Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

February 2011

MLDC decision papers present the Commission-approved, subcommittee-specific recommendations. These recommendations are the product not only of the logic and evidence presented in the decision papers but also the values and judgments of the Commissioners. Legally imposed time constraints naturally limited the Commission's ability to undertake extensive research. Thus, the decision papers present the evidence that was available and that could be collected during the discovery phase of the Commission. The decision papers were reviewed by subject-matter experts external to the Commission.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This decision paper documents the work of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee. It presents the research, facts, assumptions, and opinions that informed the Commission in devising those recommendations that are aimed at increasing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the Reserve Component and at improving the integration of Reserve Component personnel into the total force.[1]

The Military Leadership Diversity Commission

The Commission was established under the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. The Commission was asked by Congress to execute a wide-ranging review of issues regarding diversity in the military services. Specifically, Congress defined 16 charter tasks for the Commission.[2] To address these tasks, the Commission formed nine subcommittees:

- Branching and Assignments
- Definition of Diversity
- Implementation and Accountability
- Diversity Leadership and Diversity Training
- Outreach and Recruiting
- Promotion
- Retention
- Metrics
- Legal Implications.

Although the Commission's initial mandate was to address diversity issues in the Active Component, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 expanded the mission of the MLDC to include the National Guard and Reserve. No new specific tasks were added, but Congress wanted to ensure that "[n]o component [was] left behind in the DOD's shift to increase diversity in the Armed Forces" (Congressional Record, 2009). Therefore, about nine months after the Commission had started its work, six new Commissioners were added to the Commission, and the tenth subcommittee was formed: the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was charged with examining the same wide range of diversity issues considered by the entire Commission but to do so from the perspective of the Reserve Component. Even with this broad scope, the subcommittee had to work under an abbreviated timeline because when the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was added, the Commission had already ended its discovery phase and had started deliberating on recommendations.

Consequently, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee worked quickly to get up to speed, meeting frequently, interviewing subject-matter experts, organizing briefings, and reviewing

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[1] For a brief discussion of these recommendations and the logic behind them, please refer to the conclusion of this paper.

[2] See Appendix A for a complete list of Charter Tasks.

research already produced by the Commission. The subcommittee relied on the expertise of the Commission at large and on the knowledge and experience of its own members. To fill in gaps, especially those related to areas either specific to the Reserve Component or to the differences between the Reserve and Active Components, the subcommittee produced its own research, which is documented in a series of issue papers.

This research and the subcommittee's discussions brought several important points to the fore. First, because the National Guard and Reserve constitute about 50 percent of military manpower in the U.S. military, any change in their demographic makeup could have a significant effect on the demographic makeup of the entire military.

Second, because National Guard and Reserve servicemembers integrate on the battlefield with active-duty branches, operate in disaster relief situations, and are mobilized within the United States for missions (including homeland security), the National Guard and Reserve should strive to mirror the racial, ethnic, and gender demographic diversity of the United States.

Third, because of the military/civilian duality of the Reserve Component and because Reserve servicemembers integrate with active-duty forces, the National Guard and Reserve, with their particular institutional characteristics, add a different dimension of diversity to the Armed Forces: structural diversity.

These three issues form the general backdrop for what is examined in this paper. The first part of the paper provides necessary background information on the Reserve Component and supplies a discussion of diversity, placing particular emphasis on issues of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity and on structural diversity. This background information helps frame the paper's second piece: an analysis of the recommendations approved by the Commission at large but considered from a Reserve Component perspective.

The subcommittee examined each of the Commission's recommendations at length. When a recommendation spoke directly to the diversity issues raised by the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee, the recommendation was left unchanged, and the subcommittee did not comment on it. Although these recommendations are briefly discussed in this paper, for details, readers should consult the relevant decision papers.

In cases when a recommendation did not fully address the diversity issues specific to the Reserve Component, the subcommittee developed possible modifications for the Commission's consideration. Finally, when the existing recommendations did not attend to diversity issues particular to the National Guard and Reserve, the subcommittee proposed new recommendations to be discussed by the Commission. This paper details the final versions of these Commission-approved subcommittee recommendations.[3]

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[3] The recommendations discussed in this decision paper are the Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commission's understanding and interpretation of the findings from this subcommittee. Following the approval of all of the subcommittee-specific recommendations, the Commission developed its final recommendations by combining recommendations across subcommittees to reduce overlap and repetition. Therefore, the recommendations presented in this paper do not map directly to the recommendations presented in the Commission's forthcoming final report.

A RELEVANT AND DIVERSE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE

This section presents three topics: the structure and significance of Reserve Component manpower; racial, ethnic, and gender characteristics of the Reserve Component; and structural diversity. The section on manpower structure describes how the National Guard and Reserve are organized and how the Reserve Component compares with the Active Component in terms of size. The section on demographic characteristics illustrates how the National Guard and Reserve compare with their respective Active Component counterparts in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender. It also includes comparisons with external benchmarks, such as the population eligible for military service and the U.S. population as a whole. These statistics provide a basic measure of demographic diversity in the Reserve Component. The structural diversity section discusses the institutional features that characterize the Reserve Component and the differences that distinguish it from the Active Component. The section emphasizes those characteristics that play a role in the integration of Reserve and Active Component servicemembers.

By emphasizing these issues, the subcommittee's findings are framed in terms of the importance of the Reserve Component, given its size; in terms of racial, ethnic, and gender representation relative to the Active Component and to the U.S. population as a whole; and in terms of the integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.

The Structure and Significance of Reserve Component Manpower

In total, the Reserve Component constitutes almost 50 percent of U.S. military personnel and consists of seven components, divided into two groups:[4]

- National Guard
  - Army National Guard
  - Air National Guard
- Reserve
  - U.S. Army Reserve
  - U.S. Navy Reserve
  - U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
  - Air Force Reserve
  - Coast Guard Reserve.

The role of the Reserve Component, as codified in Title 10, Section 10102, is

> to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.

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[4] This list does not include the United States Health Service Reserve Corps, which is a uniformed service but not an armed service.

Title 10 gives the Reserve Component a federal mission and puts all the Reserve Components under federal control. However, based in Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, and regulated by Title 10 and Title 32, the National Guard also has a state mission. Each state or territory can employ its National Guard force, which is under the command and control of the Governor of that state or territory.[5] The National Guard, then, can be characterized as 54 organizations under the command and control of the Governors of each state, unless otherwise recalled into federal duty.

Thus, the main difference between the National Guard and the other Reserve Components is that, although the Reserve's missions are exclusively federal in nature, the National Guard falls under the purview of both federal and state governments, depending on the mission.

The Manpower Structure of the Reserve Component

Organization

Figure 1 shows the principal categories and various subcategories of the Reserve Component personnel. Issue Paper #53 describes each of the categories and subcategories in detail, but only the following major categories are included here: the Ready Reserve, which includes the Selected Reserve; the Standby Reserve; and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is composed of National Guard and Reserve members—organized in units or as individuals—who can be called to active duty during war or a national emergency. This category is divided into three subcategories. Here and throughout this paper, the focus is on the Selected Reserve because reservists in the Selected Reserve are the primary source of augmentees to active forces and because they actively train throughout the year.[6] Selected reservists are designated by their respective Services as essential to initial wartime missions and can be called into active duty when the President issues a mobilization order.[7]

The Standby Reserve is made up of several different types of personnel, including those who maintain Reserve affiliation but who are not in the Ready Reserve, reservists who have been designated key civilian employees, and reservists who have a temporary hardship or disability. Personnel in the Standby Reserve are not required to train or be part of units. Rather, the Standby Reserve is made up of trained individuals who can be mobilized if necessary in order to fulfill manpower needs in specific areas.

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[5] This dual role has several legal implications for the National Guard. One of the most important implications is that, although the Posse Comitatus Act proscribes the use of the military for the enforcement of civil law, the National Guard is only bound by this act when in federal service. Other legal exceptions bestow law enforcement authority on the Coast Guard and allow the President to use the military to control internal insurrections and other violence.

Note that, throughout this paper, in the context of the National Guard, the word *states* refers to states, territories, and the District of Columbia, unless otherwise noted.

The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard. Usually, this responsibility is delegated through the Secretary of Defense to the Commanding General Joint Force Headquarters, District of Columbia National Guard, who is the equivalent of the Adjutant Generals in the states and other territories.

[6] Selected Reserve servicemembers train a minimum of one weekend a month and two consecutive weeks in a given year.

[7] The actual language from DoD Instruction 1215.06 is, "The Selected Reserve consists of those units and individuals in the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Service, and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008b).

Figure 1. Reserve Component Manpower Categories

SOURCE: Adapted from Office of the Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), 2005.

The Retired Reserve is made up of officers and enlisted personnel who are eligible to receive retirement pay for their military service. They can be involuntarily called to active duty in the event of full mobilization.

Size

Reserve manpower, with a total of about 1.28 million people, constitutes an major portion of overall military end strength. Indeed, the Selected Reserve constitutes more than one-third of the force. When the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve are also included, the Reserve portion jumps to nearly 50 percent.

Tables 1 and 2 show, by Service, Reserve and active-duty manpower as percentages of the total force. The last row of each table combines all Services to show percentages for the entire U.S. military. Table 1 focuses on the Selected Reserve, and Table 2 looks at total Reserve manpower—Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve—as a percentage of each Service's total military strength. To make comparisons with Active Component counterparts, the Army Reserve is combined with the Army National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve is combined with the Air National Guard. The data used to create the tables come from September 2008 snapshots from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (found at Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008). Issue Paper #53 shows the raw numbers that underlie the percentages presented here.

As Table 1 shows, when Selected Reserve personnel from all Services are combined, Selected Reservists made up just over 37 percent of the total force. The Army stands out with a Reserve share that surpassed its Active share; in the Air Force, about one-third of its total strength came from the Reserve.

Table 1. Selected Reserve and Active-Duty Percentages, by Service

Service	Selected Reserve	Active Duty
Army	50.8%	49.2%
Coast Guard	16.1%	83.9%
Air Force	35.1%	64.9%
Marine Corps	15.9%	84.1%
Navy	17.2%	82.8%
All Services	37.2%	62.8%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

In Table 2, all categories of Reserve personnel (i.e., Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve) are included. When the Services are combined, Reserve strength is shown to have represented nearly 50 percent of the total manpower of the U.S. military. Reserve shares in the Army and Air Force were around 50 percent, and shares in the remaining Services were between 25 percent and 34 percent.

Table 2. Total Reserve and Active-Duty Percentages of Total Military Strength, by Service

Service	Reserve (Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve)	Active Duty
Army	56.8%	43.2%
Coast Guard	25.9%	74.1%
Air Force	47.9%	52.1%
Marine Corps	34.0%	66.0%
Navy	33.3%	66.7%
All Services	47.4%	52.6%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

As this section shows, the Reserve Component has been an important source of manpower for the U.S. military, representing over one-third of the total force when only Selected Reservists are included and more than half when all Reserve manpower is taken into account. With this in mind, the next section presents the racial, ethnic, and gender profiles of the Reserve Components.

Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Characteristics of the Reserve Component

The focus of this subsection is on racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the National Guard and Reserve. First, by looking at both officers and enlisted personnel, it compares the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of each of the Reserve and Active Components. Second, it presents a comparison of the National Guard and Reserve, in aggregate, against two external benchmarks: the U.S. population as a whole and a proxy eligible population.

This discussion serves several purposes. First, it provides a general understanding of demographic representation in the National Guard and Reserve, essentially giving a snapshot of where the Reserve

Component was at the time the data was collected in 2008. Second, it highlights similarities and differences between the Reserve and Active Components in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender. Third, it reveals those areas in which demographic representation may have to improve if the goal is for the force to mirror the population that it serves.

Throughout this discussion, it is important to keep in mind that, as highlighted in the previous subsection, Reserve manpower constitutes a large portion of the total force, even when only the Selected Reserve is taken into account. Therefore, any change in demographic representation in the Reserve would be reflected in the makeup of the total force.

Comparing the Reserve Component with the Active Component

To better understand how the racial, ethnic, and gender profiles of the Active Component compare with the Selected Reserve in each of the Reserve Components, this section presents side-by-side comparisons in Figures 2–5.

As in the previous subsection, the data are snapshots based on DMDC data from September 2008. For a more detailed breakdown of the information provided here, and for the raw numbers that underlie the percentages shown in the following figures, see the demographic profile issue papers and their respective appendixes.[8]

Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of women in the officer corps and the enlisted ranks, respectively. Figures 4 and 5 show the same information for minorities, with all race and ethnicity categories combined into a single "minority" category in order to contrast it with non-Hispanic whites. The minority category includes non-Hispanic Asian Pacific Islanders (API, NH), non-Hispanic blacks (black, NH), Hispanics, and non-Hispanic others (American Indians, Alaska natives, and those reporting more than one race). It does not include "unknown," and it does not further categorize by gender. That is, both women and men are included in the categories used Figures 4 and 5. For detailed breakdowns by race and ethnicity, see the issue papers listed above.

For two primary reasons, caution is urged in the interpretation of the percentages presented in this section. First, in some cases, because the numbers that underlie the percentages are so small, any change could have resulted in large differences in percentage shares. For example, as pointed out in Issue Paper #54, women constituted 11.1 percent of the flag/general officer corps in the Marine Corps Reserve and 0.0 percent in the Coast Guard Reserve. This difference of over 11 percentage points seems very large. However, if there had been just one fewer female flag/general officer in the Marine Corps Reserve, the female share in that component would have fallen to 0.0 percent, erasing the difference between the two organizations. Second, because the analysis presented here does not include information about why differences across Components exist, it would be inappropriate to interpret differences in the profiles presented here as evidence of the presence or lack of discrimination in the Reserve, the Active Component, or any of the individual Services. The numbers presented in this section are intended to be descriptive of particular issues in the Services rather than prescriptive.

Female Representation: Officers

As shown in Figure 2, with regard to ranks O-1 through O-6, the Air Force Reserve, the Army Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve stand out, with female shares of more than 21 percent. In the case of the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve, around one-quarter of the O-1 through O-6 officer population was made up of women. Of the Active Components, the Air Force, with 18.4

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[8] Specifically, see Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, Issue Paper #44, Issue Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55.

percent, had the largest female share. In most cases, when the Active Components are compared with their respective Reserve Components, female representation is shown to have been higher in the Reserve.

Two exceptions are the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, whose shares of females were lower than the shares of females in the Air Force and Army, respectively. In some cases, the differences in percentages are large. For example, the female share in the Air Force Reserve was over 25 percent, and the female share in the Air Force was 18.4 percent—nearly 7 percentage points lower. Similarly, the Army Reserve share was 24.6 percent, and the Army share was 16.9 percent.

In the case of flag/general officers, because their numbers were so small, any change in gender makeup could have drastically affected the percentages. Keeping that in mind, two observations need to be made. First, with the exception of the Marine Corps Reserve and the Navy Reserve, female representation across the board fell in the flag/general officer ranks. Second, comparing flag/general officers in each Reserve Component with flag/general officers in their respective Active Components shows that female representation, in most cases, was higher, albeit slightly, in the Reserve. Notable exceptions are the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve, with 12.5-percent female representation in the Active Component but 0.0-percent representation in the Reserve, and the Air Force and Air National Guard, with a 9.5-percent female share in the Air Force and an 8.6-percent share in the Air National Guard.

Figure 2. Percentage of Female Officers, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

NOTES: ANG = Air National Guard. ARNG = Army National Guard. USAR = U.S. Army Reserve. USNR = U.S. Navy Reserve. USMCR = U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. AFR = Air Force Reserve. CGR = Coast Guard Reserve (CGR). USAF = U.S. Air Force. USA = U.S. Army. USCG = U.S. Coast Guard. USMC = U.S. Marine Corps. USN = U.S. Navy

Female Representation: Enlisted

As in the case of the officer population, Figure 3 shows that female shares were larger in the junior enlisted ranks than they were in the senior enlisted ranks in both the Reserve and Active Components, but the differences tended to be less dramatic in the enlisted population than in the officer population. For example, consider the Air Force Reserve. Women constituted over 25 percent of the O-1 through O-6 officer population but only 9.5 percent of the flag/general officer

population. In contrast, although the lower ranks of the enlisted population in the Air Force Reserve also consisted of over 25 percent women, the female share dropped only a few percentage points (to 21.8 percent) in the senior ranks.

Figure 3. Percentage of Female Enlisted Personnel, by Component and Rank, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

Female representation was generally higher in the Reserve Component than in the Active Component both for ranks E-1 through E-6 and for senior enlisted personnel. In some cases, the differences were large. For example, in the E-1 through E-6 population in the Army, the female share was 13.5 percent. The Army Reserve share, in contrast, was more than 10 percentage points higher, at 24.4 percent. Female representation in the Navy was about 5 percentage points lower than in the Navy Reserve. The same proves true when the E-1 through E-6 populations in the Air Force and the Air National Guard are compared. Large differences were also evident in the senior ranks. Female shares in the Navy, for example, were about 10 percentage points lower than in the Navy Reserve. Women constituted 21.8 percent of the senior enlisted population in the Air Force Reserve but only 13.5 percent in the Air Force.

There are a few exceptions to the general results discussed above. In the E-1 through E-6 ranks, female representation in the Air Force was greater than it was in the Air National Guard, although not by much—20.9 percent compared with 19.2 percent. This also proved true when comparing the Marine Corps (women had a 6.3-percent share) with the Marine Corps Reserve (women had a 4.8-percent share). In the E-7 through E-9 ranks, the female share of the population was higher in the Army (11.0 percent) than it was in the Army National Guard (9.5 percent). The same proved true when comparing the female share in the Marine Corps (5.2 percent) with female share in the Marine Corps Reserve (4.6 percent).

Minority Representation: Officers

Figure 4 shows that, in the O-1 through O-6 officer population the Coast Guard Reserve, with 31-percent minority representation, stands out when compared with the other Components. However, as noted in Issue Paper #54, this percentage is likely inaccurately high. Research for that issue paper revealed that representation in the other, NH category—one of the four categories grouped to create the "minority" category presented here—was significantly higher than it was in the other

Services/components. According to communications between Coast Guard representatives and the Commission, this is likely due to a systematic default inaccuracy that improperly recorded the race and ethnicity of some members in both the officer and enlisted populations of the Coast Guard's Active and Reserve Components. The Coast Guard has contacted affected members, and future data should not contain this inaccuracy.

Figure 4. Percentage of Minority Officers, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008

Notable minority shares in the O-1 through O-6 ranks include those of the Army Reserve, with 27.8 percent, and the Army, with 22.6 percent. Both organizations reported relatively high percentages of minority officers. In most cases, compared with their respective Reserve Components, the Active Components had larger minority shares in the O-1 through O-6 ranks. Exceptions include the Air Force Reserve, which had the essentially same minority share as the Air Force (14.3 percent and 14.2 percent, respectively), and the Army Reserve, which had a larger minority share than the Army (27.8 percent and 22.6 percent, respectively). In addition, the Coast Guard Reserve had a larger share than the Coast Guard (31.0 percent and 19.7 percent, respectively); however, as noted earlier, the Coast Guard percentages may be inaccurate.

