environment. This will inform future directions of the study.
Understand how the cyber environment shapes Service member attitudes and behaviors in ways that increase or decrease harmful behaviors	Through the agreement with the Library of Congress FRD, DoD is assessing how activities in the cyber environment can increase or decrease risk and protective factors for harmful behaviors. For example, FRD is reviewing academic literature and government studies to identify how the cyber environment shapes Service member attitudes and behaviors, including information cocooning among Service members. Additionally, FRD is soliciting information from the Services on programs or initiatives related to harmful behavior in the cyber environment implemented Service-wide or at specific installations.
Define elements and the essential conditions necessary for the implementation and evaluation of multi-pronged, multi-level, integrated approaches in military communities	Through an interagency agreement with the CDC's Division of Violence Prevention (DVP), DoD is conducting a review of the literature to create a comprehensive list of essential conditions that contribute to the success of multi-level prevention approaches. These approaches emphasize mutually reinforcing prevention activities at each level of the social ecology, applicable to the military environment. The envisioned end-products will complement the 2023 "Community and Organizational Level Prevention of Harmful Behaviors in the Military: Leveraging the Best Available Evidence." (Downloadable from: https://www.prevention.mil/Resources/Tools/)
Develop and evaluate online bystander intervention tools to mitigate risk for harmful behaviors in the cyber environment	Through the agreement with the CDC DVP, DoD is conducting a literature review and environmental scan to identify and assess the best available evidence on bystander interventions for technology-facilitated abuse. To augment this information, DoD will also gather input from subject matter experts in various related sectors. The outputs of these efforts will inform potential adaptations of bystander intervention approaches for the cyber environment, specifically for the military context.

FY 2024 Research Agenda Progress

Focus Areas	Progress Updates
Define risk and protective factors at interpersonal and organizational levels	In the fall of 2023, the Defense Advisory Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Misconduct (DAC-PSM) began a study on community- and organizational-level risk (e.g., gender stereotypes, institutional racism, alcohol outlet density) and protective factors (e.g., connectedness, safe housing, access to medical care and mental health services) for harmful behaviors in the military environment. The subcommittee will recommend measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for those identified factors to assist DoD's efforts to track changes over time, as well as to inform efforts to evaluate programming focused on modifying these factors to decrease harmful behaviors. In addition, through the interagency agreement with FRD, DoD's Violence Prevention Cell (VPC) is working to further understand the role of core values in the Services as a protective factor for harmful behaviors at the organization/community level.
Assess whether and to what extent sub-populations of the military community are targeted by harmful behaviors more than others	In collaboration with DoD's Office of People Analytics (OPA), DoD's VPC is conducting a study to identify military sub-populations who may be at increased risk for harmful behaviors and to understand the organizational climates that may contribute to that increased risk. The study involves secondary analysis of data collected from OPA surveys, including the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of the Active Component (WGRA), the Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of the Active Component (WEOA), the Status of Forces Survey of the Active Component (SOFA), and the Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS). Ultimately, findings from this work may inform selected primary prevention programs and policies addressing disproportionate risk.
Seek to improve the collection and dissemination of data on hazing and bullying related to interpersonal and self-directed harm	Through the agreement with the FRD, DoD's VPC is assessing current processes in the Services for summarizing, distilling, sharing, and using hazing and bullying data to inform decision-making when planning prevention activities. This work includes conducting document reviews and key informant interviews with Service representatives and will result in recommendations based on best practices from the research literature.

BREAK

Public Meeting will resume at 1:00 PM ET

NDAA Study Topic:

Recruit Screening

Topic: Recruit Screening

NDAA FY21 Study Requirement

- Assessment of the feasibility of...

  - Screening before entry into military service of recruits who may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment, including through background checks; and

  - Administration of screening tests to recruits to assess recruit views and beliefs on equal opportunity, and whether such views and beliefs are compatible with military service

Committee Efforts to Date

- Prior discussion on hold pending fuller implementation of relevant DoD initiatives

Today's brief will lay out what DoD already has underway on this issue
- Dr. Sofiya Velgach -- Personnel and Readiness, M&RA, MPP (AP), Assistant Director, Testing Standards

Accession Process

SLIDES ONLY
NO SCRIPT PROVIDED

DAC-PSM Presentation
Assessment at Accession
November 2024

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
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Topic: Recruit Screening

- **Question:** FY 2021 NDAA - The DAC-PSM was directed to assess the feasibility of **screening recruits** who may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment and the feasibility of administering screening tests to assess if recruits' views on equal opportunity are compatible with military service.

- **Responsive Efforts:** Enlistment screening is part of the Accession Process
  - Processes and Policies
    - Accession Process
    - Disqualification Factors
    - Waivers
  - Evidence based Analyses
    - Personnel Security Analysis
    - Military Compatibility – Aligned to Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault in the Military, Recommendation 2.6 c - Screening Tests
      - Compatibility – Personality Based Composite
      - Feasibility of using Licensed Clinician

Accession Process

Gate 1 Prior to visiting MEPS	Gate 2	Gate 3

Recruiting

Contact, Interview, gain Commitment, etc.

Some applicants will take the ASVAB at this stage

Recruiter has applicant fill out Medical history (DD2807-2) and prescreen documents; Background check (DD369), Questionnaire for national security positions (SF-86)

Recruiter sends prescreen packet through their representative Service Liaison/Guidance Counselor (SL/GC) at MEPS

Pre-MEPS Administration

SL/GC and MEPS create applicant record in processing systems

MEPS medical personnel conduct prescreen of medical history using DD 2807* and information available through MHS GENESIS for applicants who self-disclosed

*As Per DoDI 6130.03 v1

Applicants with no history move to PA	Some require additional medical records

Processing authorized

At the MEPS

Aptitude testing as required – ASVAB, special tests, etc

Drug and HIV testing

Submit Fingerprinting and FBI background check

Medical exam to determine qualifications

Applicants work with recruiting command personnel at MEPS to determine career path, pay, bonuses, timeline to ship to basic training, etc.

