

2016 RADAR Adjudication Quality Evaluation

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PREFACE

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In 2005 the Government Accountability Office listed the DoD personnel security clearance program as "high risk." One reason for the "high risk" designation was the lack of adjudication quality metrics. Since then, DoD initiated several efforts to address this issue. Specifically, DoD prepared policy and developed a quality measurement tool to ensure that final adjudication documentation reflects DoD adjudicator decision-making factors in accordance with national adjudication guidelines. This tool is the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR).

RADAR evaluations are conducted nearly every year to measure the extent to which adjudication decisions are made and recorded correctly. This report presents RADAR evaluation results for adjudication decisions documented in 2016, the third in a series of reports documenting adjudication quality evaluation. Results demonstrate that determinations were consistent with national adjudication guidelines. Additionally, the sampled adjudication documentation identified several opportunities for improvement.

Eric L. Lang Director, PERSEREC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report outlines the results of the latest Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR) evaluation, conducted on adjudication decisions made during FY16. It is part of an ongoing effort to ensure adjudication documentation quality within DoD. This evaluation builds upon previous RADAR work by assessing continued compliance with standards and providing recommendations for improved metrics and adjudication documentation practice (Nelson & Tadle, 2014; Nelson & Tadle, 2017).

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Overall, the methodology for collecting and analyzing RADAR evaluations has largely remained the same. Independent evaluators with adjudication experience for the Department of Energy used the online RADAR tool to review case information and evaluate the quality of adjudication decisions and decision documentation provided by adjudicators at the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF). The sample of cases included cases from Army, Navy, Air Force, and Industry DoD CAF divisions and only those used to make personnel security determinations in FY16. Every case in the sample contained derogatory investigative information.

OVERALL RESULTS

The first result of interest is the evaluation of the DoD CAF adjudicators' compliance with DoD adjudication documentation standards. This year 70.5% (n=1,105) of cases were rated as meeting documentation standards (i.e., documentation was evaluated as "Acceptable" or "No Documentation Required"), and for all these cases evaluators selected a reason for the unsatisfactory rating. The RADAR tool provides prepopulated reasons from which evaluators can choose (e.g., no annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed) and of the cases that were rated as "Unacceptable," 46.5% (n = 205) were identified as having an unlisted reason for the rating.

The second result of interest is the evaluation of the extent to which the adjudication decisions were consistent with the national adjudicative guidelines. The results from this evaluation indicated that 94.6% of the adjudication decisions sampled for this iteration are consistent, and of the 84 that were not consistent 60% were because the evaluator disagreed with use of disqualifying or mitigating conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE ASSESSMENTS

RADAR evaluators do not have the same training as DoD CAF adjudicators and as some of the evaluations are skewed to be more critical. This was especially evident in this year's evaluation. Conducting RADAR evaluations in-house at the DoD CAF

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

may provide a better assessment of adjudication documentation and decision outcomes. Adjudicators reviewing the work of peers with the same training, guidance, and experience would provide CAF with a closer look at its work and put it in a position to address issues sooner and in a more directed manner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT	
DOD ADJUDICATION QUALITY STANDARDS	1
EVALUATION TOOL: RADAR	2
PRESENT EVALUATION AND REPORT	2
METHOD	3
REVISIONS TO RADAR	
DATA	3
SAMPLING PLAN	3
EVALUATORS	5
EVALUATION DATA AND RESULTS REVIEW	5
RESULTS	6
SAMPLE INFORMATION	6
ADJUDICATION DOCUMENTATION	
Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Use of Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions	; 7
ConditionsOverall Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Decision Documentation	8
Overall Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Adjudication Decision	
COMPARISON ACROSS YEARS	
DISCUSSION	
OVERALL RESULTS	
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE ASSESSMENTS	_15
REFERENCES	16
APPENDIX A: RADAR 2016 TOOL	A-1
LIST OF TABLES	
Table 1 RADAR Sampling Plan	4
Table 2 Actual Sample/Cases Evaluated	6
Table 3 Eligibility Determinations	7
Table 4 Disqualifying and Mitigating Condition Ratings-Percentages (%)	8
Table 5 Quality of Adjudication Decision Documentation – Percentages (%)	8
Table 6 Unacceptable Adjudication Decision Documentation Ratings –	
Reasons	_ 10
Table 7 breaks the rationale for rating the adjudication decision as unacceptable by CAF division.	_ 11
Table 7 Unacceptable Adjudication Decision Documentation Ratings –	
Frequencies	11
Table 8 Adjudication Decision Consistent with National Adjudication	
Guidelines – Percentages (%)	12

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table 9 Detailed Reason Adjudication Decision Rated as Not Consistent with	
National Adjudication Guidelines	13
Table 10 Comparison of Frequency and Percentage of Cases that Met	
Adjudication Decision Documentation Standards FY13-FY16	13
Table 11 Comparison of Frequency and Percentage of Adjudication Decisions	3
Consistent with National Adjudication Guidelines 2013-2016	14

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this project was to perform a quality evaluation of the adjudication component of the DoD personnel security program. Adjudication quality measurement is important to ensure that decisions and documentation conform to quality standards. In the current context, adjudication refers to the process of determining whether an individual is *eligible* to access classified information or perform sensitive duties. It requires review of completed background investigations by specially trained personnel (adjudicators). Adjudicators assess the investigative information in the context of national adjudicative guidelines (at the time of this project the guidelines were *Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information*, 1997; revised December 2005¹) to make a whole-person evaluation of the subject's eligibility. The eligibility determination is used by federal agencies, security managers, and related DoD entities to either grant access to classified information or assign sensitive duties to properly screened individuals. Given the importance of adjudicative decisions, it is critical that adjudicators thoroughly document the key adjudicative elements.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT

This effort is a continuation of earlier Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) work using the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR) tool (Nelson, et al., 2009). RADAR is used to conduct an independent review of the adherence of DoD adjudication decisions and corresponding documentation to DoD adjudication quality standards. RADAR evaluations address the Government Accountability Office's concerns about the quality of DoD personnel security adjudications, as detailed in previous PERSEREC reports (Nelson & Tadle, 2017).

DOD ADJUDICATION QUALITY STANDARDS

The quality standards established by DoD for adjudication documentation are outlined in a policy memorandum (Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence), November 8, 2009, *Personnel Security Clearance Adjudication Documentation*). Adjudicators are expected to document their adjudication decisions based on the criteria and format indicated by the standards.

Two types of cases must be documented: (a) cases with significant derogatory information as defined by the national adjudicative guidelines, and (b) Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs) where the investigation is missing one or more standard scope item(s) and was not returned to the investigative service provider (ISP) for additional investigative work.

¹ The 2005 Adjudicative Guidelines were replaced by Security Executive Agent Directive 4, *National Security Adjudicative Guidelines*, effective 08 June 2017.

1

INTRODUCTION

The documentation standard for cases with significant derogatory information requires the following documentation:

- (a) adjudicative issues,
- (b) disqualifying factors,
- (c) mitigating factors,
- (d) review of previously adjudicated information, if relevant, and
- (e) rationale for mitigating an issue if the mitigating factor is not one of those found in the adjudicative guidelines.

The documentation standard for SSBIs that are missing one or more standard investigative scope items (e.g., neighborhood check, education check) requires:

- (a) a brief description of the missing scope item and,
- (b) a brief description of the reason the investigation was not returned.

However, to date, there is no way to identify cases that are missing one or more scope items, so this standard is not assessed.

EVALUATION TOOL: RADAR

RADAR is organized to mirror the steps in the adjudication process and asks evaluators to make a number of ratings as part of the evaluation. Evaluators are not asked to "re-adjudicate" the case using RADAR, but rather to determine whether the original adjudication was justified given the information in the investigation. RADAR is accessed online and evaluators complete their quality evaluations by answering multiple choice questions, reviewing checklists, and entering responses in text boxes. Depending on the answers evaluators provide regarding a particular case, the tool's built-in branching logic presents appropriate follow-up questions and skips questions irrelevant to the case. For additional detail on RADAR, refer to Nelson & Tadle (2017).

PRESENT EVALUATION AND REPORT

As part of ongoing efforts to ensure adjudication documentation quality, RADAR was employed to evaluate quality for cases adjudicated in FY16. The RADAR tool used in the current evaluation was slightly modified to address response issues discovered in the previous evaluation but did not change in terms of the evaluation metric itself (i.e., RADAR still measures adjudication documentation compliance with standards).

METHOD

METHOD

Overall, the methodology for collecting RADAR evaluations has largely remained the same from inception in 2009 to present. The data required for evaluation purposes have not changed, nor has the need for evaluators with adjudication training, to include DoD adjudication training. There have been, however, revisions to the RADAR tool itself and to the sampling strategy.

REVISIONS TO RADAR

For this iteration of evaluations, changes were made to the existing RADAR tool to decrease data entry errors and to clarify the guidance documents that should be used by evaluators for assessments. Instructions were added to the section on "Review Case and Use of Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions" to provide reviewers with the standard operating procedures at the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF). Access National Agency Check and Inquiries, National Agency Check with Law and Credit investigations were removed from the evaluation and replaced with Tier 3 and Tier 3 Reinvestigations (Tier 3 R), as defined in the Federal Investigative Standards (2012). Eligibility determination was also added as a question.

DATA

To ensure accurate RADAR evaluations, evaluators must have all of the materials that were available to the original adjudicator, as well as the documentation record of each decision. Complete investigative data are generally found in the report of investigation (ROI) provided to adjudicators by the ISP, including any additional investigative material gathered by the ISP after the original investigation was completed. In addition, the materials may include information the adjudicator gathers after the original investigation was completed. Adjudication documentation is gathered from the Case Adjudication Tracking System (CATS) that DoD CAF adjudicators use to enter their documentation.

SAMPLING PLAN

A stratified random sample was identified from all cases adjudicated during the fiscal year. Primary stratification factors included (a) DoD CAF division (Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Agencies, and Industry), (b) investigation type (Tier 3, Tier 3R, SSBI, Single Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation [SSBI-PR], and Phased-PR). For this study, PERSEREC requested, but did not receive, ROI data for the Defense Agencies; therefore, it is not included in this analysis.

In addition, the sampling plan targeted cases where eligibility for access to classified information was granted, denied, or revoked. Cases where a final determination was not made (e.g., No Determination Made or Loss of Jurisdiction) were not included in the sample. The sampling plan also excluded non-national

METHOD

security eligibility types that are not subject to the documentation standards, such as Position of Trust.

The current evaluation focused only on cases with potentially significant derogatory information. These cases were identified by the case seriousness code assigned by the ISP (for this sample, the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services). Cases with the following case seriousness codes were sampled: B code (moderate issues), C code (substantial issues), and D code (major issues).

Table 1 displays the numbers and types of cases types that were ultimately requested from the DoD CAF divisions. The size of this stratified sample (N=1,887) was based on an assumption (from previous work) that at least 95% of the adjudications were documented correctly, allowing for confidence that the evaluation's findings are within one percent of actual results.

Table 1
RADAR Sampling Plan

CAF _	Proposed Sample Size							
Division	Tier 3	Tier 3R	SSBI	Phased PR	SSBI-PR	Total		
Army	95	78	74	77	74	398		
Navy	94	78	74	77	74	397		
Air Force	94	77	73	77	74	395		
Industry	N/A^1	77	74	77	74	302		
Defense Agencies	94	77	73	77	74	395		
Total	377	387	368	385	370	1,887		

After identifying the sample the CATS data team pulled (a) the electronic investigation files and (b) the associated adjudication documentation. Both the spreadsheets containing the adjudication documentation and zip files containing the investigative information were sent to PERSEREC via secure transfer through U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center, Safe Access File Exchange which is compliant with DoD policy guidelines regarding exchange of sensitive information (e.g., personally identifiable information).

Once PERSEREC researchers received the adjudication and investigation information, they created a log documenting the data received. After the log was created, the data were sent via secure online transfer (also Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center, Safe Access File Exchange) to the organization employing the evaluators. The evaluators conducted the RADAR evaluations from February 2017 to June 2017.

METHOD

EVALUATORS

RADAR evaluators must make objective judgments as to whether the original adjudicators properly and effectively adjudicated cases and documented the determination. In order to do this, they must have both DoD personnel security adjudication training and experience performing adjudication. They must also have thorough knowledge of the national adjudication guidelines and DoD adjudication documentation standards. Evaluators for the current research had the same qualifications and training as evaluators in previous RADAR studies. For details on evaluator preparation, refer to Nelson & Tadle (2017).

EVALUATION DATA AND RESULTS REVIEW

As a lesson learned from previous RADAR evaluations, evaluation results are reviewed after completion to identify (a) duplicate or incomplete evaluations, (b) evaluations in which sections were incorrectly skipped (i.e., that the branching logic worked correctly), and (c) data entry errors for case identifiers (e.g., CAF division, investigation type). Evaluation data review followed the same methodology as previous evaluations (Nelson & Tadle, 2017).

Another lesson learned from prior evaluations is the need to monitor evaluation results (e.g., cases that get unacceptable ratings for adjudication documentation quality). The reason for this is to invite opportunities to discuss the evaluation process with evaluators to determine whether they are using the correct criteria for their evaluations.

5

This section provides descriptive information about the sample and the results of the evaluations of adjudicators' use of disqualifying and mitigating factors. Additional key results are the evaluations of the extent to which the adjudication documentation met documentation standards and the extent to which the overall decision was consistent with the national security adjudication guidelines.

SAMPLE INFORMATION

The data provided by the CATS team varied somewhat from the sampling plan; it did not include Defense Agency data, included different numbers of cases per CAF division, and some of the case files provided did not include any data. As a result, a total of 1,564 cases were evaluated (i.e., our actual sample²). Table 2 shows the distribution of cases in the actual sample by investigation type for each CAF division.

Table 2
Actual Sample/Cases Evaluated

CAF Division	Tier 3	Tier 3 R	SSBI Cases	Phased PR Cases	SSBI-PR Cases	Total
Army	95	74	73	75	73	390
Navy	94	78	74	77	72	395
Air Force	93	77	72	72	74	388
Industry	74	77	73	77	72	373
Defense Agencies ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	356	306	292	301	291	1,546

¹ No ROIs were received for the Defense Agency population; therefore, no RADAR evaluations were conducted for this sample.

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² Previous reports have included information on number of cases including polygraph results. Only one case in the current sample included a polygraph, so the polygraph table was not included.

Table 3 shows the distribution of eligibility types that were in the sample. Most of the determinations were Secret, Top Secret, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI), but the sample also included a few cases with denials or revocations.

Table 3 Eligibility Determinations

	Frequency	Percentage
Secret - Initial	358	23
Secret - Continued	310	20
Top Secret - Initial	74	5
Top Secret - Continued	152	10
TS/SCI - Initial	216	14
Denied	1	<1
Revoked	3	<1
TS/SCI - Continued	436	28
Revoked	6	<1
Total	1,546	100

ADJUDICATION DOCUMENTATION

The first set of adjudication quality results are the evaluations of the original adjudicators' use of disqualifying and mitigating conditions. It is important to note that identification and use of disqualifying and mitigating conditions can vary among adjudicators. For example, one adjudicator may assign to a particular issue a disqualifying condition of "a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses" while another may assign one of "allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted." While adjudicators may disagree on specific disqualifying or mitigating factors, they may still agree on the overall adjudication decision (i.e., to grant or deny eligibility). Given this, the most useful results are those that serve as measures of adjudication documentation quality (i.e., adjudicator compliance with DoD adjudication documentation standards) and the extent to which the adjudication decisions are consistent with the national security adjudicative guidelines.

Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Use of Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions

Table 4 shows the percentages of cases rated as correctly using disqualifying and mitigating conditions. That is, evaluators rated whether the adjudicative issues identified by the original adjudicator were supported by the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions the adjudicator selected from the national adjudicative guidelines. In cases that received a favorable eligibility determination, evaluators

7

also rated whether the adjudicator provided any mitigating conditions or written explanations justifying why that decision was made. Overall, adjudicators' use of disqualifying and mitigating conditions was rated as meeting national adjudication guidelines in 53.4% (n=826) of cases. Table 4 displays these results by DoD CAF division and the overall sample.

Table 4
Disqualifying and Mitigating Condition Ratings-Percentages³ (%)

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Industry	Overall
Disqualifying Conditions Correctly Identified	47.9	46.6	57.7	54.7	51.7
Mitigating Conditions Correctly Identified Disqualifying and Mitigating Conditions Correctly	51.8	49.1	62.9	56.3	55.0
Used	48.7	47.6	63.4	54.2	53.4

Overall Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Decision Documentation

Table 5 displays the ratings of the extent to which evaluators rated the adjudication documentation as aligning with DoD standards. As seen in the last column, 70.5% (n=1,105) of cases were rated as meeting documentation standards (i.e., documentation was evaluated as Acceptable or No Documentation Required).

Table 5
Quality of Adjudication Decision Documentation – Percentages (%)

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Industry	Overall
Met Documentation Standards	74.4	65.6	72.9	70.5	70.5
Unacceptable	25.6	34.4	24.5	29.5	28.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Unacceptable Ratings – Decision Documentation

Evaluators were asked to provide a reason that they determined the adjudication documentation was unacceptable (n=441; 28.5% of the total sample). RADAR offered six reasons with check boxes, plus the option of 'Other.' Evaluators were instructed to select all that apply. Table 6 shows all of the rationales selected.

For cases when only one reason was selected, the most commonly identified reason was that the original adjudicator did not document that they had reviewed previously documented information (n=74, 16.8%). The next most common single reason was that the case included significant derogatory information that was not clearly mitigated and no rationale for mitigation was provided (n=39, 8.8%). The third most common single reason was the presence of significant derogatory information that was clearly mitigated, but no rationale was provided (n=32, 7.3%).

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³ Values reflect the percentage of cases identified with issues.

Of the remaining cases where the documentation was rated as unacceptable, n=90, 20.4% were assigned multiple reasons.

About 47% (n=205; 46.5%) of the cases that received negative documentation ratings had "Other" as the sole reason as to why the documentation was unacceptable. Analysis of the comments provided by the evaluators found that the most common reasons were that no rationale was provided (n=39; 8.8%), and adjudicators did not annotate that previously adjudicated information had been reviewed (n=29; 6.6%).

Table 6
Unacceptable Adjudication Decision Documentation Ratings – Reasons

	Frequency	Percent
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed	74	16.8
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided	3	0.7
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Other	29	6.6
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; Other	3	0.7
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided	32	7.3
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed	1	0.2
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Other	10	2.3
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Other	1	0.2
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; SSBI missing standard scope item(s) and not returned to ISP: No rationale provided	1	0.2
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided	10	2.3
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; Other	2	0.5
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed	1	0.2
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; SSBI missing standard scope item(s) and not returned to ISP: No rationale provided	1	0.2
Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided	39	8.8
Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; Other	28	6.3
Exception granted: No rationale provided	1	0.2
Other (only)	205	46.5
Total	441	100.0

10

Table 7 breaks the rationale for rating the adjudication decision as unacceptable by CAF division.

Table 7
Unacceptable Adjudication Decision Documentation Ratings – Frequencies

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Industry
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been	-			200
reviewed	27	17	10	20
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Other	6	10	9	4
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; <i>Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated:</i> No rationale provided	2	-	-	1
No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; <i>Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated:</i> No rationale provided;				
Other	-	2	-	1
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided	1	27	3	1
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Other	1	6	1	2
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed	_	_	-	1
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed; Other	_	1	-	-
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; SSBI missing standard scope item(s) and not returned to ISP: No rationale provided	-	1	-	-
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided	5	3	1	1
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No				
rationale provided; Other	1	_	1	-
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed	-	_	-	1

11

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Industry
Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided; Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No				
rationale provided; SSBI missing standard scope				
<pre>item(s) and not returned to ISP: No rationale provided</pre>	_	_	_	1
Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided	9	11	9	10
Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided; Other	3	8	3	14
Exception granted: No rationale provided	-	-	1	-
Other	45	50	57	53
Total	100	136	95	110

Overall Ratings of the Original Adjudicators' Adjudication Decision

Each DoD CAF division, and DoD CAF as a whole, were rated as making adjudication decisions consistent with standards in a majority of cases (n=1,462; 94.6% at the DoD CAF level). Table 8 presents the ratings regarding adjudication decision for each DoD CAF division and the DoD CAF.

Table 8
Adjudication Decision Consistent with National Adjudication Guidelines –
Percentages (%)

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Industry	Overall
Consistent with Nat'l Adjud Guidelines	94.9	92.9	96.6	93.8	94.6
Not Consistent with Nat'l Adjud Guidelines	5.1	7.1	3.4	6.2	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Research staff reviewed evaluator comments to understand the reasons evaluators rated 84 of the total 1,546 adjudication decisions as not consistent with national adjudication guidelines. In most cases, evaluators indicated that they disagreed with the strategies the original adjudicators used to mitigate disqualifying information, or that they should have gathered additional information regarding an issue to determine whether the issue could be mitigated. Table 9 provides a summary of the reasons given for why the adjudication decisions made in these cases were not in accordance with national adjudication guidelines

Table 9
Detailed Reason Adjudication Decision Rated as Not Consistent with National
Adjudication Guidelines

Evaluator's Reason for Rating	Frequency				
 Evaluator disagreed with use of disqualifying or mitigating conditions: There were other undocumented disqualifying and mitigating conditions Subject was not interviewed, though most issues were mitigatable Clearance was granted in the presence of disqualifying information, but no mitigating factors were identified. Based on the recency and severity of certain 					
derogatory information, clearance should not have been granted	50				
There was insufficient evidence in the investigation to support issues identified by the adjudicator or items noted in the rationale	3				
No rationale was provided	10				
The original adjudicator should have followed up on an issue in order to assess whether it was indeed mitigatable	21				

COMPARISON ACROSS YEARS

Overall, the results of the 2016 RADAR evaluations indicated that (a) over 70.5% of the adjudication decisions evaluated met adjudication documentation standards, and (b) over 94.6% were consistent with national adjudication guidelines.

Table 10 shows a comparison of the percentage of adjudication decisions across the FY13 through FY16 evaluations that met documentation standards. However, this comparison should bear in mind that each year's evaluation used different versions of the RADAR tool and had unique sampling and rating biases that affected results. It is unclear whether the perceived decrease in quality of in-adjudication documentation practice is attributable to DoD CAF practice, harsher evaluation standards, or both.

Table 10
Comparison of Frequency and Percentage of Cases that Met Adjudication Decision
Documentation Standards FY13-FY16

	2013 Eval	uation	2014 Evaluation 2015 Evaluation 2016		2015 Evaluation		2016 Evalu	2016 Evaluation	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	
Met Documentation		70.1	1.551	00.0	1 005	06.5	1.105	70.	
Standards	1,145	78.1	1,664	89.2	1,397	86.5	1,105	70.5	
Unacceptable	322	21.9	201	10.8	218	13.5	441	28.5	
Total	1,467	100.0	1,865	100.0	1,615	100.0	1,546	100.0	

Table 11 shows a comparison of the percentage of adjudication decisions from 2013 to 2016 that met national adjudication guidelines. In the 2014 analysis, a higher percentage of decisions met adjudication guidelines.

Table 11 Comparison of Frequency and Percentage of Adjudication Decisions Consistent with National Adjudication Guidelines 2013-2016

	2013 Eval	uation	2014 Eval	uation	2015 Evalu	ation	2016 Evalu	ation
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Consistent with Nat'l Adjud Guidelines	1,407	95.9	1,842	98.8	1,539	95.3	1,462	94.6
Not Consistent with Nat'l Adjud Guidelines	60	4.1	23	1.2	76	4.7	84	5 4
							_	5.4
Total	1,467	100.0	1,865	100.0	1,615	100.0	1,546	100.0

14

DISCUSSION

The results of this installment of adjudication quality measurement showed some parallels to the results of previous years and some differences. It also demonstrated the need for ongoing assessments and training to better calibrate adjudicators to the documentation standards. Given the significance of the decisions that rely on adjudicative results, it is critical that the decisions conform to the national adjudicative guidelines and documentation standards.

OVERALL RESULTS

The current RADAR evaluation found that a majority (70.5%) of cases in the sample met documentation standards. For those cases that did not meet documentation standards, many were noted for missing a notation that previously adjudicated information had been reviewed.

Overall, adjudication decisions made at the DoD CAF were consistent with national adjudication guidelines (94.6% of the cases in the sample received favorable ratings). Given the challenging task of reviewing investigation information, coming to an adjudicative decision based on interpretation of adjudicative guidelines, and recording one's decision rationale, it is a significant finding that eligibility determinations are made appropriately and with high confidence.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE ASSESSMENTS

The individuals completing RADAR evaluations are non-DoD adjudicators who have received DoD adjudication training and certification but serve a non-DoD agency. Review of evaluator ratings suggested there may be some basic differences between documentation expectations despite the training evaluators receive on DoD adjudication documentation standards.

With this in mind, conducting RADAR evaluations in-house at DoD CAF may provide a better assessment of adjudication documentation and decision outcomes. Adjudicators reviewing the work of peers with the same training, guidance, and experience would provide CAF with a closer look at its work and put it in a position to address issues sooner and in a more directed manner. This would also make the RADAR process more efficient by eliminating CAF's need to review outside evaluators' work, provide feedback regarding disagreements with ratings, and receive results based on data already examined.

REFERENCES

- Adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified information (1997; revised December, 2005).
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APPENDIX A: RADAR 2016 TOOL

RADAR 2016

BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1. Enter your Rater ID *This question is required.
2. Enter CATS Case ID This is the title of the folder containing the investigative materials for each case/subject. It is also found in the adjudication documentation record file. *This question is required. 3. Enter OPM Case ID This is found on the Certificate of Investigation (COI) for each case. It is also found in the adjudication documentation record file. *This question is required.
 4. Select the DoD CAF division that adjudicated the case. *This question is required. Army Navy Air Force Industry Defense Agencies Investigation Type *This question is required. Tier 3 (T3)
 T3 Reinvestigation (T3R) SSBI SSBI-PR Phased PR Other Please enter an 'other' value for this selection. This question is required.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION (continued) 6. Adjudication Type *This question is required.
 Secret Secret Reinvestigation Top Secret Top Secret Periodic Reinvestigation Top Secret/SCI Top Secret/SCI Periodic Reinvestigation Other Please enter an 'other' value for this selection. This question is required.

- 7. Eligibility Determination *This question is required.
 - Granted

Denied			
Revoked			
Other Please enter an 'other' value for this selection.		* -	This
question is required.			
8.			
OPM Issue Code			
The Issue Code appears on Form 79A - Report of Agency Adjudica	ative Action.		
The code is generally about 10 lines down on the right side of the p	age.		
*This question is required.			
• C B			
• o C			
• O D			
F or G (no issues)			
O or R (no actionable issues)			
Other Please enter an 'other' value for this selection.			*
This question is required.			
SCOPE ITEMS			
Missing Investigative Scope Ite	ms		
Check the investigation against the Scope Item lists that follow. Pla "Complete" column if a scope item was completed. Place a check n Incomplete" column if a scope item was not completed. If a scope it investigation to determine whether the investigator provided adequatem. If an adequate explanation was not provided, place a check m that item.	nark in the l em was not ate explana	oox in the "M completed, tion for the r	lissing or review the nissing scope
The first Scope Item list focuses on standard scope items. For any care listed in one of three subsequent Scope Item lists (Conditional, and By Request).			
Standard Scope Items			
Scope items that are always included in a specific i	nvestigatio	n product.	
*This question is required.			
Standard Scope Items Scope items that are always included in a specific investigation product. *This question is required.	Complete	Missing or Incomplete	No Explanation
App: Copy of completed application. For example, completed SF-86 or eQIP.			
CRED: Credit check. Credit search of the National Credit Bureaus.			

Standard Scope Items Scope items that are always included in a specific investigation product. *This question is required.	Complete	Missing or Incomplete	No Explanation
CRED DATE: Out-of-date Credit Report. Credit report was completed but report date more than one year prior to investigation close date.			
DCII: Defense Clearance and Investigations Index. Check of DSS records of previous background investigations as well as other DoD conducted investigations (e.g., ACRD, OSI, etc.).			
EDUC: Education. For all listed Registrars; to ensure complete coverage for timeframe additional personal or records may be obtained.			
EMPL: Employment Record review (all employment) & personal testimonies (employed 6 months or more). For all part-time, intermittent, and self-employment. Records and corroboration for unemployment of more than 60 days. Former employment: Conducted through CONUS sources. Overseas: only checked if currently employed overseas.			
FBIF/FBFN: FBI Identification (Criminal History). Classification attempted on all fingerprint submissions. Name check provided if results Unclassifiable.			
LAWE/LAC: Law Enforcement/Local Agency checks. Scheduled to appropriate jurisdictions for all locations of listed residence, employment, and education activities for the coverage period.			
Standard Scope Items Scope items that are always included in a specific investigation product. *This question is required.	Complete	Missing or Incomplete	No Explanation
REFE: Reference check. Personal testimonies (2 minimum) from people who a) know Subject socially, b) have had significant contact with Subject, and c) span the scope. CONUS only. Scope: 5 years.: Notes: a) Reference coverage may be reported under other item types and b) at least one must be a developed character references.			
RESI: Residence check. Personal testimony for most recent CONUS residence of at least 6 months or more, as indicated on case papers. If current residence is less than 6 months, record, personal or collateral coverage is provided.			
SII: Security/Suitability Investigations Index. Check of OPM historic record of investigations conducted for 16 years from the date of the last investigative activity.			
SFBN: FBI Name check – Spouse/Cohabitant. Records Management Division (Investigations). Check of FBI maintained database of FBI conducted investigations for Spouse/Cohabitant names. (Conditional scope item for T3)			

9. Based on the review and the above Scope Item checklist, was the investigation missing any standard

		2.0	
sco	pe.	iter	ns :

If the investigation was a T3 and is missing only the conditional scope items noted in the list (SFBN), select No. *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No

10. Was the investigation missing any other scope items (e.g., Conditional, Conditional: Spouse or Cohabitant, and/or By Request)? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No

Was the Subject Interview missing? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No

Was the Subject deployed and not available to the investigator (e.g., overseas)? *This question is required.

- o Yes
- O No
- O Don't Know

Conditional Scope Items

Scope items that are included in the investigation when defined conditions are met.

Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.

Conditional Scope Items Scope items that are included in the		
investigation when defined conditions are met. Place a check mark in		
the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope	Missing or	No
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No	Incomplete	Explanation
Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate		
explanation.		
CIAS: CIA Security check. Conducted when any of the following are true		

about the subject: a) foreign born; b) outside the U.S. for 90 days or more (other than for U.S. military service); c) outside the U.S. in excess of one year if on U.S. Government assignment; d) resided or traveled in certain countries identified by the requesting agency; or e) if marriage occurs during any of the above activities.	
DCIF: Defense Clearance and Investigations Index File. Provide copies of available DCII files.	
EMPL ER: Employment Inquiry. Follow-up for employment issues.	
FBIN: FBI Records Management Division (Investigations). Check of FBI maintained database of FBI conducted investigations.	

Conditional Scope Items Scope items that are included in the investigation when defined conditions are met. Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope Missing or No items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Incomplete Explanation Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.

FINCEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network		
FINL: Financial Issue follow-up. Follow-up review of creditor or bankruptcy records, including civil court actions such as judgments and liens. Conducted when Bankruptcy, Foreclosure, Credit Counseling, Judgments, Tax Liens, Civil Suits record(s) are identified; Student Loan, Child Support, and unpaid Government Overpayment reimbursement accounts identified as 120 days delinquent (or more) when total delinquency is \$1000 or greater; all other delinquent accounts (120 days or more) of \$1000 or more when total delinquency is \$7500 or greater, bankruptcy within the past two years or in years 3-5 if current delinquencies are identified, unless covered in prior investigation.		
FORMER SPOUSE. Personal testimonies from all former spouses, unless former spouse is non-U.S. citizen residing overseas or a U.S. citizen residing overseas other than on a military base.		
Conditional Scope Items Scope items that are included in the investigation when defined conditions are met. Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.	_	No Explanation
INS: INS/USCIS check. Includes check of "Systematic Alien Verification		
for Entitlements" program (SAVE) to confirm legal residency status. Conducted if subject claims he or she is NOT a U.S. citizen.		
Conducted if subject claims he or she is NOT a U.S. citizen. LAWE PR: Police and/or Court Record review and follow-up. For all		

Conditional Scope Items Scope items that are included in the investigation when defined conditions are met. Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.	-	No Explanation
OUTS: Foreign Country Law check. Interpol search. Conducted if Subject reports: a) Military service overseas (excluding Canada) for 90 days continuously or a combined six months or more in the last 5 years, or b) Foreign Residence, Education, or Employment for 90 days continuously or a combined six months or more in the last 5 years.		
PUBR: Criminal or Civil Court Records review. For any cases involving the Subject, except when Subject is plaintiff and there is no indication of unfavorable information.		
SESE: Selective Service check. Scheduled for all males born after 12/31/59 if currently at least 18 years of age		
Conditional Scope Items Scope items that are included in the investigation when defined conditions are met. Place a check mark in	•••	
the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any applicable scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.	_	No Explanation
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate	_	
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation. SIIF: Security/Suitability Investigations Index File. Provide copies of	Incomplete	Explanation
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation. SIIF: Security/Suitability Investigations Index File. Provide copies of available SII files. SPIN: Special Interview. Conducted with the Subject of investigation to	Incomplete	Explanation
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation. SIIF: Security/Suitability Investigations Index File. Provide copies of available SII files. SPIN: Special Interview. Conducted with the Subject of investigation to allow the Subject to confirm, refute, provide additional information STSC: State Department Security check. State Department Security check scheduled when SCI access 4 is requested and activities outside the U.S. exceed one year while on U.S. Government assignment, or	Incomplete	Explanation
items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation. SIIF: Security/Suitability Investigations Index File. Provide copies of available SII files. SPIN: Special Interview. Conducted with the Subject of investigation to allow the Subject to confirm, refute, provide additional information STSC: State Department Security check. State Department Security check scheduled when SCI access 4 is requested and activities outside the U.S. exceed one year while on U.S. Government assignment, or exceed 90 days if outside the U.S. for other purposes. SUBS: Substance Abuse Follow-up (Record Review and Interview). Record review and interview with listed or developed alcohol and/or	Incomplete	Explanation

Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate

explanation.

Conditional Scope Items: Spouse or Cohabitant Scope items that are included in the investigation when a current spouse or cohabitant is identified and other conditions are met. Place a check mark in the box in the "Missing or Incomplete" column for any scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the "No Explanation" box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.	•	No Explanation
SDCF: DCII files - Spouse/Cohabitant. Provide copies of Spouse/Cohabitant DCII files.		
SDCI: DCII check - Spouse/Cohabitant. DCII checked for trace records of DSS conducted Spouse/Cohabitant background investigations as well as other DoD conducted investigations (e.g. ACRD, OSI, etc)		
SFBN: FBI Name check – Spouse/Cohabitant. Records Management Division (Investigations). Check of FBI maintained database of FBI conducted investigations for Spouse/Cohabitant names.		
SFPN: FBI Fingerprint check – Spouse/Cohabitant. If Subject in Top Secret access, Spouse/Cohabitant FBI criminal history check. Classification attempted on all fingerprint submissions. Name check provided if results are unclassifiable.		
SINS (COHAB/ FAMILY): INS/USCIS checks – Cohabitant, Family. Scheduled if Subject currently in Top Secret access, and cohabitant or family members are a) foreign born, b) currently residing in the US, and c) are listed on case papers.		
SINS (SPOUSE): INS/USCIS check – Spouse. Scheduled if Subject's spouse is foreign born AND access is 3,4,5, or 6.		
SSIF: SII files – Spouse/Cohabitant. Provide copies of Spouse/Cohabitant SII files.		
SSII: SII check – Spouse/Cohabitant. Check of OPM's historic record of investigations conducted for 16 years from the date of the last investigative activity for Spouse/Cohabitant.		
By Request Scope Items Scope items that are included only if the case includes documentation that the	o itomo woro	roquested
Scope hems that are included only if the case includes documentation that if	ie ileilis weie	requesteu.
Place a check mark in the box in the Missing or Incomplete column for any sco Place a second check mark in the No Explanation box, if the investigator did n explanation.		
By Request Scope Items Scope items that are included only if the case includes documentation that the items were requested. Place a check mark in the box in the Missing or Incomplete column for any scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the No Explanation box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation.	Missing or Incomplete	No Explanation
BVS: Bureau of Vital Statistics. Requires specific request from CAF. Confirm birth record at listed State of birth. ONLY conducted if Mother's and Father's full names are provided.		

By Request Scope Items Scope items that are included only if the case includes documentation that the items were requested. Place a check mark in the box in the Missing or Incomplete column for any scope items not completed. Place a second check mark in the No Explanation box, if the investigator did not provide an adequate explanation. SCIS: CIA Security check – Spouse. Conducted when any of the	Missing or Incomplete	No Explanation
following are true: a) Spouse is foreign born, b) spouse resided or traveled in certain countries identified by the requesting agency. c) spouse currently lives outside the U.S.		
STPA: State Department Passport and/or Births Abroad check. Check of State Department maintained electronic files of births abroad. Search scheduled if case papers indicate foreign born and 240 data or Passport information is provided. May be used to verify U.S. citizenship. OTHER SCOPE MISSING Was the investigation missing any scope items that did not appear in the precedure.	□ eding checkli	sts?*This
 question is required. O Yes O No 		
Use the space below to list any missing scope items that did not appear in any question is required.	of the check	dists. *This
After reviewing the guidelines for adjudicating incomplete investigations, should investigation have been returned to the investigation provider? *This question O Yes No		
INVESTIGATION QUALITY 11. After the CAF received the closed investigation, did someone at the CAF ginformation or request additional information from the investigative service pro apply) *This question is required.		
 Gathered additional information (CAF) Requested additional information from the investigative service provi Don't Know No additional information gathered 	der (ISP)	

APPENDIX A

Was the additional information gathered by the CAF or OPM included in the case materials? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No
- O Don't Know

12. Rate the quality of the information available for the adjudication: *This question is required.

- Complete. Investigation documentation contained every scope item and lead required by the
 national standards, included enough information to resolve all issues, and provided a thorough
 basis for the adjudication decision.
- Adequate. Investigation was missing a few minor scope items or leads and/or the adjudicator
 was able to gather enough information to make an adjudication decision.
- O Unacceptable. Investigation did not include sufficient information for an adjudication decision.

Please indicate why the investigation was unacceptable. (select all that apply) *This question is required.

- It was missing key scope items without sufficient explanation.

 It did not include sufficient information to resolve issues.
- □ Other

Other reasons the investigation was unacceptable: *This question is required.

13. Did the investigation materials include polygraph results? *This question is required.

- © Yes
- O No

Was the polygraph a standard component of the investigation or added to resolve an issue? *This question is required.

- O Standard
- Added to the investigation to resolve an issue
- O Don't Know

Were the polygraph results included with the rest of the investigation materials? *This question is required.