When the minority share in an Active Component was larger than its respective Reserve Component, the difference in percentage share was generally fairly small. In only one case did the difference exceed 5 percentage points: that of the Army (22.6 percent) and the Army National Guard (15.9 percent).

In all cases, minority representation declined in the flag/general officer ranks. Note, however, that the flag/general officer population was very small, so any change in raw numbers could have significantly affected the percentages. Keeping this in mind, the following observations about the flag/general ranks can be made. The Army Reserve, with 14.7 percent, had the largest minority share; the Army National Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Army followed, each with minority shares greater than 10 percent. In general, the Reserve Components had larger minority shares than their respective Active Components. The three exceptions are the Air Force (5.5 percent) and Air Force Reserve (4.1 percent), the Coast Guard (7.5 percent) and Coast Guard Reserve (0.0 percent), and the Navy (6.5 percent) and Navy Reserve (4.4 percent). However, as noted earlier, the Coast Guard percentages may be inaccurate. With the exception of the Coast Guard, the difference

in percentage share of minority representation in flag/general officers ranks between the Active Components and their respective Reserve Components never exceeded 5 percentage points.

Minority Representation: Officers

Figure 5 shows that, in the E-1 through E-6 population, the Navy, Navy Reserve, and Army Reserve all had minority shares of over 40 percent. Minority representation in the Army and Air Force Reserve followed closely behind, with percentages in the mid-30s. Comparing each Reserve Component with its respective Active Component reveals that minority percentages in the E-1 through E-6 ranks were generally greater in the Active Component than in the Reserve. The difference is especially notable when the Army, with a 36.1-percent minority share, is compared with the Army National Guard, which had a 25.4-percent minority share. In two cases, a Reserve Component had a larger minority share than its Active counterpart: that of the Air Force Reserve and the Air Force (33.7 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively) and that of the Army Reserve and the Army (41.1 percent and 36.1 percent, respectively).

Figure 5. Percentage of Minority Enlisted Personnel, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

Unlike the officer population, whose minority shares decreased in the senior ranks in every component, in the enlisted population, minority shares sometimes increased in the senior ranks. This was the case for the Army Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Army, and the Marine Corps. These same components also had the largest minority shares in their senior ranks, ranging between approximately 35 percent and 45 percent. Comparing each Reserve Component with its active-duty counterpart reveals that, in all but one case (the Army and Army Reserve), minority representation was higher in the Active Component. The differences were sometimes quite large. For example, the Army minority share of the senior enlisted ranks was 45.2 percent, and the Army National Guard share was nearly 25 percentage points lower. Similarly, in the Navy, minority representation was 36 percent; in the Navy Reserve, it was 22.2 percent.

Summary

Comparing female representation in the Active Components with female representation in the Reserve counterparts reveals that, in general, women were better represented in the Reserve Components. This was true for both officers and enlisted personnel and in both lower and upper pay grades. In contrast, in terms of minority shares, the Active Component, in general, tended to have higher minority representation. This was especially true in the enlisted ranks in both the lower and upper pay grades. The difference is less notable in the O-1 through O-6 officer ranks. In the flag/general officer corps, the Reserve Components, in most cases, had larger minority shares than their active-duty counterparts. Services in both the Reserve and Active Components tended to have lower minority and female representation among flag/general officers than in the O-1 through O-6 officer ranks. This was also the case among senior enlisted personnel when compared with the E-1 through E-6 population, although there were more exceptions.

Comparing the Reserve Component with the U.S. Population

As part of its tasking from Congress, the Commission examined how demographic representation in the military compares with the demographic characteristics of the U.S. population in general. The relevance of this comparison stems from the general belief "that a force reflecting society is . . . likely to respect societal values, advance societal goals, and receive societal support" (Kirby & Thie, 1997).

In the last few years, prominent government and military leaders have echoed this sentiment. In February 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, said, "The Navy must reflect the face of the nation. When the nation looks at its Navy, it should see itself reflected back. From diversity we cross rank, we draw different perspectives, we make ourselves better and that's why it's important" (Roughead, 2008). In the congressional record from June 25, 2009, Congressman Elijah Cummings was quoted as saying, "My passion is to ensure that our armed services are representative of America and that the leadership pipeline reflects our Nation's diversity" (quoted in Issue Paper #9). As "citizen warriors," it is important that Reserve Component servicemembers reflect the demographics of the nation. In many ways, they are the face of the military in communities around the United States.

The concept that the Armed Forces should mirror the nation, demographically speaking, is particularly relevant in the case of the National Guard, and especially in the states that each of the "54 National Guards" serve. This is because these units are often called upon by state governments to serve in domestic operations in the areas where they are based. Although there is still work to be done, the National Guard recognizes the importance of the issue. As Felton Page, then the National Guard Bureau's (NGB's) equal opportunity and civil rights director, noted in an interview for a Department of Defense (DoD) news article, "gone are the days when an all-white Guard unit would go into a predominantly black neighborhood to maintain order, as during the 1965 riots in Los Angeles" (Smith, 2008).

Unlike the National Guard, the Reserve is, at all times, under the control of the federal government, and it does not have a specific state mission. Therefore, within the Reserve, the emphasis on diversity centers primarily on representing the nation as a whole, as opposed to the specific geographic areas where units are based. However, there is a relationship between the demographics of an area and the demographics of Reserve members located within that area. And although the Reserve does not have a mission attached to any specific geography, the dual military/civilian life of Reserve members does link them to their locations because of their jobs and families.

Tables 3–5 compare the benchmarks established in Issue Paper #26 and the demographic characteristics of the Reserve and National Guard. The focus in this section is on national benchmarks, so this paper does not provide statistics below the national level. However, as discussed above, the subcommittee believes that, for both the National Guard and the Reserve, benchmarks at the state and community levels are particularly important. As a result, one of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommendations focuses specifically on that issue. However, National Guard and Reserve data available to the Commission did not supply credible statistics at the state level.

In this section, three benchmark populations are considered: the U.S. population as a whole, a proxy eligible population, and the Active Component as a whole. Although the Active Component population and the U.S. population are clearly defined in terms of demographics, how to define the eligible population is less straightforward. The effects of subtle differences between the Services and their eligibility requirements,[9] such as those related to military qualification test scores and weight, are not observable for all portions of the U.S. population.[10] So, although it is not possible to identify the exact eligible population, it is possible to construct a proxy eligible population from data that are closely correlated with eligibility requirements and observable to researchers. The results presented here reflect the proxy eligible population defined in Issue Paper #26.[11]

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[9] For example, the Services can issue waivers that admit into their ranks people who would otherwise be ineligible.

[10] For example, only those who which to enter into military service take the qualification tests. This information is not observed for the rest of the population.

[11] Issue Paper #26 states:

> Due to the difficulty of estimating a "true" eligible population, a proxy for the eligible population is often constructed. Such proxies are used in the DoD Population Representation documents. For instance, these reports rely on CPS data, using citizens ages 18–44 as a civilian comparison for the enlisted force and using citizen college graduates ages 21–49 as a civilian comparison for the officer commissioned corps. In the data we present . . . , we further refine the eligible population comparisons, using CPS [Current Population Survey] data to define proxy eligible populations through age, citizenship, education, and labor-force participation. Specifically, our proxy populations were the following:
>
> - Junior enlisted (E-1–E-4): Active labor-force participant (i.e., currently working or seeking employment), high-school education or equivalent, between ages 19 and 30; no citizenship requirement because noncitizens can enlist and subsequently gain citizenship through military service
> - Midlevel enlisted (E-5–E-6): Citizen, active labor-force participant, high-school education or equivalent, between ages 23 and 39
> - Senior enlisted (E-7–E-9): Citizen, active labor-force participant, high-school education or equivalent, between ages 31 and 47
> - Company-grade officer (O-1–O-3): Citizen, active labor-force participant, college education, between ages 23 and 40
> - Field-grade officer (O-4–O-6): Citizen, active labor-force participant, college education, between ages 33 and 52
> - Flag-grade officer (O-7–O-10): Citizen, active labor-force participant, college education, between ages 48 and 59.

The military data presented come from the September 2008 DMDC datasets, and the data used to construct the civilian benchmarks presented in Issue Paper #26 and reproduced here come from the October 2008 CPS (found at U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).[12]

Officer and enlisted populations are considered by pay grade. Officers are divided into three groups: O-1 through O-3, O-4 through O-6, and O-7 through O-9. Enlisted personnel are also divided into three groups: E-1 through E-3, E-4 through E-6, and E-7 through E-9. Here, each component is not addressed separately. Rather, the five Reserve Components are grouped under "Reserve," and the two National Guard Components are grouped under "National Guard." Likewise, the Active Component is not broken out by individual Service.[13] Each table also includes a column with statistics for the entire Reserve Component (i.e., the National Guard and Reserve together).

Discussions accompany each table, and a summary paragraph is included at the end of each discussion. Female shares are considered first, and minority shares, broken out by race and ethnicity category, are discussed second.

Female Representation: Officers and Enlisted

Before examining the percentages specifically, it is important to contextualize female representation in the military, which, at all ranks—in both the Reserve Component and the Active Component— has fallen very short of reaching either the U.S. population benchmark or the eligible population benchmark. As discussed in Issue Paper #26,

> Women make up about half of the U.S. population, but, with the exception of a Navy policy of seeking an enlisted force that is 20-percent female, we have not found any DoD representation "benchmark" for women.

> There are two contributors to uncertainty about where to set a benchmark for women. First, women are currently prohibited from serving in combat arms. The proportion of restricted positions is not consistent across Services. Only two-thirds of positions in the Army and the Marine Corps are open to women, while nine of ten in the Navy are and almost all positions in the Air Force are. In the current system, women have a much greater chance of reaching top leadership positions in the Navy and the Air Force than in the Army and the Marine Corps (Harrell & Miller, 1997). . . .

> Second, women have a lower propensity than males to serve in the military. According to the 2008 Youth Poll, female propensity is about half that of males (Yanosky et al., 2009). This implies that one might expect women to constitute a maximum of one-third of the military. Such a figure does not take into account limitations on careers for women in the military. However, these conditions (i.e., propensity to

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[12] For more-detailed information on the data, as well as a detailed discussion of how these particular benchmarks were established, see Issue Paper #26.

[13] Breakdowns by individual component are provided in the prior section, "Comparing the Reserve Component with the Active Component." See also the demographic profile issue papers, which are Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, Issue Paper #44, Issue Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55.

serve and restrictions on female service in certain military positions)
could change if societal expectations shift over time.

This quotation mentions two specific benchmarks: a goal of 20-percent female representation in the enlisted ranks of the Navy and a minimum of 33-percent female representation in the military, based on current female propensity to serve but not including limitations on careers. However, if the goal is for the Armed Forces to mirror the population that it serves, then the benchmark for women should be set at 51 percent, which is the female share of the U.S. population. Changes in policy and military culture could help close the gap between current representation and this benchmark. Many of the Commission's recommendations address this issue.

With this in mind, the following discussion centers on how female representation in the Reserve Component compares with female representation in the United States and in a proxy eligible population. Table 3 presents this figures.

As Table 3 shows, with regard to the lower ranks of the officer population, although no group in either the Reserve or Active Component approximated the U.S. population benchmark or the proxy eligible population benchmark, the Reserve stands out, with 27.05-percent female representation. This was about 9 percentage points higher than the Active Component and about 12 percentage points higher than the National Guard. However, with respect to both external benchmarks, it still fell about 25 percentage points short.

Table 3. Female Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Demographic Profiles

		Reserve Component			Benchmarks	
		National Guard	**Reserve**	**Total for the Reserve Component**	**Active Component**	**U.S. Population**	**Proxy Eligible Population**
Officer							
	O-1–O-3	15.48%	27.05%	21.09%	18.20%	51.00%	52.70%
	O-4–O-6	12.02%	19.20%	16.86%	12.90%	51.00%	49.40%
	O-7–O-10	6.21%	11.07%	8.19%	6.40%	51.00%	47.60%
Enlisted							
	E-1–E-4	17.56%	22.07%	19.38%	14.70%	51.00%	45.60%
	E-5–E-6	13.34%	20.67%	16.51%	14.30%	51.00%	45.10%
	E-7–E-9	12.74%	19.90%	15.96%	10.10%	51.00%	46.60%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

Moving from the junior to the midlevel pay grades, it is evident that female representation declined across the board, although female representation in the Reserve, which had a 19.2-percent female share, was higher than both the National Guard, which had a 12.02-percent share, and the Active Component, which had a 12.90-percent share. Moving to the senior pay grades, it is evident that female representation declined further: Women constituted 11.07 percent of the Reserve but only 6.21 percent of the National Guard and 6.40 percent of the Active Component.

The trends were similar in the enlisted population. In the E-1 through E-4 ranks, female representation in the Reserve, which was made up of 22.07 percent women, was about 8 percentage points higher than in the Active Component and 5 percentage points higher than in the National

Guard. Representation fell through the midlevel and senior pay grades, although not as sharply as it did in the officer corps. For example, the table shows that, in the total for the Reserve Component, women constituted 21.09 percent of the junior officer corps and 8.19 percent of the senior officer corps—a difference of about 13 percentage points. In the enlisted ranks, women constituted 19.38 percent of the population in the junior pay grades and 15.96 percent in the senior pay grades. In this case, the difference was only 3.42 percentage points.

Minority Representation—Officers

Table 4 shows how the officer corps in the Reserve and National Guard compared with the U.S. population and with a proxy eligible population in terms of race and ethnicity. The focus is on six specific groups: Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic (API); black, non-Hispanic (black); Hispanic; other, non-Hispanic (other); unknown; and white, non-Hispanic (white).

Table 4. Officer Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Racial and Ethnic Demographic Profiles

	Reserve Component			Benchmarks		
	National Guard	**Reserve**	**Total for the Reserve Component**	**Active Component**	**U.S. Population**	**Proxy Eligible Population**
Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic						
O-1–O-3	2.95%	4.87%	3.89%	4.30%	4.60%	6.10%
O-4–O-6	1.60%	2.64%	2.30%	2.80%	4.60%	5.90%
O-7–O-10	1.69%	1.64%	1.67%	0.50%	4.60%	5.30%
Black, non-Hispanic						
O-1–O-3	8.09%	14.23%	11.07%	8.80%	12.20%	8.50%
O-4–O-6	5.83%	9.81%	8.51%	8.20%	12.20%	8.40%
O7–O-10	4.24%	4.92%	4.52%	5.40%	12.20%	7.10%
Hispanic						
O-1–O-3	5.29%	7.20%	6.22%	5.60%	15.40%	6.60%
O-4–O-6	3.88%	4.61%	4.38%	4.40%	15.40%	5.50%
O-7–O-10	3.67%	2.87%	3.34%	1.60%	15.40%	3.90%
Other, non-Hispanic						
O-1–O-3	0.21%	0.72%	0.46%	1.50%	2.10%	1.30%
O-4–O-6	0.24%	0.50%	0.42%	0.80%	2.10%	1.10%
O-7–O-10	0.56%	0.00%	0.33%	0.10%	2.10%	0.90%
Unknown						
O-1–O-3	2.50%	4.15%	3.30%	5.80%	N/A	N/A
O-4–O-6	1.28%	3.62%	2.86%	3.40%	N/A	N/A
O-7–O-10	0.56%	3.28%	1.67%	0.10%	N/A	N/A

	Reserve Component			Benchmarks		
	National Guard	Reserve	Total for the Reserve Component	Active Component	U.S. Population	Proxy Eligible Population
White, non-Hispanic						
O-1–O-3	80.46%	68.27%	74.55%	74.10%	65.80%	77.50%
O-4–O-6	86.72%	78.39%	81.10%	80.40%	65.80%	79.10%
O-7–O-10	88.98%	87.30%	88.29%	92.30%	65.80%	82.80%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

NOTES: N/A = not applicable. It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for the "unknown" category.

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic. With regard to APIs, in the lower officer ranks, the Reserve had the highest representation (4.87 percent). This compared favorably with the U.S. population (4.60 percent) but fell slightly short of the proxy eligible population, which was 6.10 percent. It was slightly higher than the Active Component, which had a 4.30-percent API share. In all cases, API representation decreased with rank. The total for the composite Reserve Component, for example, fell from 3.89 percent in the junior officer ranks to 1.67 percent in the flag/general officer ranks.

Black, non-Hispanic. In the lower officer ranks, black representation was highest in the Reserve, which had a 14.23-percent share; this was 2 percentage points higher than the U.S. population and nearly 6 percentage points higher than the proxy eligible population. The National Guard share (8.09 percent) was similar to the proxy eligible population (8.50 percent) and to the Active Component population (8.80 percent). Across the board, representation declined with rank. At midlevel ranks, the Reserve Component had an 8.51-percent black share, the Active Component had an 8.20-percent black share, and the U.S. population had a 12.20-percent black share. The proxy eligible population was 8.40 percent black. Compared with the lower ranks, at the flag/general officer ranks, black representation declined substantially, to 4.24 percent in the National Guard, 4.92 percent in the Reserve, and 5.40 percent in the Active Component. The benchmarks at this level were 12.20 percent for the U.S. population and 7.10 percent for the proxy eligible population; both benchmarks were markedly higher than actual black representation in the flag/general officer ranks.

Hispanic. Compared with the U.S. population, Hispanic officers in all ranks in both the Active and Reserve Components were underrepresented. However, compared with the proxy eligible population, the difference was less noticeable. In the lower ranks, the Reserve, with a 7.20-percent Hispanic share, came the closest to the 15.40-percent U.S. population benchmark, and the Reserve was the only group that surpassed the 6.60-percent proxy eligible population benchmark. Hispanics constituted 5.29 percent of the National Guard in ranks O-1 through O-3 and 5.60 percent of the same population in the Active Component. As in the other race and ethnicity categories, representation decreased with rank, falling a few percentage points in the transition to midlevel ranks and then a few more in the transition to the flag/general officer ranks. Although the U.S. population benchmark remained constant, the proxy eligible population decreased. With a 3.67-percent Hispanic share in the flag/general officer ranks, the National Guard compared favorably with the 3.90-percent proxy eligible population benchmark but fell significantly short of the 15.40-percent U.S. population benchmark. The Reserve had a 2.87-percent Hispanic share, and Hispanics constituted only 1.60 percent of the flag/general officer population in the Active Component.

