DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (DAC-PSM)

Public Meeting Minutes
November 14, 2024

The Defense Advisory Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Misconduct (referred to as DAC-PSM or the Committee) convened a public meeting at 9:00 AM ET on November 14, 2024. The meeting was held in-person at the Mark Center Conference Center in Alexandria, Virginia and virtually via Zoom webinar.

Committee Members

The following DAC-PSM Committee Members attended the November 14 meeting:

- Co-Chair: The Honorable Gina Grosso (Lt Gen, United States Air Force (Ret))
- Co-Chair: Dr. Lindsay Orchowski
- Mr. Clem Coward (MG, United States Army (Ret))
- Dr. Dorothy Edwards (Prevention Training and Activities Subcommittee Chair)
- Dr. Armando Estrada
- Ms. Stephanie Gattas
- Dr. Sharyn Potter
- Dr. John Pryor
- Ms. Lynn Rosenthal
- Ms. Jennifer Silva
- Dr. Amy Smith Slep
- Ms. Glorina Stallworth
- Dr. Michelle Ybarra

The following DAC-PSM Committee Member was absent from the November 14 meeting:
- Dr. Antonia Abbey (Metrics and Performance Subcommittee Chair)

Opening Remarks

The DAC-PSM Executive Director and Designated Federal Officer (DFO), Dr. Suzanne Holroyd, opened the Committee's public meeting by reviewing the charter of the Committee and its mission. Dr. Holroyd informed those in attendance that this meeting was being held in line with requirements stated in the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Attendees were reminded that any comments made during the meeting by Committee Members are their personal opinions and do not reflect the position of the DAC-PSM, Department of Defense (DoD), Military Departments, or Military Services. Dr. Holroyd then conducted a roll call of DAC-PSM Members and confirmed that a quorum was met. Dr. Holroyd turned the meeting over to the DAC-PSM Co-Chair, Ms. Gina Grosso, for opening comments. Co-Chair Grosso thanked everyone for attending the public meeting and provided an overview of the agenda for the day. She stated that the DAC-PSM would revisit the topic of exit interviews and the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) program, which was previously discussed at the June 2024 public meeting. Additionally, the Committee would meet with Defense Advisory Committee on Investigations, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) representatives to

discuss their recent DAC-IPAD site visits as well as their results from a closed case analysis. The DAC-PSM would also receive a briefing on a recruit screening effort related to a directed DAC-PSM study topic. Finally, the Committee would hear from the two DAC-PSM subcommittees on recommendations related to their FY24 study efforts and hold a Committee vote on acceptance of study recommendations.

Overview of Public Written Comments

Dr. Holroyd opened the portion of the meeting designated for review of the public's written comments. She noted that the Committee did not receive any public comments (by email or phone) prior to the deadline listed in the Federal Register Notice, and thus, had no comments for the Committee to address. Dr. Holroyd stated that the Committee had received a submission from an individual with several recommendations for the Committee's consideration and explained that the Committee is currently reviewing those recommendations and will publicly respond at a future public meeting.

Throughout the meeting, between 20-48 individuals of the public were in attendance via Zoom.

Discussion and Vote: NDAA Study Topics

Dr. Holroyd introduced this session by explaining that the Committee was assigned four study topics in the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21 NDAA). At this session, the Committee would be discussing the study topics related to exit interviews and the CATCH Program. The FY21 NDAA directed the Committee to assess the feasibility of conducting exit interviews during the discharge process to determine if Service members experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it, and to assess the feasibility of combining such exit interviews in DoD's CATCH Program. Dr. Holroyd reminded the Committee members and public attendees that at the June 27, 2024 DAC-PSM public meeting, they heard from representatives from Health Affairs and DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) about this topic, as well as a Victim Assistance Subject Matter Expert (SME). (*Note: Minutes from that public meeting can be found on the DAC-PSM website at* https://www.dhra.mil/DAC-PSM/Public-Meetings/.)

Co-Chair Grosso began the discussion by offering her thoughts on the subject. She noted that she believes that there is no need to make any changes to the current exit interview process. One significant reason underlying this belief is that only one third of victims who request a CATCH password actually end up making an entry in the database. In her opinion, combining the CATCH program with exit interviews would have neutral results at best and would likely be detrimental, due to the time the effort would require. She noted that the CATCH program is well-developed in her view, and it is currently under study by the DoD to evaluate its effectiveness. Co-Chair Grosso explained that the CATCH program only allows for anonymous submissions of entry. If there is a match, the victim is contacted by Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) personnel, not investigators, which she noted is important for protecting victims' sense of control over the process, as victims can then decide whether or not to participate in an investigation without feeling pressured to do so. Co-Chair Grosso stated that information on the CATCH program is readily available in multiple places. With this context, Co-Chair Grosso offered her perspective that no further action is necessary on the topic of the CATCH program being combined with exit interviews.

Co-Chair Grosso reminded attendees of the Committee's discussions with the topic experts and proposed the recommendations listed below for the Members to consider as next steps:

- Discussion Recap: While asking such questions is likely feasible, the DAC-PSM supports DoD's current approach of not asking such questions during exit interviews due to potential negative impact on transitioning Service members. Of note, the DAC-PSM learned there is no DoD-wide policy preventing this questioning.
  - Recommendation: DAC-PSM recommends implementation of DoD-wide policy preventing transitioning Service members from being asked during exit interviews whether they experienced or witnessed sexual assault or harassment during military service and did not report it.
- Discussion Recap: Given existing DoD policies regarding the CATCH Program (including the 2023 policy update that allows Service members to file a CATCH report without filing an official report), the DAC-PSM did not see the need for additional recommendations regarding the role of the CATCH Program in such situations. However, the DAC-PSM did encourage DoD to share appropriate information regarding the 2023 policy update with those going through the military separation process.
  - Recommendation: Any informational materials provided to Service members separating from the Service should clearly reflect the 2023 DoD policy update allowing Service members to submit a CATCH report without having to make an official report of sexual assault.
- Discussion Recap: The DAC-PSM discussed whether the above observations and recommendations addressed the intent of the NDAA FY21 study topic.
  - Recommendation: Report that DAC-PSM sees need for no further action on topic.

Mr. Coward asked for additional context about the second recommendation (*"informational materials provided to Service members separating from the Service should clearly reflect the 2023 DoD policy update allowing Service members to submit a CATCH report without having to make an official report of sexual assault"*). Dr. Holroyd answered that the Committee had only heard from DoD staff, not Veterans Affairs (VA) staff, but that they had heard about a joint DoD/VA effort to develop an information guide which would provide transitioning Service members with information about the CATCH program. At the June meeting (when the Committee heard from DoD staff), that draft guide did not include the reference to the new policy. Under the 2023 policy addition, all Service members (including those being processed for discharge from military service) can connect with a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) to submit a CATCH entry without having to make an official report of sexual assault. This new policy is facilitated via DD Form 2910-4, which contains information allowing for the victim to be contacted in the event of a future "match" in CATCH system. The DAC-PSM recommendation would ensure that this added opportunity to submit a CATCH entry is included in official communications, with the intent to reach the widest possible audience.

Dr. Pryor asked for elaboration on the first recommendation related to the specific possible negative impacts on the transitioning process that may be experienced by Service members who disclose an experience of sexual assault during their exit interview. Dr. Holroyd stated that, during the June briefing, the DoD Victim Assistance SME mentioned concerns about potentially re-

triggering victims by asking if they had experienced a sexual assault. Additionally, the Victim Assistance SME detailed anecdotal incidents in which Service members who had disclosed an experience of sexual assault were delayed in their transitioning while their case unfolded. Dr. Holroyd added that the perspective of the Victim Assistance SME was that not asking the question during exit interviews is one final opportunity to allow victims ultimate control of their situation. During the exit interview, all Service members receive information on available resources, support services, and the CATCH program, so verbally asking the question is not only unnecessary, but also potentially harmful. Dr. Ybarra added that she recalled a potential Service member concern that future VA services could be denied, if they were to respond in the negative to such exit interview questions, due to feelings of discomfort or pressure. Dr. Holroyd also reminded the Members that, during the June discussion, there were concerns that the DoD staff conducting exit interviews may not necessarily be trained to provide immediate care in the event that someone were to disclose a sexual assault.

Dr. Holroyd presented the three recommendations to the Committee for a vote. All three recommendations were adopted by unanimous vote.

Dr. Holroyd noted that another FY21 NDAA study topic on database anonymization was still being considered by the Committee and would be addressed at a future public meeting. This study topic directed the DAC-PSM to assess whether DoD's sexual assault reporting databases are anonymized to ensure privacy, while still providing military leaders with necessary information (e.g., length of time the victim and assailant were at the duty station where the sexual assault occurred; percentage of sexual assaults occurring while the victim or assailant were on temporary duty, leave, or otherwise away from their permanent duty station; number of sexual assaults that involve an abuse of power by a commander or supervisor). Dr. Holroyd reminded Members of the previous DoD briefing on current database anonymity approaches and is reviewing DoD feedback to follow-up questions.

Discussion: DAC-IPAD Insights from Closed Case Data Analysis and Site Visits

Dr. Holroyd introduced this session by explaining that the DAC-PSM Charter states that the Committee "shall also consult and coordinate with the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD) on matters of joint interest to the two advisory committees." Additionally, the DAC-PSM Charter directs the Committee to review "closed cases involving allegations of sexual assault." Accordingly, this session was intended to offer an opportunity for the DAC-PSM to hear from DAC-IPAD on the results of its closed case review analysis and share insights from site visits. Ms. Meghan Peters (DAC-IPAD Deputy Director) and Ms. Suzanne Goldberg (DAC-IPAD Member; Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State) presented the brief.

Ms. Peters began by reminding the attendees that she and Ms. Goldberg would be speaking as individuals and not on behalf of the DAC-IPAD. She noted that DAC-IPAD does not yet have official findings or recommendations at this stage of the site visit report process.

Ms. Peters provided a brief background on the DAC-IPAD. She explained that the DAC-IPAD was established in the FY15 NDAA and is chartered to provide independent advice and recommendations on the investigation, prosecution, and defense of allegations of rape, sexual

assault, and other sexual misconduct involving members of the Armed Forces, based on its ongoing review of cases. DAC-IPAD has 17 members from diverse backgrounds, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, federal and state judges, victim rights advocates, sexual assault nurse examiners, academics, and criminologists; all with expertise that could be relevant to the review of sexual assault cases. While its mandate is to look at sexual assault offenses, the DAC-IPAD can make recommendations for systemic change when, in the DAC-IPAD Members' collective judgment, it will improve the investigation, prosecution, and defense of sexual misconduct.

Ms. Peters explained that DAC-IPAD study topics come from a variety of sources including congressional taskings, requests from the DoD General Counsel, and internally by decision of Committee Members. She noted that while the DAC-IPAD was given a statutory mandate to review cases, Congress did not define what an ongoing review of cases would look like, so internal Committee decisions help guide that effort. DAC-IPAD Members apply their collective judgment and their familiarity with the civilian and military court system to review trial documents, investigative files, and transcripts in order to inform their findings and recommendations. Ms. Peters stated that the DAC-IPAD defined "case review" for themselves and others in their closed case review report.

Ms. Peters then provided an overview of the DAC-IPAD *Report on Investigative Case File Review.* She explained that this report was the culmination of a three-year effort in which the DAC-IPAD reviewed every single allegation of a penetrative sexual assault reported in an unrestricted report and investigated by one of the military criminal investigative organizations. DAC-IPAD defined the data set as any case that was closed in FY17 (i.e., disposition reached during FY17; case opening dates varied and were not limited to FY17). Ms. Peters explained that DAC-IPAD went to Quantico and collected the physical investigative files (totaling 1,900 files) and then requested the corresponding charge sheets and procedural documents for any other follow-on action. In consultation with an independent criminologist, Members developed a checklist with up to 230 data points.

Ms. Peters reported that DAC-IPAD staff reviewed 100% of the 1,900 files (Members reviewed roughly 10% of the case files in the data set.) Ms. Peters stated that two staff members reviewed each file, and if their assessment differed, they would present the file to a Member for a tie-breaking vote on how to categorize that case. She remarked that applying independent data analysis to these source documents was critical to their methodology, as it ensured verifiable results. Because this analysis relied on subjective judgments about the cases, DAC-IPAD depended on having multiple eyes on every case. Ms. Peters stated that a small group of roughly 10-12 people in total were reviewing these cases. When a particular case presented a unique feature, the reviewers discussed interpretation of that feature and how it should be represented in the rule set for documentation.

