



# Insider Threat Prevention and Mitigation — A Problem-Based Learning Experience for Organizational Leaders

## Facilitator Guide v2.1

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Office of People Analytics (OPA)

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PERSEREC-PA-21-35 | OPA Report No. 2021-090



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Within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), the primary mission of the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is to develop a Government-wide insider threat program for deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats, including the safeguarding of classified information from exploitation.



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Weywadt, C. R., Schneider, K. G., Wolford, R., Jaros, S. L. & Chandler, C. J. (2022). *Teaching organizational risk prevention and mitigation using a problem-based learning experience (RN-21-13)*. Seaside, CA: Defense Personnel and Security Research Center/ Office of People Analytics. OPA Report No. 2021-089



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# Overview

## Purpose

Organizational leaders are responsible for their organization's culture, health, and well-being. Mismanagement at the organizational level can amplify employee dissatisfaction, disgruntlement, and counterproductive work behavior, increasing the risk of an insider threat incident such as espionage, theft, or workplace violence. Insider threat incidents occur when individuals use their authorized access to harm an organization's assets, including employees, wittingly or unwittingly.

This learning experience encourages participants to think critically about organizational issues related to a real-world insider threat case and apply what they know about risk prevention and mitigation.

## Target Audience

This learning experience may be used to supplement a graduate-level course (e.g., Enterprise Risk Management [ERM] within Master of Business Administration [MBA] programs) or as a free-standing workshop to teach participants about the impact of organizational factors on insider threat.

We expect that your participants have a basic understanding of Shaw and Seller's (2015) Critical Pathway to Insider Risk (CPIR) model. If you use this learning experience to supplement a course, we expect that this foundational knowledge came from their participation in the course. However, if you use this as a free-standing workshop, then we recommend that participants be familiar with the CPIR model as a prerequisite for attendance.

## Assumptions

The learning experience is designed as a facilitator-led case-study that will give participants the opportunity to analyze a real-life insider threat case.

The in-class portion of the learning experience is designed as a 180-minute, in-person facilitator-led training (FLT), but you may adapt the materials to support virtual FLT, as needed. Similarly, you may modify the agenda to suit your unique instructional needs and constraints. However, we recommend that you preserve the basic structure of the learning experience and avoid making changes to the materials to ensure 508 compliance<sup>1</sup> is maintained and the learning objectives are met.

We expect you, as the facilitator, to be familiar with the types of organizational vulnerabilities and risk factors that are associated with insider threat, including targeted workplace violence.

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<sup>1</sup> Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that Federal Agencies ensure their electronic and information technology is accessible to employees and members of the public with disabilities.



## Facilitator Preparation

The Facilitator Guide and Instructional Slides provide the instructions you'll need to facilitate a successful facilitator-led case study. We recommend you review these documents at least a week in advance of the in-class portion of the learning experience. These documents outline the agenda, the materials needed, and instructions for the participants. The notes section of the Instructional Slides also provides "Suggested Language" and "Important Points" to help guide your facilitation of the case study.

You are expected to be familiar enough with the case to be able to provide constructive feedback on the participant-generated recommendations. You are encouraged to prepare by completing the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) and the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) to become familiar with the case and identify your own knowledge gaps prior to facilitating the learning experience.

Remember to plan what you can prior to the event. For example, consider assigning participants to groups for the small-group discussions before the event begins. The size of the small groups will depend on the overall size of your class (ideally, 4 individuals per group).

You should also prepare your participants for the learning experience by disseminating the Participant Guide approximately 3-5 days prior to the session. Instruct participants to read the Doug Williams Case Synopsis (Appendix A) and complete the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) before class. Consider bringing additional copies of the case synopsis and worksheets for those who forget their Participant Guide. Other helpful materials include markers, name-tags, and over-sized flip charts.

## Scope

This problem-based learning experience focuses on the problem of insider threat and an organization's responsibility to prevent and mitigate this risk. Problem-based learning (PBL) is a teaching method where participants are presented with a realistic problem, such as a case study, and are encouraged to use inductive reasoning to learn information about the topic and how to think critically about it. Instead of a traditional lecture, participants are presented with a problem they must try to solve. The participants have to decide what information they need to solve the problem, seek that information and communicate it to the rest of the group.

In this PBL experience, participants will analyze a case synopsis, reflect on cause-and-effect relationships in the case, and critically apply Counter-Insider Threat (C-Int) concepts, such as the CPIR model, in novel ways to address organizational vulnerabilities. PBL encourages analytic problem solving through active reflection on, and comparison of, alternative available paths to achieve desired outcomes. The goal of the learning experience is for participants to identify individual and organizational risk factors that contributed to the insider threat incident so they can recommend mitigation strategies and alternative courses of action that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Facilitators have the option to include additional training following the case study (e.g., Run-Hide-Fight violence response training).



## Learning Objectives

After participating in the learning experience, participants will be able to:

1. *Identify and Categorize:*
  - concerning behaviors displayed by the individual,
  - risk factors introduced by the organization's culture, structure, and organizational controls (or lack thereof), and
  - actions that the organization took in an effort to mitigate the potential threat posed by the individual.
2. *Evaluate* the organization's preparedness and response, identifying which actions taken by the organization helped to mitigate the potential threat and which actions failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat.
3. *Propose and discuss* alternative actions that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat.