Other, non-Hispanic: The "other" category comprises American Indians, Alaska natives, and a category for people reporting more than one race. In both the military and civilian populations, the "other" share was small. The U.S. population benchmark was 2.10 percent. The proxy eligible population was lower and decreased with rank, from 1.30 percent in the lower officer ranks to 0.90 percent in the flag/general officer ranks. The Active Component, with 1.50 percent in the lower ranks, had the largest "other" share, coming close to the U.S. population benchmark and surpassing the proxy eligible population benchmark by 0.20 percentage points. The percentage of officers in the "other" category decreased with rank.

Unknown. Unlike civilian data, military data include cases when race and ethnicity are listed as "unknown." It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for this "unknown" category. The "unknown" category is included in our calculations because, were it excluded, the proportions for other categories would not be computed accurately. Issue Paper #26 discusses in detail the effect of including the "unknown" category in the calculations.

White, non-Hispanic. In the case of non-Hispanic whites, representation increased substantially with rank, and, compared with the U.S. population benchmark of 65.80 percent, whites were overrepresented in all officer ranks and in all components. In many cases, the difference was quite large. For example, whites constituted 88.98 percent of the flag/general officer ranks in the National Guard—over 23 percentage points higher than the U.S. population benchmark. Comparing the Active Component with this benchmark reveals that the difference was even larger (26.5 percentage points).

Minority Representation: Enlisted

Table 5 illustrates how the enlisted populations of the Reserve and National Guard compared with the U.S. population and a proxy eligible population in terms of race and ethnicity.

Table 5. Enlisted Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Racial and Ethnic Demographic Profiles

	Reserve Component			Benchmarks		
	National Guard	**Reserve**	**Total for Reserve Component**	**Active Component**	**U.S. Population**	**Proxy Eligible Population**
Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic						
E-1–E-4	2.40%	4.93%	3.42%	4.00%	4.60%	3.30%
E-5–E-6	2.24%	4.12%	3.05%	4.30%	4.60%	2.60%
E-7–E-9	1.62%	2.36%	1.95%	3.30%	4.60%	2.50%
Black, non-Hispanic						
E-1–E-4	13.83%	17.62%	15.35%	15.00%	12.20%	13.60%
E-5–E-6	12.42%	20.01%	15.70%	20.40%	12.20%	15.10%
E-7–E-9	10.52%	24.32%	16.71%	24.60%	12.20%	14.50%
Hispanic						
E-1–E-4	8.13%	13.49%	10.29%	11.90%	15.40%	18.00%
E-5–E-6	7.68%	13.38%	10.14%	12.20%	15.40%	14.10%
E-7–E-9	6.21%	8.96%	7.44%	8.60%	15.40%	11.20%

	Reserve Component			Benchmarks		
	National Guard	**Reserve**	**Total for Reserve Component**	**Active Component**	**U.S. Population**	**Proxy Eligible Population**
Other, non-Hispanic						
E-1–E-4	0.23%	0.79%	0.45%	3.40%	2.10%	2.40%
E-5–E-6	0.30%	0.93%	0.57%	2.30%	2.10%	2.20%
E-7–E-9	0.24%	0.41%	0.32%	1.20%	2.10%	1.80%
Unknown						
E-1–E-4	1.48%	1.48%	1.48%	1.00%	N/A	N/A
E-5–E-6	2.16%	2.56%	2.33%	2.70%	N/A	N/A
E-7–E-9	1.58%	2.09%	1.81%	3.60%	N/A	N/A
White, non-Hispanic						
E-1–E-4	73.04%	60.46%	67.98%	64.80%	65.80%	62.80%
E-5–E-6	74.48%	58.24%	67.47%	58.30%	65.80%	66.00%
E-7–E-9	79.15%	61.33%	71.16%	58.60%	65.80%	70.00%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

NOTES: N/A = not applicable. It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for the "unknown" category.

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic. For the API category, the U.S. population benchmark was 4.60 percent. In the lower and midlevel pay grades, the Reserve compared favorably with this benchmark, with 4.93- percent and 4.12-percent shares, respectively. The National Guard shares in these pay grades were about 2 percentage points lower than the U.S. population benchmark. Compared with the proxy eligible population, both the lower and midlevel pay grades in the Reserve surpassed the benchmark, and the difference between the benchmark and the API share of the National Guard was less pronounced. API shares dropped in the senior pay grades, but, although the U.S. population benchmark remained constant, the proxy eligible population benchmark declined, making the difference less noticeable.

Black, non-Hispanic. In the Reserve and National Guard, black shares exceed the U.S. population benchmark in all but one group: E-7 through E-9 National Guard personnel. In some cases, the difference was great. For example, blacks constituted 24.32 percent of the E-7 through E-9 population in the Reserve, and their share of the general U.S. population was only 12.20 percent—a difference of over 12 percentage points. Compared with the proxy eligible population, blacks were also overrepresented, although less so than when compared with the general population. For example, looking at the total for the Reserve Component shows that blacks constituted 15.35 percent of the E-1 through E-4 population, whereas the proxy eligible population was 13.60 percent. Black representation fell with rank in the National Guard but increased with rank in the Reserve.

Hispanic. Compared with both the U.S. population benchmark and the proxy eligible population benchmark, Hispanics were underrepresented in all pay grades in both the Reserve and Active Components. The E-1 through E-4 enlisted Hispanic population in the Reserve, with a 13.49-percent share, came closest to the 15.40-percent U.S. population benchmark. Hispanic representation in the Reserve dropped sharply in the E-7 through E-9 pay grade (to 8.96 percent). Compared with the U.S. population benchmark, this was a difference of over 6 percentage points,

but the difference was only about 2 percentage points when compared with the proxy eligible population. The Hispanic share in the National Guard was smaller than in the Reserve in all pay grades, and the difference between Hispanic shares in the National Guard and the benchmarks was pronounced in some cases. For example, comparing the proxy eligible population benchmark with the E-1 through E-4 pay grade reveals a difference of around 10 percentage points. This gap closes when the Hispanic share is compared with the U.S. population benchmark. As in the Reserve, Hispanic shares fell with rank, but the difference was less noticeable in the National Guard.

Other, non-Hispanic. Representation in the "other" category was small in the Reserve and National Guard, ranging from 0.23 percent in the E-1 through E-4 pay grade in the National Guard to 0.93 percent in the E-5 through E-6 pay grade in the Reserve. Compared with the U.S. population benchmark (2.10 percent) and the proxy eligible population benchmark (2.40 percent, 2.20 percent, and 1.80 percent), "other" representation in the Reserve and National Guard fell short in all pay grades.

Unknown. As noted above, this category is included for completeness in the computation of the results.

White, non-Hispanic. Compared with the benchmark population and the proxy eligible population, white Reserve members in all enlisted pay grades were underrepresented. In the National Guard, however, white shares were greater than both benchmarks in all pay grades. In the case of the Reserve, the differences ranged between 4.47 percentage points and 7.56 percentage points below the U.S. population benchmark (depending on pay grade). Comparing the E-7 through E-9 population with the proxy eligible population shows that the difference was slightly more pronounced (8.67 percentage points), but, in the case of the E-1 through E-4 population, the difference was much smaller (just over 2 percentage points). White shares in the National Guard were larger compared with both benchmarks. Depending on pay grade, the differences ranged between 7.24 percentage points and 13.35 percentage points over the U.S. population benchmark. Compared with the proxy eligible population, the differences were smaller but still hovered between 8 percentage points and 10 percentage points over the benchmark.

Summary

In summary, in all pay grades in both the officer corps and the enlisted ranks, the Reserve Component had a larger female share than the Active Component, but all pay grades lagged significantly behind the external benchmarks. Again, if the goal is for the force to mirror the demographic characteristics of the population that it serves, then the number of women serving will have to increase substantially.

Turning to race and ethnicity, compared with the U.S. population benchmark, whites were overrepresented in the officer corps and all other race and ethnicity categories were underrepresented, a pattern most noticeable in the upper ranks. As was the case with black and API shares, there were a few exceptions in which minority shares in the lower officer ranks compared favorably to or surpassed the U.S. population benchmark. Compared with the proxy eligible population, whites were, again, overrepresented, and all other race and ethnicity categories were underrepresented. As before, this was most noticeable in the upper ranks. However, in the case of the proxy eligible population, the differences were less striking. In the lower ranks, the representation of blacks and Hispanics compared favorably with the proxy eligible population, even surpassing the benchmark in a few cases; in one case, whites were underrepresented.

Compared with the U.S. population and the proxy eligible population benchmarks, in the enlisted ranks, whites were underrepresented in the Reserve but overrepresented in the National

Guard. In many cases, black shares were greater, sometimes significantly greater, than the U.S. population benchmark. This difference was less apparent, however, when comparing black representation against the proxy eligible population. And, in the case of the National Guard, in the midlevel and senior-level pay grades, blacks were underrepresented. In all pay grades and in both the Reserve and National Guard, Hispanics were underrepresented, compared with the U.S. population and proxy eligible population benchmarks. In many cases, API shares compared favorably with the benchmarks, especially in the Reserve and in the lower pay grades. Representation of the "other" category in both the Reserve and National Guard was lower than both benchmarks in all cases.

Structural Diversity

The introduction to this paper lists three strategic issues that have served as a backdrop for the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee: the importance of the size of the Reserve Component relative to the size of the overall force, the importance of the Reserve Component demographically reflecting the population it serves, and the particular characteristics that differentiate the Reserve Component from the Active Component and that affect the way that the Active and Reserve Components integrate and interact. The first two issues speak to the significance of representation. The last issue adds a new dimension of diversity: structural diversity.

Structural Diversity Defined

Generally speaking, whereas demographic diversity considers race, ethnicity, and gender,[14] structural diversity focuses on institutional and organizational backgrounds. Structural diversity is based on work-related differences and is found in groups made up of people that come from different organizations, roles, positions, or ranks. The institutional background that each member brings exposes the group to different types of organizational knowledge, skills, and behaviors—that is, to diversity.[15]

Specifically, for the purposes of this paper, structural diversity is defined by those structural differences that determine how servicemembers from the Reserve Component integrate with servicemembers in the Active Component.

Structural Differences Between the Reserve and Active Components

The main structural differences between the Reserve and Active Components stem from the components' contrasting natures. The Active Component is, by definition, active. Active-duty servicemembers are on military duty full time. In contrast, the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve serve the nation in their military capacity while at the same time carrying on with their civilian and professional lives. Furthermore, also in contrast to those in the Active Component, National Guard and Reserve members generally serve in units close to their homes, and part of their mission is specifically focused on the states and communities that they serve.

Given the different natures of the Active and the Reserve Components, diversity and representation within the Active and the Reserve Components could be analyzed separately. In fact, this was the method the Commission followed before the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was created. Before the subcommittee was created, the Commission's research and

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[14] Demographic diversity includes not only race, ethnicity, and gender, which are the focus of the Commission's representational concerns, but also other *personal* characteristics, such as age and religion.

[15] Conceptually, the definition of diversity is consistent across sources. See Cummings, 2004, and Issue Paper #3.

recommendations for improving diversity management were solely based on information about the Active Component.

However, National Guard and Reserve servicemembers routinely integrate with active-duty forces. They provide support within the Active Component ranks and operational capabilities on the battlefield. This makes managing structural diversity an operational imperative in that it advances effective integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.

Consequently, to help the Commission identify recommendations that aim to improve total force integration, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee considered the interaction between the Active and Reserve Components and the structural differences between the two.

Operational Requirements and the Integration of the Active and Reserve Components

In the last three decades, the Reserve Component has faced and met increasing operational requirements. The shift began in 1990 with Desert Storm and the first involuntary activation of the Reserve Component since the Vietnam War.[16] Following Desert Storm, continuing through Desert Shield, and throughout the 1990s, the tempo of operations in the Reserve Component continued to be higher compared with earlier eras.[17] However, it was not until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that the use of the Reserve Component expanded dramatically. Reserve servicemembers started regularly deploying with active-duty forces, requiring increased interaction between the Active and Reserve Components.

Although the Commission does not have direct measures that quantify this interaction, several indicators point to an increased use of Reserve forces, which implies increased interaction. These indicators include the frequency of mobilizations, the rate of utilization of Reserve Component servicemembers, and the number of National Guard and Reserve servicemembers deployed at any given time.

For example, in 2003, the Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General James Helmly, reported that "Army Reserve soldiers have been deployed 10 times in the past 12 years for operations from Bosnia to Iraq," adding, "During the 75 years before that, the Army Reserve had been mobilized just nine times" (Helmly, 2003). Moreover, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (2008) reported that use of Reserve Component personnel increased from 12.7 million duty-days in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to 61.3 million duty days in FY 2006. Lastly, at their peak utilization, National Guard and Reserve servicemembers represented 33 percent of the forces deployed to Iraq (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008).

DoD acknowledged and discussed these increased requirements in DoD Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*. The directive states that it is DoD policy that the Reserve Components provide capabilities to meet defense requirements "across the full spectrum of conflict" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a). It also states that the Active and Reserve Components should be integrated as part of the total force and that the Reserve Components should be resourced to meet their operational requirements.

DoD Directive 1200.17 also tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Secretaries of the military departments with managing their Reserve Components as operational forces. It noted the importance of providing necessary training to the Reserve Component, of ensuring readiness, and of supporting family and employer programs. However, many of these programs are in their early stages and, as discussed in the recommendations below, there is still much

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[16] See Duncan, 2004.

[17] See Binnendijk & Cordero, 2005.

to be done to ensure proper integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.[18] Also, many Reserve Component leaders acknowledge that the debate about the role of the Reserve Component as a strategic force with increasing operational requirements is still ongoing.[19]

Structural Diversity and Total Force Integration

Riche et al. (2007) describe the similarities and differences between the Active and Reserve Components thus: "On one hand, the organizations have parallel structures and a shared mission; on the other hand, they have different mind-sets, different degrees of skill, and different policies, as well as different social identities." This statement could apply to the Active and Reserve Component in general or it could apply to any of the Services and their respective Reserve Components in particular.

For example, Bell (2005) argues that the Army really has three separate cultures—an Army National Guard culture, an Army Reserve culture, and an active-duty Army culture. He argues that the increase in Army National Guard and Army Reserve participation in what used to be the sole domain of the active Army makes a greater understanding among these three Components mission critical.

Riche et al. (2007) describe some of the difficulties related to Active and Reserve Component integration. Most arise from ambiguity regarding which elements of personnel control on joint assignments rest with which components. Difficulties also stem from differences in policies that govern the structure and length of the work day and from support services that are not accommodating in terms of working with the Reserve Component.

Kraus et al. (2007) examine deployed servicemembers' perceptions of the role of group diversity in determining performance in the combat environment. The authors' analysis is based on transcripts of interviews and includes a section detailing issues of structural diversity. Although most comments, whether positive or negative, related to structural differences between Services, several interviewees spoke of issues that arose when the Active Component and the Reserve Component worked together. For example, an active-duty captain described apprehension about working with National Guard or Reserve personnel, noting that there were widespread perceptions that Reserve Component servicemembers, compared with servicemembers in the Active Component, are less committed to deploying and to getting their jobs done. Some Reserve Component servicemembers described feelings of discrimination based on their organizational affiliation.

Although several difficulties have been noted in these studies, Riche et al. (2007) also report that deployment overrides some of these issues because of both the close contact between Active and Reserve Component servicemembers and their shared mission. In interviews reported in Kraus et al. (2007), some positive comments were noted. For example, a major in the Air Force Reserve made the following statement: "Believe it or not, reservists brought much more knowledge than some of the Active Duty individuals because of their vast experience in the civilian sector and the military sector. So, I believe that across the board it was a positive experience" (quoted in Kraus et al., 2007).

As just demonstrated, the structural differences between the Active and Reserve Components can, on one hand, cause friction that may detract from the mission. On the other hand, these

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[18] Also note that the degree to which the Reserve Component should transition to a more operational force has been extensively debated. See, for example, Graham, 2005.

[19] For example, the Air Force Reserve strategy suggests the need to maintain a strategic Reserve while leveraging it to provide an operational capability. See Stenner, 2009.

structural differences can bring together different types of experiences that help advance mission objectives.

As military operations have become more joint, with the Reserve Component operating alongside active-duty personnel and with different Services working together, the importance of managing structural diversity has increased. However, there is limited research on structural diversity, on its effect on mission accomplishment, and on how to manage it for maximum gains.

Using information gleaned in their focus groups, Riche et al. (2007) provide some guidance for managing structural diversity. They note that respondents frequently mentioned wanting more information about the other groups that they work with, such as reservists and civilians. Respondents also suggested that the policies that govern individual groups should be more similar from one group to the next. It was also noted that frequent interaction and a common goal contributed to successful working relationships.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT

According to its charter, the primary mandate of the MLDC is to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces and to provide recommendations for increasing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity within the Armed Forces. To support the Commission's effort, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee reviewed the Commission's work, considering the particularities of the Reserve Component. It examined diversity issues in the Reserve Component and helped the Commission identify strategic areas in which new recommendations were needed.

To carry out its work, the subcommittee examined features that differentiate the Reserve Component from the Active Component and tried to identify diversity management issues—as well as other institutional factors that can affect diversity in the force—at each stage of a servicemember's career. As previously noted, the background work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee highlights three main ideas. First, given the size of the Reserve Component, which constitutes about 50 percent of total manpower in the Armed Forces, any changes in the demographic makeup of the Reserve Component will be reflected in the total force. Second, diversity metrics show that, although it is more representative than the Active Component in many respects, the Reserve Component falls short of many national population benchmarks. Third, institutional and cultural differences between the Active and Reserve Components emphasize the issue of structural diversity in the Armed Forces and the importance of the Reserve Component in the current operational environment.

With this background in mind, the next four sections examine the strategic diversity issues that led to the recommendations that resulted from the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee's work. The first section provides the Commission's definition of diversity. The remaining sections present the new recommendations in three broad categories: those that address widening the pool of people that join the Reserve Component, those that focus on widening the opportunities of advancement for those already in service, and those that aim to improve the organizational structures that support diversity and diversity management. To provide the reader with a framework within which to contextualize diversity issues in the Reserve Component, the Commission's work on active-duty diversity issues is interweaved with the new recommendations.

Defining Diversity and Diversity Leadership

Definition of Diversity

Diversity Beyond Demographics in the Reserve Component

Diversity means different things to different people. For some, diversity is strictly associated with a person's race or ethnicity, but for others, diversity goes beyond demographic characteristics and includes such characteristics as cognitive ability, education, experience, and job type. The Commission recognizes that diversity spans many dimensions. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that DoD expand its diversity definition to read: "Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core

values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we serve."[20]

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that this definition applies to the Reserve Component. Moreover, the broad nature of this definition emphasizes structural diversity as one of the aspects of diversity that, together with demographic diversity, are integral to the recommendations that the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee advocates in this paper.

The subcommittee placed special emphasis on the concept of structural diversity because doing so helped frame the subcommittee's perspective. Although demographic diversity provides the background for most of the Commission's recommendations, structural diversity forms the backdrop for those recommendations that address the particular issues related to the National Guard and Reserve.