Ms. Peters stated that an important goal of this effort was to assess and identify patterns in case characteristics, as well as how cases progressed through the system. For example, they looked at the relationship between victim participation in the investigation (or not) and whether judicial or non-judicial actions taken. DAC-IPAD Members then reviewed the case files and made qualitative assessments about the types of evidence in these cases; that is, whether the applicable legal

standard was met and whether the commander's disposition decisions were reasonable within a permissible zone of discretion.

Dr. Ybarra asked about the aims of the checklist and whether it centered on particular themes. Ms. Peters answered that the checklist was designed to identify case characteristics that were predictive of the disposition of the case, such as whether victim participation, or continuation of that participation, was a factor in case disposition. The other goal was for the DAC-IPAD Members to make their own independent assessment of case evidence and determine whether or not it met a legal standard that justified the outcome; in other words, an assessment of whether the system was working or not. Ms. Peters noted that there have been questions about commander's decisions regarding case investigation, and the DAC-IPAD wanted to see if their decisions to take no action were reasonable based on the evidence available. She stated that DAC-IPAD Members found that in 95% of cases, the initial disposition decision made by the commander was reasonable.

Ms. Stallworth asked if there were any themes or conclusions that came out of the data analysis. Ms. Peters answered that as they looked at the investigative files, they found was often a discrepancy between what was documented in the file and what was ultimately recorded in the system or database. It also did not appear in the files that attorneys or commanders had a standard protocol for their decision to prosecute or refer a case to trial. She noted that there were guides in the manual for court-martial, but they were vague, and it was difficult to tell from the files how those guides influenced the decisions they saw in the files. The DoD has since implemented prosecution standards that the DAC-IPAD had recommended verbatim.

Ms. Peters stated that one issue highlighted during this analysis was "stove piping" between investigators and prosecutors. For example, initial interviews with victims did not always establish all the elements that prosecutors needed to objectively evaluate the case. As a result, prosecutors in these cases had to revisit and make up that ground themselves. For the DAC-IPAD, it would have been easier to objectively evaluate all these cases if the initial phases of investigation were more thorough and consistent. Ms. Goldberg added that one theme that emerged was a gap between investigator and prosecutor. She stated that they often heard prosecutors saying things like "It seems like something could have happened here, but we do not have the file," and after time passes, it becomes more difficult to obtain the necessary evidence.

Mr. Coward asked whether the assumption was that each case file had been investigated by the Service's investigation organization (for example, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for Army). Ms. Peters affirmed that each of the 1,900 case files was an unrestricted report that required mandatory investigation conducted by the appropriate Service investigation organization. She added that they uncovered a correlation between who had made the report and victim participation in the case: If the victim or victim's designated representative made the report, there was a positive correlation with victim participation in the case. However, if the report was filed by a mandatory reporter, such as a member of the chain of command or a third party, victim participation was less likely.

Ms. Peters then shifted her brief to an overview of characteristics of those accused or investigated for penetrative sexual offense. She noted that the 1,900 cases examined by the DAC-IPAD represented roughly one third of the total 6,000 sexual misconduct investigations closed that year

and re-clarified that the DAC-IPAD focused solely on penetrative sexual offenses and not the full spectrum of sexual misconduct.

Ms. Peters continued that their analysis found that accused Service members were, by and large, male, junior enlisted, and white. She commented that this was the first difficulty experienced by staff, with tracking race and ethnicity of participants in the military justice system. She also expressed that the Committee was surprised to find that just over half of accused Service members reported alcohol use. Ms. Peters noted that this data point was determined by direct evidence or strong circumstantial evidence within the file that the accused was consuming alcohol in proximity to the alleged event.

Dr. Pryor asked whether the race and ethnicity of accused offenders differs from the proportions of the general population of Service members. Ms. Peters was unable to answer, as DAC-IPAD does not have the overall population data from that year. Mr. Coward asked whether there was any further breakdown on the ages of the junior enlisted group. Ms. Peters answered that the DAC-IPAD report contains an appendix with Service-specific breakdowns by pay grade, and they observed that critical mass was hit in the E-3-E-4 range.

Ms. Peters provided the following information on case characteristics:

- 75% of sexual assaults were reported in CONUS.
- 57% of victims reported alcohol use at the time of the assault. Ms. Peters added that this statistic did not relate to whether there was significant enough alcohol use to affect the charging decision, in the legal sense, but is simply documentation of whether the victim was consuming alcohol at the time of offense.
- The top reported relationship between the subject and the victim, from the victim's perspective, was a friend followed by a current or former spouse.
- Type of victim:
  - 52.7% enlisted and 2.5% officer.
  - 94% of victims were in the pay grade of E-5 or below.
  - Civilian (21.7%)
  - DoD Spouse (22.8%). In 70.6% of these cases the subject was the spouse's husband.

Co-Chair Grosso asked about corresponding civilian statistics and whether those cases would be typically handled by local police. Ms. Peters answered that generally, local police contact the local CID and then, either conduct a joint investigation or hand off the case to the local military branch. She stated that civilian jurisdiction typically has little appetite to handle these cases, as the military has jurisdiction over the subject.

Dr. Edwards said that, at the beginning of the presentation, Ms. Peters stated that their analysis showed that in the majority of cases, commanders had appropriately passed decisions on the disposition of penetrative sexual offense allegations. She asked whether that statistic looked any different when the victim was using alcohol. Ms. Peters answered that she would have to return to the appendices to check, as they had done a multivariate analysis on two fronts to see if there was a correlation to victim participation and disposition decision.

Dr. Holroyd asked Ms. Peters if it was correct that DAC-IPAD intends to repeat this exercise in coming years. Ms. Peters stated that their study was completed in 2020, and one of the

recommendations they put forth was for the study to be repeated, either by DoD or DAC-IPAD. She added that they would like to do the study again at a sample size using a more recent batch of cases, now that they know what they are looking for and what to target, but the DAC-IPAD needs an extension from Congress for an additional five years before it can commence planning.

Dr. Ybarra asked if the replication of the study would be intended to see if there were any changes in case outcomes. Ms. Peters answered that the first study was effective for understanding what is happening during the investigative process, which has its own value, but she does not believe this is an appropriate metric by which to assess the Office of Special Trial Counsel (OSTC). The case file review process is one facet of the broader scheme of data collected to assess the decision making and performance of the OSTC, so she believes any future review would be focused on the investigative process. Ms. Goldberg added that this would help to validate or invalidate anecdotal but widespread challenges associated with the investigative process that they heard about during their site visits.

Dr. Slep asked whether there might be any appetite to expand the range of cases examined beyond penetrative sexual assaults. Ms. Peters answered that it would depend on the numbers; they would begin by scoping the review by offense and then decide to include or exclude those cases based on whether the data set was usable. She added that many cases that include some type of sexual contact offense end up at a lower disposition level (administrative and non-judicial) and therefore are harder to assess legally and consistently based on the available documentation.

One discussion prompt offered in the DAC-IPAD presentation was "understanding the characteristics of military sexual assault offenders is crucial for developing effective and targeted prevention strategies, including education and training initiatives." Dr. Edwards asked if Ms. Peters could talk more about this. Ms. Peters answered that in talking to Service members during their site visits, they heard that there was a desire for inclusion of real-life applicable scenarios in training so that what they learn about reflects their real-life setting. She stated that there was potential to use characteristics from the case files in trainings so that Service members could utilize realistic examples. Ms. Goldberg added that they repeatedly heard, often from junior enlisted women, that trainings would be more meaningful if they knew the scenarios had actually happened. She also stated that the case review showed that only 55% of accused Service members reported alcohol use (which she opined may be more illustrative of who feels comfortable reporting, rather than who offends). Trainings which focus on alcohol use could be missing opportunities to discuss other factors and instances that Service members should be aware of. Mr. Coward added that there is a tendency among senior leadership to focus on the myth that everything happens in the barracks, which is untrue, as less than half of the population lives in the barracks. Accordingly, limiting the amount of beer in the barracks (a common response by senior leadership) will not address a large portion of the instances of sexual assault being reported.

Dr. Estrada asked if there were any plans to make recommendations regarding standardization of data gathering to make these kinds of analysis easier to do in the future. Ms. Peters answered that the DAC-IPAD created this methodology and defined the parameters of a "case review" for their own purposes. Aside from their own advisory committee initiative, Ms. Peters did mention that the DoD is undergoing efforts to assess the OSTC in a more prosecution-focused review, and there are other groups conducting a holistic review of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She stated that the DAC-IPAD is currently collecting procedural documents for every court martial,

which will produce future analysis that is relegated to the judicial realm. This will provide information about what types of charges result, but not what types of misconduct are actually occurring. She added that DAC-IPAD would like to stay in communication with DAC-PSM about this area. Dr. Holroyd questioned whether the DAC-IPAD methodology could be repurposed by DoD to conduct regular assessments and asked whether DAC-IPAD had recommended anything along those lines. Ms. Peters answered that the only recommendation that came out of the report was to standardize the prosecution standards. There were assessments made about the investigative practices, which is an area where DAC-IPAD could still issue recommendations.

Dr. Potter referenced the data presented that 93% of perpetrators were at the E-3 and E-4 level and stated that this finding backs up the findings of the study that the DAC-PSM Prevention and Training Subcommittee (Prevention Subcommittee) has been doing on training consistency and qualifications of trainers, which the Prevention Subcommittee would be presenting later in the public meeting. Ms. Peters clarified that the 93% of accused are enlisted, and of that number, the majority are E-3 and E-4. She stated that she recalled the majority meant that upwards of 60 or 70% were E-3 and E-4 combined. Ms. Goldberg remarked that that data point says a lot about where those offenses are occurring and who is comfortable reporting whom. As the gap grows between victim and accused in terms of rank, they saw less willingness to report.

Dr. Pryor stated that the DAC-PSM Metrics and Performance Subcommittee has been evaluating risk and protective factors connected to sexual misconduct and asked whether the DAC-IPAD team had any insight to offer regarding contextual factors suggested by their analysis. Ms. Peters answered that their team called them "case complexities" when a victim in a case file engaged in traditional risk-taking behaviors. The team included those case complexities in their multivariate analysis to determine the level of correlation between risk-taking behaviors and case outcomes, meaning they analyzed risk-taking as correlated with the likelihood of whether the case would progress in the system, rather than correlation with the nature of the offense itself. She stated that the report appendices would contain more detailed information.

Dr. Slep stated that she could not recall the specific number of officers who indicated experiencing a sexual assault in the DoD Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, but she would be curious to see if that proportion differs from the low rate DAC-IPAD saw in their case file review. She postulated that a comparison of the two could be a good angle for analyzing reporting gaps, as the anonymous nature of the Annual Report might mean that officers felt more comfortable divulging a sexual assault there rather than filing a formal report. Dr. Holroyd answered that they could pull the 2017 Annual Report to do that comparison. Ms. Goldberg commented that one common theme that emerged during their site visits was that reporting has different consequences at different levels, and some of the disparities in reporting (even anonymously) relate to the perception or reality of those consequences.

Ms. Goldberg then shifted the briefing to an overview of the DAC-IPAD 2024 Site Visits. In 2024, DAC-IPAD Members visited 16 military installations world-wide, where they conducted 125 small focus group discussions with more than 600 personnel regarding their perspectives on the military justice system. Of the 600 participants, more than 150 were junior enlisted E-1 to E-4. The DAC-IPAD Members gathered base-level perspectives on the OSTC and on sexual assault and harassment awareness among junior enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, and commanders. She noted that DAC-IPAD goals included a focus on observations from junior

enlisted Service members about sexual assault and harassment prevention and unit climate; identifying shared and unique challenges faced by male and female Service members; and presenting feedback from the field on ways to improve the effectiveness of prevention training, unit culture, and reporting processes. Ms. Goldberg highlighted that the DAC-IPAD is still in the data-gathering process, so the presentation at this session is not final. Ms. Peters added that this presentation does not reflect the official views of the DAC-IPAD, as they have not yet deliberated and made an assessment on this information. She commented that the idea of this effort is to identify issues around perceptions of the military justice system; that is, they want to see not only if the system objectively works, but if Service members feel like it works.