## Materials

The materials for this learning experience include the following:

- Facilitator Guide
- Participant Guide
- Instructional Slide Deck

The Facilitator and Participant Guide appendices include:

- Appendix A: Doug Williams Case Synopsis
- Appendix B: Information Gathering Worksheet
- Appendix C: Case Analysis Tool

Finalized materials are 508 compliant/accessible, and copies can be downloaded from the Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE) website.





## Facilitator Role

As the facilitator, your role is to facilitate the learning experience, guiding participants through the case study process using the provided Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) and discussion questions. Guide the participants by asking questions and offering hints when necessary to correct their mistakes.

To facilitate this learning experience, be sure you:

- Disseminate the Participant Guide approximately 3-5 days prior to the facilitator-led class,
- Direct participants to read the Doug Williams Case Synopsis (Appendix A) and to complete the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) before class,
- Assign your participants to small groups (ideally 4 participants per group),
- Provide clear verbal instructions for each section of the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C),
- Answer participant questions but encourage participants to answer the questions posed in the class materials themselves, before providing your input,
- Prepare participants to work together in small groups,
- Check on small groups to assess their progress,
- Resolve any disagreements or debates,
- Facilitate real-time discussion of relevant case details,
- Use the questions provided to highlight relevant case information, and
- Offer feedback on the feasibility and effectiveness of the mitigation and prevention recommendations shared by participants.







## Learning Experience


This in-class learning experience uses focused discussion questions and a Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) to guide participants through analysis of a real-world insider threat case. The experience is designed to take approximately 3 hours.

Following an introduction, the class is divided into small groups and, using the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) participants completed prior to the class, they identify and categorize individual and organizational factors that contributed to the incident. After the small group discussions, the class reconvenes to evaluate the organization's preparedness and response, identifying which of the organization's actions helped to mitigate the threat and which failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the threat. Next, the participants each identify at least one actionable recommendation for how the organization could have prevented or mitigated the insider threat along with their rationale for the recommendation. The class concludes with an opportunity for participants to share their recommendations and for the facilitator to answer any additional questions.

### Recommended Agenda

- Introduction (~30 minutes)
- Small Group Discussion (~45 minutes)
- Break (~15 minutes)
- Class Discussion (~45 minutes)
- Individual Recommendations (~15 minutes)
- Review Recommendations and Wrap Up (~30 minutes)

The remainder of this guide provides instructions for conducting the learning experience, including using the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C), presenting the Instructional Slide Deck, and facilitating the discussions. It also contains information and suggestions to help support your instruction.





## Introduction ~30 Minutes



### **Display Slide 1: Title Page**

Begin with a brief introduction to the learning experience, including the purpose, learning objectives, and agenda. Review the materials provided in the Participant Guide. If participants have not read the Case Synopsis encourage them to skim the document so they can contribute to the small group discussions.

### **Display Slide 2: Agenda**

### **Display Slide 3: Overview**

### **Display Slide 4: Purpose**

### **Display Slide 5: Learning Objectives**


### **Display Slide 6: Critical Pathway to Insider Risk (CPIR) Model**

Provide a brief review of the Critical Pathway to Insider Risk model.

- The Critical Pathway to Insider Risk (CPIR) model describes the development of insider risk and how it can lead to an insider threat incident.
- The CPIR framework describes the development of risk over time whereby the personal predispositions of the individual interact with situational triggers or stressors, leading to concerning behaviors.
- The model emphasizes that the organization's response to these concerning behaviors determines whether the risk is mitigated or leads to an insider threat incident.

**Figure 1**

*Critical Path to Insider Risk (CPIR) Model*



*Note:* From “Application of the Critical-Path Method to evaluate insider risks,” by Shaw, E., & Sellers, L. (2015), *Studies in Intelligence*, 59(2), 41-48. <https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-59-no-2/application-of-the-critical-path-method-to-evaluate-insider-risks/> Copyright Studies in Intelligence.



Within the CPIR framework, individuals who have certain predispositions such as poor judgment, substance misuse, or personality dysfunction may be at increased risk of becoming an insider threat. Employees and other insiders with such predispositions may engage in concerning behaviors when faced with significant life stressors. Examples of these stressors include the death of a loved one, relationship problems, or loss of their job.

Concerning behavior varies but it often includes increasingly erratic, unsafe, or aggressive behaviors, expressions of hostility or blame, and dramatic changes in personality or performance. An organization may contribute to or mitigate the concerning behavior depending upon how and when they respond. When an organization fails to identify and manage the situation in a timely manner, the behavior may escalate until it culminates in an attack, breach, or compromise of the organization's information, systems, facilities or personnel.

Direct participants to their Participant Guide and point out the three main appendices that they should be familiar with for the learning experience, including:

1. The Case Synopsis (Appendix A)
2. The Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B)
3. The Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C)



***Display Slide 7: Doug Williams***

Confirm participants have read the Doug Williams Case Synopsis (Appendix A) and have completed the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B).

Provide a brief synopsis of the Doug Williams case yourself, or call on a participant to provide an overview of the case:

- This case synopsis is about a workplace homicide at a Meridian, Mississippi facility owned by Lockheed Martin, the United States' largest defense contractor.
- Doug Williams, an employee, shot and killed five coworkers on July 8, 2003, and wounded nine more (one of whom later died) before turning the gun on himself.