Moreover, structural diversity is especially relevant to the congressional task that requires the Commission to propose a new definition of diversity. Congress asked for a definition of diversity that, among other things, is consistent with the vision of DoD for the future workforce. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) emphasizes that this vision includes

- more regional and cultural capabilities
- more partner capacity skill sets
- more joint military/civilian capability
- seamless integration between the Reserve and the Active Components
- more specialized skills, such as foreign languages, medicine, and computer network operations (Department of Defense, 2010).

The subcommittee discussions that resulted in recommendations endorsed by the Commission addressed each of these points. The subcommittee's recommendations aim to leverage the structural differences that distinguish the Reserve and the Active Components, with the ultimate goal of creating a more effective total force that is aligned with the QDR's vision.

Widening the Pool

Outreach, Recruiting, and Retention

In the military's closed personnel system, the demographic profile of the leadership, and that of the force as a whole, depends on past outreach, recruiting, and retention efforts. In an all-volunteer force, outreach and recruiting inform the general population about military opportunities and bring in qualified personnel. They also determine the demographics of the initial population from which the military will develop its leadership. Retention efforts aim to ensure that qualified personnel moving through the ranks stay in the military, and, together with branching, assignments, and promotions, they shape how the demographic composition of each of the Services evolves through the ranks.

From the perspective of the subcommittee, outreach, recruiting, and retention efforts take on an additional dimension in the Reserve Component. In the Active Component personnel system, only those who join at the lowest ranks have the opportunity to move up the ranks—that is, it is a closed system. In contrast, in the Reserve Component, servicemembers leaving active-duty service can join the Reserve Component at any rank, if they are eligible. In fact, about one-third of enlisted personnel and almost 90 percent of officers in the Reserve Component come from prior active-duty service.[21]

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[20] See Appendix B for the full text of this recommendation.

[21] See Issue Paper #57 and Issue Paper #61.

This effectively means that the National Guard and Reserve can attract active-duty personnel that may otherwise leave the military, thus increasing, overall, the retention of talent that would otherwise be entirely lost to the Armed Forces.

This section discusses, from a National Guard and Reserve perspective, the recommendations presented by the Outreach and Recruiting Subcommittee and the Retention Subcommittee. In general, these recommendations are aimed at expanding the pool of applicants, at increasing the level of the skills of potential applicants through early engagement efforts, at improving recruiting from the current pool, and at detecting the causes of possible retention problems—especially for women. The reader should refer Decision Paper #1 and Decision Paper #3 for a complete discussion of the research and logic behind these recommendations.

This section also includes the discussion of a recommendation that is the direct result of the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee: a recommendation aimed at improving transitions between the Reserve and Active Components and between individual Reserve Components. The ultimate goal of this particular recommendation is to improve total force retention by attracting into the Reserve Component those talented servicemembers who might otherwise leave the military altogether.

Outreach and Recruiting: Expanding the Pool, Early Engagement, and Improving Recruiting

Current population trends show that the proportion of minorities in the population that is age-eligible to serve in the military is growing while the age-eligible population itself is not projected to grow. Moreover, education projections indicate that, although the rates are improving, minorities will continue to meet eligibility requirements at a lower rate than their white counterparts for the foreseeable future.[22] Because the age-eligible population is not growing and because those subpopulations that are increasing in proportion meet eligibility requirements at a lower rate, a decrease in the eligible pool of applicants is expected.

This issue affects the Reserve Component in two ways. First, it affects Reserve Component recruitment from the civilian population. Second, it affects the Reserve Component through the prior service pool that joins its ranks. The Commission identified this decrease in the eligible population as an important problem for all the Armed Forces and proposed a series of recommendations to help address it.

First, the Commission recommends that all stakeholders, including the President, Congress, DoD, and state and local officials, take steps to increase the size of the eligible pool. This recommendation's aim is to increase the number of individuals that are eligible to serve in the military. It asks the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria. It does not ask them to lower standards but rather to ensure that the chosen standards are good predictors of future performance in the military. It also involves stakeholders outside the military and asks them to work in partnership with the military to make sure that the youth of this country are educated and healthy so that they are eligible to serve.

The second recommendation emphasizes the role of early engagement programs that help increase the level of skill of potential applicants. The emphasis is not on using these programs as a recruiting tool. Rather, the programs are intended to be civic in nature, focused on encouraging youth to study science, technology, and mathematics; helping them stay in and succeed at school; and assisting them in becoming and staying physically fit.

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[22] See Riche, 2010.

The goal for the third recommendation is to improve current recruitment practices so as to ensure that all qualified potential applicants are reached. The recommendation aims to improve recruitment in all areas of the country and to streamline the process for applying to Service Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and academy programs.

In its discussions, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found that these recommendations address Reserve Component outreach and recruitment issues in that an increase in the eligible population will benefit diversity in the National Guard and Reserve, both in the civilian pool and in the prior service pool.

The subcommittee also believes that the National Guard, because of its proximity to the communities it serves, can be an effective partner in implementing these recommendations. In fact, the National Guard is already working in this capacity. Current efforts include programs that help at-risk students succeed in school, such as the Patriot Academy program[23] and GED Plus.[24] Other programs focus on early engagement efforts. These include the Guard Fit Challenge and the Warrior Challenge programs, which focus on fitness, and the About Face program, which teaches life skills to students between the ages of 13 and 17.[25]

Retention: Sabbatical Programs and Improved Data Collection

Retention helps shape the demographic profile of the upper ranks of the military. If servicemember retention differs by race, ethnicity, or gender, the upper ranks will not be representative of the lower ranks. In fact, the demographic profiles presented earlier in this paper reflect this pattern.

In its research, the Retention Subcommittee found that, among active-duty personnel, retention for minority groups was not a cause for minority underrepresentation in the upper ranks. In fact, in general, minority retention was found to be higher than white retention. However, women in both in the enlisted ranks and the officer corps were less likely than men to remain in service.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found similar results for women, but it also found that blacks are less likely than their white counterparts to remain in service in the Reserve Component. The next few paragraphs describe these results in more detail. These statistics help frame how the Retention Subcommittee–approved recommendations affect the National Guard and Reserve. For details about active-duty retention, see Decision Paper #3.

Retention as Measured by Conditional Continuation Rates. This subsection makes use of conditional continuation rates by years of service (YOS) as a measure of retention. The continuation rates used here were constructed using data from the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) provided by DMDC (found at Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008, 2010b), and they represent averages that include information from FY 2004 to FY 2009.

To facilitate the interpretation of our results, average continuation rates are presented as percentage-point deviations from the baseline.[26] For gender, the male category serves as the. For the race and ethnicity category comparisons, the white category is the baseline. This means that, for women, average continuation rates are presented as a percentage-point difference from the male

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[23] The Patriot Academy program offers otherwise qualified high school dropouts the opportunity to join the National Guard and provides them with curriculum and resources to earn their high school diploma.

[24] The GED Plus program enables qualified students to earn their GED while experiencing military training at the GED Plus residential school in Arkansas.

[25]This program is a coordinated effort between the National Guard and the departments of military affairs in the states. See New Jersey National Guard, 2010.

[26] For more details about how to compute these conditional continuation rates and for a more comprehensive presentation of our results, please see Issue Paper #59 and Issue Paper #60.

rates. For race and ethnicity categories, comparisons are presented as percentage-point differences from the white category.

Note that conditional continuation rates, as presented here, measure the percentage of individuals who stayed in the Reserve Component in a given year, given that they were in the Reserve Component the year before. Thus, they give us an aggregate measure of servicemember retention outcomes. Specifically, although continuation rates do reflect the individual decision to remain in the military an additional year, they also capture other causes for separation, such as not meeting a specific qualification, lack of promotion opportunities, and other factors that are not directly decided by the individual servicemember.

National Guard and Reserve Officer Continuation Rates. The baseline row in Table 6 reports the average continuation rate for male officers in the National Guard and Reserve. The "Female" row reports the average deviation from the baseline rate. For example, in Table 6, the average continuation rate for male officers in the Navy Reserve was 86.2 percent. The average continuation rate for females was 1.8 percentage points below that. These estimates were constructed using regression analysis. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, and those estimates that are statistically significant are marked with an asterisk.[27]

Our results show that, on average, and across all YOSs, women had lower continuation rates than men in all the Services. All results are significant to at least at the 10-percent level, except in the case of the Air National Guard.

Table 6. Average Effect of Gender on Officer Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

	Air Force Reserve	Air National Guard	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Navy Reserve
Female	−0.0212***	−0.0042	−0.0047*	−0.0124***	−0.0354***	−0.0221*	−0.0181***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.003)
Baseline	0.9032***	0.9237***	0.8967***	0.8889***	0.8995***	0.8048***	0.8618***
(Male)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
N	90,349	66,246	151,448	177,461	6,355	16,331	86,424
F	86.5267	2.3847	3.7629	51.8464	13.4350	2.7271	33.5594
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
p-value	0.0000	0.1225	0.0524	0.0000	0.0002	0.0987	0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = p < 0.10. ** = p < 0.05. *** = p < 0.01.

Table 7 reports differences in average continuation rates by race and ethnicity. In this table, the "Baseline" row indicates the average retention rates for whites for all the YOSs included in the sample. The columns labeled with each of the race and ethnicity categories indicate deviations from that average.

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[27]The standard errors provide a measure of the accuracy of the results given the sample of data used to construct the estimates. Smaller standard errors are associated with more-accurate estimates. Likewise, more asterisks point to a smaller probability that the results appear to be different from zero due to chance alone. For example, * means that there is at most a 10-percent probability that gender results are in fact zero, ** shows that this probability is 5 percent, and *** shows that this probability is only 1 percent.

With the exception of blacks and, in some Services, APIs, minorities had higher continuation rates than whites in the National Guard and Reserve. However, not all of these continuation rate differentials were statistically significant, and, therefore, it cannot be ruled out with statistical certainty that these rates were different from the continuation rates for whites. Note, however, that, considering the magnitude of the results, they may merit further investigation.

Table 7. Average Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Officer Continuation Rates, by Service

	Air Force Reserve	Air National Guard	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Navy Reserve
API, NH	0.0056	0.0024	0.0031	0.0156***	−0.0255**	−0.0211	0.0115**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.006)
Black, NH	−0.0147***	0.0007	0.0022	0.0039*	−0.0201	−0.0374**	−0.0151***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Hispanic	0.0046	0.0064	0.0092**	0.0087***	−0.0051	−0.0157	0.0126**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Other	−0.0086	−0.0032	0.0006	0.0212***	0.0226	0.0240*	0.0111***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.004)
Baseline	0.8984***	0.9227***	0.8954***	0.8834***	0.8951***	0.8051***	0.8570***
(White, NH)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
N	90,349	66,246	151,448	177,461	6,355	16,331	86,424
F	4.3107	0.4495	1.7697	9.8674	1.5579	2.9611	6.3388
d.f.	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
p-value	0.0017	0.7728	0.1318	0.0000	0.1826	0.0186	0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = $p < 0.10$. ** = $p < 0.05$. *** = $p < 0.01$.

National Guard and Reserve Enlisted Continuation Rates. In the enlisted ranks, the racial, ethnic, and gender differences in continuation rates were more marked. Table 8 shows that, on average, women had lower continuation rates than men for all the Services, and all results were significant at least at the 1-percent level. Table 9 shows that, compared with whites, APIs and Hispanics tended to have higher continuation rates and blacks had consistently lower rates. In the "other" category, continuation rates depended on the particular Service. Most of the resuls were statistically significant. This indicates that, on average, the reader can be confident in the patterns just described.

Table 8. Average Effect of Gender on Enlisted Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

	Air Force Reserve	Air National Guard	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Navy Reserve
Female	−0.0177***	−0.0272***	−0.0406***	−0.0203***	−0.0281***	−0.0276***	−0.0169***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Baseline	0.8831***	0.9051***	0.8328***	0.8144***	0.8527***	0.8002***	0.7875***
(Male)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	320,453	474,644	1,716,119	875,876	38,876	204,232	284,849
F	170.5018	569.1499	2333.2497	423.5561	29.3769	40.4876	78.7512
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = $p < 0.10$. ** = $p < 0.05$. *** = $p < 0.01$.

Table 9. Average Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Enlisted Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

	Air Force Reserve	Air National Guard	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Navy Reserve
API, NH	0.0081***	0.0142***	0.0135***	0.0303***	0.0192**	−0.0036	−0.0018
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Black, NH	−0.0146***	−0.0221***	−0.0174***	−0.0075***	0.0002	−0.0399***	−0.0428***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hispanic	0.0050**	0.0008	0.0146***	0.0107***	0.0096	−0.0368***	−0.0013
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other	0.0015	−0.0021	−0.0155***	−0.0131***	0.0110	0.0034	−0.0274***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Baseline	0.8809***	0.9017***	0.8287***	0.8089***	0.8466***	0.8071***	0.7932***
(White, NH)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	320,453	474,644	1,716,119	875,876	38,876	204,232	284,849
F	30.7661	67.0050	209.3027	102.1680	1.8564	77.9737	113.7692
d.f.	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
p-value	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1151	0.0000	0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = $p < 0.10$. ** = $p < 0.05$. *** = $p < 0.01$.

In summary, the research initiated by the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee shows results similar to those found by the Retention Subcommittee. Consistently, women had lower continuation rates across the Reserve Component. In general, continuation rates for most minority groups were higher than white continuation rates. However, unlike the results for the Active

Component, the results for the National Guard and Reserve revealed lower continuation rates for blacks and for API officers in some Services.

To understand the causes of these continuation rate differentials, the subcommittee used the *June 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members* (found at Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009) to examine overall satisfaction with the military way of life and retention intentions in the Reserve Component. In general, this research suggests that women and minority groups in the Reserve Component do not show significant differences in their reported satisfaction with the military way of life compared with their male and white counterparts, respectively. The same is true for their reported retention intentions. However, as reported in Issue Paper #52, although the differences are not statistically significant, the numbers suggest that women are slightly less satisfied than men and that some minority groups are slightly less satisfied than their white counterparts.

The results presented above help identify potential problems, but they do not reveal much about the actual causes of the continuation rate differential. Moreover, continuation rates, as reported here, only measure whether an individual leaves a Service; they do not tell us why. Many factors other than retention can affect these rates. For example, an individual may decide to leave because of lack of promotion opportunities, as a result of health or behavioral issues, because of legal problems, or because of a failure to obtain necessary qualifications to remain in service. Investigating the effect of these and other factors on retention will help the Services identify root causes and implement policies and programs that address current and future retention problems.

Although further analysis might have helped clarify some of these issues, data and time constraints prevented the Commission from investigating the root causes of a number of issues identified during the discovery phase.[28] Therefore, the information presented here is intended to describe the situation. The methodological limitations of using these results to inform policy decisions must be kept in mind, since effective policy should be directed at the causes of these patterns in order to successfully drive change.

With these caveats in mind, the Commission developed two recommendations directed at improving retention. First, the Commission recommends that the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) expand its current focus to investigate the causes of retention rate differentials for women. It also recommends that DACOWITS investigate the effects of sabbatical programs on the retention of women. Further, it asks that the results of this research be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

The aim of this recommendation is twofold: to investigate the causes of retention problems for women and to find appropriate solutions for them. Although the recommendation is specifically directed at DACOWITS and aimed at improving retention rates for women, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee suggests that the Services, and especially the Reserve Components, expand on this idea and investigate retention issues not only for women but also for minorities, especially blacks.

To support the Services' efforts to identify retention issues and their causes, the Commission also recommends that DoD establish a universal data collection and analysis system to track issues related to military career progression over time. This system should include qualitative and quantitative data from all the Services and should consistently track information about branching, assignments, promotion, and retention.

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[28]More information is available in the issue papers on retention in the Active and Reserve Components.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: The Prior Service Pool

As codified in Title 10, Section 10102, one of the main roles of the Reserve Component is to serve as a repository of "qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require." Although the Reserve Component obtains a large portion of its force from the civilian population, almost 90 percent of its officers and over one-third of its enlisted personnel were once active-duty servicemembers.

The next few paragraphs describe the importance of the prior service pool as a source of personnel for the Reserve Component and that pool's role in promoting structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention.

The Importance of the Prior Service Pool to Reserve Component Recruiting and Accessions. Table 10 shows that, for all seven Components, the vast majority—an average of 87 percent—of Selected Reserve officer accessions, and 38 percent of enlisted gains, came from the prior service pool. Thus, although there are differences among the Services, in general, the relevant Selected Reserve recruiting pool was constituted of individuals leaving active-duty service rather than of civilians.

Table 10. Prior Service Contribution to Selected Reserve Gains

Service	Enlisted	Officer
Air Force Reserve	62.5%	94.3%
Air National Guard	44.9%	91.3%
Army National Guard	30.7%	84.8%
Army Reserve	39.3%	80.1%
Coast Guard Reserve	54.9%	87.7%
Marine Corps Reserve	26.3%	97.2%
Navy Reserve	66.6%	89.1%
Total	38.4%	87.3%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

In addition to its implications for racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, this fact has important implications for recruiting and training costs that are worth mentioning here. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the cost of recruiting a new member into the Armed Forces in 2008 was $17,047 (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b), an amount calculated by dividing the total cost of the program by the number of recruits. The estimated cost of accession training for newly enlisted servicemembers was $8,757 in 2008 (Office of Management and Budget, 2009a), an amount that is a weighted average of cost per recruit for all four Services and that includes only the cost of basic training.

An average estimate for officer training is not easily defined. Enlisted servicemembers follow very similar training regimes when newly recruited, and, therefore, there is less variance in the cost of training them. The cost of training an officer, on the other hand, depends not only on the specialty (e.g., pilot, medic, infantry) but also on the commissioning source (e.g., ROTC, a Service academy). Regardless of the exact cost, the training and recruitment money invested in a servicemember is lost, sometimes in as little as two to six years, if that servicemember decides to leave his or her Service.

However, if active-duty servicemembers join one of the Reserve Components, the initial investment is not entirely lost because the skills are kept within the Armed Forces.

There are two important implications of the prior service pool on Reserve Component racial, ethnic, and gender demographics. First, given that a large percentage of enlisted personnel, and nearly all officers, that join the Reserve Component come from the Active Component, the demographics of Reserve Component accessions are constrained, to a great extent, by the demographics of the Active Component population. Second, the eligibility issues that affect the demographic diversity of Active Component also affect Reserve Component accessions, both indirectly via prior service accessions and directly via nonprior service accessions. Thus, the demographics of those who come from the prior service pool largely determine the demographics of the Reserve Component as a whole.

Service Pool Affiliation Rates Race, Ethnicity, and Gender. Tables 11 and 12 report the rate at which prior service servicemembers joined the Selected Reserve within six months of leaving active duty by gender and race/ethnicity for FY 2008. Each percentage reported in the table is calculated within group.[29] Therefore, the percentages can be thought of as a crude affiliation rate for each of the categories reported. For instance, about 6 percent of female officers who left the Air Force in FY 2008 joined the Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard, compared with 6.3 percent of men.