One common topic for feedback provided during site visits was that of training and awareness. Ms. Goldberg expressed that they heard that training is overly dependent on PowerPoint slides ("death by PowerPoint"), often repetitive, and viewed as ineffective. Training sessions are usually conducted in large groups which limit engagement and personalization. She said that Service members reported viewing these large sessions as opportunities to catch up on rest and that there was a general sense from higher-ups that they were "checking the box" to get it over with, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the PowerPoint even further. DAC-IPAD Members heard that, even when there were opportunities to engage within the training sessions, people did not feel comfortable speaking up in these large groups. Ms. Goldberg added that these observations also came from people who received specialized representative training (such as SARC trainings) within their junior enlisted units. Service members expressed a preference for small group sessions, scenario-based learning, and real-life role-playing exercises. Ms. Goldberg stated that there was a mix of preference for trainers (civilian vs. uniform). In her own observations, Ms. Goldberg noted that many junior enlisted expressed a preference for a civilian trainer, who might be more understanding. On the other hand, some participants preferred a trainer in uniform who might be more personally understanding of the military context. In discussing training and awareness efforts, gender-specific insights from female Service members highlighted what they saw as the importance of self-defense and predator-awareness training as needed components.

Ms. Goldberg observed consistent discomfort with the way training was delivered and, in addition, indications that training was not taken seriously by leadership. While trainings may have initially been appropriately designed, when they are delivered "as a joke" or simply not presented seriously, they can have the opposite intended effect. Some male Service members reported feeling unfairly generalized as potential aggressors, which can lead to disengagement during training.

Co-Chair Grosso asked if there were predator-awareness trainings, and Ms. Goldberg answered that she had not seen any. Dr. Ybarra commented that this was interesting, as data both within and outside of the military context indicates that sexual assault is more likely to be committed by someone you know, rather than the classic "stranger danger" myth of the rapist in the bushes. Ms. Goldberg responded that she thinks the Service members understand that, but that the desire seemed to be based off the idea that they knew who these bad actors were, but nothing necessarily happened to those perpetrators in terms of consequences.

The topics of accountability and fairness were also discussed at the on-site sessions. Ms. Goldberg stated that many junior enlisted personnel perceived a clear double standard (junior vs senior personnel) with leniency afforded to senior ranks in cases of misconduct. Both male and female Service members expressed frustration over perceived favoritism in disciplinary actions.

Additionally, concerns over accountability were tied to mistrust in the reporting process and doubt that justice will be served.

Ms. Goldberg tied this concern about accountability to another feedback topic on reporting challenges. She stated that fear of retaliation is a primary barrier to reporting, with personnel concerned about social and career repercussions. One example of a career repercussion she heard, which may not be immediately evident, is when a Service member is pulled out of duty or held back so they can participate in their case. Depending on the career path, that delay could have significant impact on a Service member's ability to participate in career-advancing training.

Ms. Goldberg also noted that the informal pipeline of information is a barrier to reporting. As illustration, she recalled hearing a comment from a senior enlisted that "we know, well before we receive any formal reports, who is coming to us and whether they were accused or a victim." DAC-IPAD also heard that female Service members are particularly hesitant to report incidents involving higher-ranking perpetrators.

Also, a lack of confidentiality and trust in the chain of command exacerbates underreporting. Co-Chair Grosso added the example that even the person designated within a unit to receive reports may not be able to maintain confidentiality. Ms. Goldberg also highlighted that cultural barriers to reporting persist for males who experience sexual harassment and sexual assault. At this juncture, Ms. Peters interjected to remind attendees that this site visit effort had a much broader scope (sexual harassment and sexual assault) than the previously discussed case review report. Ms. Goldberg stated that at one of the focus groups with male junior enlisted, the DAC-IPAD asked if anyone had either experienced or knew someone who had experienced sexual harassment or assault, and every single person present raised their hand.

The final feedback topic briefed was unit climate and culture. Ms. Goldberg stated that command intervention on harassment varies widely: Some leaders address issues promptly, while others overlook or dismiss complaints. Some junior enlisted indicated that they trusted their chain of command to take action if they reported an issue, while others stated they would never consider making a complaint, as they believed senior leaders would not take it seriously. Ms. Goldberg noted that some junior enlisted mentioned that leadership response to complaints was calibrated based on how important or valuable the accused was perceived to be. She highlighted that they heard from senior leaders that, if an accused was perceived to be a problem generally in the command and then an accusation came up related to that individual, the senior leader was happy to get rid of the person via administrative action. She said they heard that a "boys' club" culture is prevalent in male-dominated units, where inappropriate behavior can be normalized. Male and female participants described a culture of "locker room" language and tolerance for off-color comments, which can make professional interactions uncomfortable.

Barracks and dorm safety is top of mind, along with reported concerns about women working in isolated or all-male workspaces. Ms. Peters added that they heard that people knew when they came into a unit or group if it was a bad or good environment just based on "the vibes". Ms. Goldberg commented that the good news about that is that it shows how good leadership can filter down through the chain to create healthy work and living environments. She then provided some gender-specific insights on the topic of unit climate and culture. She stated that female Service members reported feeling isolated, stigmatized, and unsupported in male-dominated environments,

while many male Service members expressed fear of accusations and reported avoiding one-on-one interactions with female colleagues.

The DAC-IPAD made note of suggested improvements offered during the sessions, including a shift to small-group, scenario-based, and role-playing training formats. Suggestions related to accountability included the creation of a feedback mechanism on case progress and publicization of cases of senior personnel accountability to foster trust and transparency. Ms. Goldberg commented that a significant number of women said that they had filed a report and never heard anything back. She stated that the perception of a lack of consequences, whether true or not, affects people's willingness to report. Formal actions, like ensuring confidentiality around reporting and reinforcing protections for those who do report, are important, and she added that an informal piece would be considering how leadership can engage in creating a climate where gossip is not tolerated. One unit culture recommendation was to emphasize the value of increasing gender diversity in leadership roles to model inclusive behavior and mitigate isolation.

Ms. Goldberg observed that a good number of leaders at bases they visited expressed genuine commitment and support. Mr. Coward requested a definition of "leader," and Ms. Goldberg answered that they defined it as the senior-most commander at the base. She elaborated that these leaders understand not only that sexual misconduct is a problem for troop morale, but also that processing these cases requires a great deal of time and effort, which takes away from resources they could be using otherwise. She opined that one of the challenges is ensuring that commitment is found not only at the very top of the leadership structure, but also in the middle and all the way down the organizational ladder. Commitment also needs to be informed, which is an area Ms. Goldberg believes the DAC-PSM can be instrumental, as there are still pervasive misperceptions about what prevention is.

In closing, Ms. Goldberg offered several final observations:

1. Ambivalence: There is a lot of ambivalence surrounding the issue of sexual misconduct in the lower ranks and echelons.
2. Training cadence: How frequently should training occur? There is not necessarily "week one" prevention training occurring, and when prevention training does occur, it may be just ten minutes out of the entire course.
3. Quality of training: The size and format of training classes, as well as the quality of facilitation, are concerns. The training of facilitators providing sexual harassment training is a particular concern; Ms. Goldberg remarked that many facilitators with whom they met stated that their instructor training focused on how to fill out applicable forms, and not on things like victim-centered or trauma-informed engagement.
4. Tailoring of training: Diverse groups of learners are coming in with varying levels of knowledge, experience, prior victimization, and/or prior perpetration. Training cannot be one-size fits all.
5. Content: In addition to concerns about lack of sex education and healthy relationship content in training, Ms. Goldberg noted that they heard that a lot of content focuses on response and less on prevention. Additionally, there were variations in how consent is presented; she stated that it was often presented in the context of ethics around consent, with less focus on the legal definition of consent as outlined in the UCMJ. This leads to a gap where junior enlisted women feel more empowered to report and are then surprised to

learn that what they have experienced does not meet the legal elements of sexual assault under UCMJ.

6. Time and Resources: The biggest challenge regarding prevention education that they heard from commanders was time and resources.

Ms. Peters added that junior enlisted was a subset of their larger group of participants, and that DAC-IPAD also talked to legal personnel, mid-level enlisted leadership, and some officers. She noted that DAC-IPAD was primarily interested in ensuring they talked to a group of six to ten junior enlisted males and a group of six to ten junior enlisted females (in separate focus groups) at every base.

Dr. Holroyd asked what the next steps are for this effort. Ms. Peters answered that next steps are to be determined. The next DAC-IPAD public meeting was scheduled for December 2024, where the Committee would deliberate on a summary of the information and decide if it might fit with an ongoing project or inform a future study. (Update: This summary can be found on the DAC-IPAD website here: https://dacipad.whs.mil/meetings/december-3-4-2024). A summary of this effort may be packaged up as an executive summary to be included in the next DAC-IPAD Annual Report.

Dr. Holroyd remarked that the DAC-PSM received a DoD briefing earlier in 2024 on the On-Site Installation Evaluation (OSIE) site visits and that it was interesting to hear some similarities between that effort and the DAC-IPAD site visits. She stated that junior enlisted are not heard from often enough, despite being at the highest risk for harmful behaviors, so it was good to hear that DAC-IPAD specifically sought out those perspectives. Ms. Goldberg commented that it was important to note that the junior enlisted they heard from were selected for the opportunity by someone, and so it might be fair to infer that DAC-IPAD did not receive an entirely full picture. Additionally, for many junior enlisted, this is their first time away from home, so DAC-IPAD was speaking with a lot of young and homesick people. She added that they did also hear some first-time disclosures in some of these meetings. Ms. Goldberg remarked that one positive takeaway was that people did seem to know how to report and that the bathroom poster campaign seemed to be very effective, though there continues to be a pervasive distrust surrounding who is safe to tell. She expressed that it is important to remember when having discussions about prevention that there is a group of people in any given room who have personal experiences with the topic.

Dr. Ybarra asked whether there were any standardized consequences for not keeping confidentiality. Ms. Goldberg answered there is certainly a perception that there are no consequences, but that she would expect a chaplain or someone with legal obligation to keep confidentiality; she did not recall hearing any specific examples of those types of breaches of confidentiality during their site visits.

Dr. Ybarra remarked that there seems to be a possible opportunity to make a recommendation to codify consequences for confidentiality breaches by people who receive reports, in the same way that there are legal obligations for chaplains. Ms. Goldberg responded that that is an interesting idea, but one issue is that there are several ways to breach confidentiality without words; for example, eye-rolling, leaving someone behind, or not advancing someone in their career. She stated that they consistently heard that if somebody makes a complaint or is accused, it entails an enormous derailment of their career. It is known that in civilian college campus settings, many people who are involved in any way with a Title IX investigation leave the institution, especially

victims. Additionally, there is a perception that an accused Service member's career may be derailed, even if the accusation is proven unfounded, which creates another layer of anxiety that needs to be recognized in any prevention efforts.

Dr. Pryor asked whether there was any obligation for someone who hears a complaint to report. Ms. Goldberg answered that it depends on the person's role. Ms. Peters added that the information flow that was described to them was not just up and down, but also horizontal. Dr. Pryor remarked that as information goes up and down, the potential for it to go across increases. Ms. Goldberg added that people generally knew counseling was an option, but some people indicated feeling hesitant to pursue counseling due to a concern that it might affect their career progression or become a mark on their record (over concerns indicated in previous years regarding the stigma of pursuing counseling at all.) Additionally, waiting lists to get into counseling are very long unless a Service member reported suicidal ideation.

With this session concluded, Dr. Holroyd thanked Ms. Goldberg and Ms. Peters for their time and effort and stated that the DAC-PSM would be in touch to collaborate again in the future.

Brief: Office of Force Resiliency: FY25 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda

Dr. Holroyd introduced the next session by reminding attendees that the Committee had previously met with Dr. Jason Katz from the Office of Force Resiliency to provide ideas for the Department's FY25 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda. Dr. Katz had returned to the DAC-PSM to present the finalized version to the Committee and solicit new ideas to inform the upcoming FY26 edition.