***Display Slide 8: Case Analysis Tool***

Present the Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C). Explain that participants will use this tool to summarize the Case Synopsis (Appendix A) in their Small Group Discussions.

Answer any participant questions about the expectations for the learning experience or the materials and remind participants that these notes will be especially valuable during the third and final section of the class when they'll propose alternative actions that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat along with their rationale.



## Small Group Discussion ~45 Minutes



### **Display Slide 9: Small Group Discussion**

Instruct participants to use their completed Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) as they work in their small groups to complete the “Identify and Categorize” section of their Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C), listing any:

- concerning behaviors displayed by the individual,
- risk factors introduced by the organization’s culture structure, and organizational controls (or lack thereof), and
- actions that the organization took in an effort to mitigate the potential threat posed by the individual.

Participants should move into their small groups (~4 participants per group) and be instructed to begin their group discussion by addressing the first question on the Case Analysis Tool (i.e., "List any concerning behaviors displayed by the individual"). They should then go on to complete the top row of the Case Analysis Tool, using the following questions to help guide their group discussion, as needed<sup>3</sup>.

- How is Doug Williams’ history of interpersonal threats and intimidation related to the attack?
- Did Doug Williams demonstrate any pre-attack planning behaviors, such as acquiring weapons, performing target practice, performing surveillance, testing boundaries for vulnerabilities, or attempting attacks? If so, what were these?
- How did the organization (e.g., William’s supervisors, managers, Equal Employment Office, and Employee Assistance Program) respond to employee concerns about Williams’ prior behavior in the workplace?
- What organizational vulnerabilities did Doug Williams exploit in the attack?
- How did the organization’s physical and operational security practices influence the outcome of the incident?

*Check on the small groups to assess their progress and provide a signal at the five-minute mark so participants can address any remaining items in time to rejoin the larger class.*

Ask participants to return to the class for the class discussion after the break.

## Break ~15 Minutes

### **Display Slide 10: Break**

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<sup>3</sup> These questions are also provided in the Participant Guide



## Class Discussion ~45 Minutes



### **Display Slide 11: Class Discussion**

Encourage participants to take notes during the discussion in the “Evaluate” section of their Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C) to answer the following questions:

- What actions did the organization take that helped to mitigate the potential threat?
- What actions did the organization take that failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat?

Use the following questions to guide the discussion:

- Do you think that this attack was planned or was it impulsive?
  - Does that change your perspective on the organization’s ability to prevent such an incident?
- If the organization had terminated Williams’ employment when his problematic behavior toward coworkers first became apparent, would this have guaranteed that his concerning behavior did not escalate to violence?
  - If not, what could the organization have done to reduce the risk of escalation to violence when terminating his employment?
- Is there any way that the organization could have prevented the attack without removing Doug Williams from the organization?
  - If you were Doug Williams’ supervisor, what might you have done differently?
- What else could the organization have done to protect its employees?
  - If you were the Equal Employment Officer who referred Doug Williams’ case to the Employee Assistance Program, what might you have done differently to reduce the risk of his concerning behavior leading to an insider threat incident?
- What steps has the organization taken since the incident that may help to prevent future workplace violence?
  - Might any of these changes have helped to prevent this incident?

*Be mindful of the participants’ answers so you are prepared to offer feedback as part of the Wrap-Up. You will want to provide feedback on the feasibility and effectiveness of the mitigation and prevention recommendations generated during this discussion, referring to the Information Gathering Worksheet (Appendix B) and the CPIR framework as you conclude the class.*



## Individual Recommendation ~15 Minutes



### **Display Slide 12: Individual Recommendations**

Ask participants to reflect on the class discussion and write down at least one alternative action that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat. Participants can expand on a recommendation from the class discussion or propose a unique recommendation from their own organization or experience.

Instruct participants to document their recommendation(s) and rationale in the “Individual Recommendations” section of their Case Analysis Tool (Appendix C).

## Review Recommendations and Wrap-Up ~30 Minutes



### **Display Slide 13: Wrap-Up**

Open the class to discussion, asking participants to share their individual recommendations, and calling on them to take action by applying what they've learned to their own organizations.

The Call to Action will vary based on the composition of the group, however encourage your participants to actively consider how they can use what they have learned from this experience to improve the policies and procedures relevant to threat response and mitigation within their own organization.

Be prepared to ask clarifying questions about the participant's recommendations and connect the recommendations to elements of the CPIR model, noting whether the proposed change to the organizational response is likely to interrupt the pathway to the insider threat incident.

Conclude the class by asking if anyone has anything to share/add and answering any final questions.



## Appendix A: Doug Williams Case Synopsis

*Note: contains violent content and racist language.*

*“Workplace/organizational violence consists of any act or threat of physical violence, harassment, sexual harassment, intimidation, bullying, offensive jokes, or other threatening behavior by a coworker or associate that occurs in a person’s place of employment or while a person is working” (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020).*

This case study is about a workplace homicide at a Meridian, Mississippi facility owned by Lockheed Martin, the United States’ largest defense contractor. On July 8, 2003, Doug Williams, an employee, killed five employees and wounded nine more (one of whom died a week later, leading to a total of six victims killed) before turning the gun on himself.