In Table 11, the data for officers show that, across the Services, women joined at a slightly higher rate than men: 10.1 percent compared with 8.6 percent. Prior service minorities, except for blacks, joined the Selected Reserve at a higher rate than whites.

Table 11. Percentage of Prior Service Officers that Joined the Selected Reserve

Service	Gender		Race/Ethnicity				
	Female	Male	API	Black	Hispanic	Other	White
Air Force	6.0%	6.3%	8.9%	3.8%	8.4%	6.0%	6.2%
Army	17.0%	14.7%	21.8%	7.3%	17.6%	6.3%	12.8%
Coast Guard	35.9%	13.8%		20.0%	12.5%	54.2%	12.8%
Marine Corps	5.8%	5.9%	0.0%	11.3%	8.3%	7.7%	5.5%
Navy	0.8%	1.7%	1.7%	1.5%	2.6%	0.0%	1.5%
Total	10.1%	8.6%	12.1%	5.7%	10.8%	14.1%	7.3%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

NOTE: The "unknown" category is not included.

As shown in Table 12, the results were similar for enlisted personnel. Women joined the Selected Reserve at a higher rate than men, and all minority categories joined at higher rates than whites.

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[29] The prior service pool percentages reported here are derived from the number of individuals in each category that joined the Selected Reserve, divided by the total number of individuals in the category as a whole.

Table 12. Percentage of Prior Service Enlisted that Join the Selected Reserve

Service	Gender		Race/Ethnicity				
	Female	Male	API	Black	Hispanic	Other	White
Air Force	9.9%	7.9%	10.5%	8.0%	11.5%	9.1%	8.0%
Army	10.9%	11.9%	18.7%	9.9%	16.0%	10.8%	11.5%
Coast Guard	17.0%	10.8%	0.0%	4.8%	12.8%	28.3%	9.7%
Marine Corps	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%	2.2%	1.8%	1.6%	1.3%
Navy	3.5%	3.0%	5.2%	3.8%	3.9%	2.2%	2.5%
Total	8.2%	7.0%	10.5%	7.1%	8.9%	9.0%	6.6%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

NOTE: The "unknown" category is not included.

Although these results are encouraging, the actual numbers of women and racial and ethnic minorities from the prior service pool that joined the Selected Reserve were relatively small. As reported in the issue papers on the demographics of the prior service pool (i.e., Issue Paper #57 and Issue Paper #61), only 22 percent of officers and 17 percent of enlisted servicemembers who joined the Selected Reserve during FY 2008 were women. The percentages for minorities are more encouraging: In FY 2008, 27 percent of officers and 46 percent of enlisted were minorities. However, although the data show that women and minorities joined the National Guard and Reserve at a higher rate than whites after leaving active duty—perhaps showing a higher propensity to continue service in the Reserve Component—the numbers need to be higher to significantly increase the demographic diversity, particularly the gender diversity, of the Reserve Component senior leadership.

Structural Diversity, Total Force Integration, and Overall Retention. The transfer of active-duty prior service personnel into the Reserve Component brings trained and experienced personnel into the Reserve. This not only adds to the structural diversity of the National Guard and Reserve but also helps facilitate total force integration. Overall retention also increases as a result: Prior service personnel who may have otherwise left the Armed Forces altogether are retained. This subsection presents a discussion about how flexible service opportunities may help increase retention. Structural diversity and total force integration are discussed in other sections of this paper.

A major retention issue that the military faces in its pursuit of demographic diversity, particularly in the higher ranks, is the retention of women. Private industry has a similar problem, and many companies have started addressing this by adding work flexibility in order to improve career management within their organizations. Hewlett and Luce (2005) argue that work flexibility should be thought of not only as a flexible work day but also defined in terms of a flexible career arc.

Using a nationally representative survey of a group of highly qualified women, Hewlett and Luce (2005) show that almost four in ten women leave their jobs at some point in their careers. The reasons for leaving are both internal and external. The authors cite family and personal needs as external pull factors for leaving. They also cite internal push factors, such as low satisfaction and lack of opportunity, as reasons for leaving.[30] However, whatever the reason for leaving, Hewlett and Luce (2005) point out that "companies that can develop policies and practices to tap into the female talent pool over the long haul will enjoy a substantial competitive advantage." The authors present some

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[30] Men cite some of these same reasons. See Decision Paper #3 for more information.

strategies on how to achieve that goal. For flexible working arrangements to succeed over the long term, they suggest, among other things, that employers remove the stigma associated with these arrangements. They encourage them not to burn bridges, to maintain a connection with employees, and to nurture ambition.

The story is not significantly different in the military, and many of the same solutions could be adapted to improve the retention of servicemembers leaving the ranks. Using a survey of naval surface warfare officers, Parcell (2007) shows that traditional retention methods, including retention bonuses, are not closing the gap between the retention rates of men and women. Additionally, Parcell (2007) points out that the causes associated with female officers' continuation decisions cannot be easily affected by accession or retention policies.[31]

However, survey and focus group results for both male and female officers in Parcell's 2007 study suggest that taking time away from an active-duty career in order to achieve a better work-life balance could help retention, as long as career progression is not hindered. In general, progress is being made in this area, and as, Decision Paper #3 reports, there are already working pilot programs in the Navy and the Coast Guard that allow servicemembers to take time off and then return to active duty. However, there are cultural, policy, and practical barriers that need to be addressed in order for these programs to be widely applied across all Services.

Recommendation 2—

DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting Active to Reserve Component and internal Reserve Component transition protocols to promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention.

Personnel leaving active duty are a valuable resource for the Reserve Component in particular and for the Armed Forces in general. For this reason, the Commission believes that DoD needs to improve its policies, practices, and personnel and pay systems in order both to encourage these servicemembers to join the Reserve Component rather than leave the military altogether and to facilitate the process. Moreover, the Commission believes flexibility in transitions within the Reserve Component could improve retention, broaden advancement opportunities for National Guard and Reserve servicemembers, and positively affect demographic diversity.

As it reported to the Commission, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee strongly believes in the positive effect of the added service flexibility made possible by streamlining transition processes. The next few paragraphs present some background on the transition processes and the relevant effects of improving them.

The current process for officers transitioning from Active Duty List to Reserve Active Status List, and for enlisted active-duty personnel transitioning to the Reserve Component, is lengthy and inefficient. National Guard and Reserve Components told the subcommittee that current policies are cumbersome and may discourage members from applying. Indeed, although the details are different for each of the Reserve Components, data presented by the Services show that it can take an average of one to six months for a servicemember to move from active duty to the Reserve Component,

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[31] For example, female Naval Academy graduates, women with high scores on technical/mathematics tests or with technical/mathematics degrees, and single women are more likely to have lower retention rates. Although these observable differences describe those groups that are most likely to leave the Navy, they do not explain the causes of the lower retention rates and, therefore, do not easily translate into policy solutions.

depending on the branch of Service.[32] The process can take even longer if there is a break in service during which the servicemember leaves active duty before starting the process of joining the National Guard or Reserve.

In general, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy requires officers to be approved for release from active duty by their Service and to be approved for a Reserve appointment. Servicemembers' records are screened for adverse material before their names can be included in a scroll that is then routed through various channels for final approval by OSD.[33] Although some Services have automated and streamlined *parts* of the process, for the most part, the process is manual, and, in some cases, the availability of personnel or, as in the Coast Guard, the periodicity of panel meetings, drives the process.[34]

The process is similar for enlisted personnel. Servicemembers' records are screened for eligibility, and, if they are found acceptable, the servicemembers are authorized for transition. Authorization for transition includes being authorized to leave active duty and to find a billet in the Reserve Component.

In general, then, the process is based on a series of boxes that need to be checked before transition can take place. Many steps in this process could be improved by automation and better interfaces between personnel and finance (pay) systems across the Services. This includes automatic checks, wherever possible; real-time updated billet availability for assignment approvals; and close-to-real-time transitions between personnel and pay systems across the Services.

The Commission believes that streamlining this process will give the National Guard and Reserve access to a broader talent pool because it will make it easier for a servicemember leaving active duty to join the Reserve Component. Although the Commission also suspects that the effect on the demographic makeup of the Reserve Component will be positive, there are no estimates of the exact magnitude of the change.

Also note that the Retention Subcommittee recommends further study into flexible service opportunities and their effect on female retention. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee would like this study to also include the effects that streamlining the Active to Reserve Component and internal Reserve Component processes could have on female and minority retention. Again, although the Commission does not yet know whether making this process more efficient will retain underrepresented groups at a greater rate, it does believe it could have a positive impact. Therefore, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommends that this issue be studied further.

Lastly, this recommendation is consistent with the 2010 QDR, which emphasizes that the military departments should engage in original ways to retain qualified personnel and that the Armed Forces should offer "more flexible ways for military personnel to serve, by implementing programs to better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Furthermore, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resource Strategy (2000) and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (2008) point out that smooth transitions between components would help improve total force integration.

In summary, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee sees facilitating the transition between the Active and the Reserve Component and between National Guard and Reserve Components as a way to increase retention and promote structural diversity and total force integration. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee strongly believes that streamlining and

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[32] Note that these are Service averages and that there is also case-by-case variation.

[33] This scroll includes the names of those wishing to be added the Reserve Active Status List.

[34] In the Coast Guard, an appointed panel meets quarterly to consider Active Component officers who, within a year of resignation of their active-duty commissions, have requested Reserve commissions.

shortening the transition process, which would make it easier for active-duty servicemembers to transition to the Reserve Component and for Reserve Component personnel to transition between Reserve Components, will likely have a positive effect on demographic diversity in the Armed Forces in general.

Widening Opportunities

Branching, Assignments, and Promotion

Bringing a diverse pool of people into the Reserve Component is only the first step in developing a diverse senior leadership in the National Guard and Reserve. After joining the Reserve Component, servicemembers need to be developed into future leaders. This development process determines who will reach top leadership positions. Each step in the career life cycle of servicemembers is therefore directly linked to the demographic composition of the future leadership. Two key steps in this career progression are (1) branching and assignments and (2) promotion. Branching and assignments decisions determine the career field and assignments an that individual will have throughout his or her career. In turn, career field and assignments have an effect on potential promotion opportunities. As explained below, these two factors—(1) branching and assignments and (2) promotion—help shape the demographics of the upper ranks.

From the National Guard and Reserve perspective, branching, assignments, and promotions present some of the same issues that exist in the Active Component. First, branching and assignments decisions, and especially career field decisions, have a considerable effect on the promotion opportunities of officers. Moreover, there are demographic differences in the various career fields that have an effect on the number of promotion opportunities available to women and minorities. Second, the Commission identified several issues in promotion rates across demographic groups that relate to assignments and evaluation, but it believes the design of the selection board process to be, in general, fair. However, the Commission also recognizes that servicemembers need to be adequately educated about the promotion process to be able to take advantage of opportunities available to them.

The next section presents a discussion of the branching and assignments recommendations put forth by the Commission and presents the National Guard and Reserve perspective. It also includes a discussion of a new recommendation and an addition to a branching and assignments recommendation. The new recommendation aims to change the current officer career management system to a more flexible one that does not necessarily prioritize tactical occupations. The addition to the existing recommendation focuses on improving mentoring programs to provide to all servicemembers support regarding career decisions.

The following section includes a discussion of the promotion recommendations and provides the logic behind a new recommendation that is the direct result of the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee. This recommendation concentrates on providing Reserve Component officers a path toward attaining the education and experience necessary to develop their full potential.

Branching and Assignments: Institute Accountability Reviews, Eliminate Combat Exclusion Policies, and Improve Mentoring

Research conducted by the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee shows that there are structural and perceptual barriers that affect career field preferences and command assignment opportunities. This research also shows that career and command assignments can, in turn, affect the diversity of senior military leadership.

The Commission identified two structural barriers that may obstruct the advancement of women and minority officers in the military. First is the combat exclusion policies that preclude women from serving in occupations that involve direct ground combat. These policies close many tactical occupations to women and, because of the preponderance of officers in tactical fields in the upper ranks, may curtail promotion opportunities. The second barrier is that minority officers are less likely to be commissioned via Service academies, and, at least in the Army and Air Force, a larger proportion of tactical slots goes to academy graduates.

The Commission also identified perceptual barriers that lower the likelihood that women and minorities will choose occupations in tactical career fields. Although the Commission identified many possible reasons for these differences in preferences, it found no unifying framework that consistently explains this perceptual barrier.

Based on these facts, the Commission proposes three recommendations. The first recommendation asks the Secretary of Defense to conduct annual diversity accountability reviews. The goal of this recommendation is to assess diversity patterns across the military lifecycle and, in doing so, to help identify potential problems and hold leadership accountable.

The second recommendation asks DoD to eliminate the combat exclusion policies for women. The intent of this recommendation is to eliminate structural barriers that prevent many female officers from reaching the upper ranks of the military.

The third recommendation asks the Services to ensure that all servicemembers are informed about the effect of different career paths on their assignment and promotion opportunities. Based on the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee, the Commission modified the mentoring recommendation. The subcommittee also added a fourth recommendation that proposes a more flexible career management system for officers. Both the modification and the new recommendation are discussed below. Decision Paper #2 contains details on all three recommendations. The next section, however, documents the facts and logic behind the modifications to the mentoring recommendation and to the career management recommendation.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Career Field Assignments[35]

This section examines the nature of the relationship among career field assignments, demographic diversity, and promotion potential. First, it looks at the effects of career assignment on promotion opportunities in the Reserve Component. Next, it presents a discussion of how career assignments are distributed across demographic groups. Decision Paper #2 considers these issues for the Active Component.

Table 13 illustrates the distribution of career fields across different stages of an officer's career in the Reserve Component. In general, this table shows whether specific career fields have an effect on opportunities for advancement. If the percentage of servicemembers in a particular career field increases with rank, this indicates that those in that career field have a higher chance of advancing through the ranks relative to those in other occupations whose percentages do not increase in the higher ranks.

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[35] In general, this paper refers to the process that determines the career field of an officer as an *assignment*. However, the way in which career fields are determined is much more complex than a simple "assignment." The process accounts for the officers' choice, aptitude tests, and the needs of each Service. For detailed information about this process, see Decision Paper #2.

Table 13. Distribution of Career Fields, by Pay Grade

Career Field	O-1–O-3	O-4–O-6	O-7–O-8
Unknown	3.82%	0.78%	0.00%
Tactical operations	22.05%	35.30%	52.98%
Intelligence	8.90%	6.19%	2.89%
Engineering	11.78%	9.48%	9.58%
Scientist and professional	4.85%	9.96%	5.06%
Health care officer	19.51%	20.72%	5.79%
Administrator	8.55%	7.29%	11.57%
Supply, procurement, and allied	7.91%	10.16%	12.12%
Nonoccupational	12.64%	0.11%	0.00%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTE: Data are for Selected Reserve officers not in active duty.

The most salient example of a career field that is conducive to advancement is tactical operations. Although some other career fields show increases from one pay grade category to another, the tactical career field shows substantial increases across all pay grade categories. This clearly indicates that a servicemember in a tactical occupation would have a higher chance of advancement than another servicemember with exactly the same characteristics but in a different career field.

Because the assignment of an officer to a tactical career field can affect promotion opportunities, it is important to examine whether there are any diversity implications associated with this fact. Table 14 shows the demographic distribution of officers in the tactical career fields. The numbers presented here represent the within-group distribution of servicemembers in tactical occupations by race, ethnicity, and gender categories. It shows that female and minority officers tend to be underrepresented in tactical occupations. This may be hurting their advancement opportunities.

Table 14. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Careers, by Gender and Race/Ethnicity

	Gender		Race/Ethnicity				
	Men	Women	Asian/PI	Black	Hispanic	Other	White
All officers	34.15%	7.06%	20.04%	13.5%	23.02%	24.93%	31.83%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTE: Data are for Selected Reserve officers not in active duty.

For women, this pattern of underrepresentation is consistent across careers and becomes even more pronounced in the higher ranks. Female officers may have fewer opportunities to advance to more-senior levels because, as shown in Figure 6 and as of June 2010, few female officers were in tactical occupations at the ranks of O-1 through O-3.

Figure 6. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Occupations in June 2010, by Gender and Pay Grade

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

The situation is similar for minority officers. Figure 7 suggests that occupational assignment for minority officers was, as of June 2010, indeed related to advancement opportunities. The percentage of minority officers in tactical fields in the junior (i.e., O-1 through O-3) ranks was lower than that of their white counterparts. Among company grade officers, white officers were the category most likely to be occupied in tactical careers. This same trend existed for field and flag/general officers, with one exception: "other" minorities at the flag/general officer level, who represented only a small number of servicemembers. When other qualifications were the same, because minority and female servicemembers tended to be assigned to tactical career fields at a lower rate, they had fewer opportunities for advancement than their white and male counterparts, respectively.

Figure 7. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Occupations in June 2010, by Race/Ethnicity and Pay Grade

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

Thus, occupational category appears to play a substantial role in limiting the ability of officers in underrepresented demographic groups to attain senior pay grades. Those in tactical career fields have had more opportunities for advancement. The findings reported here for the Reserve Component are consistent with those reported for the Active Component in Decision Paper #2: Flag/general officers tend to come from career fields involving tactical occupations, but minority and female officers have been considerably underrepresented in tactical occupations.

Based on these facts, the Commission proposed two recommendations that are discussed below.

Recommendation 4—

The Services and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag or general officer and senior noncommissioned officer.

As noted above, research from the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee and the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee shows that the majority of flag/general officers have been drawn from tactical occupations and that tactical occupations have been disproportionately composed of white males. Moreover, tactical career fields have tended to become more dominant in the more senior officer pay grades. This implies that the choice or assignment of career field may influence the type and number of opportunities for promotion available to officers throughout their careers.

Therefore, the Commission recommends a shift toward a more flexible officer career management system that does not necessarily prioritize tactical occupations. Although the ultimate goal of this more flexible management system is to improve mission effectiveness in an increasingly complex operational environment, a secondary result of this change could be a more diverse senior leadership.

A Changing Operational Environment. Many have noted that future leaders in the officer corps will require a greater mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to be effective in ever-changing operational environments. This claim is supported by changes that have already occurred as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist Affiliates and by forecasts of needed competencies that have been laid out in such reports as the QDR. Many of the forecasts suggest a greater need for cultural and language skills and for improved expertise in cyber warfare. Although the demand for these skills is growing, in terms of career advancement, it is often risky for servicemembers to deviate from traditional career paths if they seek to reach the highest ranks of the military.[36]

Language and cultural skills. According to the QDR, operational missions are likely to be increasingly asymmetric and complex, with no clearly delineated front lines. This new operational environment will require more officers to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with different governments, and in nation-building activities. As a result, officers will need "greater expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills" (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 54).