Dr. Katz reminded Members that the research agenda is intended to be actionable. Therefore, agenda development begins by looking at areas where differences can be made and then working backwards to determine what research priorities are needed to advance those changes. The research agenda portfolio includes sexual assault, harassment, suicide, child abuse, domestic abuse, retaliation, and the shared risk and protective factors that are contributing to these harmful behaviors. The research agenda is intended to strengthen the DoD's primary prevention research portfolio by prioritizing research topics, ensuring collaboration across sectors and organizations, and reducing duplication of effort, with the goal of eventually moving toward a holistic approach to preventing harmful behaviors before they begin.

The research agenda is informed by foundational DoD guidance as well as recommendations stemming from the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military (IRC-SAM.) Dr. Katz noted that one key piece of DoD guidance is the Prevention Plan of Action (PPOA) 2.0, which formalizes the DoD's adoption of a public health approach to prevention and outlines a robust prevention system and prevention process working in concert together. IRC-SAM recommendations, particularly those stemming from the Prevention and Climate lines of effort, also factor into research agenda focus areas, such as selected primary prevention and leadership development. The Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6400.09 (*Policy on Integrated Primary Prevention of Self-Directed Harm and Prohibited Abuse or Harm*), which outlines the key elements of prevention, provides another key underpinning of the research agenda.

Dr. Katz reminded the DAC-PSM Members that the research agenda framework, completed during FY22 and first utilized to develop the FY23 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda, helps to consolidate potential topics and focus areas. The framework helps the team to identify short- and long-term priorities for inclusion in the agenda. Dr. Katz noted that the framework is dynamic and

will be revisited given evolving focuses, additional strategies of importance, and any potential new requirements.

Dr. Katz next described related efforts, including an overview of DoD's Clearinghouse for Primary Prevention Research and Evaluation. He offered details about the DoDI 6400.11 (*DoD Integrated Primary Prevention Policy for Prevention Workforce and Leaders*) establishment of the Clearinghouse, directing that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R))…

> "(D)evelops and maintains a DoD clearinghouse on DoD-sponsored prevention research to catalog and disseminate, as appropriate, harmful behavior prevention research and evaluation findings to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DoD Components."

Dr. Katz remarked that the Clearinghouse is a repository of information about the DoD's primary prevention research and evaluation. The Clearinghouse collects information from the Services and DoD offices on their research efforts annually, including study summaries, statuses, methods, outcomes being addressed, and alignment with research agenda focus areas. The overall intent of the Clearinghouse is to facilitate dissemination of research and avoid duplication of effort. Dr. Katz highlighted that the Research Agenda and the Clearinghouse go hand in hand in helping to connect work across the Department.

The Clearinghouse is using annual data calls to the Services and DoD to determine what research is underway across the Department. The Clearinghouse is now fielding its second data call; the Office of Force Resiliency (OFR) will continue to link Clearinghouse findings with the research agenda and will provide an overview and status update in the FY26 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda. Dr. Katz expressed that ultimately, the goal is to incorporate research findings within the work of the Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW) to guide practice.

Mr. Coward asked if the annual research agenda is an NDAA requirement; Dr. Katz confirmed.

Dr. Katz shared that the FY25 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda, published on October 1, 2024, is available at https://www.prevention.mil/Resources/Research/. The three focus areas identified in the agenda are:

1. *Assess frequency and type of pre-military risk or protective factors.* This includes a focus on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), such as being a victim of abuse or neglect, as well as on protective factors, such as connectedness.
2. *Identify interpersonal characteristics of prevention personnel that enhance work performance.* Prevention personnel perform tasks such as delivering prevention information and talking with military leaders, so formally articulating the interpersonal skills that assist with these tasks will be helpful. Such skills could include clear and tailored communication, cooperating, and practicing empathy. Research could also look at a subdivision of verbal and non-verbal skills.
3. *Identify implementation science principles that support local prevention practice.* Dr. Katz explained that it is one thing to have well-designed prevention programs that utilize tested practices; however, actually implementing them correctly is another thing. A sub-focus of this area could be on tailoring – for example, how to tailor a training to a specific audience

while still preserving fidelity and allowing flexibility for staff to build and develop new knowledge and skill sets.

Dr. Katz then shifted to discussing what might be included in the upcoming FY26 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda. He offered that one focus area could potentially include identifying the optimal type and phase of leadership development to maximize prevention work. This focus area might look at different leadership types, such as strategic transformational leadership, to further that understanding and use it to improve prevention efforts. Research could also look at readiness of leaders to work with the IPPW, including an openness to hear what they have to say, as well as further define leaders' core competencies in prevention. Leadership development could also be studied in terms of a tailored process, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, understanding that leaders start at different points and may need to develop foundational Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes (KSAs), as well as more advanced skills, such as relationship development and team building. Overall, this type of research focus area would look at leadership dimensions with an eye towards command climate and the prevention of harmful behaviors, as well as the promotion of well-being.

A second potential focus area of the FY26 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda could be identifying essential elements of effective prevention approaches for the military community, which Dr. Katz explained as the characteristics or aspects of a program that increase the likelihood of obtaining positive outcomes. A good place to begin this effort could be looking at the essential elements of prevention as captured in DoDI 6400.09 and identifying any gaps.

Q&A/Discussion:

Dr. Slep asked whether the Clearinghouse was planning to collect older research that predates the Clearinghouse. Dr. Katz answered that they will be going back a few years to collect anything done after DoDI 6400.11 came into policy (December 20, 2022). Dr. Holroyd asked to confirm that the Clearinghouse would eventually look at non-DoD research for inclusion. Dr. Katz answered that the Clearinghouse is focused on research and evaluation primary prevention within the DoD but we may feature different resources and links to relevant work as the effort evolves.

Ms. Rosenthal remarked that it was exciting to see how much of the research agenda aligned with the work done by the IRC-SAM. She asked Dr. Katz if any of the research agenda related efforts were looking at perpetration of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the context of risk factors. Dr. Katz answered that perpetration research has been a blind spot in the past and while there have been advancements, more research needs to be done on perpetration and we're looking at different options for continuing to evolve this focus.

Dr. Estrada commented that the previous session (the DAC-IPAD brief and discussion) had touched on common concerns about training delivery, content, and standardization. He asked Dr. Katz if he could speak on any research related to that topic. Dr. Katz answered that the FY25 Integrated Prevention Research Agenda included implementation science as a focus area, as it covers topics such as adult learning principles, making training relevant and engaging, and providing follow-on support. Dr. Katz added that he understands the DAC-PSM is currently studying Professional Military Education (PME) which aligns with this focus area. Dr. Holroyd asked Dr. Estrada if he thought an additional layer would be aligning content and methodology by career band. Dr. Estrada agreed that layered content, tailored to the appropriate needs of the individual throughout the levels of career progression, would be a way to improve training delivery.

Dr. Edwards stated that these concepts around effective training and adult learning are well-established (for example, we know that PowerPoint delivery does not work). She asked what the goal is in terms of additive research that moves the field forward: What can we learn that we do not already know? Dr. Katz responded that there is a solid foundation on adult learning and implementation science and that next steps could be to connect those principles to the military context, including in the area of leadership development.

Dr. Holroyd remarked that one topic the DAC-PSM has encountered is that leaders often do not understand the concepts of prevention in general, let alone the value of prevention as it relates to leadership skills and tools. Prevention includes skills and concepts such as fostering good communication, healthy relationships, stress management, and conflict resolution – things that are also key leadership skills more broadly. She stated that it seems like these have been categorized in two separate silos, but they really should be considered together. Dr. Katz agreed and commented that this viewpoint helps make the case for the research agenda, which he remarked is helping to broaden the context of prevention research by making links across these kinds of topics.

Dr. Ybarra mentioned that in previous DAC-PSM public meetings, Members had heard from Service representatives on prevention efforts. She remarked that they heard about a great deal of variability across the different Services, and wondered if there was a way to 1) figure out who is actually delivering prevention education and training, and 2) determine whether there is a best practice that could be set in policy. She stated that while leadership is crucial, they may not necessarily be the best suited for doing prevention work or delivering prevention content. Dr. Katz answered that the research agenda focus area on leadership development is aimed at unpacking roles and responsibilities of leaders, including how leaders work with the prevention workforce. Dr. Ybarra opined that codifying the roles and responsibilities around prevention content delivery would be helpful. Her hypothesis is that having prevention specialists be officially responsible for delivery would be the best method. Dr. Slep commented that even if training were not delivered via "death by PowerPoint," if it were presented as "checking a box," that could still undermine the intended effect. She stated that an evaluation of training implementation within the military context might need more than just a fidelity checklist. Dr. Edwards added that it seems like these conversations have 90-95% overlap, year after year, without ever getting to real results, and it is not due to a lack of knowledge on these topics. She argued that a more useful study could be to examine why the DoD remains stuck having these same conversations and not making major progress.

Dr. Pryor observed that a lot of prevention research focuses on factors that beget positive outcomes, with less attention given to bad leadership behaviors or factors that are known to be problematic. Dr. Katz agreed that both sides are important to look at. As illustration, Dr. Holroyd provided an anecdote from a recent site visit where Service members stated that connectedness, while sometimes a positive, can also be a negative. For example, group members may not want to report a sexual assault because they do not want to burden their group.

Ms. Rosenthal responded to Dr. Edwards' comment about feeling stuck, adding that part of the issue is a constant shifting of priorities. Part of the IRC-SAM Report included comments to Congress about needing time to let prevention efforts take hold. She stated that these efforts need time and persistent focus to take effect and make sustained progress. Dr. Edwards agreed and added that it is not only an issue at the congressional level, but also at the Service level, where people rotate in and out of important positions every two or three years. Mr. Coward commented that prevention should not be politicized but rather be seen an absolute warfighting function, alongside things like physical training and basic marksmanship. Dr. Slep added that the whole

point is to trust the process, to build and stay the course over time, not throw out the whole system and redesign it any time there has been a sexual assault or a suicide.

With this session concluded, Dr. Holroyd thanked Dr. Katz for his time and effort.

Brief: NDAA Study Topic on Recruit Screening

One of the FY21 NDAA-directed study topics (referred to as "Recruit Screening") called for the DAC-PSM to assess the feasibility of screening before entry into military service those recruits who may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment, including through background checks. The Committee was also directed to consider the administration of screening tests to recruits to assess recruit views and beliefs on equal opportunity and whether such views and beliefs are compatible with military service. This session was intended to give the DAC-PSM Members an understanding of the issue and what related work might already be underway within the DoD.

The following briefers began the session by providing an overview of the current accession process:

- Dr. Sofiya Velgach (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Military Personnel Policy (Accessions Policy), Assistant Director, Testing Standards)
- Mr. Chuck Lamer (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Military Personnel Policy (Accessions Policy), Assistant Director)

Next, an overview on military compatibility research was provided by the following briefers:

- Dr. Rene Dickerhoof (Office of People Analytics, Defense Personnel Analytics Center, Deputy Director of Research – Strategy, Policy, and Dissemination)
- Dr. Tia Fechter (Office of People Analytics, Defense Personnel Analytics Center, Supervisory Personnel Psychologist)

Dr. Velgach began with an overview of the existing processes and policies in place for recruit screening. She noted that there are several elements already in place during the accession process that help identify and review a potential recruit's background information, such as their demographic information, their capabilities (assessment of cognitive ability and specialized knowledge, e.g., cyber), and any adverse history or history of victimization (history of victimization is a voluntary self-report), and that this is a very coordinated process between the Services and OSD.

The accession process starts with a recruiter conducting an interview with a potential recruit and collecting background information (including medical history and fingerprints), which is then sent to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to determine if there is any cause for immediate disqualification or ineligibility. Dr. Velgach stated that while there are several disqualification and eligibility criteria, the Services do have an opportunity to request and process waivers for individuals, apart from certain disqualifying criteria that are not eligible for waivers. She noted that individuals are not asked if they have a history of victimization and that this information will often come to light during medical examinations in the form of a self-report. A history of victimization is not a factor that would ever impact someone's qualification for service,

and Dr. Velgach emphasized that there are no plans to make victimization a part of eligibility determination in the future.

Dr. Velgach stated that there is a very specific policy in place (DoDI 1304.26, "*Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction*"), which outlines the qualification standards for enlistment and details factors that make an applicant ineligible for service. Conduct and character are part of the evaluation. DoDI 1304.26 states that a person will be considered ineligible if they have a:

> "(S)tate or federal conviction, or a finding of guilty in a juvenile adjudication, for a felony crime of rape, sexual abuse, sexual assault, incest, any other sexual offense, or when the disposition requires the person to register as a sex offender. Waivers are not allowed."