Outcome #1
If qualified

Outcome #2
If more medical information is needed

Outcome #3
If found not qualified

Sign contract
Oath of Enlistment

After MEPS

Get medical consult/additional medical records and return to MEPS

Service recruiting decision to pursue waiver for medical or non-medical(tattoo, criminal history etc.) disqualification

Waiver approved, return to MEPS	Waiver denied or not pursued, applicant disqualified

Most will enter delayed entry program, return to MEPS to access and ship to basic training

Legend:
Gate 1 – Recruiting Service Area of Responsibility
Gate 2 – Service and USMEPCOM Area of Responsibility
Gate 3 – Service Waiver Authority and USMEPCOM Area of Responsibility

Applicable elements are in red

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Disqualification Factors

Ineligibility based on Character/Conduct

- DoDI 1304.26, "Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction" sets minimum standards for disqualification - an applicant will be considered ineligible based on character/conduct if he or she:

(1) Judicial restraint (bond, probation, imprisonment, parole)

(2) Significant Criminal Record: convicted of a felony; waivers authorized in meritorious cases. *The waiver procedure is not automatic, and approval is based on each individual case.*

(3) State or federal conviction, or a finding of guilty in a juvenile adjudication, for a felony crime of rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, incest, any other sexual offense, or when the disposition requires the person to register as a sex offender. Waivers are not allowed.

(4) Previously separated from the Military Services under conditions other than honorable or for the good of the Military Service concerned.

(5) Exhibited antisocial behavior or other traits of character that may render the applicant unfit for service.

(6) Receives an unfavorable final determination by the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility on a completed National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) or higher-level investigation, which is adjudicated to the National Security Standards in accordance with Executive Order 12968, during the accession process.

     (a) An applicant may be accessed if a NACLC or higher-level investigation was submitted and accepted by the investigative service provider (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) and an advanced fingerprint was conducted, and OPM did not identify any disqualifying background information.

     (b) If NACLC adjudication is not completed until after accession, disqualifying information identified during the adjudication is transmitted to the appropriate personnel offices for action.

Conduct Waivers

- Conduct Waivers – A Conduct Waiver is required when the final finding of the courts or other adjudicating authority is a conviction or other adverse adjudication of:

(a) One "major misconduct" offense, or;

(b) Two "misconduct" offenses, or;

(c) A pattern of misconduct:

> 1. One "misconduct" offense and four "non-traffic" offenses.

> 2. Five or more "non-traffic" offenses.

DoDI 1304.26 – provides guidance on level of offense and applicable code.

Waivers not authorized:

- Domestic battery and/or violence as defined in the Lautenberg Amendment.

- Rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse, incest, or other sex crimes.

Waivers FY 2024 – Q1 – Q3

DoD Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions ~ 131K

Number of individuals who accessed with a waiver ~ **44K** (34%)

One individual can receive multiple waivers

Waiver Types

- Medical 84%
- Dependency 7%
- Conduct 4%
- Drug 5%

Conduct Waivers ~2K

Questions

Military Compatibility Research:
Contributions from Personnel Security

UNCLASSIFIED

Project Overview ~ A Modeling Effort

- An *exploratory* exercise to evaluate
  - **RQ1:** What is the value of personnel security program data for (in)compatibility assessment at accession?
  - **RQ2:** Does the personnel security data add unique information to previously examined MEPCOM and Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment Systems (TAPAS) data sources ultimately improving the accession process?

Enlisted AD Accessions (FY11 15) who "came of record in a DoD system during FY11 19

Personnel Security "Clearance" Data + Accessions Data

Proxy Compatibility Outcomes
(1) Came of record for *any* misconduct
(2) Came of record for sexual assault
(3) Came of record for criminal misconduct
(4) Came of record for misconduct separation
(5) Came of record for drug test failure

Timeline:
- Project Planning: November – December 2023
- Date Review: January – June 2024
- Analytic Work: July 2024 – January 2025

January 2025 Completion Target

Excellence | People-Centric | Integrity | Collaboration | Respect
UNCLASSIFIED
8

Questions

Assessment of Military Compatibility

- Effort in response to IRC recommendation 2.6 c

  - Line of Effort 2: Prevention

  - 2.6: Create a state-of-the-art DoD prevention research capability

  - Concentration: 2.6 c - operational testing of a Compatibility Assessment for purpose of research using a pre-accession sample

  - Key purposes:

    - Inform the future development of an evidence-based accessions instrument*

    - Inform DoD and the Services about risk factors among the military population, to guide the selection, adaptation, or development of prevention approaches

  *DTAC's efforts focus on this purpose

Assessment of Military Compatibility

- Defining military compatibility (traits to avoid) informed by Military Compatibility Research Group (MCRG)
  - Counterproductive work behaviors
  - Propensity for sexual assault/harassment
  - Insider Threat
  - Other types of misconduct

Non-Cognitive Testing

- The Services have traditionally taken the lead in research and development of non-cognitive assessments

- In FY22 DTAC was charged with introducing joint-service personality assessments
  - To expand the definition of quality (beyond aptitude and education)
  - To expand enlistment eligibility
  - In response to recommendations of the Independent Review Commission (IRC) on Sexual Assault in the Military

- The Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS) was identified as the joint-service assessment instrument

- New efforts include:
  - Joint Enlistment Composite
  - Compatibility Composite
  - Licensed Clinician Evaluation
  - Similar efforts for Officer population

Compatibility Assessment -TAPAS Screening Tool

- Multiple facets of personality are assessed
  - Forced choice between two paired statements with each statement coming from a different personality dimension
    - E.g., Achievement, Non-Delinquency, Physical Conditioning, Self-Control, Even-Tempered, Humility

Which of these statements is the most like you?