Metrics Recommendation 3 promotes this aim by requiring DoD and the Services to track regional and cultural expertise and to continue to track language ability. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee augmented that recommendation by also including relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise, which may include some of these same foreign-language, regional, and cultural skills. Moreover, one way to create incentives for servicemembers at all ranks to develop these

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[36] Decision Paper #4 for full explanation of this issue.

skills is to recognize their value at the time of promotion. A more flexible career management system could take those skills into account.

Cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is becoming increasingly important, and it requires the Services to have "cyber experts" (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 38). Such expertise has not been part of traditional tactical career fields, yet it will be increasingly necessary at all ranks. Again, a more flexible career management system could take those skills into account, helping to promote those individuals whose skills meet the needs of the evolving operational environment.

A Flexible Career Management System. A career management system based on specified knowledge, skills, and abilities could provide all officers—not just racial and ethnic minority and female officers—more flexibility in managing their careers than a rigid, time-based, or tactical occupation–prioritized career management system. Furthermore, a system based on knowledge, skills, and abilities also fits with the Services' "emerging human capital strategies," which aim to connect "mission[s] and goals that result from capability-based defense planning to personnel policies via competencies" (Schirmer et al., 2006, p. 5). This system will meet the military's demand for different knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential and will reward individuals prepared for 21st-century warfare.

Clearly, implementing a more flexible officer career management system requires the Services to identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential required by each assignment and to decide how to manage each; it also requires them to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities that education and training should confer. Because requirements will change over time, assessments will have to be conducted regularly. Also, there should be explicit consideration of knowledge, skills, and abilities that may be needed in the future.

This recommendation is even more pertinent to certain sectors of the Reserve Component. For example, the Army Reserve is predominantly a combat-support Service. In the current system that emphasizes tactical career fields in the flag/general officer ranks, Army reservists without prior active-duty service have a reduced chance of reaching the upper ranks. This also points to a structural diversity issue, as Reserve Component servicemembers may not always have the same opportunities for advancement as their active-duty counterparts.

This recommendation also aims to provide more career flexibility to senior noncommissioned officers. Although enlisted servicemembers have a different career management system than officers, and although the data presented here do not provide evidence that career fields are a limiting factor for female and minority advancement among enlisted servicemembers, the added flexibility and transparency afforded by specifying knowledge, skills, and abilities will also provide a benefit to these servicemembers and the Services. As is the case for officers, this system will provide the Services with the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for current and future warfare environments.

In summary, this recommendation aims to open advancement opportunities to highly qualified officers regardless of career field. This will result in a senior leadership with knowledge, skills, and abilities that are consistent with the current and future warfare environment. As an additional benefit, this recommendation will increase promotion opportunities for women and minorities. Currently, these groups have, on average, fewer promotion opportunities available to them because they tend to be in the combat arms fields at lower rates than their male and white counterparts, respectively.

Recommendation 3—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance servicemembers' knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component

> ***opportunities,** **to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.***
>
> ***a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember's career.***
>
> ***b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor.***

The Commission approved a recommendation from the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee that addressed the issue of mentoring. However, that recommendation missed some of elements that are unique to the Reserve Component. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee added language to this recommendation in order to address the issues specific to the Reserve Component. These modifications, as approved by the Commission, aim to benefit servicemembers in all of the Armed Forces. (Changes to the recommendation are underlined.)

The following is a clarification of the additional language the National Guard and Reserve subcommittee added to the Commission's recommendation. "[I]ncluding Reserve Component opportunities" refers to advising active-duty servicemembers about Reserve Component opportunities and to advising Reserve Component servicemembers about other Reserve Component opportunities, whether they be in a different branch of the Reserve Component or related to vacancy-driven promotion issues. "[A]nd employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor" refers to ensuring face-to-face contact between mentor and protégé. This is particularly important in the Reserve Component because reservists meet with their units only a few times a year.

One of the main concerns of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee, and of the Commission as a whole, is ensuring that advancement opportunities are open to all servicemembers. The subcommittee believes that one of the most basic strategies that will guarantee that advancement opportunities are open to all is ensuring that servicemembers are informed about how different choices can affect their careers.

As seen above, racial and ethnic minorities and women are currently underrepresented in the upper ranks of the military. This is documented in a series of demographic profile issue papers for both the Active and the Reserve Components.[37] Although part of the problem may be related to recruiting, retention, and other issues, our research shows that that there is a strong relationship between branching and assignment decisions and advancement opportunities.

This body of research shows that, especially for officers, a tactical career field can lead to a greater number of advancement opportunities than other fields. It also shows that minorities and women tend to be in tactical career fields at a lower rate than their white and male counterparts, respectively.[38] This is the case in both the Active and Reserve Components.[39]

There are different ways to address this issue. One of them, the one discussed here, is mentoring, which will help servicemembers make informed choices about careers in the military. Another one is to open some of the positions that have traditionally gone to servicemembers with a tactical background to all others that meet the positions' requirements. The latter is addressed in a recommendation discussed below. Here, the focus is on mentoring.

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[37] See the following demographic profile issues papers: Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, Issue Paper #44, Issue Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55.

[38] See Issue Paper #15, Issue Paper #23, and Issue Paper #32.

[39] See Issue Paper #58.

Both of the modifications added to the original recommendation should also have positive effects on the total force in general. Mentoring active-duty servicemembers about National Guard and Reserve opportunities may help increase the numbers of women and minorities that stay in the Armed Forces. The second modification is intended to ensure that mentors and protégés get adequate face time in the Reserve Component. In addition, this practice will benefit Active Component servicemembers by ensuring that they also receive face-to-face mentoring.

Moreover, to have successful careers, Reserve Component personnel must understand how to maneuver within the structural and geographic constraints of the National Guard and Reserve. In many instances, taking advantage of promotion opportunities may require servicemembers to move to a different region of the country or to regularly travel long distances. In general, the vacancy-driven promotion system dictates that any individual promoted to a higher rank must identify a billet, in that rank, to be promoted into.[40] Mentors should advise National Guard and Reserve servicemembers on how the force structure, promotion system, and geographic distribution of billets could affect their career decisions; this will allow servicemembers to plan appropriately. These issues are unique to the Reserve Component and need to be included, along with other career issues, in the Reserve Component mentoring program.

In summary, many of the branching and assignment mentoring issues pointed out by the corresponding subcommittee also apply to the National Guard and Reserve. However, there are specific issues that require the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee to propose a modification to the existing recommendation. These modifications should also enhance mentoring programs in the Active Component.

Promotion

Promotion: Report Promotion Rates, Monitor Perceptions, and Promote Transparency

Two important issues in the promotion process are its fairness and transparency. Fairness ensures that those best qualified have the best chance of being promoted. Transparency ensures that servicemembers participate in the process with ample information to manage their careers to the best of their potential. Although the Commission's research did not identify any significant problems in the promotion process, and although the Commission considers it fair, by and large, the Commission did find that servicemembers could benefit from more transparency. The Commission further believes that added transparency could also help identify existing and emerging promotion issues.

The main pattern found in the research conducted by the Promotion Subcommittee is that, with very few exceptions, promotion rates for active-duty minority officers in ranks O-4 through O-6 are lower than those for white officers. Promotion rates for female officers and enlisted servicemembers in general are not as clear. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee could not obtain data that would allow it to consistently compare promotion rates for all demographic categories and for all Services.

Based on this information, and to ensure the transparency of the process, the Commission proposes three recommendations. First, the Commission recommends that the Service report enlisted and officer promotion rates, for all demographic groups, based on common definitions and methodology. This can help the Services identify potential issues early on, investigate root causes, and take corrective actions as necessary. Second, the Commission recommends that the Services use a common survey instrument to monitor perceptions about the promotion process and to take corrective action. This can help the Services make sure that the process is transparent and that it is

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[40] This is more prevalent in the National Guard. Parts of the Reserve have moved away from this system.

also perceived as transparent. Third, the Commission recommends that the Services promote transparency and educate and counsel all servicemembers on how to prepare themselves for the promotion process.

Moreover, although the Commission did not investigate the causes of the promotion rate differentials, the Commission believes that part of the problem may arise from involuntary deviations from normal career paths due to, for example, equal opportunity (EO) or recruiting assignments that may negatively affect promotion opportunities. The Commission recommends that these involuntary deviations from normal career paths should be acknowledged by senior rater evaluations. Decision Paper #4 contains more details about the logic behind these assumptions.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Joint Requirements

Over the past several decades, joint operations have become the norm in the U.S. military. As a result, both Active and Reserve Component officers are required to gain military experience and education not only so that they can lead successful joint missions but also so that they can advance in their careers. However, these increasing expectations for joint experience and education are not easily aligned with the career path of traditional drilling reservists in the National Guard and Reserve. Unlike their Active Component counterparts, Reserve Component servicemembers must meet their educational and operational requirements without detriment to or neglect of their civilian occupations. In addition, their window of opportunity to gain operational experience and credibility in their primary area of concentration, and to complete a joint assignment, is particularly narrow.

If, as may soon become the case, Reserve Component officers are required to be designated as Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs) in order to be promoted to O-7, many will lack the necessary qualifications and, as a result, become noncompetitive for general/flag officer ranks. This could have a negative effect on diversity, both structural and demographic, because the eligible promotion pool will likely be smaller.

The discussion that follows describes these issues in detail. Although one of the principal aims of the recommendation presented here is to ensure that there is a qualified traditional Reserve Component officer corps, the recommendation also aims at promoting structural diversity in the upper ranks by clearing the path so that skilled National Guard and Reserve officers can represent the Reserve Component in the highest ranks. In addition, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that this recommendation may help improve demographic diversity in the upper ranks by increasing the pool of qualified officers who can compete for promotion.

Recommendation 5—

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience and fulfill joint requirements given the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommends that DoD and the Services implement policy that provides flexible opportunities for officers to become joint-qualified, ensuring that the constraints and requirements of the Reserve Component career path are accommodated and that the military/civilian duality is taken into account. In particular, the Services should provide mechanisms for officers to acquire both joint and operational experience at the appropriate rank. The Services should also provide enough education slots so that all qualified National Guard and Reserve servicemembers can complete their education requirements in a timely fashion. Furthermore, because

senior leaders may find it difficult to release their officers from unit responsibilities so that they can enroll in courses, the Services may need to incentivize such releases.

   The Increasing Importance of Joint Experience. In recent history, joint experience has become increasingly important in both the Active and Reserve Components. Specifically as it relates to the Reserve Component, beginning in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) outlined the process and procedures for delivering joint education to Reserve Component members, but it did not include statutory guidelines for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management. The requirements for Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), outlined in Title 10, Chapter 38, were specifically intended for the Active Component—that is, Reserve Component officers could not be designated as JSOs. Recent congressional and DoD action opens the JQO designation to Reserve Component officers, but there is no *requirement* for Reserve Component officers to be joint-qualified.[41]

   Despite the lack of a requirement, increasing emphasis is being placed on joint experience and joint education in the Reserve officer corps. For example, the October 2007 DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1300.19, *DoD Joint Officer Management Program*, established that it is DoD policy to

> designate as JQOs sufficient numbers of quality officers who have
> completed Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II (or in
> the case of RC officers, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education)
> . . . [and to] establish, to the maximum extent practicable, similar policies
> emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for officers [in the
> Reserve Component]. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007)

   DoDI 1300.19 assigns responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs for monitoring "RC compliance with the . . . goal of increasing the pool of RC joint-qualified officers" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).

   More recently, the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves urged Congress to amend the GNA to require that Reserve Component officers be designated as joint-qualified. They further recommended the following:

> At the end of a 10-year transition period, . . . joint qualification [should
> be made] a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer rank.
> Congress should mandate that the Services develop an action plan and
> milestones and report regularly to Congress on progress made to
> accomplish this goal. (Commission on the National Guard and Reserve,
> 2008, p. 20)

This recommendation was based primarily on the increasing importance of joint experience for *all* officers. However, it also stems from the notion that Reserve officers should be held to similar standards as Active Component officers, who are required to be JQO-designated in order to be promoted to O-7.

   Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is currently studying the Commission's recommendation that would require JQO status for Reserve officer promotion to the rank of O-7. His November 24, 2008, memorandum stipulates the following:

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[41] Title 10 only requires the Reserve Chiefs and Directors of the Air and Army National Guard to have "significant joint experience" to be considered for assignment to these positions.

1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, shall:

a. evaluate the changes to Joint Officer Management as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and DoD Instruction 1300.19, DoD Joint Officer Management Program, issued on October 31, 2007, and updated on March 30, 2008—which included adding Reserve billets to the Joint Duty Assignment List and the establishment of the experience path in the new Joint Qualification System—to determine if those changes allow sufficient flexibility to produce a sufficient number of joint-qualified general and flag officers. The evaluation shall include a recommendation regarding the effects of mandating that the provisions of chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), be imposed for Reserve component officers, and

b. if determined appropriate in the evaluation, modify the DoD instruction and develop legislative proposals for consideration in the Department's legislative process.

2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

a. consider including in promotion board precept language that the board consider joint qualifications in their deliberations; and

b. as part of the periodic implementation updates provided to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary, report on their efforts to integrate the management of their Reserve component officers with the Active component officers to afford Reserve component officers the joint duty and educational opportunities to improve their competitiveness for promotion to senior ranks. (Gates, 2008)

Joint Experience. As mentioned above, the principal motivation behind these policy changes and discussion is the need for joint-trained and joint-qualified officers who can respond to the increasingly joint nature of operations (Smith & Pullen, 2008). Lovely (2007) reports that, according to the DoD's *2006 Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management & Joint Professional Military Education*, "Joint Task Forces now define the way we array our Armed Forces for both war and operations other than war." As a result, Reserve officers are frequently serving side by side with their Active Component counterparts. With this in mind, the strategic plan recognizes the importance of providing joint opportunities and education that are similar for both Reserve and Active Component officers (Joyner & Mazezka, 2009; Lovely, 2007).

There have been recent improvements to the joint qualifying process for Reserve officers. One important change is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the congressional modification of the GNA that allows officers to gain joint experience through two paths. Before this new system is discussed, however, it is important to note that it is currently under review, as stipulated in Secretary Gates' November 2008 memorandum. In that that memorandum, the Secretary of Defense directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in

coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, to evaluate whether this change (among others) provides "sufficient flexibility to produce a sufficient number of joint-qualified general and flag officers" (Gates, 2008).

The Joint Qualification System (JQS) was the result of a collaborative effort involving OSD, the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Services (Hemmerly-Brown, 2010). Previously, only active-duty officers who were assigned to a sanctioned joint-duty billet could become joint-qualified. Now, officers can nominate themselves to receive joint credit if they have served in a nonappointed joint position, such as on a deployment or on a combined Joint Task Force for humanitarian relief.

This self-nomination process is referred to as the "experience" path. Although officers can still become joint-qualified by completing the standard joint assignments, the new experience-based track acknowledges joint experiences based on a formula that considers the environment and intensity of the joint environment. Experiences that are germane to National Guard forces, such as responding to national security threats, interagency combat operations, and humanitarian crises, are now recognized. As a major in the Air Force Reserve commented, "It's the way Citizen Airmen typically serve: a few months here, a few weeks there. Joint experience begins to accumulate" (Joyner & Mazezka, 2009). This new system allows DoD to better incorporate Reserve officers' joint experiences and qualifications into assignment and development decisions, which can accelerate Reserve Component participation in the joint community.

However, despite these recent improvements, which essentially define joint experience more broadly, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that further flexibility and more education on the new processes may be necessary in order to improve representation and ensure that Reserve Component officers can achieve their full potential. In terms of flexibility, it is important to point out the importance of considering the structural differences between the Active and Reserve Components when defining joint expectations. Active Component officers work full time in their military capacity, but Reserve Component officers are, in general, civilians who train one weekend a month and two full weeks a year while maintaining a civilian job. Although expectations are not identical, it is important to remember the military/civilian duality of the Reserve Component officer corps. In terms of education, clarity and the appropriate tools should be provided so that Reserve Component officers can identify and navigate a defined career path to the best of their ability. It is also important to note that, in some cases, language regarding how some of these policies are to be implemented has not yet been written. This means that, in some Components, servicemembers are likely unaware of their options.

Joint Education.[42] Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements still apply in the new JQO system. To be designated as a JQO, a Reserve Component officer must have completed JPME I and the Advanced JPME (AJPME, which is equivalent to JPME II for Active Component officers). Moreover, Reserve Component officers are still expected to complete the appropriate level of educational requirements before assignment to a Joint Duty Assignments Reserve (JDA-R) billet.

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[42] Although this section focuses on officers, the Services would also like to increase the proportion of joint-qualified senior enlisted personnel. An example of this is the Army's goal of having all E-9's complete a joint keystone course. Our recommendation is targeted at officers, but the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must also be attentive to changes in policy so that Reserve Component enlisted personnel also have the opportunity to access the same educational and assignment opportunities as their Active Component counterparts.

DoD is working now to identify positions that require no JPME, those that require JPME Phase I, and those that require AJPME.

However, only a very small number of Reserve Component officers in the O-4 through O-6 ranks currently enroll in the AJPME courses (Smith & Pullen, 2008). And, in general, only a limited number of school seats are available to Reserve Component servicemembers. In many cases, unfilled Active Component seats open up to Reserve Component members at the last minute. These slots either go unfilled or are filled by personnel who are available rather than by those best qualified to receive the opportunity.

Increasing the number of Reserve Component officers enrolled in the AJPME is considered the responsibility of senior leaders (Lovely, 2007; Smith & Pullen, 2008). However, leaders may be torn between fulfilling this responsibility and retaining the strong officers in their unit who would benefit from this training, particularly if the unit is preparing for a deployment. Moreover, Reserve Component officers may find it increasingly difficult to consider joint education, given their operational requirements and their civilian responsibilities.

As a first step in addressing this issue, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee suggests that the Services examine the historical allotment of school seats for Reserve Component personnel and make seats available to the Reserve Component in a timely manner. Ensuring lead time between the announcement of school seat openings and the start of the course will allow Reserve Component servicemembers who would otherwise be unable to consider applying for the school seats to plan ahead and accordingly vis-à-vis their civilian lives and jobs.

A second step is to examine the demand for these seats and ensure that supply can meet the demand. In some cases, the situation could be improved by opening up more online seats to some of these courses. In other cases, completing part of the course online may serve as a screening mechanism for completing the last part of the course onsite. Although some of the Services are already doing much of this, others lag behind.

Finally, as mentioned above, senior leaders may need to be incentivized to release officers from unit duties so that they can participate in joint education opportunities.