Dr. Velgach explained that waivers are issued under the authority of the Service and stem from a "whole person" assessment, where the applicant is assessed for what they could bring to the Service, balanced with an assessment of risk that individual carries. She noted that in addition to sex crimes, waivers for domestic battery and/or violence (as defined in the Lautenberg Amendment) are also not authorized. Dr. Velgach recognized that waivers are often an area of concern for the public worried about lowering standards. She stated that in FY24 Q1-Q3, 34% of individuals accessed with waivers. Of that, only 4% were conduct waivers; overwhelmingly it is medical waivers that are granted.

Dr. Ybarra asked about the 7% of waivers issued for dependency (*see slide 57 of the meeting materials*); Mr. Lamer answered that at this time, DoDI 1304.26 specifies applicants must have no more than two minor dependents (not including spouses) at the time of application, stemming from concerns about mission readiness and ability to deploy. Some Services may pursue or decline waivers for dependency based on the abilities of the individual, the job they are being considered for, and the nature of the Service. He gave the example that the Marine Corps is much more restrictive on dependency than other Services and issues close to 0 waivers for this criteria, simply due to the nature of that Service's mission.

Dr. Estrada asked about the 4% rejected for conduct and wanted to know if they could offer any further breakdown of what that number entailed. Mr. Lamer explained that various offenses are broken down by major and minor categories, as well as by pattern of conduct and assessed holistically. For example, an applicant who has a history of speeding and parking tickets could indicate a pattern of misconduct, but the assessment could be that "this person is 19 and immature, they just need time to grow" and could entertain a waiver. More egregious offenses require much higher levels of discernment, and Mr. Lamer noted that very few waivers are issued for conduct of a serious nature.

Dr. Estrada asked whether there was anything they could glean from accession data that might point to a gap in terms of screening or accession that increases or decreases the propensity for prior perpetration. Dr. Velgach answered that she feels they do a good job screening the background of applicants; the question on the table that they are currently studying is whether it is actually possible to predict future behavior based on background. Research is underway to determine the effectiveness or validity of an instrument for evaluating an applicant's potential for committing a crime while in service.

Mr. Lamer added that, in addition to considering conduct (including criminal charges, arrests, etc.), they also evaluate the tattoos an applicant may have, which can be indicative of other concerning issues. Ms. Rosenthal asked whether the background check included civil proceedings in addition to criminal, giving the example of someone who has a domestic violence order of protection issued against them. Mr. Lamer answered that it should; the background check includes information from federal and state/local law enforcement agencies and a credit check, with an even deeper background dive for certain positions. Ms. Rosenthal remarked that campus offenses seem like a potential area for expansion. Dr. Holroyd asked whether the breakdown of waivers issued during this period was consistent with that of previous years. Mr. Lamer answered that it was relatively consistent with regard to conduct but highlighted that 2022 showed a spike in medical waivers issued, specifically, due to a new electronic exchange of medical records which made it easier to evaluate.

Dr. Pryor asked about screening with regards to involvement with extremist groups. Dr. Velgach answered that extremism is part of the Accessions Policy portfolio, but that she would describe her office as more of a touchpoint, as there are other DoD entities working to define those constructs appropriately in policy. She stated that, in general, they do not consider extremism to be a big concern in assessing eligibility or ineligibility at this time, as it is not commonly presented.

Dr. Velgach introduced Dr. Dickerhoof to brief on military compatibility research related to personnel security. Dr. Dickerhoof stated that she is conducting research on how existing personnel security data may be used to help to understand someone's potential future conduct and whether it can be used to assess military compatibility, allowing the Services to make better accession decisions. She highlighted that her research is an exploratory exercise to evaluate two research questions (RQ):

> RQ1: What is the value of personnel security program data for (in)compatibility assessment at accession?
> RQ2: Does the personnel security data add unique information to previously examined U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment Systems (TAPAS) data sources, ultimately improving the accession process?

The first research question was focused on evaluating the personnel security program data and determining whether that program would help to make good accession decisions. Dr. Dickerhoof explained that the personnel security program data she is referring to comes from the SF-86 "Questionnaire for National Security Positions," which is a self-report form used to determine someone's eligibility for secret or top secret clearance. Her team also looked at additional information uncovered during a Report of Investigation, which includes automated record checks and other background investigatory processes. The second question was focused on whether that personnel security data would improve the accession process by providing additional value. Dr. Dickerhoof explained that the project looked at the population of enlisted active-duty accessions who "came of record", meaning there is official documentation on the incident in a DoD system for any type of misconduct-related issue during FY11-19, including sexual assault, criminal misconduct, misconduct separation, and/or drug test failure.

Dr. Dickerhoof summarized the research finding for RQ1, saying that the personnel security program on its own would be not of sufficient value to warrant inclusion in the assessment of

compatibility during the accessions process. She said that the personnel security program model performed only slightly better than chance when it came to determining who would come of record for misconduct. Regarding RQ2, she noted they found that adding the personnel security program data into the existing accessions data that is already in use does not provide additional value and is in fact may be redundant to the data collected during the accession process. Dr. Dickerhoof stated that they ultimately concluded that they would not advise focusing on personnel security program data during the accession process.

Dr. Velgach added that the result does not suggest that the personnel security program is ineffective; rather, it is effective for its designed purpose, which is to evaluate eligibility for access to classified information and to hold a sensitive position. However, Dr. Dickerhoof's research shows that data from this program does not provide additional information, beyond what is already provided during the current accession process. Dr. Velgach also noted that the current accession process already identifies the critical factors needed to determine eligibility, and that current study included a restricted sample meaning that the individuals that are most likely to perpetrate in the future are already disqualified from the process under the current policies.

Dr. Velgach then introduced Dr. Tia Fechter to provide an overview of current efforts to assess the feasibility of developing an evidence-based pre-accession personality assessment for the purpose of determining military compatibility. Dr. Fechter stated this effort is responsive to IRC-SAM Recommendation 2.6c (*operational testing of a Compatibility Assessment for purpose of research using a pre-accession sample*). She explained that prior to the IRC-SAM recommendations, the Military Compatibility Research Group (MCRG) was working on ways to best identify individuals who may exhibit undesirable traits incompatible with military service. Based on the IRC-SAM recommendation and existing MCRG work, a 10-factor definition of military compatibility has emerged. These factors fall within the categories of counterproductive work behaviors, propensity for sexual assault/harassment, insider threat, and other types of misconduct.

Dr. Fechter stated that historically, the Services have taken the lead in research and development of non-cognitive assessments. However, in FY22, the Defense Testing and Assessment Center (DTAC) was charged by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness with introducing joint-service personality assessments to expand the definition of recruit quality (beyond aptitude and education); to expand enlistment eligibility; and in response to IRC-SAM recommendations. TAPAS was identified as the joint-service assessment instrument, resulting in the formation of DTAC's non-cognitive assessment branch. Dr. Fechter explained that there are four primary focus areas:

1) Joint enlistment composite, calculated using a selection of TAPAS facets
2) Compatibility composite, calculated using a selection of facets
3) Analogous military compatibility assessment program for an officer population
4) Licensed clinician evaluation program.

Dr. Fechter stated that the TAPAS screening tool has been under study by the DoD since its inception in 2004. She noted that there are three distinct versions of TAPAS developed independently for Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, but that all three were developed using the same contractor and base tools. TAPAS versions are administered to applicants at MEPS (the Army version is administered to Navy applicants as well). Each TAPAS consists of 12-17

personality facets, with a total of 25 facets that could be included in any single version of TAPAS. Dr. Fechter highlighted that making score comparisons across these different versions is not recommended and is often infeasible, so any applicant who wishes to switch Services would need to take the TAPAS version associated with that specific Service to obtain the Service-specific composite. Dr. Fechter explained that TAPAS uses forced choice between two paired statements, with each statement coming from a different personality dimension, to assess personality facets. Statements are matched on their extremity and social desirability parameters. Dr. Fechter explained that this means that the level of typical endorsement for either statement is relatively equivalent, and the perception of how good or bad it is to identify with either statement is also approximately equivalent.

She provided the following example of paired statements:

Which of these statements is most like you?

- People come to me when they want fresh ideas. (*Dr. Fechter remarked that this could be associated with being inventive or aligned with an ingenuity facet.*)
- Most people would say I am a "good listener." (*Dr. Fechter stated that this could be associated with being humble or aligned with a humility facet.*)

Dr. Fechter noted that both statements would generally be considered good qualities to have, and neither express strong adherence to an extreme level of either facet. The examinee must choose which statement is most indicative of themselves, and over the course of TAPAS, several of these types of comparisons are presented, with examinees forced to choose one over the other. Facets (Dr. Fechter noted here that "facets" is used interchangeably with "dimensions") are scored using Multi-Unidimensional Pairwise-Preference item response theory, which is a model that explores the patterns of preferences across several dimensions. This analysis results in a score for a person on each dimension, and those scored can be directly compared on strength; that is, if your ingenuity score is higher than your humility score, then you tend to value being inventive over being humble. Likewise, these patterns are also explored across people, and people can be compared with respect to their dimension scores.

Dr. Fechter stated that typically, the facet-level scores would not be compared for any operational purposes, because the scores on any given facet are usually not reliable enough. Instead, composites are formed, like the Army's Military Conduct Composite, for example, where several weighted scores on a selection of facets (e.g., non-delinquency and team orientation) are used to calculate a composite score. This composite score can then be compared across individuals and has acceptable reliability, given the significant increase in the number of items associated with its calculation.

Dr. Fechter explained that DTAC was charged with developing a joint-Service TAPAS that could be used across all the Services. Implementation of this joint-Service TAPAS began on September 17, 2024, which is a first step in a phased approach toward the development of a DoD-wide Military Compatibility Composite. Phase 0 of this effort is currently underway, using the Army Conduct Composite, which has been optimized for predicting conduct-related first-term attrition and is being administered across all the Services. Phase 1, starting in FY26, will consist of optimizing the composite by refining the facets included in the compatibility composite and

adjusting as needed. Phase 2 (rollout date TBD) will optimize composites through further refinement and potential introduction of new facets.

Dr. Fechter remarked that it is unlikely that a forced choice personality assessment alone will be able to identify applicants who are at elevated risk of misconduct in the military with high fidelity. She stated that they anticipate that the joint-Service TAPAS will serve as a good flagging tool to signal when an applicant should be evaluated further, based on possible concerns. DTAC is currently evaluating a two-step process for evaluation of military compatibility, starting with the initial non-cognitive assessment (TAPAS, military compatibility composite score). Anyone flagged as high-risk during that step may then undergo step two, which would consist of an interview with a clinician, who then provides a recommendation for eligibility for service. Next steps for this licensed clinician program will be to design the pilot and evaluate feasibility. DTAC is exploring methods for setting cut scores on the composite score of the screener for Phase 1 (e.g., TAPAS) and working to define the optimal point in time during the accession pipeline to hold the clinical interview. They will also need to develop detailed processes and procedures for the clinical evaluation and identify what types of supporting information would aid the clinician in making a recommendation. DTAC is also exploring in-person and remote options for the clinical assessment, as well as determining the overall feasibility of such a logistically complex assessment system for implementation.

Dr. Fechter noted that research is ongoing regarding assessment of officers, and DTAC is relying on input from its Best Practices team to guide the search for existing assessments that could be adopted for use with officer candidates to assess military compatibility. She stated that there is currently no centralized testing software for officer candidates, so there is an opportunity to explore and evaluate a range of assessments that may support the military compatibility assessment goal. With this, Dr. Fechter concluded her presentation and deferred to Dr. Velgach for additional comments or clarification.

Dr. Velgach reiterated that another DoD federal advisory committee, the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing (DAC-MPT), is specifically concentrated on test development. The DAC-MPT will be analyzing and providing advice on the psychometric properties of the compatibility assessments that were discussed at this session. She explained that her understanding is that the DAC-MPT welcomes DAC-PSM advice and recommendation from a theoretical, construct, and process perspective and will look at integral parts of the actual tests to ensure that they are fair, reliable, and valid for their intended purposes.