### The Insider Threat

On the morning of July 8, 2003, Doug Williams, 49, arrived for work at the Lockheed Martin (LM) subassembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi, which employed approximately 150 workers. Williams was an assembly worker who had worked at the plant for 19 years. He was angry that his managers required him—and 12 other LM employees—to attend an annual ethics and sensitivity training that morning. Williams, a white man, had a long history of making racist comments and threats against coworkers. He reportedly arrived to work that morning in an angry mood and repeated threats he had made previously about killing black coworkers (Ross & Scott, 2005).

As the training began at approximately 9:00am, Williams sat at a table with three black employees—Brad Bynum, Alvin Collier, and Sam Cockrell. A few minutes into the training, Williams stood up and angrily said, “You all can handle this,” and then stormed out to his truck in the employee parking lot (Halbfinger, 2003).

Williams reportedly saw his manager and plant supervisor, Jeff McWilliams, on his way out of the building and said he was going to “take matters into his own hands” (Ross & Scott, 2005). Following Williams’ comment, either McWilliams or another supervisor reportedly told employees, “If Doug leaves at lunch, I want you to go home.” When an employee asked why, the manager replied, “Well, I’m afraid of what he might do” (Ross & Scott, 2005).

Williams returned to the classroom at approximately 9:30am carrying a 12-gauge shotgun, a semiautomatic rifle, and a bandolier of shotgun shells strung across his chest. Williams announced, “I told y’all to stop (expletive) with me. Didn’t I tell y’all not to (expletive) with me?” and then fired several shots. Williams’ first victim was Mickey Fitzgerald, a white coworker who had stood up to calm him



down (Halbfinger, 2003). Witnesses stated that Fitzgerald had said to Williams, “‘Doug, you really don’t want to do this.’ Doug says, ‘Yeah, I want to do this,’” and then he shot Fitzgerald in the face (Halbfinger, 2003).

Williams then turned to a group of black employees huddled on the floor. He reportedly said, “There’s four right there,” and shot them, killing Sam Cockrell and wounding three others: Delois Bailey (who later died of her injuries), Al Collier, and Charles Scott (Ross & Scott, 2005).

Collier was shot in the shoulder and torso but tried to wrestle the gun away from Williams. “Aren’t you all going to help me?” Collier yelled at his coworkers as they ran from the room. Williams then shot Collier a third time in the hand, and Collier fell to the ground (Gold & Hart, 2003).

Williams then left the classroom and went to the production floor. A long-time coworker, Pete Threatt, saw Williams jogging toward him and the plant supervisor, McWilliams, who was standing nearby. When Threatt, a white man, saw that Williams was armed with weapons and ammunition, he stepped in front of Williams and tried to take the shotgun from him, saying, “Doug, what are you doing? Don’t do this!” (Watkins, 2018).

Threatt said Williams was so pumped up with adrenaline that he easily flung off Threatt’s attempts to wrestle away the shotgun. Williams pointed the gun at Threatt’s chest and told him, “Get out of my way, or I’ll kill you, too” (Watkins, 2018).

Williams began jogging toward other employees at their workstations. Threatt followed him and shouted warnings to workers, but the plant floor was noisy with machinery, and most people were wearing ear protection. Meanwhile, McWilliams and others called 911 at 9:43am (Carmichael, 2003).

Williams walked through the aisles of workstations, shooting repeatedly. Threatt saw him target and shoot three black employees: Lynette McCall, Thomas Willis, and Charlie Miller. Witnesses stated that Williams taunted McCall before shooting her at point-blank range: “Didn’t I tell you I was going to kill you, (expletive)?” (Ross & Scott, 2005).

As other employees screamed and ran away, Williams’ coworker and girlfriend, Shirley Price, approached and pleaded with him to stop shooting. He then killed himself with a gunshot to the abdomen (Watkins, 2018).

Police arrived at the plant at 9:49am. They surrounded the facility and helped employees get outside. The entire incident lasted approximately 15 minutes. Williams killed five employees besides himself and wounded nine more, one who would die a few days later in the hospital.

Police found additional firearms in Williams’ truck parked outside the plant: a .22-caliber Magnum, a .45-caliber pistol, and a .22-caliber rifle with a scope as well as a large amount of ammunition (Halbfinger, 2003). No security guards were on-site at the building where the shooting occurred, according to the Lauderdale County Sheriff (Carmichael, 2003).





## Leadership Awareness of the Threat

LM is a global defense contractor in security and aerospace, headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. The company employs over 114,000 people around the world. LM's subassembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi, opened in August 1969 and has produced aircraft parts for several airplanes including the JetStar, F-22 Raptor fighter jet, and military transport aircraft (Lockheed Martin, 2019).

Although several coworkers told authorities and news outlets after the shooting that Williams had made many death threats and racist statements, including racial slurs, over the years, LM President Dain Hancock said during a July 9, 2003 news conference that the company had been aware of only two complaints involving Williams during his 19-year LM career. Hancock said (Lockheed Martin, 2003):

“His employment files show his performance on the job was solid, with two exceptions that came to management's attention. The two incidents noted unacceptable behavior in the workplace.

In December 2001, Mr. Williams supposedly made threatening remarks during a confrontation with another employee. As a result of a company investigation and his own admission of a problem with his temper, Mr. Williams was required to undergo professional psychological counseling. After satisfactorily completing the treatment, he was cleared to return to work and no further instances were reported for the next year and a half.

The only other situation we are aware of occurred on June 12 of this year. Mr. Williams placed some protective clothing over his head, which was perceived as offensive by another employee. Williams was ordered to remove the 'hat' or leave the premises. He chose to go home. The employee who complained was notified of management's actions.

These are the only known incidents that were reported to management. Both incidents were taken seriously and dealt with promptly” (Lockheed Martin, 2003).

## The Two Documented Incidents

The first of the two incidents that management documented in Williams' employment file took place in December 2001, when he threatened to kill a black coworker, Aaron Hopson, because he thought Hopson was “propositioning” a white woman, Phyllis Huffmaster, after Hopson paid her a compliment. According to several reports from LM coworkers, Williams did not believe in black and white people “mixing.” Williams also stated he would go to the plant and “kill a bunch of n—s, then I'm going to kill myself.” LM managers documented this incident in Williams' file, suspended him, and required him to attend counseling for two weeks (Casetext, 2007).

Coworkers, including Thomas Willis and Lynette McCall, who would later become victims of Williams, were interviewed by Darryl Sawyer from LM's EEO department about Williams' December 2001 threats. Willis told Sawyer that a few years earlier, Williams had been laid off temporarily from LM and threatened to “get his rifle and 'pick off' employees as they left the plant.” This prior incident had not been documented in Williams' employment file. Willis added that LM should enforce its policy on



harassment, which stated that employees would be dismissed for serious violations (Ross & Scott, 2005).

In response to the first documented incident, in which Williams threatened to kill coworker Aaron Hopson, Sawyer referred Williams to the company's Employee Assistance Program, NEAS, who then sent him for counseling with Psychology Associates, a private company in Meridian contracted by NEAS. According to a lawsuit filed against LM by Willis' daughter in 2003, neither LM nor NEAS informed Psychology Associates about Williams' death threats, racial slurs, or racist attitudes. As a result, Williams met with counselor Jennifer Whitcomb in three sessions only "to deal with common issues and anger management," and he was back to work at the plant two weeks later after completing the sessions.

The second incident LM President Hancock mentioned in his statement happened only two weeks prior to the shootings. Williams wore a white shoe covering on his head for most of the workday that resembled the hoods worn by Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members. When a black employee complained about it to a manager, the manager instructed Williams either to take off the hood or go home. Furious, Williams went home and did not return to work for five or six days (Halbfinger, 2003). The manager did not write up the complaint in Williams' file because the employee who reported the behavior wanted to remain anonymous. Williams believed it was Sam Cockrell who had complained, and he killed Cockrell just two weeks later (Ross & Scott, 2005).

## The Historical Context

LM executives and the local Sheriff initially argued that the shootings were not racially motivated. They pointed to the fact that Williams 1) had the opportunity to kill Brenda Dubose, a black coworker, but did not, and 2) killed one white employee, Mickey Fitzgerald, and wounded several others (Ross & Scott, 2005). In response, Bill Blair, attorney for the Willis family in a lawsuit against LM, said that no one in this region of Mississippi would want the shootings to be associated with racism "because of Lauderdale County's terrible racial past" (Ross & Scott, 2005). The history of the County included multiple murders of black residents at the hands of white vigilantes and the shooting of civil rights workers by Klansmen.



## The Local Insider

Williams was born in 1954 in Clarke County, Mississippi, near Meridian. He graduated from Clarkdale High School in 1973, married, and had two children. Williams began working for LM in 1984. He went through a “bitter divorce” in 1989, according to his coworker, Pete Threatt. When Williams and his ex-wife Donna first separated in 1988 and appeared in court for a temporary custody hearing, Williams was so “visibly distressed” that the judge ordered him to attend counseling before he could return to court (MS, 1988).

At the time of Williams’ death in 2003, his son and daughter were in their early 20s, and Williams had been living with his girlfriend, Shirley Price, for four years. The couple had a doublewide mobile home on a dirt road east of Meridian (Halbfinger, 2003).

Clarke County Sheriff Todd Kemp said that Williams grew up going to church, and “to the best of my knowledge, he was a pretty straightforward, churchgoing man.” According to Williams’ parents, though, their son was “an angry man” (Halbfinger, 2003). Williams had suffered from depression since his divorce and was taking two antidepressants, Celexa and Zoloft, according to Threatt (Carmichael, 2003). Williams had been working Sundays and several overtime shifts and overnights at the plant, said Sheriff Sollie, who responded to the 911 calls from LM workers on the day of the shooting (Halbfinger, 2003).

Fellow LM employees were not surprised when they learned that Williams was the shooter. LM managers knew Williams kept loaded weapons and ammunition in his truck parked in the employee lot, according to one of the lawsuits filed against the company. Williams’ login password at work was also “white power” (ABC News, 2005).

He had a reputation at work as a “bad-tempered racist who disliked being told what to do” (Wordsworth, 2003). Williams was frequently angry when black coworkers received higher-paying jobs or complained about his racial slurs to LM managers (Ross & Scott, 2005) He thought that black people “had a leg up in society,” according to his girlfriend, Shirley Price (Franklin County Times, 2003).