In summary, given the constraints of the Reserve Component structure, this recommendation asks the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs to establish policies and procedures that allow Reserve Component officers to gain operational and joint experience. The subcommittee's aim is to ensure that Reserve Component officers remain competitive throughout their careers.[43] The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that this can add to the structural diversity of the upper ranks by ensuring that traditional reservists are qualified to be promoted to the highest ranks. The subcommittee also believes that this recommendation could have an impact on demographic diversity by increasing the pool of qualified personnel that could reach the highest ranks.

Diversity Metrics

Ensuring that the Military Offers the Same Opportunities to All Those Qualified

Although the Services are currently making an effort to improve diversity within their ranks, much of this effort is not institutionalized and not driven by an overall DoD strategy. The work of the Metrics Subcommittee identified the need for OSD to provide and institutionalize a framework for a set of common, strategic metrics that can help measure and sustain diversity and diversity

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[43] See Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, especially recommendations 12–18 (pp. 147–149) and the accompanying text (pp. 138–149).

management progress in the Services and that can reflect an overall diversity strategy for DoD. These metrics should allow for an integrated approach to diversity across DoD and, at the same time, help the Services identify their own unique issues.

According to the research done by the Metrics Subcommittee, this framework should allow for the development of metrics that enable evaluation and control over performance and resources, communicate performance to internal and external stakeholders, and help identify areas where improvement is needed (Melnyk et al., 2004). Additionally, these metrics should be developed with strategic goals in mind, help measure progress toward a concrete end state, be easily understood and communicated, incorporate useful information about key aspects of performance, and provide information that can be acted upon.

With this in mind, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10 to institutionalize the establishment and reporting of diversity metrics throughout DoD. This recommendation asks OSD to develop standard metrics and benchmarks to track progress, to submit an annual report to the President and Congress about progress toward diversity goals, and to produce an annual report about the available pool of qualified minority and female candidates for 3- and 4-star flag/general officer positions. It also requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct annual diversity accountability reviews with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted advisors.

The Commission also recommends that OSD revise and reissue DoD diversity policies to define clear measures of DoD's diversity goals, to establish standards for the collection and analysis of data needed to measure progress toward diversity goals, and to provide oversight and support for the Services' diversity initiatives.

Lastly, the Commission recommends that OSD take steps to ensure that all qualified candidates are considered for nomination to every 3- and 4-star position. Also, it recommends that if there are no female or minority candidates, a statement of explanation should be submitted to Congress.

Together, these three recommendations provide a general structure to help OSD institutionalize a set of strategic diversity metrics that can help DoD and the Services focus their efforts on strategic goals, clearly communicate with stakeholders, and promote accountability. The main thread through these recommendations is that DoD and the Services need to do everything possible to ensure that every prospective and current servicemember knows that every opportunity for entry and advancement in the Armed Forces is open to all those qualified.

Moreover, the Metrics Subcommittee also recognizes the effect of different types of qualifications on structural diversity. At issue is whether the Armed Forces contain the range of expertise needed to meet the requirements associated with current and future conflicts as outlined in the QDR. Although there have been efforts to track some of these types of expertise, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services expand these efforts.

Structural diversity here is an issue of particular importance to the National Guard and Reserve. By nature, individuals in the Reserve Component not only bring their military skills to their Service but also possess civilian skills that can enhance their value to the Services. The next few paragraphs discuss the background of this recommendation.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Civilian Expertise

The Commission approved a recommendation proposed by the Metrics Subcommittee that requires DoD and the Services to track regional and cultural expertise and continue to track language ability. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee augmented this recommendation by including language that requires DoD and the Services to track relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise. (Changes to the recommendation are underlined.)

The Metrics Subcommittee makes the case for tracking regional, cultural, and language expertise by linking these skills to the current needs of the force as put forth in the 2010 QDR. The dual military/civilian nature of Reserve Component personnel allows them to bring these and other types of expertise that have value to today's military. For instance, National Guard and Reserve personnel may have gained regional, cultural, or language expertise through their civilian employment or other experience. However, these skills are currently not consistently tracked across the Reserve Component.

Moreover, National Guard and Reserve personnel also bring other types of expertise to the military. For example, in addition to regional, cultural, and language expertise, the current QDR identifies expertise in the following areas as necessary and relevant to today's military: information technology, engineering, and biological technology. The civilian education, employment, and experiences of many reservists may include expertise in these and other relevant skill areas. Recognizing and valuing the relevant civilian expertise that Reserve Component personnel bring to the total force promotes structural diversity, as both Active and Reserve Component skill sets will be acknowledged and integrated.

Recommendation 1—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise <u>and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise</u> and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout servicemembers' careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

The Commission proposes that DoD and the Services codify and track civilian expertise that is deemed mission critical.[44] Some of these types of expertise, such as cultural expertise or language ability, may be closely associated with demographic diversity. Additionally, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee members believe that acknowledging the value of other civilian expertise will help attract and retain a wider pool of applicants to the Reserve Component.

A potential mechanism that could be leveraged to track relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise already exists. Currently, the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) program requires each member of the Ready Reserve to report

- employment status
- employer's name
- employer's complete mailing address
- member's civilian job title
- total years experience in current civilian occupation.

This information is maintained in the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS). The CEI program could be expanded to collect mission-critical skills, including regional, cultural, and language expertise and additional civilian expertise deemed relevant. This additional information could be tracked in the RCCPDS and made accessible to commanders requiring specific skill sets.

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[44] It is important to note that, although the Services can solicit volunteers, the Services are precluded from using civilian skills as a basis for involuntary mobilization. So, although it is important to track this type of information, it is also important to have the right incentives in place for individuals to use their skills in military settings.

The subcommittee acknowledges that Reserve Component personnel may not be forthcoming about possessing certain civilian expertise if there is a perception that reporting expertise may result in increased deployment.[45] Thus, Reserve Component personnel must be incentivized to provide this information and to make their civilian skills available to the military. For example, to help attract a diverse and diversely skilled pool of personnel, high levels of in-demand civilian skills could be considered for lateral entry into the Reserve Component at a rank corresponding to the level of skill but that considers the lack of previous military experience. Other incentives could include one-time bonuses for achieving a certain level of proficiency in a skill that is considered valuable to the military. In a different recommendation, the Commission directly recommends that such relevant civilian skills be considered in promotions.

However, even if this information is tracked, there are several issues that still need to be addressed. For example, it is difficult to discern skill levels from self-reported information or job titles as currently reported on the CEI. One way to assess skill level is to focus on educational degrees and technical credentials (e.g., plumber's or electrician's licenses), together with years of experience. Another problem is how to evaluate the value of different qualifications to the Services. Demand for skills is one way to address this problem, but it does not address future requirements.

In summary, the modified metrics recommendation follows the spirit of the current QDR and highlights the importance of identifying mission-critical skills that may already be available to DoD and the Services.

Organization and Management

Diversity Leadership

The Commission recommends that diversity leadership become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces. Research shows that the link between diversity and increased capability is not automatic; rather, it requires diversity-conscious leadership (Issue Paper #14). Absent such leadership, diversity—whether defined in traditional demographic or broader terms—can actually reduce capability, most frequently through decreased communication, increased conflict, or both. The next few paragraphs present a brief discussion of diversity leadership and its importance for today's military. For more detail, see Decision Paper #6.

The Commission defines *diversity leadership* as the ways in which leaders, at all ranks and organizational levels, shape the impact of diversity dynamics in the forces under their command.[46] Moreover, it views diversity leadership as a set of skills, and a fundamental way of thinking, at which all military leaders must excel in order to get the best performance possible from the servicemembers they lead every day.

Diversity leadership involves applying practices that management professionals have long identified as successful people-management techniques but that take on new significance for leaders of diverse workgroups. This is because leaders are responsible for the way the group communicates, cooperates, trusts one another, and remains cohesive—all of which may be affected by the degree of diversity in the group. Absent effective leadership, such as the leader focusing the group on the overarching mission, these dynamics decrease on-the-ground capability in a diverse group.

The Diversity Leadership Subcommittee identified several effective practices for leading diverse workgroups that can help the Services benefit from diversity and avoid potential pitfalls (see Issue

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[45] Or that they will be force to perform a job that they may want to keep separate from their military life.

[46] In this case, the group dynamics that arise specifically as a result of group diversity. See Decision Paper #6 for more detail.

Paper #29). In particular, studies suggest that effective diversity leadership begins with a leader looking through a "diversity lens" to identify and understand the diversity dynamics that are relevant in his or her command.[47] Doing this requires the leader to

- recognize the "differences" that exist within the group
- both understand the dynamics that can cause those differences to have negative effects (e.g., loss of cohesion, communications difficulties, conflict) and create opportunities for having a positive effect on organizational performance
- apply leadership practices that can neutralize the potential negative effects and, if possible, leverage those differences in support of the mission (see Issue Paper #29).

However, facilitating strong communications, cooperation, trust, and cohesion can be challenging for leaders when members of the group are different, and training can greatly help leaders successfully implement the steps listed above. Therefore, the Commission emphasizes education as part of the recommendation pertaining to diversity leadership. Developing leaders to lead diverse groups effectively goes beyond training them to understand diversity; it requires educating them about the dynamics that diversity creates in workgroups and then training them in practices that will neutralize the negative dynamics and maximize diversity's positive potential.

The Commission also stresses that diversity leadership training must be offered *at all levels*. There are two important reasons for this. First, this will help the military grow leaders who are current on the skills and ways of thinking necessary to lead diverse workgroups at every level in the military. Second, it is important to note that it is those individuals who are in direct contact with workgroups who can make a difference in capability. The key term here is *workgroup* because it is in these groups that day-to-day interactions among different people take place. In other words, the Commission views diversity leadership practices as the things that all leaders do, day to day, not what others (e.g., EO advisors, diversity officers) may do on their behalf.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes the idea of making diversity leadership a core competency across DoD and the Services is equally relevant in the Reserve Component. The Commission's recommendation asks that this be implemented through leadership education and training and that the Services determine the framework for how to inculcate such education into leader development. From the point of view of the National Guard and Reserve, and as reflected in the recommendations below, DoD and the Services should specify how this training is to be incorporated into the current training requirements for reservists and should ensure that Reserve Component servicemembers receive adequate support to complete this training.

Implementation and Accountability

The work of the Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee points to four main pieces that need to be in place for the successful implementation of diversity initiatives. First, the most important lesson from the private sector is that the top leader of an organization must personally commit to guiding the diversity effort in a visible, specific, and persistent manner (Visconti, 2010). This commitment should also include the establishment of support structures within the organization that are in close contact with the leadership and that can help deliver and implement a consistent diversity message. Second, diversity policies need to be clear and specific and to assign responsibility to those in charge of carrying them out. Third, the culture of the organization must support the diversity goals. This may require a cultural change driven by the realization that diversity

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[47] Refer to Decision Paper #6 and the other work of the Diversity Leadership Subcommittee for a list of references.

can add value to the organization. Fourth, organizations must have accountability systems and monitoring mechanisms that create the right incentives, in terms of rewards and consequences, for individuals.

Currently, although many of these pieces are in place as a result of some of the diversity efforts undertaken by DoD and the Services, in general, it is the view of the Commission that there is no institutional effort that has all the pieces in place to affect permanent changes within DoD and the Services. The Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee found many instances in which some of the pieces were in place and found that there has been a sincere institutional and leadership effort to implement effective diversity policy, but it found no programs containing all these elements and no unified strategy across DoD to support these efforts.

Given these findings, the Commission developed several recommendations that ask the leadership of DoD and the Services to personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority, to align OSD's organizational structure so as to ensure a sustained focus on diversity, to institute clear and robust diversity policies with a focus on accountability, to adjust organizational cultures to inculcate a broader understanding of different types of diversity, and to institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring.

In its work, the National Guard and Diversity Subcommittee found that, although all these recommendations could have a positive effect on the Reserve Component, the particularities of the command structure in the National Guard made it necessary for the Commission to modify its recommendation and add new recommendations to improve implementation and accountability in the National Guard.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: The Structure of the Reserve Component

The main accountability problem in the National Guard is the fact that, as previously noted, the National Guard is basically composed of 54 separate organizations with 54 different commanders in chief. This diffuses accountability because there is no centralized position with direct command and control of all 54 state National Guards. Although Chief, NGB, writes and disseminates policy at the national level, each individual state is in charge of policy implementation.

Moreover, because of the local nature of the National Guard in particular, and, to a lesser degree, the Reserve, most Reserve Component servicemembers live in the state where their unit is located. This implies that no single state National Guard will be representative of the overall population of the country and that the demographics of most Reserve units will not mirror the demographics of the nation. However, each state National Guard can strive to be representative of the state it serves, and each Reserve unit can strive to be representative of the larger area surrounding the unit. This will make the Reserve Component representative of the nation as a whole. This is particularly important for National Guard units because, as previously discussed, they may be called on to provide support to local communities during emergencies.

The next few sections discusses those aspects of National Guard and Reserve that made it necessary for the Commission to modify existing recommendations and add new ones to cover implementation and accountability issues in the Reserve Component.

> ### Recommendation 6—
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> ### DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at the OSD and Service levels for both the Active and Reserve Components by:

- ***a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.***
- ***b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief***

    - ***i. Include in Senate Armed Services Committee questionnaire***
    - ***ii. Document and publish the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection***

- ***c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) to a periodic meeting of the existing Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG).***
- ***d. Instituting a system of "accountability reviews" that is driven by the Secretary of Defense.***
- ***e. Directing the "Research and Analysis" office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.***
- ***f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter to encompass diversity as a whole.***

This recommendation aims to institute mechanisms for accountability and monitoring at OSD and Service levels. The Commission approved the top level of this recommendation, originally proposed by the Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee augmented this recommendation with a statement that includes the Reserve Component in these accountability mechanisms. This additional language (underlined) was added to ensure accountability at all levels—not only for the Active Component but also for the Reserve Component.

As stated in Decision Paper #1, "Lessons from the private sector indicate an important best practice in achieving accountability: '[E]mbed the accountability for diversity into many things . . . we find that it is most effective if it shows up in multiple places and in different ways throughout the corporation.'" The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee concurs with this statement about the means of achieving accountability, and it also believes that holding leaders accountable is key to achieving diversity goals in both the Active and Reserve Components.

The unique features of the Reserve Component require specific attention in terms of implementation and accountability. In particular, the command and control structure of the National Guard makes holding leaders accountable at the state level a complex issue. Thus, by specifically naming the Reserve Component in the language of this recommendation, the subcommittee's aim is to call out state-level leaders and make it clear that they will be held accountable for, and monitored on, their progress with respect to diversity efforts.

For instance, this recommendation requires that the Reserve Component, in addition to the Active Component, include diversity leadership in performance assessments throughout Service careers. This would apply to all states' performance assessments in the case of the National Guard. Furthermore, by specifically naming the Reserve Component in the recommendation, the intention is that diversity leadership will be a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior leadership positions for the National Guard and Reserve, as outlined in Recommendation 5b. Ensuring that the National Guard complies with these requirements along with the Active Component will also be relevant when National Guard members apply for federal recognition.

Recommendation 7—

Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity leadership efforts.

Decision Paper #7 points out that one overarching strategic goal is to devise institutional structures in DoD and the Services that promote accountability and that involve the top leadership.[48] The Commission recommends that NGB and the Reserve Components implement such a structure.[49]

Until recently, NGB did not have a diversity office. Although NGB has made efforts to improve the situation, the current diversity office is not staffed, resourced, or placed appropriately in the organizational chart to promote accountability. Moreover, the Commission believes that, as currently structured, this office will not be able to effectively implement and coordinate the diversity endeavors that will result from the Commission's recommendations. The next few paragraphs describe this office in its current state, present a discussion some of its problems, and present some possible solutions.

The recently created office of the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity was established to meet NGB's basic diversity needs. This office was stood up on September 14, 2009, with one position at the GS-15 level, with no other staff, and no annual budget.[50] NGB created this position to emulate efforts by the Services and to address the poor diversity numbers that the NGB's EO office had been observing for some time. Its current activities include writing the diversity strategic plan for Chief, NGB, thereby setting diversity policy for the National Guard, and organizing the NGB Diversity Council.

There are two particular problems with the current diversity support structure at NGB that the Commission wishes to address with our recommendation: the role of this office, and its location in NGB's organizational chart.

The role of the Special Assistant for Diversity is to provide diversity policy for the entire National Guard. The Army and Air National Guard offices are responsible for supporting these policies in each of the states. The Army National Guard has a national diversity office and a diversity coordinator in each state. The Air National Guard planned to stand up a diversity office in January 2011 and has a Human Resource Advisor in each state.

However, these offices do not report directly to NGB's diversity office and are not obligated to advocate national diversity policy. Thus, much of the intended impact of this office is curtailed because the diversity office at the national level cannot effectively fulfill its role due to lack of direct implementation power. Good communication about the importance of the message and support for implementing the policy are key elements for successful implementation of national policy in the states, territories, and the District of Columbia.

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[48] The other two overarching strategic goals are (1) implementing strategic efforts across human capital enterprises and throughout careers in order to ensure diversity in the senior leadership and (2) instituting clear and robust polities that embed reporting and accountability.

[49] Because the implementation and accountability recommendations include the Reserve Components through their parent Services, our focus here is on the National Guard.

[50] This office meets its budget needs by requesting funds from the office of the Comptroller for training, travel, material, or any other particular need on a case-by-case basis. This situation is expected to improve with time as this office becomes more established and is incorporated into the budget cycle.

As currently established, the office of the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity reports to the Comptroller and Director of Administration and Management for NGB. As shown in Figure 8 the Comptroller oversees this and a number of other offices with Comptroller-related functions. This structure takes away some of the visibility necessary to actively include top leadership in diversity efforts.

Figure 8. National Guard Bureau Organizational Chart

SOURCE: National Guard Bureau, 2010.

Thus, the two main issues are that (1) this office does not have the manpower and visibility to have more influence on the policy implementation side and (2) the office's position in the organizational chart impedes communication and information flow between the Special Assistant for Diversity and Chief, NGB. These two issues can be rectified dramatically with some simple changes in the organization of this office.

The Commission believes that the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity should report directly to Chief, NGB, to maximize leadership visibility and involvement and that this office should be properly staffed to support the policy objectives of the leadership.

A suggested location for the Office of the Special Assistant for Diversity is on the Chief's Personal Staff. As shown in Figure 8, the Personal Staff comprises offices, such as the Inspector General and legislative liaison, that report directly to Chief, NGB, and advise him or her on matters that require leadership involvement.

A diversity office on the Personal Staff could act as the center of communication between NGB and OSD. It could also distribute policy and information to the Air and Army National Guard from the Chief, NGB, Personal Staff position. This would likely increase the visibility and therefore the ability of the Special Assistant for Diversity to influence NGB diversity policy and its implementation.

Diversity Metrics

The National Guard of the United States is made up of 54 organizations, corresponding to the 50 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Each of these National Guards is made up of residents from that state, territory, district, or surrounding metropolitan area. Unless the National Guard is called into federal service, the commander in chief of each National Guard is the governor of that state or territory; in the case of the District of Columbia's National Guard, the President of the United States is the commander in chief.

The ideal pursued by this Commission is for the Armed Forces in general to be representative of the nation. NGB can contribute to this ideal by helping the National Guard strive to represent the state, territory, or district that it serves.

> ### Recommendation 8—
>
> **The Commission recommends that Congress include the following text in Title 32:**
>
> - **a. The National Guard Bureau shall report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of diversity for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia. This report shall show how reflective each district, territory, and state National Guard is of its respective general population, relevant labor pool, and eligible population.**
> - **b. Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a dashboard of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. This dashboard shall show comparisons across states, territories, and the District of Columbia and highlight best practices.**

The unique features of the National Guard require specific attention in terms of implementation and accountability. In particular, the command and control structure of the National Guard makes holding leaders accountable at the state level (here, *states* includes U.S. territories and the District of Columbia) a complex issue. Thus, the subcommittee recommends implementing an accountability mechanism that will encourage states to take measures necessary to improve its National Guard's diversity.

One of the main problems in achieving accountability is the complexity of command and control issues in the National Guard. As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to active duty. However, most of the time, the National Guard in not in active duty and, therefore, not under federal control.

Title 32 assigns command of state National Guard units to the governors of the state—the state governors are commanders in chief for their state National Guard when the National Guard is not under federal control.[51] As commanders in chief, it is also the governors who select the Adjutant Generals to their states. Title 10 and Title 32 effectively indicate that Chief, NGB, has no command authority over each state's National Guard.

Therefore, to increase accountability at the state level, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommends that NGB prepare a report to Congress and a detailed diversity dashboard to help National Guard units, and their state leadership, assess their diversity efforts. The

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[51] The President is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard.

report to Congress will offer diversity and representation statistics to Congress and DoD that provide comparisons with different civilian population benchmarks. The purpose of this report is to increase stakeholder and public awareness about diversity issues in the National Guard and, consequently, to increase accountability.

The dashboard will serve as an information sharing tool to aid each state in identifying diversity problem areas and solutions. This report should include some of the same statics included in the report to Congress, but it should be augmented with diversity indicators at the unit level.

Moreover, the dashboard should also include a compendium of diversity best practices and programs. This report will help leaders assess the diversity situation of their unit or command and help them facilitate improvement in state National Guard diversity programs. All of the information contained in the dashboard should be available to the states.

In summary, Congress should revise Title 32 to make these reports a permanent assessment of diversity in the National Guard. This will ensure a permanent focus on diversity issues and will place accountability at the state level. NGB can track these diversity metrics, report them to Congress, and serve as a facilitator of diversity best practices for states struggling with diversity initiatives.

CONCLUSION

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was created to bring the Reserve Component perspective to the Commission. In its work, the subcommittee highlighted the differences between the Active and Reserve Components with regard to issues that pertain to the diversity of the force. As a first step in its assessment, the subcommittee provided a description of the manpower structure of the Reserve Component, assembled demographic profiles of all of the Reserve Components, and illustrated the role of structural diversity in the integration of the Active and Reserve Components as a total force. This provided the backdrop for the rest of the work of the subcommittee.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee then reviewed the work the Commission had already done with regard to the Active Component, and it added its own analysis informed by the Reserve Component perspective. This helped the Commission identify recommendations that required modification in order to fully addresses Reserve Component issues and identify existing recommendations that failed to cover diversity issues specific to the National Guard and Reserve. In those cases, the subcommittee proposed new recommendations.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found that most issues covered by the Commission at least partially addressed diversity issues in the Reserve Component. However, the subcommittee also found that new recommendations were necessary in order to increase the pool of applicants that join the Reserve Component, to increase promotion opportunities, and to improve the management and organizational structures that can improve representation in the Reserve Component.

The first part of this paper presents background facts and a demographic profile of the Reserve Component, highlighting three main points. First, depending on how it is measured, the Reserve Component constitutes between 37 percent and 47 percent of total U.S. military manpower. Second, although there are several differences between the Active and Reserve Components, including the fact that the percentage of women in the Reserve Component is higher than in the Active Component, in general, both the Active and Reserve Components exhibit the same representation issues when compared with the general population. Lastly, because of the increased interaction between the Active and Reserve Components, differences between Active and Reserve Component personnel are assuming an important new dimension in the form of structural diversity.

These facts indicate that, because of the size of the Reserve Component relative to the total force, any change in the demographic profile of the National Guard and Reserve will be reflected in the demographic profile of the Armed Forces as a whole. They also indicate that structural diversity issues, which arise from the interaction between the Active and Reserve Components, could have a positive effect on mission readiness and mission accomplishment if they are identified and managed appropriately.

Mindful of this information, the remainder of this section summarizes the Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commissioners' understanding and interpretation of the findings of this and other subcommittees. These recommendations are grouped into three categories: (1) recommendations that widen the pool of those entering the Reserve Component, (2) recommendations that widen opportunities and remove barriers so that qualified servicemembers can move up the ranks, and (3) organization and management recommendations that aim to improve diversity support structures and leadership accountability in the Reserve Component.

Widening the Pool

Because of the structure of the Reserve Component, the recommendations related to widening the pool of applicants can be organized into three main topics: retention, the prior service pool, and civilian skills and expertise. The National Guard and Reserve subcommittee found that, just as in the Active Component, the Reserve Component has low retention rates for women and, to a lesser degree, minority groups. The subcommittee also found that much of the Reserve force comes from prior service personnel and that prior service personnel are a valuable source of manpower for the Reserve Component and the military as a whole.

Based on this fact, the Commission recommends improving transition processes to allow servicemembers to more seamlessly move from their active-duty Services to the National Guard and Reserve and also between Reserve Components. The Commission believes that, improving these processes, talented individuals who might otherwise leave the military altogether could be retained in the Reserve Component, thereby increasing the pool of personnel who may join the National Guard and Reserve. The Commission also believes that the added flexibility implied by these seamless transitions will decrease barriers to service and potentially increase the retention rates of women and other groups in both the Reserve and Active Components. However, the Commission also recognizes that more research is necessary to assess the effects on retention of this added flexibility.

Widening Opportunities

The recommendations intended to widen opportunities for those in the force aim to remove barriers that may have a detrimental effect on advancement opportunities for different demographic groups or that may have negative effects on structural diversity. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee's main findings in this area are that career assignments—specifically, assignment to a tactical occupation—can supply more advancement opportunities than are provided by other career fields. Furthermore, the subcommittee also found that women and minorities tend to be in tactical occupations at a much lower rate than males and whites, respectively. The Commission acknowledges this to be a barrier that affects the rate of advancement of these groups to the higher ranks of the military.

The Commission also examined structural issues that may impede the advancement of traditional reservists. The Commission recognizes that one of the major differences between active-duty and Reserve Component servicemembers is that, to achieve operational credibility, National Guard and Reserve personnel must achieve some of the same career milestones achieved by active-duty personnel while at the same time balancing their civilian lives and employment demands.

Lastly, the Commission recognizes that the civilian skills and expertise of reservists can be valuable to the Service in the operational environments of today and the future.

Given these facts, the Commission proposes four recommendations. First, the Commission recommends that knowledge, skills, ability, and potential be emphasized for promotion to the flag/general officer ranks. The Commission believes deemphasizing career field and placing more weight on the qualifications required for flag/general officer positions may remove some of the barriers that encumber the advancement of women and minorities—with no detriment to the quality of officers in the upper ranks.

Second, although the Commission identified some areas for concern in promotion rates, the Commission believes the process to be fair in general. However, the Commission also believes that fairness in the process is not enough and that all servicemembers should have a good understanding of the promotion process so that they are aware of the opportunities available to them. Because of

this, the Commission recommends that the Services improve their mentoring programs, and it believes that these programs should include information about Reserve Component opportunities. Particularly important for the Reserve Component is an emphasis on the person-to-person aspect of mentoring. Because Reserve Component units meet only a few times a year, the amount of time available for personal contact between mentor and protégée is often limited. The Commission believes that, given these constraints, every effort should be made to take advantage of the limited time available.

Third, the Commission recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs identify ways for National Guard and Reserve personnel to effectively fulfill joint and operational requirements. As previously mentioned, because of the military/civilian duality, the time available for Reserve Component servicemembers to achieve these career landmarks is limited; therefore, the Services must strive to provide the appropriate opportunities for reservists to achieve these milestones.

Fourth, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services track civilian skills and expertise. The Commission believes that by acknowledging and appreciating the value of these skills, the Reserve Component will be able to attract a more diverse pool of applicants. The principal aim of these recommendations is to provide opportunities to all those qualified and thereby attract a diverse pool of qualified candidates to the Reserve Component.

Organization and Management

Lastly, the Commission provides recommendations that will help the National Guard and Reserve align themselves with DoD diversity initiatives, facilitate implementation of policies that promote and help manage diversity, and institute accountability mechanisms. The subcommittee found that, due to the command and control structure of the National Guard and the need to accomplish the goals set forth by the Commission, modifications to the existing recommendations and a new set of recommendations were required.

The Commission makes three recommendations in this regard. First, the Commission recommends that the Reserve Component institute the same mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring required of the Active Component. These accountability and monitoring mechanisms should be instituted at the OSD and Service levels and aimed at promoting accountability at all levels in a servicemember's career.

The second recommendation asks Chief, NGB, to establish and support organizational structures that facilitate diversity efforts. This recommendation aims to provide the National Guard with the support it requires to write, disseminate, and support the diversity policy that is to be implemented in all the states.

Third, the Commission recommends that NGB collect and publish diversity metrics at the state level. These metrics will be the basis of a report to Congress. They will also form the basis of a dashboard, which is intended to help the states identify diversity issues and will serve as a tool to disseminate best practices. The Commission believes that the report to Congress will serve as an accountability tool that will hold state leadership accountable for its diversity efforts.

Final Note

In conclusion, the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee provided the perspective of the Reserve Component to the Commission. The subcommittee identified issues that were unique to the National Guard and Reserve, bringing them to the Commission for deliberation. The work

and deliberations resulted in recommendations that cover issues related to widening the pool of people that may enter the Reserve Component, widening opportunities for qualified servicemembers to advance through the ranks, and providing the organization and management structures to support diversity initiatives. The Commission believes that, together, these recommendations can have a strong positive effect on diversity in the Reserve Component.

APPENDIX A: MLDC CHARTER TASKS

1. Develop a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD congruent with the core values and vision of DoD for the future workforce.
2. Incorporate private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership to DoD policy.
3. Assess the ability of the current organizational structure to ensure effective and accountable diversity management across DoD, including ODMEO and other similar offices within the Military Departments.
4. Explore options available to improve the substance and implementation of current plans and policies of DoD and the Military Departments.
5. Examine existing metrics and milestones for evaluating DoD diversity plans (including the plans of the individual Services) and how to facilitate future evaluation and oversight.
6. Evaluate efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership at all levels of the Armed Forces.
7. Analyze successes and failures of efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership, particularly of flag officers.
8. Determine the status of prior recommendations made to DoD and Congress concerning diversity initiatives within the Armed Services.
9. Consider the benefits of conducting an annual conference focused on diversity attended by DoD civilians, active duty and retired military personnel, and corporate leaders, to include a review of current policy and the annual demographic data from the DEOMI and DMDC.
10. Examine the possible effect of expanding DoD secondary educational programs to diverse civilian populations, including military academy preparatory schools.
11. Evaluate the ability of current recruitment and retention practices to attract and maintain a diverse pool of qualified individuals in sufficient numbers in pre-commissioning officer development programs.
12. Assess the pre-command billet assignments of ethnic-specific officers.
13. Examine command selection for officers of particular ethnicities.
14. Evaluate the establishment and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command opportunities and their effect by gender and ethnicity for officers at O-5 and above.
15. Evaluate the existence and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command opportunities for ethnic and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the levels of warrant officer, chief warrant officer, company and junior grade, field and mid-grade, and general and flag officer.
16. Measure the ability of current activities to increase continuation rates for ethnic and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces.

APPENDIX B: SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

Definition

Recommendation 1—

The DoD shall expand its definition of diversity to read: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflect the nation we serve.

- a. The DoD shall accompany this definition with a mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable and measurable.
- b. The mission statement shall be accompanied by a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to advance implementation.

Outreach and Recruiting

Recommendation 1—

The shrinking pool of qualified candidates is a threat to national security. All stakeholders should develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.

- a. The President, Congress, and state and local officials should develop, resource, and implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.
- b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should:
  - i. Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.
  - ii. Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.
  - iii. Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military service.

Recommendation 2—

DoD and the Services should focus their outreach efforts on early engagement. They should conduct strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs and practices. To that end, they should increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available pool of qualified candidates by:

- a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.
- b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups.
- c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.
- d. Closely examining the prep schools' admissions processes and making required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.

Branching and Assignments

Recommendation 1—

To assess demographic diversity patterns across the military lifecycle, the Secretary of Defense shall hold annual accountability reviews with the individual Service secretaries, Service chiefs, and Chief, National Guard Bureau. The Coast Guard should be subject to a similar review.

Recommendation 2—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance servicemembers' knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component opportunities, to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

- a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember's career.
- b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services should eliminate the "combat exclusion policies" for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. The commission recommends a time phased approach:

- a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with the current operational environment.
- b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open additional career fields and units involved in "direct ground combat" to qualified women.
- c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.

Promotion

Recommendation 1—

The Services should report enlisted and officer promotion rates based on a common definition of demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure to the SecDef. Specific deviations for demographic groups and career fields should be investigated for underlying causes and corrective actions should be taken as appropriate. Each Service shall make the promotion and/or selection rate of underrepresented groups a key metric of the Services' success in creating an inclusive environment.

Recommendation 2—

DoD should continue to require that its Services use a common survey instrument to monitor and periodically report on servicemembers' perceptions about promotion opportunities. The Coast Guard should participate in this effort. DoD and the Services should take corrective actions whenever negative perceptions emerge or persist.

Recommendation 3—

The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding Service-directed special assignments outside of normal career paths and/or fields. As appropriate, senior raters' evaluations should acknowledge when a servicemember has deviated from the due-course path at the specific request of his/her leadership.

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services must ensure that there is transparency throughout the entire promotion system so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and processes. The Services shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.

Retention

Recommendation 1—

DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should examine the effects of retention programs such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard, as well as any other innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 2—

DoD shall establish a universal qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis system that tracks career progression over time, including branching and assignments, promotion, and retention.

Diversity Leadership

Recommendation 1—

To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, leading diverse groups effectively must become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation:

- a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.
- b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework for how (e.g., curriculum, content, methods) to inculcate such education and training into leader development, including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.

Metrics

Recommendation 1—

Congress should revise Title 10 Section 113 to require that:

- a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense develop a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks that enables the Secretary of Defense to track progress toward its goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20-30 year pipeline that yields (1) An officer and enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and

ranks and (2) A military force that is able to prevail in its wars; prevent and deter conflict; defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.

- b. The Secretary of Defense meet at least annually with Service secretaries, Service chiefs and senior enlisted advisors to drive progress toward diversity management goals.
- c. The Secretary of Defense send an annual report to Congress and the President on the progress made toward diversity goals in the Services, including the National Guard and Reserve.
- d. The Secretary of Defense report annually an assessment of the available pool of qualified minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star general and flag officer positions.

Recommendation 2—

The Office of the Secretary of Defense must revise and reissue existing DoD diversity policies to:

- a. Require DoD to define clear measures of its diversity goals.
- b. Require DoD to establish standards that allow for the accurate collection and analyses of data needed to measure progress towards diversity goals.
- c. Provide oversight and support for the Services' respective diversity initiatives and metrics to ensure that, as a minimum, they align with the end state established by DoD.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise, and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout servicemembers' careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

Recommendation 4—

The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including minorities and women) have been considered for the nomination of every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.

Implementation and Accountability

Recommendation 1—

The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.

Recommendation 2—

The OSD organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services must institute clear, robust diversity policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability (R2A2).

- a. DoD and the Services shall revise and/or reissue and enforce compliance with their diversity and equal opportunity policies.
- b. Diversity policies at all levels should be implemented via strategic plans and within a life-cycle framework.

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services should adjust their organizational cultures to inculcate a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by:

- a. incorporating diversity leadership skills and respect for diversity into training and education throughout career development.
- b. identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 21st century.
- c. using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.

Recommendation 5—

DoD should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at OSD and Service levels, including the Reserve component, by:

- a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.
- b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and Flag and General officers, including 3-star and 4-star positions and Service chief.
    - 1. Formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection in the DoD instruction 1320.4, Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary of Defense or the President, or Confirmation by the Senate.
        - Service laydowns.
        - Slates of candidates.
        - Broadened pool to include nontraditional sources.
        - Describe vetting process to emphasize accountability.
    - 2. Include diversity leadership statement in SASC questionnaire.
- c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD's leadership, the existing Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG).
- d. Instituting a system of "accountability reviews" that is driven by the Secretary of Defense.
- e. Directing "Research and Analysis" office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.
- f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a whole.

APPENDIX C: NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE RECOMMENDATIONS

In cases when language was added to an existing recommendation, that language is underlined.

Recommendation 1 (Added to Metrics Recommendation 3)—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise <u>and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise</u> and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout servicemembers' careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

Recommendation 2 (Outreach and Recruiting)—

DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting Active to Reserve Component and internal Reserve Component transition protocols to promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention.

Recommendation 3 (Added to Branching and Assignments Recommendation 2)—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance servicemembers' knowledge of career choices<u>, including Reserve Component opportunities,</u> to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

- a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember's career.
- b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices <u>and employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor</u>.

Recommendation 4 (Promotion)—

The Services and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag or general officer and senior noncommissioned officer.

Recommendation 5—

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience and fulfill joint requirements given the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

Recommendation 6 (Added to Implementation and Accountability Recommendation 5)—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at OSD and Service levels for <u>both</u> the Active <u>and Reserve</u> Component<u>s</u> by:

- a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.

- b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3-star and 4-star positions and Service Chief.
    - i. Include in Senate Armed Services Committee questionnaire
    - ii. Document and publish the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection
- c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD's leadership, the existing Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG).
- d. Instituting a system of "accountability reviews" that is driven by the Secretary of Defense.
- e. Directing the "Research and Analysis" office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.
- f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter to encompass diversity as a whole.

Recommendation 7 (Implementation and Accountability)—

Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity leadership efforts.

Recommendation 8 (Implementation and Accountability)—

Congress include the following text in Title 32:

- The National Guard Bureau shall report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of diversity for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia. This report shall show how reflective each district, territory, and state National Guard is of its respective general population, relevant labor pool, and eligible population.
- Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a dashboard of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. This dashboard shall show comparisons across states, territories, and the District of Columbia and highlight best practices.

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