Dr. Estrada asked to clarify whether the efforts mentioned in the latter half of the presentation are ongoing or concluded. Dr. Velgach answered that the efforts are ongoing. The research on the personnel security program is planned to conclude around January 2025, while the research on development of new assessments is a long-term project currently in the data-gathering and feasibility assessment phase. Dr. Estrada asked if there was a timeline associated with the research on development of new assessments. Dr. Velgach answered that Phase 0 has already been implemented as of September 2024. Phase 1 is anticipated to roll out at the end of FY26.

She noted that in addition to reviewing and refining facets during Phase 1, they are also taking the opportunity to evaluate how TAPAS addresses various additional objectives for the DoD. Beyond providing a compatibility assessment, TAPAS also offers the opportunity to potentially understand

factors such as motivation and grit that have unique interest to the DoD. Dr. Velgach offered the example that some individuals who score low on the aptitude test may score high on motivation or grit, and so the DoD may be able to make the risk assessment that the individual could still be successful. The idea is that TAPAS could offer the ability to meet a number of objectives (e.g., evaluate motivation and compatibility) without requiring Service members to take multiple different assessments. Dr. Estrada asked if it would be accurate to say that the personnel security program data screening includes some TAPAS-related types of assessment. Dr. Velgach answered that the purpose of that research was to determine if the Security Form-86 data might provide additional value to the existing accessions investigations and TAPAS data, and the conclusion was that it does not.

Dr. Pryor stated that the prediction value of personality factors might vary depending on the context in which individual is placed and asked whether there were any plans to look at those kinds of complexities in future work. Dr. Velgach answered that they do have plans in FY25-FY26 to look at the impact of extraneous variables on the validity of the instruments. Dr. Pryor stated he was not just referring to validity issues, but also a concern that personality factors could be expressed differently in different kinds of social contexts. His idea was that a personality factor itself is something that could have impact depending upon the context in which the individual works. Dr. Fechter commented that her research team has been discussing the issue of environment and how it can impact how personality traits are realized. They are conducting a literature view on that concept, as well as developing (on the officer side) a potential situational judgment assessment to also address military compatibility. That assessment could be used to introduce environmental contextual nuances that provide various responses someone may have to choose from, which would then serve to predict how someone may behave given that simulated environment. She added that research in this realm is just beginning and that they are looking at it in tandem with TAPAS development.

Dr. Ybarra remarked that this research is fascinating and that she can see the potential, but she also sees the risk. She wanted to know what the end goal looks like, in terms of how this data and assessment will be used. She added that she appreciates the thoughtful methodology but hopes they are engaging a bioethicist for this work. Dr. Velgach answered that they are still in the beginning stages and are trying to ensure the work is data-driven and appropriate for understanding the validity of an assessment instrument. She referenced back to the budding efforts mentioned by Dr. Fechter and clarified that the overall vision would be for this type of assessment to identify "red flags," which may then be followed up with a deep dive with a licensed clinician. Dr. Velgach also explained that as they begin to design a pilot for this program (assessment by a licensed clinician), one concern is the lack of availability of licensed clinicians, which is associated with long time delays for appointments. She remarked that recruitment faces many challenges and they do not wish to impede recruitment progress or make the recruiting process any harder. As they design the methodology, they are balancing all of these priorities and working to ensure that the phased approach is thoughtful and appropriate. Ms. Rosenthal commented that there could be an opportunity for the Services to flag someone for further attention and provide them with potential support, rather than immediate separation. Ms. Rosenthal added that while it appears that potential clinical issues are already being addressed, it seems the major concerns here are legal in nature.

Dr. Holroyd asked the DAC-PSM Members if they felt that the information conveyed in this presentation meets the intent of the NDAA language, or if they felt further information was required to make an assessment. Dr. Slep answered that she felt the first bullet ("*assess feasibility of screening before entry into military service of recruits who may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment*") is largely handled, with the exception of prior university incidents (which she noted can be hard to find) and sexual harassment incidents (which she added may be protected by the Privacy Act). She stated that the second bullet ("*assess feasibility of the administration of screening tests to recruits to assess recruit views and beliefs on equal opportunity, and whether such views and beliefs are compatible with military service*") seems to focus more on attitudes and beliefs, which did not seem to be part of the research they heard about from Dr. Velgach's team, which Dr. Slep noted seems to be more personality test-focused.

Dr. Velgach commented that TAPAS is indeed a personality assessment, but from the DoD's perspective, the way forward with TAPAS offers the opportunity to provide additional insights. Dr. Slep remarked that currently, TAPAS does not assess attitudes and beliefs. Dr. Pryor added that personality factors are usually related to attitudes and beliefs. Dr. Velgach added that personality tends to be more stable than attitudes and beliefs, which can be dynamic in nature, and that a personality assessment is more valuable in the accessions process for the purposes of eligibility assessment.

Dr. Ybarra asked for clarification: Were they being asked if they thought this topic was under their purview? Dr. Holroyd clarified that the NDAA language is what was assigned to the DAC-PSM, and she wanted to know if Members felt that the efforts discussed at this session would provide answers to close out the topic. Dr. Slep stated that she felt the answer to this was yes. Dr. Holroyd stated that a potential way forward for the DAC-PSM on this topic would be to inform Congress of the various efforts discussed at this meeting, highlight that the DAC-MPT is already working this topic, and state that to avoid duplicative work, the DAC-PSM would continue to track and monitor ongoing progress on the topic.

Ms. Rosenthal offered that, while the SF-86 did not appear to contain any additional valuable information beyond what is already collected during the accessions process, the program could potentially be expanded to ask applicants to provide documentation of prior incidents of sexual assault and harassment that did not rise to the level of criminal conviction. She pointed out that the problem is that there are very few criminal convictions, and so this expansion would account for prior incidents that may be red flags but would not have shown up otherwise. Dr. Holroyd noted that a DAC-PSM recommendation could point out this gap in the process. Dr. Pryor stated that much of this data would not be available due to legal restrictions, which is where the value of looking at personality factors as connected to these kinds of behaviors becomes apparent.

Dr. Estrada stated that he did not think he had heard any evidence that speaks directly to the NDAA language. He felt that Dr. Velgach's team was looking more at things like suitability for service and risk factors for security clearance that are not unrelated to the NDAA requirement, but perhaps are not exactly what the requirement intended for them to consider, since her team's work does not specifically look at sexual assault and harassment. Dr. Dickerhoof stated that in one of the models used in the personnel security program evaluation, a proxy compatibility outcome was

coming of record for sexual assault, which does deal directly with the topics required in the NDAA.

Dr. Holroyd brought up the word "subjects" from the NDAA language ("…may have been the subject or perpetrator of prior incidents…") and asked Dr. Velgach if she could speak to any screening done for victims (subjects) of sexual assault. Dr. Velgach answered that from an eligibility perspective, having a prior history of victimization does not make someone ineligible for service. If someone were to voluntarily disclose a prior experience of sexual assault, they would be referred to appropriate care and support services. Being a victim of sexual assault, itself, is not disqualifying.

Dr. Holroyd stated that DAC-PSM Staff would work with Members to summarize this discussion and capture potential recommendations for a future Committee vote. She thanked the speakers for their time and effort and concluded the session.

Subcommittee Study Recommendations

Dr. Holroyd stated that the remainder of the public meeting would be dedicated to presentations on the findings and recommendations of the two FY24 studies conducted by the DAC-PSM subcommittees, followed by a full Committee vote on accepting those recommendations.

Prevention Training and Activities Subcommittee Study Recommendations

The Prevention Training and Activities Subcommittee is currently working on a study regarding the preparation of instructors to deliver prevention content in Professional Military Education (PME). The Subcommittee chair, Dr. Edwards, began the session by reminding attendees that the vital role of leadership in the prevention of sexual misconduct and the creation of healthy climates is well understood. Additionally, the importance of effective education and effective educators is widely known. With those two points in mind, the intent of the PME study was to consider the preparation of PME instructors to deliver prevention-related content, specifically, and to identify the unique needs and skills of instructors delivering this content to junior leaders (i.e., junior officers (O1-O3) and junior NCOs (E4-E6)). The goal for study recommendations was to propose ways in which DoD might expand and improve processes and procedures for preparing instructors to deliver prevention-related content within PME.

Dr. Edwards explained that the study's "Priority Focus Area" concerned the policies and guidance governing prevention related requirements within PME. Underneath that Priority Focus Area, the study identifies three "Impact Areas," whose activities are all governed and informed by the policies laid out in the Priority Focus Area. (Reference slide 71 in meeting materials for graphic representation.)

> Impact Area 1: Instructor selection, recruitment, and assignment
> Impact Area 2: Development and maintenance of training skills and prevention subject matter expertise
> Impact Area 3: Monitoring, evaluation, and accountability

Dr. Edwards provided an overview of the study findings and recommendations regarding the Priority Focus Area on policies and guidance governing prevention within PME. Ms. Faith Berrier (DAC-PSM Program Strategic Advisor) noted that proposed recommendations also came with associated process suggestions, which the Prevention Subcommittee hoped would provide the DoD with a way forward for implementation. The process guidelines are intended as additional context

to the recommendations and do not constitute a formal recommendation, but rather a roadmap for the DoD to consider.

Priority Focus Area: Policies and Guidance Governing Prevention-Related Requirements Within PME

Priority Focus Area Findings:

1. Current DoD policies outline requirements for PME learners (the "what") but lack guidance on the requirements/expectations for instruction of prevention material (the "who" and "how").
   – Lack of clear guidance on "who" = it's no one's job to do it
   – Lack of clear guidance on "how" = no standard expectation for what this training must include or how it's delivered
2. Based on RFI responses, Services are not currently meeting policy requirements for inclusion of prevention within PME.
   – Lack of clear guidance in policy (see Finding 1)
   – Limited time + large volume of PME topics to cover = de-prioritization of prevention
   – Conflation of prevention with annual SAPR training
   – Perception of prevention as an "add-on," and not a core duty

Priority Focus Area Recommendations:

1. Confirm alignment between policy and learning requirements to drive the full integration of prevention competencies, as integral components of effective leadership.
   – Process: Establish Senior level acceptance and buy-in for the need to develop and reinforce prevention competencies at all levels of leadership. Clearly communicate the connection between leadership and climate to justify the importance of establishing leaders' skills to effectively support, prioritize, and implement prevention efforts. Utilize strategic messaging to make the case that prevention is a critical leadership skill with direct impact on the establishment of a healthy climate and, by extension, mission readiness.
2. Revisit applicable policies to establish the "who" and the "how" for the provision of prevention instruction within PME.
   – Process: Standardize core expectations for what PME must include and how it's delivered. Review existing practices and collect comprehensive data to help identify the most effective role/position for delivery of prevention instruction. Establish accountability for oversight and evaluation of instruction across specific populations/leadership career path.
3. Identify key topics/minimum requirements for prevention within PME and standardization of instruction.
   – Process: Establish guidance for systematic evaluation of curriculum across the Services. Provide credentialing and training requirements for instructors. Create system of tracking proximal and distal outcomes (i.e., Are instructors trained as required? Is there evidence that learning transfer is occurring in PME? Is there evidence that this learning leads to outcomes?).

Dr. Potter then provided an overview of Impact Area 1 findings and recommendations.

Impact Area 1: Instructor Selection, Recruitment, and Assignment

Impact Area 1 Findings:

1. Challenges inherent with current landscape of instructor selection, recruitment, and assignment.
    –   Nature of an instructor job (less recruitment than assignment), context on desirability of job (or not), promotional implications, etc.
    –   Instructor characteristics currently sought out/considered (previous training experience) or not (SME)
    –   Challenges associated with rotational faculty
2. Suitability of roles currently being utilized in the absence of true "PME instructors trained to deliver prevention" (i.e., SARCs, guest SMEs).
    –   In the absence of clear guidance on whose role/responsibility it is to deliver prevention instruction within PME, Services often utilize non-PME instructor positions to address the need (e.g., SARCs or Integrated Primary Prevention Workforce (IPPW)).
    –   SARCs and IPPW personnel are NOT trained instructors

Impact Area 1 Recommendations:

1. Establish a selection, training, and performance model that ensures consistent instructor competencies in the delivery of prevention training material.
    –   Process: Establish desired instructor competencies. Conduct a capacity/capability assessment to inform the securing of necessary resources for on-boarding and training. Secure funding to meet policy requirements for instruction of prevention-related PME. Include prevention concepts into the ongoing performance evaluation of PME instructors.