Williams had a list of “good n—s and bad n—s,” according to Bobby McCall, Lynette McCall’s husband (Ross & Scott, 2005). Family members of Reverend Miller, one of Williams’ victims, recounted that several years prior to the shootings, Williams preached to black children at the local shopping mall and told them “He was trying to fill up the black folks’ side of heaven because the white folks’ side was full” (Wordsworth, 2003).

According to Threatt, Williams had longstanding resentments and ongoing arguments with a number of employees (Watkins, 2018). Another coworker, Melvin Young, said Williams had issues with white and black employees, but that Williams was not a racist: “It was people he had a problem with—most of them were just black” (Wordsworth, 2003).

Lynette McCall, one of the victims that Williams reportedly taunted before shooting, had told LM management that Williams had said she was “on his list” and that he foresaw a race war coming (Ross & Scott, 2005). Her husband, Bobby McCall, said he and his wife talked daily about her fear that Williams



would carry out his threats to kill black coworkers: “He [Williams] said he was going to do what he did today, and then kill himself. He used the word ‘n—.’ That’s who he referred to when he was talking about it.... She just kept telling me: ‘Don’t worry about me. I’m watching him. I’m keeping my eyes on him. And I’m trying to steer clear of him’” (Gold & Hart, 2003).

During a memorial service for the victims two days after the shootings, Williams’ girlfriend, Shirley Price, stood up and stated, “Excuse me. Don’t criticize this man. He was a human being, too.” She held up the service program with the names of those wounded and killed and added, “His name was not on here...he was a victim, too...he was a kind and loving human being.” After several people came to Price’s side to quiet her, two city administrators escorted Price from the auditorium to her car. Outside the church, Price told reporters that Williams believed everyone was against him and that he knew he had problems, but “Lockheed officials had ignored him when he sought help” (Franklin County Times, 2003).

Among the many lawsuits filed against LM by victims’ families in the years following the shootings was a claim by the Doug Williams Estate. The attorney for the estate, Greg Malta, stated that “racial animosity cut both ways” and that LM managers punished Williams unfairly and were trying to get him to leave the company. Malta added that Williams had asked LM for mental health care help but did not receive it, and eventually, “Williams couldn’t distinguish between right and wrong” (Monk, 2004b).

## The Aftermath

In July 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in Jackson, Mississippi, sent a letter to LM officials stating that “Williams created a racially hostile work environment through ‘hostile, threatening, and demeaning comments’ and threats to kill black coworkers.” The EEOC added that LM did not take appropriate action prior to the shootings and that the plant’s “racially charged atmosphere grew in intensity until the shootings” (Joyce, 2004).

By 2004, at least eight wrongful death and similar lawsuits had been filed against LM for not protecting its workers at the Meridian facility from Williams (Monk, 2004a). In 2008, however, a federal appeals court ruled that LM was not responsible for compensating the victims and family members for Williams’ actions; rather, those claims could be considered under workers’ compensation guidelines. This ruling limited damage awards under Mississippi law to \$150,000 per victim (Mohr, 2005).



## Policy Changes Made to Prevent Future Workplace Violence

The shootings in 2003 “served to heighten the awareness of Lockheed Martin officials to the threat of workforce violence,” said LM spokesperson Johnny Whitaker in a 2013 statement on the 10-year anniversary of the tragedy (Land, 2013).

He said that LM increased security measures at all of its plants and prohibited personal weapons on the worksite, except where allowed under state laws. Whitaker added, “We have redoubled our efforts to protect our employees with everything from specific security measures, to training on how to personally protect oneself and coworkers should violence break out in their work areas, to valuing a diverse and inclusive working environment at every Lockheed Martin facility worldwide” (Lockheed Martin, 2017).

Fifteen years after the shootings, Williams’ former coworker, Pete Threatt, retired from LM after 35 years. He said that after the incident, the company made clear that harassment against coworkers was prohibited: “There is zero tolerance for making a comment that could be taken as anger toward someone or a threat. Say something once, you’re fired” (Watkins, 2018).

Today, LM has a zero-tolerance policy for discrimination and harassment, which is laid out in the company’s Code of Conduct (Lockheed Martin, 2017).

To help unite and heal the town of Meridian, one of the victim’s family members, Stacey Miller, has sponsored Reconciliation Week every July since 2005. In 2021, the week-long set of activities included delivery of lemonade to first responders, a mayor’s prayer luncheon, and a memorial motorcycle ride. Two scholarships for graduating high school seniors were established in memory of Reverend Charlie Miller, and each year a donation is made to a local charity (Jackson, 2021).

“We’re doing this for them, for the voiceless, for those who were affected but may not feel as comfortable in speaking out. We know many of them are still hurting and so we want to speak for them and let them know that the community still loves them, has not forgotten about them, and that we’re going to move on in their name, doing things for good,” said Miller (Jackson, 2021).



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## Appendix B: Information Gathering Worksheet & Suggested Answers

**Instructions:** Use the categories and questions below to identify and organize key case information. Completing this worksheet will help you to develop your recommendation(s) to help the organization avoid a similar insider threat incident from occurring in the future<sup>4</sup>.

### Case Details

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Below are some key details about the individual's demographics, the individual's intentions, and the case outcome to consider as you evaluate ways the organization could have prevented this incident.