- People come to me when they want fresh ideas.
- Most people would say I am a "good listener."

- Phased approach
  - Centralized testing software
  - Phased approach to Military Compatibility Composite
    - Phase 0: Army Conduct Composite
      - Optimized for predicting conduct-related first-term attrition – Developed by Army
      - Implemented Sept FY24 across Services
      - Actively collecting data across Services as per IRC implementation deadline
    - Phase 1: Optimized Composite (refinement of facets) – FY26
    - Phase 2: Optimized Composite (further refinement, potential for new facets) - TBD

Licensed Clinician

- Evaluating a two-step process for evaluation of military compatibility
  1. Initial non-cognitive assessment
     - Enlistment: TAPAS, military compatibility composite score
     - Officers: TBD (based on lessons learned with enlisted population)
     - Flag examinees as high-risk
  2. Clinical interview
     - Interview for flagged high-risk examinees (approx. 50-minutes)
     - Clinician would provide a recommendation for eligibility for service

- Next steps – Designing the pilot and evaluating feasibility
  - Method for setting cut score on composite score of screener for Phase 1 (e.g., TAPAS)
  - Defining the optimal point in the accessions process to hold the clinical interview
  - Detailed procedures and content areas to address during the clinical assessment
  - Identifying supporting information and gaining access to aid the clinician in making a recommendation in Phase 2
    - E.g., DD 369, Police Record Check
  - Explore in-person/remote options for clinical assessment
  - Determine feasibility

Best Practices Project Team
Military Compatibility Assessment

- Purpose: Expertise and Guidance in search for existing assessments for adoption for assessing military compatibility

- Focus: Officers
  - No centralized testing software
  - Evaluating a range of assessments

- Will be used to further inform efforts in support of enlisted population

BREAK

**Public Meeting will resume
at 2:15 PM ET**

Study Recommendations: Preparation of Instructors Delivering Prevention Content in Professional Military Education

Prevention Training and Activities Subcommittee

November 14, 2024

Agenda

- Review of Study Scope and Objective
- Discussion of Study Findings and Recommendations
  - Overview
  - Priority Focus Area
  - Impact Area 1
  - Impact Area 2
  - Impact Area 3
- Committee Vote on Recommendations

Study Scope and Objective

- Consider the **preparation approach for professional military education (PME) instructors to deliver prevention-related content** and identify the **unique needs/skills** of instructors delivering content to junior leaders (i.e., junior officers (O1-O3) and junior NCOs (E4-E6))

- **Goal for Study Recommendations**: Propose ways in which the Department might expand and improve processes and procedures for preparing instructors to deliver prevention-related content within PME

Overview of Study Findings and Recommendations

PRIORITY FOCUS AREA

Policies and guidance governing prevention-related requirements within PME

IMPACT AREA 1

Instructor selection, recruitment, and assignment

IMPACT AREA 2

Development and maintenance of training skills and prevention subject matter expertise

IMPACT AREA 3

Monitoring, evaluation, and accountability

Priority Focus Area

Policies & Guidance Governing Prevention-Related Requirements Within PME

Priority Focus Area - Findings

1. **Current DoD policies outline requirements for PME learners (the "what") but lack guidance on the requirements/expectations for instruction of prevention material (the "who" and "how").**

    – Lack of clear guidance on "who" = it's no one's job to do it

    – Lack of clear guidance on "how" = no standard expectation for what this training must include or how it's delivered

2. **Based on RFI responses, Services are not currently meeting policy requirements for inclusion of prevention within PME.**

    – Lack of clear guidance in policy (see Finding 1)

    – Limited time + large volume of PME topics to cover = de-prioritization of prevention

    – Conflation of prevention with annual SAPR training

    – Perception of prevention as an "add-on," and not a core duty

Priority Focus Area - Recommendations

1. **Confirm alignment between policy and learning requirements to drive the full integration of prevention competencies, as integral components of effective leadership.**

    – **Process:** Establish Senior level acceptance and buy-in for the need to develop and reinforce prevention competencies at all levels of leadership. Clearly communicate the connection between leadership and climate to justify the importance of establishing leaders' skills to effectively support, prioritize, and implement prevention efforts. Utilize strategic messaging to make the case that prevention is a critical leadership skill with direct impact on the establishment of a healthy climate and, by extension, mission readiness.

2. **Revisit applicable policies to establish the "who" and the "how" for the provision of prevention instruction within PME.**

    – **Process:** Standardize core expectations for what PME must include and how it's delivered. Review existing practices and collect comprehensive data to help identify the most effective role/position for delivery of prevention instruction. Establish accountability for oversight and evaluation of instruction across specific populations/leadership career path.

3. **Identify key topics/minimum requirements for prevention within PME and standardization of instruction**.

    – **Process:** Establish guidance for systematic evaluation of curriculum across the Services. Provide credentialing and training requirements for instructors. Create system of tracking proximal and distal outcomes (i.e., Are instructors trained as required? Is there evidence that learning transfer is occurring in PME? Is there evidence that this learning leads to outcomes?).

Priority Focus Area

Committee Discussion

Impact Area 1

Instructor Selection, Recruitment, and Assignment

Impact Area 1 - Findings

1. **Challenges inherent with current landscape of instructor selection, recruitment, and assignment**

   – Nature of an instructor job (less recruitment than assignment), context on desirability of job (or not), promotional implications, etc.

   – Instructor characteristics currently sought out/considered (previous training experience) or not (SME)

   – Challenges associated with rotational faculty

2. **Suitability of roles currently being utilized in the absence of true "PME instructors trained to deliver prevention" (i.e., SARCs, guest SMEs)**

   – In the absence of clear guidance on whose role/responsibility it is to deliver prevention instruction within PME, Services often utilize non-PME instructor positions to address the need (e.g., SARCs or IPPW).

   – SARCs and IPPW personnel are NOT trained instructors

Impact Area 1 - Recommendations

1. **Establish a selection, training, and performance model that ensures consistent instructor competencies in the delivery of prevention training material.**

   – **Process:** Establish desired instructor competencies. Conduct a capacity/capability assessment to inform the securing of necessary resources for on-boarding and training. Secure funding to meet policy requirements for instruction of prevention-related PME. Include prevention concepts into the ongoing performance evaluation of PME instructors.

Impact Area 1

Committee Discussion

Impact Area 2

Development and Maintenance of Training Skills and Prevention Subject Matter Expertise

Impact Area 2 - Findings

1. **Services did not report any specific preparation activities/requirements for prevention instructors (nothing above and beyond what is provided in each Service's basic instructor course for all PME instructors).**
   - Prevention subject matter expertise is not prioritized – in some instances, non-SMEs are instructing on prevention.
   - Instruction expertise is not always prioritized – in some instances, content is delivered by people who are not trained instructors.
   - Absence of true primary prevention focus – per RFI responses, much of the "prevention" training being offered is really response training.

2. **Services did not report any specific preparation activities, SME requirements, or certification/credentialing processes for prevention instructors (nothing above and beyond what is provided in each Service's basic instructor course for all PME instructors).**
   - Services reported that subject matter expertise in other topics is sought and built, but not for prevention.
   - Services reported the existence of a credentialing process for instructors completing basic instructor training courses.

Impact Area 2 - Recommendations

1. **Develop training content/skills/SME based on effectiveness/outcomes associated with what's learned from other DoD prevention efforts (e.g., Defense Workforce Development Center (DWDC, previously known as SAPRTEC))**

    – **Short Term Process:** Leverage existing resources and require those providing PME instruction complete trainings available to IPPW (e.g., SPARX) to provide foundational knowledge.

2. **Institutionalize prevention as a critical leadership skill at all levels.**

    – **Process:** Utilize the learning objectives in policy (DoDI 6400.11 "Leaders Must" objectives) to identify and define key skills and competencies needed by instructors and learners. Develop a system to track progress towards meeting those objectives. Include prevention elements in Service member performance evaluations, as appropriate to rank. Develop appropriate resources that enable leaders to embed prevention skills-building into standard unit operations (e.g., "hip pocket training"), and ensure that utilization of these materials is covered in PME.

Impact Area 2

Committee Discussion

Impact Area 3

Monitoring, Evaluation, and Accountability

Impact Area 3 - Findings

1. **Lack of monitoring and evaluation for prevention instruction within PME**
   - RFI responses indicate that instruction for other PME topics is being evaluated, but not for prevention.
   - No monitoring = no guarantee that instructors are continuing to deliver content with fidelity, utilizing appropriate instruction methods, etc.
   - No evaluation = no understanding of how effective the instruction is

2. **Accountability process/measures unknown**
   - Absence of specific accountability for provision of prevention in PME results in uneven application of policy (see PFA Finding 2).

Impact Area 3 - Recommendations

1. **Establish processes for evaluation of and accountability for provision of prevention in PME.**

2. **Collect data on learning transfer and efficacy/impact of training on outcomes.**

Process:

- **Service-level:** Have Education and Training Commands establish process to ensure PME is being delivered in accordance with existing policy (i.e., DoDI 6495.02 and DoDI 6400.11), as well as with any updated policies as recommended in PFA Rec 1. Utilize existing performance touchpoints (e.g., annual fitness reports) as an opportunity to assess Service member grasp on and application of prevention principles.

- **DoD-level:** Have Office of Force Resiliency and DWDC to audit/inspect and conduct formalized evaluation of learning outcomes as defined in policy.

Impact Area 3

Committee Discussion

Committee Vote on Recommendations

Vote on Recommendations

Priority Focus Area - Policies & Guidance Governing Prevention-Related Requirements Within PME

1. Confirm alignment between policy and learning requirements to drive the full integration of prevention competencies, as integral components of effective leadership.

2. Revisit applicable policies to establish the "who" and the "how" for the provision of prevention instruction within PME.

3. Identify key topics/minimum requirements for prevention within PME and standardization of instruction.

Committee Vote on Recommendations

Impact Area 1 - Instructor Selection, Recruitment, and Assignment

1. Establish a selection, training, and performance model that ensures consistent instructor competencies in the delivery of prevention training material.

Impact Area 2 - Development and Maintenance of Training Skills and Prevention Subject Matter Expertise

1. Develop training content/skills/SME based on effectiveness/outcomes associated with what's learned from other DoD prevention efforts (e.g., SAPRTEC, KSAs).

2. Institutionalize prevention as a critical leadership skill at all levels.

Impact Area 3 - Monitoring, Evaluation, and Accountability

1. Establish processes for evaluation of and accountability for provision of prevention in PME.

2. Collect data on learning transfer and efficacy/impact of training on outcomes.

Contact DAC-PSM

osd.mc-alex.ousd-p-r.mbx.DAC-PSM@mail.mil

Learn More

www.dhra.mil/dac-psm/

BREAK
Public Meeting will resume shortly

Study Recommendations: Measurement of Selected Risk and Protective Factors for Harmful Behaviors

Metrics and Performance Subcommittee

November 14, 2024

Agenda

- Review of Study Scope and Objective

- Review of Study Definitions

- Overview – Organization of Factor + Metrics Recommendations

- Discussion of Study Recommendations

  – General Study Recommendations and Observations

  – Unit/Community Level Factors + Metrics

  – Institutional/Organizational Level Factors + Metrics

- Committee Vote on Recommendations

Study Objective and Scope

- **Phase 1:** Identify unit/community- and institutional/organizational-level protective and risk factors for harmful behaviors most relevant to military environments

- **Phase 2:** Recommend measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the factors identified in Phase 1

- **Goal for Study Recommendations**
  - Assist DoD's efforts to track data trends and changes over time
  - Inform efforts to evaluate prevention programming intended to address the factors identified in Phase 1

Study Definitions

- **Unit/Community Level**
  - Includes Service members, DoD civilian employees, and dependents who may live and/or work together in the same geographical area, such as a DoD installation, garrison or ship, or surrounding neighborhood or town where military personnel reside
    - Among guardsmen and reservists, community may be better defined by shared organizational and social characteristics of their military communities, than by geographical or physical location

- **Institution/Organizational Level**
  - Aspects of DoD/Service department-level policies, practices, culture, and physical or social environment

Overview – Organization of Factor + Metrics Recommendations

1 **Factor**: Factor (Risk or Protective) for harmful behaviors that have been identified as relevant to military environments, at the specified SEM level (Unit/Community or Institution/Organization)

3 **Recommendation**: Info describing the metric(s) being recommended

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION

Established
Emerging
Exploratory

2 **Definition**: The study's intended meaning for the identified factor

4 **Level of Evidentiary Support**: Metrics recommendations have been sorted into one of three categories, based on the amount of available evidence for the factor and/or metric in question. Each row is shaded and marked to indicate which category has been assigned.

ESTABLISHED recommendation	Well-defined, validated measure previously used in military populations; ready to use as-is
EMERGING recommendation	Existing measure, perhaps validated in another environment/population (e.g., university students); would likely need DoD modification before using
EXPLORATORY recommendation	Important factor to explore in military environments, though the Committee is unable to recommend an existing measure at this time; recommend that DoD monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for future use

Discussion of
Study Recommendations

General Study Recommendations and Observations

Measurement

Variability of Measures	• **Recommendation 1 –** *Employ a <u>variety of metrics</u> and examine factors from multiple levels of the social ecological model (SEM) to enhance the comprehensiveness of the Department's measurement efforts.* • **Rationale –** Variability in metrics, the use of multiple measures, and the examination of a factor from multiple SEM levels provides a more complete picture of the data available for that factor (e.g., Committee's listing of select factors at multiple SEM levels, examination of a given factor through both DEOCS and WEO survey items).
Reducing Circularity within Metrics	• **Recommendation 2 –** *Examine currently employed metrics to <u>identify and rectify potential issues of circularity</u> between the constructs being measured and the questions being asked.* • **Rationale –** Upon examination of some of the metrics currently being used, the Committee notes instances where the construct being measured is also utilized within the scale's items, ostensibly using the occurrence of something as an indicator or predictor of that same thing (e.g., 2022 WEO question on diversity in military units).

General Study Recommendations and Observations

Policy/Practice

Expanding Data Integration Capacity	• **Recommendation 3** – *Create a <u>centralized structure</u> within the Department that serves as a systems integrator of data sources, strengthening data sharing and aggregation efforts across the different entities doing collection and analysis.* • **Rationale** – Moving out of information silos and working towards a more integrated approach to data management would allow the Department to better understand the data they have and see how different pieces of that data relate to each other (e.g., Committee's recommendations to utilize administrative data to complement data collected through surveys).
Expanded Analysis of Administrative Data	• **Recommendation 4** – *Assess the <u>types and sources of available administrative data</u> to determine how new methods of coding or analysis could provide a complement to the Department's more traditional survey data collection efforts.* • **Rationale** – For many of the constructs that the Committee has identified, the Department already collects significant amounts of administrative data (e.g. EEOC reports, annual Demographics Profile of the Military Community). With intentional coding and analysis, this data could be combined with survey responses to examine linkages or relationships and offer a fuller understanding of the information being collected. Expanded use of administrative data would also offer additional insights without adding to survey burden and could potentially create opportunities for prevention staff (i.e., IPPW) to crosswalk that information with survey responses during CIPP plan development and implementation efforts.
Collection of Perpetration Data	• **Recommendation 5** – *Expand <u>collection of data on the perpetration of sexual misconduct</u> to help create a more complete understanding of what is happening in these incidents and how to prevent them; develop a policy that allows for the wider sharing of perpetration data in a de-identified way.* • **Rationale** – A common theme observed across many of the currently employed measures is that they focus on the experiences of the victims of sexual assault or sexual harassment, but the publicly accessible information regarding perpetration leaves a significant gap. The Committee understands and acknowledges that the Department must consider the legal and confidentiality implications of collecting perpetration data but would encourage those charged with identifying and prioritizing measurable factors to explore how the collection of this type of data could offer a more complete picture of perpetrators and of the circumstances around sexual misconduct in the military.