Ms. Grosso commented that the military spends an incredible amount of time teaching Service members how to do combat but very little on prevention. She believes it is unacceptable that instructors are not capable of teaching prevention, and DoD needs to figure out how to ensure that they are able to do this going forward. She added that SARCs are doing important work, and it should not be their job to cover down on prevention training.

Mr. Coward asked if the Services provided any information on force structure regarding who provides prevention-related education. Ms. Berrier answered that each Service has a very robust and defined general PME instructor training program but that specific preparation for instructors of prevention-related content is lacking as part of these programs. She also offered that most of the responses from the Services were either "we do not provide prevention-related PME at this level at all," or "we do provide it, but it's not delivered by a PME instructor; this type of content is delivered a SARC or SME who comes in and provides what is effectively a regurgitation of the annual refresher training, information on reporting, etc." She added that policy is currently so vague that it is left up to the Services to interpret whose job it is to deliver prevention training within PME. Dr. Holroyd commented that, in looking at instructor training programs, there are components of what could be labelled as "prevention" (depending on the audience's rank), such as facilitation and fostering healthy communication, but those topics are not formally identified as prevention and are not meaningfully tied together.

Dr. Holroyd added that the Prevention Subcommittee recognized that there will be a need for a long-term process to get to the desired end-state, and in the meantime, it may still be a shared responsibility with prevention SMEs coming in to deliver that specific content. While not ideal, this iterative approach could ensure that, in the near-term, PME students are receiving something in the way of prevention training, until a dedicated focus on prevention expertise can be built into instructor preparation.

Ms. Grosso questioned how much subject matter expertise an instructor really needs to deliver this type of content. Mr. Coward offered an anecdote from his early career in the Air Defense Artillery Branch within the Army; he stated that his focus was on teaching air defense, but he would often have SMEs come in to deliver specific material that was not necessarily related to that topic, and his job was to facilitate that. He noted that there are often mandatory training requirements that are folded into a curriculum that need to be accommodated. Dr. Slep stated that it was apparent from the Services' data call responses that there was not a standardized requirement for prevention content. Ms. Grosso raised that the primary instructors who are teaching basic warfighting, who are in front of the room every day, have the confidence of and trust and credibility with their students that is necessary for effectively delivering prevention. Her point was that bringing in an outsider to deliver the prevention content undermines the effectiveness of the education, as it sends the message that it is less important.

Dr. Slep opined that prevention content should be framed as threat management; that is, leaders need to keep their people safe and foster healthy climates, so prevention content should fold into that. Dr. Estrada stated that prevention is siloed at every level, and it needs to be implemented as part of leadership development. He stated that prevention content should be incorporated systemically with specific touchpoints for each level of career progression, and it needs to be linked to warfighting capability to be truly integrated. To Ms. Grosso's point, he commented that DoD can develop the best prevention content possible, but if it is not seen as being on the same level as warfighting, it will not matter.

Ms. Berrier provided an overview of Impact Area 2 findings and recommendations.

Impact Area 2: Development and Maintenance of Training Skills and Prevention Subject Matter Expertise.

Impact Area 2 Findings:

1. Services did not report any specific preparation activities/requirements for prevention instructors (nothing above and beyond what is provided in each Service's basic instructor course for all PME instructors).
   – Prevention subject matter expertise is not prioritized –in some instances, non-SMEs are instructing on prevention.
   – Instruction expertise is not always prioritized –in some instances, content is delivered by people who are not trained instructors.
   – Absence of true primary prevention focus –per RFI responses, much of the "prevention" training being offered is really response training.
2. Services did not report any specific preparation activities, SME requirements, or certification/credentialing processes for prevention instructors (nothing above and beyond what is provided in each Service's basic instructor course for all PME instructors).

- Services reported that subject matter expertise in other topics is sought and built, but not for prevention.
- Services reported the existence of a credentialing process for instructors completing basic instructor training courses.

Impact Area 2 Recommendations:

1. Develop training content/skills/SME based on effectiveness/outcomes associated with what's learned from other DoD prevention efforts (e.g., SAPRO's Training and Education Center of Excellence (SAPRTEC))
   - Short Term Process: Leverage existing resources and require those providing PME instruction complete trainings available to IPPW (e.g., SPARX) to provide foundational knowledge.
2. Institutionalize prevention as a critical leadership skill at all levels.
   - Process: Utilize the learning objectives in policy (DoDI 6400.11 "Leaders Must" objectives) to identify and define key skills and competencies needed by instructors and learners. Develop a system to track progress towards meeting those objectives. Include prevention elements in Service member performance evaluations, as appropriate to rank. Develop appropriate resources that enable leaders to embed prevention skills-building into standard unit operations (e.g., "hip pocket training"), and ensure that utilization of these materials is covered in PME.

Dr. Slep commented that the Impact Area 2 recommendations go beyond specifically just the training of PME instructors, highlighting the fact that the process guidance on recommendation 2 advises DoD to utilize the learning objectives in DoDI 6400.11 to identify and define key skills and competencies needed by both instructors and learners.

Ms. Rosenthal asked if the process language would be included with the recommendations; Dr. Holroyd answered that it would be written into the narrative of the report.

Mr. Coward commented that one suggestion could be for leaders to incorporate "micro-burst trainings" that take advantage of downtime. He offered the anecdote of 100 soldiers doing marksmanship training at the range, where only 30 soldiers are actually shooting at one time, while the other 70 are just waiting for their turn. Good leaders will utilize that opportunity for "hip-pocket trainings," which are shorter and more informal opportunities to reinforce skills and discuss training concepts in the midst of everyday situations, as opposed to in a structured training or classroom environment, (e.g., how to put a mask on in eight seconds). He stated that this could be a good opportunity to incorporate prevention training, even if only as a brief touchpoint that keeps it present. Dr. Potter agreed that that would help to integrate prevention training and present it as "just part of what we do."

Dr. Ybarra asked whether it might be a good idea to move the "process" language into the formal wording of recommendation 2. Dr. Estrada commented that policy needs to provide a roadmap for educating the force across the career lifecycle at each touchpoint. Dr. Potter responded that his comment gets into Impact Area 3 recommendations.

Dr. Slep provided an overview of Impact Area 3 findings and recommendations.

Impact Area 3: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Accountability

Impact Area 3 Findings:

1. Lack of monitoring and evaluation for prevention instruction within PME
   - RFI responses indicate that instruction for other PME topics is being evaluated, but not for prevention.
   - No monitoring = no guarantee that instructors are continuing to deliver content with fidelity, utilizing appropriate instruction methods, etc.
   - No evaluation = no understanding of how effective the instruction is.
2. Accountability process/measures unknown
   - Absence of specific accountability for provision of prevention in PME results in uneven application of policy (see PFA Finding 2).

Impact Area 3 Recommendations:

1. Establish processes for evaluation of and accountability for provision of prevention in PME.
2. Collect data on learning transfer and efficacy/impact of training on outcomes.

Process:

- Service-level: Have Education and Training Commands establish process to ensure PME is being delivered in accordance with existing policy (i.e., DoDI 6495.02 and DoDI 6400.11), as well as with any updated policies as recommended in PFA Rec 1. Utilize existing performance touchpoints (e.g., annual fitness reports) as an opportunity to assess Service member grasp on and application of prevention principles.
- DoD-level: Have Office of Force Resiliency audit/inspect and conduct formalized evaluation of learning outcomes as defined in policy.

Ms. Berrier asked if the Committee wanted to return to Impact Area 2, Recommendation 2 to incorporate the process language into the formal recommendation for vote. The Members agreed. The recommendation was then edited to read as follows:

- Impact Area 2, Recommendation 2: "Institutionalize prevention as a critical leadership skill at all levels. Utilize the learning objectives in policy (DoDI 6400.11 "Leaders Must" objectives) to identify and define key skills and competencies needed by instructors and learners. Develop a system to track progress towards meeting those objectives. Include prevention elements in Service member performance evaluations, as appropriate to rank. Develop appropriate resources that enable leaders to embed prevention skills-building into standard unit operations (e.g., "hip pocket training"), and ensure that utilization of these materials is covered in PME."

Dr. Holroyd then called for the Committee Members to vote on adoption of recommendations. All recommendations were adopted by unanimous vote. Dr. Holroyd thanked everyone for their input and feedback and concluded the session.

Metrics and Performance Subcommittee Updates

The Metrics and Performance Subcommittee is currently working on a study entitled "Measurement of Selected Risk and Protective Factors for Harmful Behaviors." Dr. Ybarra explained that the study was scoped in two phases:

- Phase 1: Identify unit/community and institutional/organizational level risk and protective factors for harmful behaviors most relevant to military environments
- Phase 2: Recommend measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the factors identified in Phase 1

The goals for the study recommendations are to assist DoD's efforts to track data trends and changes over time, and to inform efforts to evaluate prevention programming intended to address the factors identified in Phase 1.

Dr. Ybarra provided an explanation of study definitions as follows:

- **Unit/Community Level:** Includes Service members, DoD civilian employees, and dependents who may live and/or work together in the same geographical area, such as a DoD installation, garrison or ship, or surrounding neighborhood or town where military personnel reside
  - o Among guardsmen and reservists, community may be better defined by shared organizational and social characteristics of their military communities, than by geographical or physical location
- **Institution/Organizational Level:** Aspects of DoD/Service department-level policies, practices, culture, and physical or social environment

Dr. Ybarra then provided an overview of the study organization (*see below, or page 97 in the meeting materials*). She stated that the Subcommittee first considered factors, both risk and protective, that were potentially predictive of harmful behaviors. Those factors were then grouped by SEM level (unit/community versus institutional/organizational). The Subcommittee sought to define each factor and, where possible, made recommendations for particular metrics or scales that could be used to measure them. Lastly, each recommendation was classified according to its level of evidentiary support: established, emerging, or exploratory (see graphic).

Dr. Estrada then provided an overview of the general study recommendations and observations.

- **Recommendation 1, Variability of Measures:** Employ a variety of metrics and examine factors from multiple levels of the social ecological model (SEM) to enhance the comprehensiveness of the Department's measurement efforts.
  - o Rationale – Variability in metrics, the use of multiple measures, and the examination of a factor from multiple SEM levels provides a more complete picture of the data available for that factor (e.g., Committee's listing of select factors at multiple SEM levels, examination of a given factor through both DEOCS and Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey (WEO) survey items).
- **Recommendation 2, Reducing Circularity within Metrics**: Examine currently employed metrics to identify and rectify potential issues of circularity between the constructs being measured and the questions being asked.
  - o Rationale – Upon examination of some of the metrics currently being used, the Committee notes instances where the construct being measured is also utilized within the scale's items, ostensibly using the occurrence of something as an indicator or predictor of that same thing (e.g., 2022 Armed Forces WEO question on diversity in military units).
- **Recommendation 3, Expanding Data Integration Capacity:** Create a centralized structure within the Department that serves as a systems integrator of data sources, strengthening data sharing and aggregation efforts across the different entities doing collection and analysis.
  - o Rationale – Moving out of information siloes and working towards a more integrated approach to data management would allow the Department to better understand the data they have and see how different pieces of that data relate to each other (e.g., Committee's recommendations to utilize administrative data to complement data collected through surveys).
- **Recommendation 4, Expanded Analysis of Administrative Data**: Assess the types and sources of available administrative data to determine how new methods of coding or analysis could provide a complement to the Department's more traditional survey data collection efforts.
  - o Rationale – For many of the constructs that the Committee has identified, the Department already collects significant amounts of administrative data (e.g. EEOC reports, annual Demographics Profile of the Military Community). With intentional coding and analysis, this data could be combined with survey responses to examine linkages or relationships and offer a fuller understanding of the information being collected. Expanded use of administrative data would also offer additional insights without adding to survey burden and could potentially create opportunities for prevention staff (i.e., IPPW) to crosswalk that information with survey responses during Comprehensive Integrated Primary Prevention (CIPP) plan development and implementation efforts.
- **Recommendation 5, Collection of Perpetration Data:** Expand collection of data on the perpetration of sexual misconduct to help create a more complete understanding of what is happening in these incidents and how to prevent them; develop a policy that allows for the wider sharing of perpetration data in a de-identified way.