#### *Individual of Concern*

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Name:	Doug Williams
Age:	49
Gender:	Male
Race:	White
Number of Children:	Two, a son and daughter in their early 20s
Educational History:	Graduate of Clarkdale High School, 1973
Employment Status & History:	Began working for LM in 1984. Temporarily laid off from LM "a few years before" 2001 threats. Temporarily suspended in 2001. Recently, he had been working Sundays, overtime, and nights shifts at the plant.

#### *Intention of the Individual of Concern*

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*Was the event intentional/malicious or unintentional/accidental?*

Intentional/Malicious

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<sup>4</sup> We have provided example answers in this Facilitator Guide to offer you general guidance. We encourage you to supplement these answers with your own notes.





*What was the individual trying to achieve?*

Williams clearly intended to do significant harm to his coworkers and the organization. The statement that he made before he began shooting ('I told y'all to stop (expletive) with me. Didn't I tell y'all not to (expletive) with me?') indicates that he viewed his actions as a justified response to what he perceived to be unfair treatment.

*The Outcome*

---

Describe the harms or losses experienced by the organization.

In addition to Williams, six employees were killed and eight more wounded. Many more employees were likely traumatized. Extensive litigation, including at least eight wrongful death and similar lawsuits for failing to protect its workers.

**Concerning Behaviors**

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Use this section to summarize known information about the concerning behaviors of the individual.

*Concerning Communications*

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According to coworkers, Williams made "many death threats and racist statements, including racial slurs, over the years." Two prior documented incidents included a threat to kill a coworker in December, 2001 and a second incident just two weeks before the attack in which Williams wore a white shoe covering on his head at work, simulating a KKK hood. He reportedly repeated threats he had made to kill black co-workers the morning of the attack.

During the ethics and sensitivity training on the day of the attack, Williams stormed out saying that he would "take matters into his own hands." This concerned others, including a manager who feared that an attack was imminent and told employees that "if Doug leaves at lunch, I want you to go home" because, he indicated, "I'm afraid of what he might do".



### *Attack-Related Behavior*

---

Describe whether the individual demonstrated any pre-attack planning behaviors, such as acquiring weapons, performing target practice, performing surveillance, testing boundaries for vulnerabilities, or attempting attacks? Did they conduct any “final acts” (e.g., giving away possessions, writing a suicide note, sending a manifesto)?

Williams brought multiple weapons and ammunition to the worksite in his truck, which could be a pre-attack planning behavior. He did not appear to conduct any “final acts”.

### *Concerning Interests*

---

Prior to the attack, did the individual demonstrate an interest in weapons or violence?

Williams demonstrated an interest in both weapons and violence. He was known to routinely bring weapons and ammunition to the worksite in his vehicle. He made repeated threats of violence against coworkers.

### *Significant Behavioral Changes*

---

Did anyone notice significant behavioral changes in the individual (e.g., not sleeping, looking unkempt)? Was anyone afraid of the individual and, if so, why?

Williams had a reputation at work as “a bad-tempered racist” and had longstanding resentments and ongoing arguments with coworkers. He was reportedly angry the morning of the attack, but this does not appear to be a departure from the norm. Many coworkers were afraid of Williams because of his threats. Only two weeks prior to the attack, he exhibited a novel form of aggression by wearing a shoe cover on his head that looked like KKK hood.

### *Personnel Actions*

---

Did the individual violate any organizational policies or experience any job performance problems before the incident?

Williams violated organizational policies related to discrimination and harassment. (He also violated the law by making death threats.) He experienced job performance problems related to his anger and threats. He was temporarily suspended on one occasion and left work for 5-6 days following another incident.



### *Grievances and Resentments*

---

Was there evidence of any real or perceived grievances and resentments the individual had toward people or organizations (e.g., job dissatisfaction)?

Williams expressed ongoing anger and resentment toward black coworkers, who he thought “had a leg up in society.” He was frequently angry “when black coworkers received higher-paying jobs or complained about his racial slurs to LM managers.” He was angry at his managers for requiring him to attend an ethics and sensitivity training.

### Organizational Factors

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Organizational security is the responsibility of the entire organization. Use this section to consider how risk mitigation and prevention can occur at many levels of the organization.

#### Job/Task Level Factors

##### *Job Characteristics/Design*

---

Were there any characteristics of the individual’s job/position or situational opportunities (e.g., location of workplace) that may have influenced the outcome of the incident?

Situational opportunities for violence included a lack of physical security (i.e., no physical security guards present) and tolerance of employees bringing weapons and ammunition onto the work site. Also, there was not a visual alarm system to alert employees of a threat in the noisy factory.

#### Group Level Factors

---

Describe how group dynamics, cohesiveness (or lack thereof), and leadership in the individual’s workplace influenced the outcome of the incident.

It is not clear from the case synopsis whether there were problematic group dynamics within the organization aside from Williams, but it is clear that leadership failed to address his escalating behavior. The EEOC described the work environment as “racially hostile” and a “racially charged atmosphere (that) grew in intensity until the shootings.”



## Organizational Structure & Culture

### *Organization Culture*

---

Describe the characteristics, goals, and culture of the organization that may have played a role in the case example.

The organization appears to have tolerated discrimination and mistreatment of employees within the workplace. Today, the company has a “zero-tolerance policy for discrimination and harassment”.

### *Organization Socialization and Ethics*

---

Describe how the organization’s values and priorities may have contributed to the incident.

While LM had a policy against workplace harassment at the time of the July 2003 incident, employees in the Meridian, MS plant perceived that this policy was not enforced, as evidenced by comments employees made to LM’s EEO department about the December 2001 incident in which Williams was involved.

## Organizational Controls

---

Describe how the organization’s personnel security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Initial personnel vetting was not described in the case synopsis. Ongoing vetting appears to have been minimal- it does not appear that anyone at the organization sought to understand or evaluate the underlying problems with Williams beyond “a problem with his temper” that was not adequately addressed. The referral to professional counseling was not adequately managed or reviewed.

Describe how the organization’s physical and operational security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Lack of physical security at the site and operational security practices that included tolerance of employees bringing weapons to the worksite exacerbated the situation.



### *Cyber Security*

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Describe how the organization's information security practices may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

N/A

### Organizational Risk Management Systems:

#### *Management Systems*

---

Describe how the organization's management system or business processes may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

Poor management oversight contributed to the incident. Many individuals within the organization seem to have been aware of Williams' concerning behavior, yet only two incidents were documented and little was done to address them.

---

Describe how the organization's communication systems or procedures may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

It appears that there was no communication system or procedure in place to alert employees to concerns of a potential attack in the workplace, when at least one manager expressed heightened concern that morning. Further, documentation and communication of concerning behavior was minimal.

### *Organizational Interventions*

---

Summarize any actual or potential organizational interventions that may have influenced the outcome of the incident.

#### **Organizational interventions that influenced the outcome:**

- Following a documented incident of a death threat against a coworker, Williams was required to undergo psychological counseling. However, neither the company nor their EAP informed the counselor about Williams' "death threats, racial slurs, or racist attitudes." Counseling was limited to just 3 sessions of generic anger management and Williams was



returned to the workplace without evaluating the effectiveness of the intervention.

- After coworkers complained that Williams was wearing a head covering simulating a KKK hood, managers ordered Williams to remove the head covering or leave the premises. They did not write up a complaint and did not address his failure to return for 5-6 days.
- Leaders attempted to address the plant’s “racially charged atmosphere” through annual ethics and sensitivity training, without a plan to address any conflict that may arise and without a specific plan to engage or contain Williams, who was known to have a problem with the topic.
- Fearing for their safety, a manager warned employees “If Doug leaves at lunch, I want you to go home” but did not take further action.
- Employees and managers were not properly trained on how to respond to an active shooter in the workplace.

**Potential organizational interventions that could have influenced the outcome:**

- Establishing and enforcing a policy to prevent employees from bringing weapons or ammunition to the worksite.
- Communicating to the counselor about Williams’ “death threats, racial slurs, and racist attitudes” and ensuring that the referral was made to someone skilled in addressing these issues.
- Following up with the counselor to monitor progress before returning Williams to the job.
- Requesting a threat assessment and individualized threat management plan from a threat assessment professional after Williams’ first reported threat.
- Developing a plan for managing high risk employees after they return to the work place.
- Requiring managers to document and report all threats and misconduct
- Allowing reporting parties to remain anonymous.
- Establishing a visual and audio alert system to notify employees of imminent danger
- Conducting active shooter training and drills with employees



## Appendix C: Case Analysis Tool

### Small Group Discussion: Identify and Categorize

List any concerning behaviors displayed by the individual.

- Many death threats and racist statements to co-workers
  - Threatened to kill coworker (12/2001)
  - Simulated KKK hood incident (6/2003)
- Stormed out of sensitivity training stating he would “take matters into his own hands.”

List any risk factors introduced by the organization.

- Allowed personal weapons at the worksite.
- No security guards on-site. No visual threat alert system on site.
- Despite a manager’s stated concerns about what Williams “might do” that day, no attempt to intervene.

List any actions the organization took in an effort to mitigate the potential threat.

- Required Williams to undergo psychological counseling.
- Ordered Williams to remove head covering that simulated a KKK hood or leave the premises.
- Attempted to address plant’s “racially charged atmosphere” through annual ethics and sensitivity training.

### Class Discussion: Evaluate

What actions did the organization take that helped to mitigate the threat?

- N/A

What actions did the organization take that failed to mitigate, or even exacerbated, the potential threat?

- Did not inform the psychological counselor about Williams’ “death threats, racial slurs, or racist attitudes.” Counseling was limited to just 3 sessions.
- Ordered Williams to remove head covering simulating a KKK hood or leave the premises, but did not write up complaint and did not address his failure to return for 5-6 days.
- Attempted to address plant’s “racially charged atmosphere” through annual ethics and sensitivity training, without a plan to address any conflict that may arise.

### Individual Recommendation(s)

Write down at least one alternative action that the organization could have taken to prevent or mitigate the insider threat. Provide justification for your recommendation(s).

- Reduce weapons access by establishing and enforcing a policy to prevent employees from bringing weapons or ammunition to the worksite.
- Obtain a threat assessment of Williams and individualized threat management plan following his first threat against coworkers.
- Referring Williams to undergo professional psychological counseling and rehabilitation prior to returning to work by ensuring that the counselor was informed about his “death threats, racial slurs, and racist attitudes” and ensuring that the referral was made to someone skilled in addressing these issues.
- Following up with the counselor to monitor progress before returning Williams to the job and establishing a monitoring plan after he returned to work