 O Yes O No
USE OF DISQUALIFYING AND MITIGATING INFORMATION Mark the check box(es) indicating the issue(s) identified by the original adjudicator: *This question is required.
 □ Original Adjudicator did not identify any issues □ a. Allegiance to U.S. □ b. Foreign Influence □ c. Foreign Preference □ d. Sexual Behavior □ e. Personal Conduct □ f. Financial Considerations □ g. Alcohol Consumption □ h. Drug Involvement □ i. Psychological Conditions □ j. Criminal Conduct □ k. Handling Protected Information □ I. Outside Activities □ m. Use of IT Systems
Should the original adjudicator have identified any issue(s)? *This question is required. • O Yes, there were issues in this case that should have been identified.
No, there were no issues in this case.
Which issue(s) and corresponding disqualifying and mitigating condition(s) should have been identified? *This question is required.
Considering only information in the current investigation, did the original adjudicator reasonably identify appropriate disqualifying condition(s)? *This question is required.
O YesO No
Why do you believe the disqualifying condition(s) identified by the original adjudicator were not appropriate? (select all that apply) * This question is required.
 The adjudicator should have identified other disqualifying condition(s) for the issue(s) they identified, as well. The disqualifying condition(s) identified were not supported by the information in the investigation. Other

APPENDIX A

Other reasons you didn't find the original adjudicator's disqualifying condition cho	ice(s) to be
appropriate: *This question is required.	
Considering only information in the current investigation, did the original adjudica appropriate mitigating condition(s)? *This question is required.	ator reasonably identify
• O Yes	
• O No	
Why do you believe the mitigating condition(s) identified by the original adjudical appropriate? (select all that apply) * This question is required.	tor were not
 The adjudicator should have identified other mitigating condition(s) for this identified, as well. 	ne issue(s) they
 The adjudicator did not identify any mitigating condition(s), but should have 	
 	ion in the investigation.
Other reasons you didn't find the original adjudicator's mitigating condition choice *This question is required.	e(s) to be appropriate:

USE OF DISQUALIFYING AND MITIGATING INFORMATION (continued)

- 14. Evaluate the original adjudicator's use of disqualifying and mitigating conditions. *This question is required.
 - C Acceptable. Evaluations of disqualifying and mitigating conditions were in accordance with
 adjudicative guidelines, took into account all relevant information, were scaled appropriately, and
 were clearly and reasonably linked to the guidelines.
 - O Unacceptable.

(select all that apply) "I his question is required.	
 Was not consistent with the adjudicative guidelines. Did not take into account all relevant information. Gave some information too much or too little emphasis. The original adjudicator should have identified Personal Conduct as a in the case. (Note: DOD CAF adjudicators are trained to limit use of the "Figuideline if an issue can be tied to another adjudicative guideline.) Other 	
Other reasons the adjudicator's use of the disqualifying or mitigating conditions *This question is required.	was unacceptable:

Why was the original adjudicator's use of the disqualifying and mitigating conditions unacceptable?

OTHER DISQUALIFYING AND MITIGATING INFORMATION

15. Was a condition, deviation or waiver noted? *This question is required.

- C Yes
- O No
- O Don't Know

In some cases, it may be possible to grant eligibility in the presence of disqualifying or derogatory information that is not clearly mitigated.

16. Did the most recent investigation include a disqualifying condition that was not clearly mitigated AND did the adjudicator grant eligibility? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No

If yes, please describe the disqualifying condition that was not clearly mitigated (where possible, provide the approximate timeframe or date of occurrence and detailed information about the issue or event).

*This question is required.

DOCUMENTATION REVIEW

17. Rate the quality of the adjudication decision documentation provided by the adjudicator: *This question is required.

This question is in specific reference to the DoD adjudication documentation standards provided in the Adjudication Documentation Standards (October 27, 2009) (attached to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, Personnel Security Clearance Adjudication Documentation, November 8, 2009).

Note: The documentation for cases with significant derogatory information must include: (a) the adjudicative issue, (b) disqualifying factors, (c) mitigating factors, and (d) if relevant, a notation that previously adjudicated information was reviewed. In the rare situation where the mitigating factor is not one of those found in the adjudicative guidelines, the adjudicator must include an explanatory rationale.

- O Documentation not required. The decision did not require documentation, in accordance with the standards laid out in the Adjudication Documentation Standards (October 27, 2009)
- Consistent with standards. Documentation met the standards laid out in the Adjudication Documentation Standards (October 27, 2009)
- Not consistent with standards. Documentation did not meet the standards laid out in the Adjudication Documentation Standards (October 27, 2009)

Reason the adjudication documentation was not consistent with standards (select all that apply): *This question is required.

- Significant Derog, mitigated: No summary documentation or other explanation provided.
- Significant Derog, NOT clearly mitigated: No rationale provided.
- SSBI missing standard scope item(s) and not returned to ISP: No rationale provided.
- Exception granted: No rationale provided.
- Dond Amendment waiver granted: No rationale provided.
- [If applicable) No annotation indicating that previously adjudicated and documented disqualifying information had been reviewed.
- □ Other

Other reasons the documentation was not consistent with standards: *This question is required.

 18. Does the adjudication decision appear consistent with the national adjudication is required. Yes No 	ative standards? *This
If No, please explain. *This question is required.	

HIGHER LEVEL REVIEW

19. Did the case receive higher-level review? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No
- O Don't Know

Did all reviewers document their comments and/or review? *This question is required.

- O Yes
- O No

Rate the quality of the case review documentation: *This question is required.

- C Acceptable. Documentation detailed all conditions considered and provided a clear explanation of information use and decision processes.
- Unacceptable. Documentation was missing many key elements, did not explain decision rationale and/or was rambling and/or unclear.
- O No Documentation Provided.

If the case review documentation was unacceptable, please explain: *This question is required.

APPENDIX A

SOR/LOI DOCUMENTATION 20. Was a Statement of Reasons, Letter of Intent or other denial or revocation is required.	sued? *This question is
C YesC NoC Don't Know	
Rate the quality of the SOR, LOI or other denial or revocation documentation: *Trequired.	This question is
 C Acceptable. Documentation detailed the relevant adjudicative guideliconsidered and provided a clear explanation of information use and decision. Unacceptable. Documentation was missing many key conditions, faile adjudicative guidelines or did so incorrectly, did not explain decision ration rambling and/or unclear. No Documentation Provided. 	ion processes. ed to reference the
If the denial or revocation documentation was unacceptable, please explain: ${}^\star T$ required.	his question is

OVERALL COMMENTS

21. Please use the space below to enter any additional comments.

APPENDIX A