General Study Recommendations and Observations

Observation

Validation of Metrics	The Committee received a significant amount of information regarding OPA's identification of factors and metrics, as well as the fielding of the recently updated DEOCS and other Departmental survey efforts. However, details regarding the empirical validation of these metrics were not provided (e.g., criteria used to evaluate them, populations with which they were tested, psychometric validity), and therefore the Committee is unable to do its full due diligence in considering their usage. Pending validity data, the Committee has clarifying wording revisions to offer for select measures being used in OPA's current data collection efforts.

General Study Recommendations and Observations

Committee Discussion

Unit/Community Level Protective Factors + Metrics (5)

Established (5)

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Diverse Environments	A diverse environment includes a variety of individuals, groups, and/or communities with different characteristics; observed at the Unit/Community level when diverse perspectives are solicited, respected, discussed, valued, and shared throughout the community.	Confirm existing survey questions that explore the mixture of personnel in a unit, including the percentage of women and minorities, and address how well or poorly members of traditionally marginalized groups are treated (WGR, DEOCS, WEO)* Recommend addition of survey questions on respondents' interaction with and formation of friendships with colleagues of another gender (Gutek et al., 1990 and Binder et al., 2009)
Connectedness	The sense of belonging and subjective psychological bond that people feel in relation to individuals and groups of others	Confirm existing survey question addressing feelings of belonging, support, and cooperation (DEOCS)* Recommend addition of survey question that queries how respected, valued, and listened to a respondent feels in their unit (Chung et al., 2020)
Transformational Leadership	Forward-looking leadership that emphasizes a collective mission to reduce harm caused by sexual misconduct; observed at the Unit/Community level through Commanders' ability to create positive change within their units and motivate and inspire workgroups to develop and follow jointly held goals	Confirm existing survey questions that address degree of trust in and inclusiveness of supervisors, as well as supervisor tolerance of problematic behavior in their unit(s) (DEOCS, WEO, SAGR, WGR)*
Social Support for Desired Norms and Behaviors	Witnessing desired norms and appropriate behaviors by peers and/or leaders	Confirm existing survey questions querying how much and how often a respondent's colleagues denounce sexism and actively promote respect (DEOCS, WGR, SAGR)*
Collective Efficacy	Shared beliefs to cohesively come together as a team, unit, or community to take care of each other and to foster healthy environments; shared responsibility to solve problems and address challenges	Recommend addition of survey questions that specifically interrogate the level of positivity of on-base experiences and the degree to which a base feels like a community (Slep et al., 2015)

* Confirmation of existing DoD measure; see Observation note on slide 8

Unit/Community Level Protective Factors + Metrics

Committee Discussion

Unit/Community Level Risk Factors + Metrics (8)

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Job Gender Context	An imbalance of gender ratios in a work environment; conformity of job assignments to traditional gender roles (i.e., men and women are primarily assigned to jobs that fit traditional gender stereotypes)	Recommend addition of survey questions regarding gender ratio and traditionality of roles in respondents' units (Fitzgerald et al., 1999) Additional recommendation to use administrative data to supplement survey data and examine linkages
Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment	A workplace climate that condones or tolerates sexual harassment	Recommend addition of survey questions addressing how leaders address issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment, as well as perceptions of unit response (Estrada et al., 2011 and Murdoch et al., 2010)
Masculinity Contest Culture	An environment characterized as a zero-sum game, in which men competing for dominance by showing no weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success, displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat competition becomes the way work gets done; masculine norms determine who and what gets rewarded, how colleagues should be treated, and attitudes about work/life balance	Recommend addition of survey questions gauging how much traditionally masculine norms, such as physical capacity and endurance or high competitiveness, are present in the workplace (Pryor et al., 2024 and Glick et al., 2018)
Installation Location and Surroundings	The degree of isolation/remoteness of an installation's location; availability of outlets for healthy socialization and recreation	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor (e.g., GIS, zip codes)

Established (4)

Unit/Community Level Risk Factors + Metrics, cont'd

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Experience of "Social Support" from Negative Influences	Social support includes encouragement and acceptance of behavior. This process occurs both implicitly (i.e., through observation of others and perceptions of peers' values) and explicitly (i.e., through words and actions of peers encouraging specific behaviors).	Recommend addition of survey questions that query how often a respondent has personally engaged in or been encouraged by a peer to engage in physical or sexual aggression or violence (Lansford et al., 2020 and Jewell et al., 2013)
Prescriptive and Descriptive Norms that Promote or Encourage Heavy Drinking	Norms can be prescriptive (i.e., what people *should* do, what is viewed as acceptable behavior) or descriptive (i.e., what people actually do). In this example, a prescriptive norm that might encourage heavy drinking would be the existence of lax rules or policies that allow for alcohol in dorms or extended alcohol sales hours. An installation where it's typical of Service members to binge drink would exhibit a descriptive norm encouraging heavy drinking.	Confirm existing survey questions that measure the extent to which drinking is a part of work culture and how frequently it takes place (DoD Health Related Behaviors Survey)* Recommend addition of survey question that explores social norms around drinking in the workplace (Bacharach et al., 2007)
Leaders or Peers with Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation	When leaders exhibit socially aversive traits (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, sadism), they create an environment which encourages others to emulate these behaviors. Examples include caring only about oneself, feeling entitled to positive outcomes, and using dominance to achieve one's personal goals, while ignoring the goals of the wider group. If a leader condones or encourages these behaviors in his/her unit, this also contributes to a toxic climate.	Recommend addition of survey questions that explore antisocial, entitled, and manipulative behaviors (Pryor et al., 2024, Paulhus et al., 2021, and Jonason et al., 2010)
Poorly Executed or Undermined Trainings; Trainings that Engender Defensiveness	Trainings that are not executed according to guidance, do not follow applicable science, or are delivered in a way that results in learner pushback or feelings of being criticized; influence of leaders who minimize the importance of trainings or fail to prioritize their success	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Emerging (3) (spanning first three factor rows)

Exploratory (1) (spanning last factor row)

* Confirmation of existing DoD measure; see Observation note on slide 8

Unit/Community Level
Risk Factors + Metrics

Committee Discussion

Institutional/Organizational Level Protective Factors + Metrics (6)

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Diverse Environments	A diverse environment includes a variety of individuals, groups, and/or communities with different characteristics; observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through the demonstration that the institution itself recognizes and prioritizes the benefits of ensuring diversity within its environments; establishment of policies and practices that foster diversity; senior leadership that upholds and champions diversity efforts	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses
Inclusivity	E.g., Organizational prioritization to ensure that members of marginalized groups are involved in senior leadership, enjoy various assignment opportunities, and have input into policy, infrastructure, and budget decision-making processes	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses
Transformational Leadership	Forward-looking leadership that emphasizes a collective mission to reduce harm caused by sexual misconduct; observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through the establishment of organizational values and a culture of expected behaviors, as well as senior leadership's championing/messaging of these values and cultural expectations	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses

Additional recommendation to develop institutional-level manifestations of transformational leadership (e.g., policy requirements for leadership training, tracking of benchmarks for satisfying those requirements) |

Established (3)

Institutional/Organizational Level Protective Factors + Metrics, cont'd

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Environments that Support Training	E.g., Establishment of clear and effective policies that communicate clear training guidance/requirements and reinforce prevention training concepts; allotment of necessary resources (e.g., money, human capital, time) to ensure that training is done well; use of evidence-based training materials and methods that are empirically proven to show impact; use of systematic training evaluation to ensure that desired outcomes are achieved; training is prioritized and reinforced by leaders at all levels	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Establishment and Prioritization of Sufficient Support Infrastructure	E.g., Effective and actionable policies that ensure reports of misconduct are taken seriously and handled appropriately and that victims are provided with adequate support; allocation of necessary budget and human capital resources to sufficiently handle response needs; accessibility of resources and support services	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Sufficient Organizational Capacity to Support Prevention Efforts and Manage Accountability	E.g., Policies and messaging from Department-level leaders prioritize and champion prevention efforts; sufficient budget and human capital designated to support prevention efforts; funding priorities that support healthy environments/outlets for positive social engagement/activities (e.g., community centers, tactical stand downs/resilience days); emphasis on evaluation of efforts; structure of accountability to ensure that that activities are being adequately supported and are achieving desired outcomes	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Exploratory (3)

Institutional/Organizational Level Protective Factors + Metrics

Committee Discussion

FACTOR	DEFINITION	RECOMMENDATION
Imbalanced Gender Ratios Among Senior Leaders	Percentage of females in senior leadership roles -- Is this comparable to the percentage of women in the military overall? Is this number/percentage trending upward on a consistent trajectory?	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor
Presence of Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation Among Senior Leadership	Presence of socially aversive traits (e.g. psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, sadism) among senior leaders sets an unhealthy tone for the organization; potential risk that these traits may shade Departmental priorities, policy decisions, and operational environments	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment Among Senior Leadership	A workplace climate that condones or tolerates sexual harassment; this is observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through lack of organizational willingness to follow through on investigations of accusations leveled against senior leaders; lack of accountability or consequences for problematic behavior among high-level, high-visibility leaders; continued promotion or maintained military status by perpetrators; senior leaders with problematic behavior patterns being held up as aspirational examples	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Policies that Fail to Ensure Protective Environments for Service Members	Rules or policies that fail to ensure the safety of environments in which Service members are living, working, and playing; Lack of attention to structural/maintenance issues that may contribute to safety concerns (e.g., poorly lit areas, broken locks, camera blind spots, lack of dedicated spaces for women)	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Policies that Fail to Effectively Inform Prevention Training Efforts	Absence of clear policy guidance on who is responsible for training delivery and how training is delivered, as well as the absence of rigorous evaluation of prevention training efforts and outcomes; Lack of follow-through on determining how effective a policy is (i.e., is it being followed, is it having the intended impact?)	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Established (1)

Exploratory (4)

Institutional/Organizational Level
Risk Factors + Metrics

Committee Discussion

Committee Vote on Recommendations

Vote on Recommendations

General Study Recommendations (5) and Observations (1)

MEASUREMENT	• **Recommendation 1 – Variability of Measures**
	  ○ *Employ a variety of metrics and examine factors from multiple levels of the social ecological model (SEM) to enhance the comprehensiveness of the Department's measurement efforts.*
	
	• **Recommendation 2 – Reducing Circularity within Metrics**
	  ○ *Examine currently employed metrics to identify and rectify potential issues of circularity between the constructs being measured and the questions being asked.*

POLICY/PRACTICE	• **Recommendation 3 – Expanding Data Integration Capacity**
	  ○ *Create a centralized structure within the Department that serves as a systems integrator of data sources, strengthening data sharing and aggregation efforts across the different entities doing collection and analysis.*
	
	• **Recommendation 4 – Expanded Analysis of Administrative Data**
	  ○ *Assess the types and sources of available administrative data to determine how new methods of coding or analysis could provide a complement to the Department's more traditional survey data collection efforts.*
	
	• **Recommendation 5 – Collection of Perpetration Data**
	  ○ *Expand collection of data on the perpetration of sexual misconduct to help create a more complete understanding of what is happening in these incidents and how to prevent them; develop a policy that allows for the wider sharing of perpetration data in a de-identified way.*

OBSERVATION	• **Validation of Metrics** - *The Committee received a significant amount of information regarding OPA's identification of factors and metrics, as well as the fielding of the recently updated DEOCS and other Departmental survey efforts. However, details regarding the empirical validation of these metrics were not provided (e.g., criteria used to evaluate them, populations with which they were tested, psychometric validity), and therefore the Committee is unable to do its full due diligence in considering their usage. Pending validity data, the Committee has clarifying wording revisions to offer for select measures being used in OPA's current data collection efforts.*

Vote on Recommendations

Unit/Community-Level Protective Factors + Metrics (5)

<table>
<tr>
<td rowspan="5">ESTABLISHED</td>
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- **Diverse Environments**
  - *Confirm existing survey questions that explore the mixture of personnel in a unit, including the percentage of women and minorities, and address how well or poorly members of traditionally marginalized groups are treated (WGR, DEOCS, WEO); Recommend addition of survey questions on respondents' interaction with and formation of friendships with colleagues of another gender (Gutek et al., 1990 and Binder et al., 2009)*

- **Connectedness**
  - *Confirm existing survey question addressing feelings of belonging, support, and cooperation (DEOCS); Recommend addition of survey question that queries how respected, valued, and listened to a respondent feels in their unit (Chung et al., 2020)*

- **Transformational Leadership**
  - *Confirm existing survey questions that address degree of trust in and inclusiveness of supervisors, as well as supervisor tolerance of problematic behavior in their unit(s) (WGR, DEOCS, WEO)*

- **Support for Desired Norms and Behaviors**
  - *Confirm existing survey questions querying how much and how often a respondent's colleagues denounce sexism and actively promote respect (WGR, SAGR)*

- **Collective Efficacy**
  - *Recommend addition of survey questions that specifically interrogate the level of positivity of on-base experiences and the degree to which a base feels like a community (Slep et al., 2015)*

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Vote on Recommendations

Unit/Community-Level Risk Factors + Metrics (8)

ESTABLISHED	• **Job Gender Context**
	   o *Recommend addition of survey questions regarding gender ratio and traditionality of roles in respondents' units (Fitzgerald et al., 1999); Additional recommendation to use administrative data to supplement survey data and examine linkages*
	• **Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment**
	   o *Recommend addition of survey questions addressing how leaders address issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment, as well as perceptions of unit response (Estrada et al., 2011 and Murdoch et al., 2010) desired norms and appropriate behaviors by peers and/or leaders*
	• **Masculinity Contest Culture**
	   o *Recommend addition of survey questions gauging how much traditionally masculine norms, such as physical capacity and endurance or high competitiveness, are present in the workplace (Pryor et al., 2024 and Glick et al., 2018)*
	• **Installation Location and Surroundings**
	   o *Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor (e.g., GIS, zip codes)*

EMERGING	• **Experience of "Social Support" from Negative Influences**
	   o *Recommend addition of survey questions that query how often a respondent has personally engaged in or been encouraged by a peer to engage in physical or sexual aggression or violence (Lansford et al., 2020 and Jewell et al., 2013)*
	• **Prescriptive and Descriptive Norms that Promote or Encourage Heavy Drinking**
	   o *Confirm existing survey questions that measure the extent to which drinking is a part of work culture and how frequently it takes place (DoD Health Related Behaviors Survey); Recommend addition of survey question that explores social norms around drinking in the workplace (Bacharach et al., 2007)*
	• **Leaders or Peers with Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation**
	   o *Recommend addition of survey questions that explore antisocial, entitled, and manipulative behaviors (Pryor et al., 2024, Paulhus et al., 2021, and Jonason et al., 2010)*

EXPLORATORY	• **Poorly Executed or Undermined Trainings; Trainings that Engender Defensiveness** o *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*

Institutional/Organizational-Level Protective Factors + Metrics (6)

ESTABLISHED	• **Diverse Environments**
	   ○ *Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses*
	
	• **Inclusivity**
	   ○ *Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses*
	
	• **Transformational Leadership**
	   ○ *Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses*

EXPLORATORY	• **Environments that Support Training**
	   ○ *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*
	
	• **Establishment and Prioritization of Sufficient Support Infrastructure**
	   ○ *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*
	
	• **Sufficient Organizational Capacity to Support Prevention Efforts and Manage Accountability**
	   ○ *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*

Vote on Recommendations

Institutional/Organizational-Level Risk Factors + Metrics (5)

ESTABLISHED	• **Imbalanced Gender Ratios Among Senior Leaders** o *Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor*

EXPLORATORY	• **Presence of Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation Among Senior Leadership**
	    o *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*
	
	• **Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment Among Senior Leadership**
	    o *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*
	
	• **Policies that Fail to Ensure Protective Environments for Service Members**
	    o *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*
	
	• **Policies that Fail to Effectively Inform Prevention Training Efforts**
	    o *Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use*

Meeting Close

- Closing Comments

- Meeting minutes and presentation slides will be available for public review on https://www.dhra.mil/DAC-PSM/Public-Meetings/

Contact DAC-PSM

osd.mc-alex.ousd-p-r.mbx.DAC-PSM@mail.mil

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