- o Rationale – A common theme observed across many of the currently employed measures is that they focus on the experiences of the victims of sexual assault or sexual harassment, but the publicly accessible information regarding perpetration leaves a significant gap. The Committee understands and acknowledges that the Department must consider the legal and confidentiality implications of collecting perpetration data but would encourage those charged with identifying and prioritizing measurable factors to explore how the collection of this type of data could offer a more complete picture of perpetrators and of the circumstances around sexual misconduct in the military.
- **Observation, Validation of Metrics:** The Committee received a significant amount of information regarding OPA's identification of factors and metrics, as well as the fielding of the recently updated DEOCS and other Departmental survey efforts. However, details regarding the empirical validation of these metrics were not provided (e.g., criteria used to evaluate them, populations with which they were tested, psychometric validity), and therefore the Committee is unable to do its full due diligence in considering their usage. Pending validity data, the Committee has clarifying wording revisions to offer for select measures being used in OPA's current data collection efforts.

Dr. Pryor provided an overview of the recommendations for unit/community level protective factors and metrics.

Level of Evidentiary Support	Unit/Community Level Protective Factor	Definition	Recommendation
Established Recommendation	Diverse Environments	A diverse environment includes a variety of individuals, groups, and/or communities with different characteristics; observed at the Unit/Community level when diverse perspectives are solicited, respected, discussed, valued, and shared throughout the community.	Confirm existing survey questions that explore the mixture of personnel in a unit, including the percentage of women and minorities, and address how well or poorly members of traditionally marginalized groups are treated (WGR, DEOCS, WEO)*; Recommend addition of survey questions on respondents' interaction with and formation of friendships with colleagues of another gender (Gutek et al., 1990 and Binder et al., 2009)
Established Recommendation	Connectedness	The sense of belonging and subjective psychological bond that people feel in relation to individuals and groups of others	Confirm existing survey question addressing feelings of belonging, support, and cooperation (DEOCS)*; Recommend addition of survey question that queries how respected, valued, and listened to a respondent feels in their unit (Chung et al., 2020)
Established Recommendation	Transformational Leadership	Forward-looking leadership that emphasizes a collective mission to reduce harm caused by sexual misconduct; observed at the Unit/Community level through Commanders' ability to create positive change within their units	Confirm existing survey questions that address degree of trust in and inclusiveness of supervisors, as well as supervisor tolerance of problematic behavior in their unit(s) (DEOCS, WEO, Service Academy Gender Relations

Level of Evidentiary Support	Unit/Community Level Protective Factor	Definition	Recommendation
		and motivate and inspire workgroups to develop and follow jointly held goals	Survey (SAGR), Workplace and Gender Relations (WGR))*
Established Recommendation	Social Support for Desired Norms and Behaviors	Witnessing desired norms and appropriate behaviors by peers and/or leaders	Confirm existing survey questions querying how much and how often a respondent's colleagues denounce sexism and actively promote respect (DEOCS, WGR, SAGR)*
Established Recommendation	Collective Efficacy	Shared beliefs to cohesively come together as a team, unit, or community to take care of each other and to foster healthy environments; shared responsibility to solve problems and address challenges	Recommend addition of survey questions that specifically interrogate the level of positivity of on-base experiences and the degree to which a base feels like a community (Slep et al., 2015)

confirmation of existing DoD measure

Dr. Pryor also offered an overview of the recommendations for unit/community level risk factors and metrics.

Level of Evidentiary Support	Unit/Community Level Risk Factor	Definition	Recommendation
Established Recommendation	Job Gender Context	An imbalance of gender ratios in a work environment; conformity of job assignments to traditional gender roles (i.e., men and women are primarily assigned to jobs that fit traditional gender stereotypes)	Recommend addition of survey questions regarding gender ratio and traditionality of roles in respondents' units (Fitzgerald et al., 1999) Additional recommendation to use administrative data to supplement survey data and examine linkages
Established Recommendation	Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment	A workplace climate that condones or tolerates sexual harassment	Recommend addition of survey questions addressing how leaders address issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment, as well as perceptions of unit response (Estrada et al., 2011 and Murdoch et al., 2010)
Established Recommendation	Masculinity Contest Culture	An environment characterized as a zero-sum game, in which men competing for dominance by showing no weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success, displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat competition becomes the way work gets done; masculine norms determine who and what gets rewarded, how colleagues should be	Recommend addition of survey questions gauging how much traditionally masculine norms, such as physical capacity and endurance or high competitiveness, are present in the workplace (Pryor et al., 2024 and Glick et al., 2018)

Level of Evidentiary Support	Unit/Community Level Risk Factor	Definition	Recommendation
		treated, and attitudes about work/life balance	
Established Recommendation	Installation Location and Surroundings	The degree of isolation/remoteness of an installation's location; availability of outlets for healthy socialization and recreation	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor (e.g., GIS, zip codes)
Emerging Recommendation	Experience of "Social Support" from Negative Influences	Social support includes encouragement and acceptance of behavior. This process occurs both implicitly (i.e., through observation of others and perceptions of peers' values) and explicitly (i.e., through words and actions of peers encouraging specific behaviors).	Confirm existing survey questions that measure the extent to which drinking is a part of work culture and how frequently it takes place (DoD Health Related Behaviors Survey)* Recommend addition of survey question that explores social norms around drinking in the workplace (Bacharach et al., 2007)
Emerging Recommendation	Prescriptive and Descriptive Norms that Promote or Encourage Heavy Drinking	Norms can be prescriptive (i.e., what people should do, what is viewed as acceptable behavior) or descriptive (i.e., what people actually do). In this example, a prescriptive norm that might encourage heavy drinking would be the existence of lax rules or policies that allow for alcohol in dorms or extended alcohol sales hours. An installation where it's typical of Service members to binge drink would exhibit a descriptive norm encouraging heavy drinking.	Confirm existing survey questions that measure the extent to which drinking is a part of work culture and how frequently it takes place (DoD Health Related Behaviors Survey)* Recommend addition of survey question that explores social norms around drinking in the workplace (Bacharach et al., 2007)
Emerging Recommendation	Leaders or Peers with Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation	When leaders exhibit socially aversive traits (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, sadism), they create an environment which encourages others to emulate these behaviors. Examples include caring only about oneself, feeling entitled to positive outcomes, and using dominance to achieve one's personal goals, while ignoring the goals of the wider group. If a leader condones or encourages these behaviors in his/her unit, this also contributes to a toxic climate.	Recommend addition of survey questions that explore antisocial, entitled, and manipulative behaviors (Pryor et al., 2024, Paulhus et al., 2021, and Jonason et al., 2010)
Exploratory Recommendation	Poorly Executed or Undermined Trainings; Trainings that	Trainings that are not executed according to guidance, do not follow applicable science, or are delivered in a way that results in	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Level of Evidentiary Support	Unit/Community Level Risk Factor	Definition	Recommendation
	Engender Defensiveness	learner pushback or feelings of being criticized; influence of leaders who minimize the importance of trainings or fail to prioritize their success	

Next, Dr. Orchowski provided an overview of the recommendations for institutional/organizational level protective factors and metrics.

Level of Evidentiary Support	Institutional/Organizational Level Protective Factor	Definition	Recommendation
Established Recommendations	Diverse Environments	A diverse environment includes a variety of individuals, groups, and/or communities with different characteristics; observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through the demonstration that the institution itself recognizes and prioritizes the benefits of ensuring diversity within its environments; establishment of policies and practices that foster diversity; senior leadership that upholds and champions diversity efforts	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses
Established Recommendations	Inclusivity	E.g., Organizational prioritization to ensure that members of marginalized groups are involved in senior leadership, enjoy various assignment opportunities, and have input into policy, infrastructure, and budget decision-making processes	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses
Established Recommendations	Transformational Leadership	Forward-looking leadership that emphasizes a collective mission to reduce harm caused by sexual misconduct; observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through the establishment of organizational values and a culture of expected behaviors, as well as senior leadership's championing/messaging of these values and cultural expectations	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor and explore linkages with relevant community-level survey responses

Additional recommendation to develop institutional-level manifestations of transformational leadership (e.g., policy requirements for leadership training, tracking of |

Level of Evidentiary Support	Institutional/Organizational Level Protective Factor	Definition	Recommendation
			benchmarks for satisfying those requirements)
Exploratory Recommendation	Environments that Support Training	E.g., Establishment of clear and effective policies that communicate clear training guidance/requirements and reinforce prevention training concepts; allotment of necessary resources (e.g., money, human capital, time) to ensure that training is done well; use of evidence-based training materials and methods that are empirically proven to show impact; use of systematic training evaluation to ensure that desired outcomes are achieved; training is prioritized and reinforced by leaders at all levels	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Exploratory Recommendation	Establishment and Prioritization of Sufficient Support Infrastructure	E.g., Effective and actionable policies that ensure reports of misconduct are taken seriously and handled appropriately and that victims are provided with adequate support; allocation of necessary budget and human capital resources to sufficiently handle response needs; accessibility of resources and support services	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Exploratory Recommendation	Sufficient Organizational Capacity to Support Prevention Efforts and Manage Accountability	E.g., Policies and messaging from Department-level leaders prioritize and champion prevention efforts; sufficient budget and human capital designated to support prevention efforts; funding priorities that support healthy environments/outlets for positive social engagement/activities (e.g., community centers, tactical stand downs/resilience days); emphasis on evaluation of efforts; structure of accountability to ensure that that activities are being adequately supported and are achieving desired outcomes	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Dr. Orchowski then provided an overview of the recommendations for institutional/organizational level risk factors and metrics.

Level of Evidentiary Support	Institutional/Organizational Level Risk Factor	Definition	Recommendation
Established Recommendation	Imbalanced Gender Ratios Among Senior Leaders	Percentage of females in senior leadership roles -- Is this comparable to the percentage of women in the military overall? Is this number/percentage trending upward on a consistent trajectory?	Recommend that the Department mine available administrative data to assess this factor
Exploratory Recommendation	Presence of Socially Aversive Personality Traits/Dominance Orientation Among Senior Leadership	Presence of socially aversive traits (e.g. psychopathy, narcissism, Machiavellianism, sadism) among senior leaders sets an unhealthy tone for the organization; potential risk that these traits may shade Departmental priorities, policy decisions, and operational environments	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Exploratory Recommendation	Climates Tolerant of Sexual Harassment Among Senior Leadership	A workplace climate that condones or tolerates sexual harassment; this is observed at the Institutional/Organizational level through lack of organizational willingness to follow through on investigations of accusations leveled against senior leaders; lack of accountability or consequences for problematic behavior among high-level, high-visibility leaders; continued promotion or maintained military status by perpetrators; senior leaders with problematic behavior patterns being held up as aspirational examples	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use
Exploratory Recommendation	Policies that Fail to Ensure Protective Environments for Service Members	Rules or policies that fail to ensure the safety of environments in which Service members are living, working, and playing; Lack of attention to structural/maintenance issues that may contribute to safety concerns (e.g., poorly lit areas, broken locks, camera blind spots,	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Level of Evidentiary Support	Institutional/Organizational Level Risk Factor	Definition	Recommendation
		lack of dedicated spaces for women)	
Exploratory Recommendation	Policies that Fail to Effectively Inform Prevention Training Efforts	Absence of clear policy guidance on who is responsible for training delivery and how training is delivered, as well as the absence of rigorous evaluation of prevention training efforts and outcomes; Lack of follow-through on determining how effective a policy is (i.e., is it being followed, is it having the intended impact?)	Recommend that DoD continue to monitor emerging evidence to identify potential metrics for this factor for future use

Dr. Holroyd then called for the Committee Members to vote on adoption of recommendations from the Metrics and Performance Subcommittee. All recommendations were adopted by unanimous vote. Dr. Holroyd thanked everyone for their input and feedback and concluded the session.

Closing Remarks
Dr. Holroyd thanked the Members, presenters, and staff for their time and commitment to the DAC-PSM. With no further issues or comments, the public meeting concluded.

Meeting was adjourned at 4:30 PM ET.

CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, the foregoing minutes are accurate and complete.

Report Certified by:

Ms. Gina M. Grosso   Dr. Lindsay Orchowski
Lt Gen, United States Air Force (Ret)   DAC-PSM Co-Chair
DAC-PSM Co-Chair   Date signed:
Date signed:

Report Submitted by:

Suzanne M. Holroyd, PhD
DAC-PSM Designated Federal Officer
DAC-PSM Executive Director
Date signed: