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Selected Reports

PERSEREC has completed a variety of research projects that have benefited Defense security programs in terms of improving policy and practical procedures, and enhancing efficiency, fairness, and due process in the personnel security system.

The following are a few examples of both Technical and Management Reports that have been published.

For information on ordering additional reports, please visit the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website.

TR 09-02 August 2009
Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit

TR 08-10 December 2008
Allegiance in a Time of Globalization

TR 08-05 March 2008
Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007

MR 07-02 July 2007
Standardizing and Automating Security Incident Reporting in the Department of Defense: Feasibility Analysis

TR 07-04 May 2007
Adjudication Decision Support (ADS) System Automated Approval Estimates for NACLC Investigations

TR 07-01 January 2007
Predicting Industry Personnel Security Investigation Requirements

TR 06-01 August 2006
Development and Application of Skill Standards for Security Practitioners

MR 06-02 March 2006
Summary and Explanation of Changes to the Adjudicative Guidelines Approved by the President December 29, 2005

TR 05-13 September 2005
Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations

TR 05-11 May 2005
Implementation of a Two-Phase SSBI-PR at DSS: An Evaluation with Recommendations

TR 05-10 May 2005
Technological, Social, and Economic Trends That Are Increasing U.S. Vulnerability to Insider Espionage

TR 05-06 May 2005
Reporting of Counterintelligence and Security Indicators by Supervisors and Coworkers

MR 05-05 April 2005
Security Background Investigations and Clearance Procedures of the Federal Government

TR 05-08 April 2005
Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process

TR 04-01 January 2004
Preferences and Priorities for Professional Development in the Security Workforce: A Report of the Professional Development Survey

TR 02-03 January 2003
Improving Supervisor and Coworker Reporting of Information of Security Concern

TR 02-05 July 2002
Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947–2001

TR 02-02 June 2002
Final Report on DSS Test of Phased Reinvestigation

MR 01-02 January 2002
Cleared DoD Employees At Risk―Report 1: Policy Options for Removing Barriers to Seeking Help

TR 01-04 January 2002
Cleared DoD Employees At Risk―Report 2: A Study of Barriers to Seeking Help

MR 01-04 October 2001
Public Opinion of Selected National Security Issues: 1994–2000

TR 01-05 August 2001
SSBI-PR Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI-PR

TR 00-02 May 2000
Adjudicative Guidelines and Investigative Standards in the Department of Defense

TR 99-02 August 1999
Trends in Public Attitudes Towards Government Security Programs

TR 96-01 March 1996
SSBI Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI

TR 95-02 February 1995
Appeal Board and Personal Appearance Procedures for Adverse Personnel Security Determinations in the Department of Defense

TR 94-04 September 1994
Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS): Systems Development and Evaluation

Report Summaries

TR 09-02 August 2009

Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit

This report documents the rationale and process for developing the Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit Tool to be used for assessing insider risk within an organization. Based on past studies of insider behavior, the authors identify several areas of effective management intervention to mitigate the probability of damaging behaviors. For each area, a series of self-audit questions point to the presence or absence of policies, safeguards, or best practices that should be considered as proactive measures to minimize insider risk. The tool itself, which can be read or downloaded from the products section of this website, was developed for use by security managers and their counterparts in human resource departments. The goal of self evaluation is to minimize the risk of a broad range of adverse insider behaviors from misuse of IT systems to espionage. The study recommends that the tool, which this report describes, can be used to assess an organization’s current level of vulnerability to adverse insider behavior and as an aid to the formulation of an insider risk mitigation plan that is both preventative and proactive.

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TR 08-10 December 2008

Allegiance in a Time of Globalization

This review of social science and policy literature explores the assessment of allegiance to a nation state during a period of globalization, when many trends appear to change or undermine earlier assumptions about allegiance. It discusses global mobility and immigration trends, and the impact of transportation and communications on patterns of mobility such as “transnational” life or the “sojourner.” It explores the impact of increasingly common dual or multiple citizenships on the meaning of allegiance based on territorial citizenship. It surveys social psychological studies of group processes and political socialization. It lists insights these studies offer for ways to think about allegiance and proposes further research and discussion on how to adjust personnel security procedures to the challenges posed by globalization.

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TR 08-05 March 2008

Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007

Espionage by Americans is the worst outcome of insider trust betrayal. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) monitors and analyzes espionage by Americans in order to improve understanding of such trust betrayal by a tiny minority of citizens. This is the third in a series of technical reports on espionage based on the PERSEREC Espionage Database, files of information from the press, and scholarship on espionage. The focus of this report is on changes and trends in espionage by Americans since 1990, compared with two earlier cold War periods. Findings include: offenders since 1990 are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties, and therefore they are more likely to be motivated to spy from divided loyalties; money has declined as a primary motive for espionage although it is still common, and since 2000 no American is known to have received payment for spying; many recent spies have relied on computers, electronic information retrieval and storage, and the Internet. The most recent cases suggest that global terrorism is influencing the crime of espionage by Americans, and that espionage statutes need revision.

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MR 07-02 July 2007

Standardizing and Automating Security Incident Reporting in the Department of Defense: Feasibility Analysis

The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (Counterintelligence and Security) (DUSD(CI&S)) is responsible for overseeing information and personnel security programs in Department of Defense (DOD) agencies and industry. It has assumed responsibility for tracking and reporting security incidents to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). DOD Regulations 5200.1-R, Information Security Program, (1997) and 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program (draft), 2002, currently undergoing revision, will require DOD agencies to submit security incident reports directly to DUSD (CI&S), where they will be analyzed for patterns and systemic problems perhaps needing policy revisions. DUSD (CI&S) will also consolidate certain incident report data and forward them to ISOO. Currently, incident reporting varies greatly by agency, and DUSD (CI&S) does not always get the information that it needs. DUSD (CI&S) needs a better method to track and analyze incidents and to support ISOO information requirements. Improvements would also benefit agencies by simplifying, automating, expediting, and standardizing incident reporting, and facilitating agency-specific analysis and problem-solving.

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TR 07-04 May 2007

Adjudication Decision Support (ADS) System Automated Approval Estimates for NACLC Investigations

The present research is the second in a series of studies to evaluate preliminary decision rules and provide automated approval estimates for a Department of Defense (DoD) Adjudication Decision Support (ADS) system. The long-term goal of the ADS program is to develop a system that will automatically evaluate completed personnel security investigations in accordance with the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (December 29, 2005) and using decision logic comparable to the logic of expert adjudicators. The ADS system will process closed personnel security investigations in accordance with national guidelines before distribution to the DoD central adjudication facilities (CAFs). The system will identify information that is relevant to clearance eligibility determinations based on decision rules established by policy, senior adjudicators, other personnel security experts, and empirical research on past determinations. Cases that contain appropriately little adverse information will qualify for automatic approval. This should greatly shorten case processing times for the cleanest cases, facilitate the initial review of complex cases by adjudicators, reduce the overall workload at the CAFs, increase adjudication consistency, and facilitate case assignment.

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TR 07-01 January 2007

Predicting Industry Personnel Security Investigation Requirements

Accurate annual predictions of personnel security investigation (PSI) requirements are important for the Department of Defense (DoD) budgeting process and for ensuring that the necessary resources are available. The Defense Security Service (DSS) currently obtains PSI prediction estimates through an annual survey of cleared industrial facilities. However, actual PSI requirements often differ substantially from PSI predictions. At the request of DSS, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) reviewed DSS prediction methods, explored supplementary data that might enhance predictions, then developed and tested a new, adjusted prediction method. The new method holds promise for improving PSI prediction accuracy.

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TR 06-01 August 2006

Development and Application of Skill Standards for Security Practitioners

Government, government contractors, and the military services need to field well-trained and competent security personnel. Adequate training is essential for competent performance. Despite this fact, several national-level security reviews and audits performed in the last decade have criticized the training and performance of security personnel. In 2002, the Joint Security Training Consortium (JSTC) requested PERSEREC to conduct research and development work to improve the training and professional development of security personnel. The work covered in the present report was driven by a subsequent JSTC tasking to develop skill standards for security practitioners, a logical extension of PERSEREC’s earlier project to develop a baseline definition of the security profession. Panels of subject-matter experts developed taxonomies describing the work performed by security practitioners in seven security disciplines: physical security, information security, personnel security, security investigations, security management, communications security, and information systems security. The seven taxonomies were intended to be the first step in developing an authoritative description of what security personnel do on the job. The skill standards appended to this report were intended for federalwide application. More recently, skill standards for work in four core security disciplines were developed by the DoD on which to base a comprehensive professional certification program for its security practitioners.

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MR 06-02 March 2006

Summary and Explanation of Changes to the Adjudicative Guidelines Approved by the President December 29, 2005

This report identifies and explains the rationale for the more significant changes to the Adjudicative Guidelines as approved by the President on December 29, 2005. The revised guidelines update the Adjudicative Guidelines that were previously approved by the President in 1997. The initial draft of the updated guidelines was prepared by and coordinated within the DoD by PERSEREC. That draft was then reviewed and revised by a subcommittee of the Personnel Security Working Group prior to submission to the National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee.

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TR 05-13 September 2005

Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations

The report provides an analysis and overview of findings based on 10 detailed case studies of IT insider offenses that are contained in a companion report, “Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders Report 2 – Case Studies. (FOUO)” These case studies describe the actions of disgruntled or malicious insiders who attack or misuse a corporate information system for personal motives. In most cases there is a clear intent to inflict damage to the system. In Report 2, the authors discuss and compare background factors that contributed to the damaging event under five headings: Subject and Attack Characteristics, Personnel Screening, Attack Detection, Organizational and Social Environment, and Personnel Management Issues. Although this research is confined to a limited number of cases, it offers general observations that have clear implications for policies and best practices that address the threat posed by at-risk employees. The level of risk in any organization appears to rise with the level of personnel stress and an adverse social climate. Furthermore, a limited window of opportunity is open for management to intervene when personal disgruntlement surfaces. The authors also identify a lack of preemployment screening, poor termination policies, unmonitored remote access to the system, inadequate security training, and weak or unenforced security policies as factors that intensify risk of insider abuse.

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TR 05-11 May 2005

Implementation of a Two-Phase SSBI-PR at DSS: An Evaluation with Recommendations

PERSEREC has conducted a series of studies aimed at improving the use of investigative resources. Following research that showed that investigative sources differ substantially in terms of their ability to yield issue-relevant information, a new reinvestigation model was developed and tested—a two-phase Single Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR). In a two-phase periodic reinvestigation, Phase 2 sources (developed and listed references, residence interviews, and residence records) are used only in cases in which Phase 1 sources (all other sources) yield issue-relevant information. Findings of the initial phasing study, and subsequent research, showed that phasing saves substantial resources with very little loss of derogatory information. In the summer of 2002, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security and Information Operations), with the support of the intelligence community, approved implementation of a phased SSBI-PR for a 1-year test period. In October of Fiscal Year 2003, Defense Security Service (DSS) implemented phasing. This study documents the findings of an evaluation of phasing as implemented by DSS. Similar to findings of previous phasing studies, results of this evaluation show that the most productive sources can be used to identify SSBI-PRs where the least productive sources are most likely to yield derogatory information— that it is unnecessary and not cost-effective to use the least productive sources in all SSBI-PRs. Findings of this study suggest that whatever the cost of conducting the 15,668 periodic reinvestigations in Fiscal Year 2003 would have been without the implementation of a phased SSBI-PR, in implementing phasing, DSS reduced these resource requirements by approximately 22%.

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TR 05-10 May 2005

Technological, Social, and Economic Trends That are Increasing U.S. Vulnerability to Insider Espionage

This study explores technological, social, and economic trends in the United States and globally that are serving to increase opportunity and motivation for espionage. Findings suggest that American insiders have an unprecedented level of access to classified and proprietary information due to technological advances in information storage and retrieval. American employees have greater opportunity to establish contact with foreign entities and to transfer information to them through traveling internationally more often and by participating in international research and business ventures more frequently. Internet use is expanding globally and computer users are becoming more culturally and linguistically diverse. The Internet can be used to transmit massive amounts of digitized information to multiple foreign parties simultaneously. Finally, the market for U.S. information is expanding. American insiders can sell more types of information to a broader range of foreign buyers than ever before. In addition to these new opportunities for espionage, American employees are more often encountering situations that can provide motivation for this crime. More insiders are experiencing financial problems and gambling addiction, both of which can provide impetus for workplace theft. Loyalty to organizations is diminishing and a greater proportion of American workers are at risk for becoming disgruntled. A growing number of insiders have emotional and financial ties to other countries. Under some circumstances, insiders with loyalties to other peoples may be less inclined to view espionage as morally wrong. It is possible that some insiders with a global orientation to world affairs will view espionage as morally justifiable if they feel that sharing information will benefit the “world community” or prevent armed conflict.

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TR 05-06 May 2005

Reporting of Counterintelligence and Security Indicators by Supervisors and Coworkers

PERSEREC recently conducted a study of supervisor and coworker reporting of security-related information. Explanations were offered by security managers and by focus group participants as to why many security-related behaviors are underreported. The main problem is that people are hesitant to report suitability behaviors, such as excessive drinking, because they are not able to see a direct link between the particular human problem and national security. Consequently, PERSEREC developed a clear, succinct list of behaviors that could pose a potential threat to national security and thus should be reported if observed. Members of various counterintelligence agencies in the government reviewed and edited this list. It has since been included as Enclosure 3 in DoD Instruction 5240.6 Counterintelligence Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs. In addition, PERSEREC developed a brochure based on these items as an educational tool to help DoD components and other departments that have need of security education materials on supervisor and coworker reporting or for counterintelligence briefings.

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MR 05-05 April 2005

Security Background Investigations and Clearance Procedures of the Federal Government

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies (as determined by the President) to jointly submit a report to Congress that evaluates and makes recommendations regarding (1) the utility and effectiveness of personnel security background investigations and clearance procedures of the Federal government, (2) the costs and benefits of conducting background investigations for Secret clearances with those of full-field investigations, and (3) the standards governing the denial and revocation of security clearances. At the request of senior staff at the Director of Central Intelligence Special Security Center and the Counterintelligence and Security office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, PERSEREC reviewed relevant personnel security literature, such as executive orders, commission reports, Congressional testimony, and research and policy papers, to summarize information and make recommendations that address the Congressional report objectives stated above.

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TR 05-08 April 2005

Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process

In early 2004, PERSEREC was tasked and sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The authors (1) reviewed recent literature and intelligence reports to identify and understand active anti-American groups of concern for military enlistment, (2) reviewed all relevant executive orders, DoD directives, and Armed Forces instructions and regulations, and (3) visited recruiting and military entrance processing facilities across the United States, interviewing personnel at each. The report focuses primarily on individuals joining the enlisted ranks rather than on those entering the U.S. Army’s 09L Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), officers, and direct commissions (chaplains, nurses, lawyers, engineers, etc.). In many ways, however, findings from the study bear on these other groups as well. Findings in the report are presented within the following areas: arriving at a working definition of a terrorist; characterizing the threat; suspicion indicators of potential terrorist allegiances; policies; screening procedures; suspicious incident reporting procedures; and training and education. The research found some evidence of small numbers of persons enlisting in the Armed Forces who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups. At the same, the Armed Forces have implemented many policies and practices designed to specifically, or by default, enable detection of and response to such individuals. Some areas where these policies and procedures can be made more efficient or effective are also addressed.

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TR 04-01 January 2004

Preferences and Priorities for Professional Development in the Security Workforce: A Report of the Professional Development Survey

PERSEREC developed and implemented the Professional Development Survey on behalf the Joint Security Training Consortium (JSTC). The purpose of this research was to assess the views of the general security workforce concerning the state of the profession and the need for training and professional development programs. Previous PERSEREC research examined the opinions of high-level security managers from five sectors of the Federal security workforce (military departments, Defense agencies, intelligence community agencies, and non-DoD agencies). This report summarizes the results of general survey data from security practitioners at all grade levels in the department. However, the authors believe there is currently little uniformity among training programs. Contrary to managers’ expectations, practitioners support the use of certification as a requirement for advancement. Results of this study will be useful in evaluating and improving security training and development programs.

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TR 02-03 January 2003

Improving Supervisor and Coworker Reporting of Information of Security Concern

PERSEREC examined government requirements that cleared supervisors and employees report to security managers behavior they observe among subordinates and coworkers that they believe to be security-relevant. Despite formal policies, very few reports are made. Authors reviewed research literature and discussed the topic with personnel security and management personnel in 20 government agencies and with supervisors and coworkers in focus groups. While supervisors and employees are not averse to reporting genuine security infractions, they rarely report other behaviors. They are confused about precisely what to report and they anguish over reporting gray-area behaviors they do not consider to be necessarily connected to security. The study recommends that DoD Directive 5200.2-R be modified to include supervisor and coworker reporting as a priority and to protect the confidentiality of people who report, if requested. It recommends that PERSEREC, with the help of counterintelligence and security personnel, develop a list of behaviors that pose a palpable threat to national security and must be reported, if observed. The list will contain behavioral examples to clarify what is considered egregious and critical to national security. It is also recommended that the ASD(C3I) issue a memorandum advising certain changes be made in the government’s philosophy, i.e., that the personnel security community be more proactive in ensuring that personal problems get addressed before they become security problems.

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TR 02-05 July 2002

Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947–2001

Analyses of 150 cases of espionage against the United States by American citizens between 1947 and 2001 provide detailed data on the demographic and employment characteristics of American spies, the means and methods they used to commit espionage, their motivations, and the consequences they suffered. Collected materials on the cases supplement the analyses conducted with a database that allows comparison of groups and the identification of trends. Factors highlighted include changes in espionage by Americans since the end of the Cold War and the impact of globalization and networked information systems on the practice of espionage.

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TR 02-02 June 2002

Final Report on DSS Test of Phased Reinvestigation

PERSEREC, together with DSS, conducted a pilot test of a phased reinvestigation. In a phased reinvestigation, information collected during Phase 1 is used to determine what additional investigative steps are appropriate for Phase 2. If Phase 1 turns up issue-relevant information, Phase 2 is conducted to complete a full-scope reinvestigation. If Phase 1 turns up no issue-relevant information, the investigation is considered clean and no further investigation is done. This is the final report on that test. The test confirmed that a phased reinvestigation can save substantial investigative resources while missing very little information. No information at all would be missed in any case on which some adjudicative action would be taken.

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MR 01-02 January 2002

Cleared DoD Employees At Risk―Report 1: Policy Options for Removing Barriers to Seeking Help

The purpose of this report is to present basic background information and a series of recommendations concerning a problem of growing importance to the DoD: How does DoD encourage people to deal with their personal problems while at the same time maintaining personnel security requirements for people who have access to classified information? This report, designed for the policymaker, answers three questions: what is the problem; why does this problem need to be addressed now; and what can policymakers do about the problem?

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TR 01-04 January 2002

Cleared DoD Employees at Risk-Report 2: A Study of Barriers to Seeking Help

This study examined the relationship between DoD security policy and Federally mandated Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) for civilians and counseling/referral services for military personnel to identify any barriers for cleared DoD employees to using these programs. The study, based largely on interviews, but also on focus-group information and on a review of policy documents and other literature, found that policy is in place to help cleared individuals with personal problems get access to the counseling and treatment they need. However, research showed that cleared employees, civilian or military, often remain suspicious that their attendance at such programs will result in clearance revocation. Thus, some consult counseling programs outside the Federal system, eschewing the very programs that the government has set up to help them. Report 2 documents the research and presents findings and conclusions; it also contains a series of appendices that provides back­ground information for the interested reader on such topics as the EAP movement, military counseling/referral programs, and DoD personnel security policies and programs.

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MR 01-04 October 2001

Public Opinion of Selected National Security Issues: 1994–2000

PERSEREC undertook this project to assess the degree of public support for various national security issues. PERSEREC commissioned the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago to include questions on its 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 general Social Surveys. PERSEREC collected attitude information relative to seven issues: (1) need for secrecy in various areas of government activity, (2) government’s need to collect information on individuals vs. people’s privacy rights, (3) public support for various security countermeasures, (4) government’s right to know mental health information, (5) loyalty to employer versus coworkers, (6) punishments for various acts of trust betrayal, and (7) perception of threats to the United States.

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TR 01-05 August 2001

SSBI-PR Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI-PR

A six-person team of highly experienced personnel security adjudicators and investigators reviewed 4,721 case files at four agencies routinely conducting the Single Scope Background Investigation Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR): DoD, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Information was obtained regarding subjects’ backgrounds, the sources that were included in the SSBI-PRs, whether sources provided issue and/or mitigating information, and the type and adjudicative value of the information that was provided. Information yield was shown to differ dramatically across sources, and differences in source productivity were consistent across organizations. The SF-86, Subject Interview, and Credit Report consistently yielded issue and mitigating information most frequently. The majority of SSBI-PRs did not contain issue-relevant information and less than 5% of the SSBI-PRs resulted in actionable outcomes by the participating organizations. These and other findings provide a foundation for designing an improved SSBI-PR process. Using data from this study, a second PERSEREC report, A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation, demonstrates how a phased approach to the SSBI-PR process could achieve a more effective periodic reinvestigation program on a community wide scale.

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TR 00-02 May 2000

Adjudicative Guidelines and Investigative Standards in the Department of Defense

PERSEREC conducted a study of the efficiency and effectiveness of Adjudicative Guidelines and Investigative Standards approved by the President in 1997. Results indicate that DoD has successfully implemented the Adjudicative Guidelines and Investigative Standards. On a summary measure the guidelines were rated as adequate. Those ranked highest in terms of their adequacy were: Foreign Preference, Emotional/Mental and Personality Disorders, Outside Activities, and Misuse of Information Technology Systems. A workshop attended by senior adjudicators suggested there may be a high level of consistency when applying the guidelines to identical cases.

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TR 99-02 August 1999

Trends in Public Attitudes Towards Government Security Programs

PERSEREC has worked with the National Opinion Research Center from 1993 until 1998 to define the climate of public opinion in which government security policy is developed. Security-related items have been included in the 1994, 1996, and 1998 General Social Surveys concerning how much protection should be provided for national security information, the appropriate areas of inquiry for establishing eligibility for positions of trust, and acceptable methods for monitoring cleared employees. This report summarizes attitude trends and magnitudes of public support on these issues across the 4-year time span. In general, the data show that there is a solid and sustained endorsement for protecting various categories of national security information and a strong and continuing support for investigative inquiry into personal areas such as finances, mental health, criminal history, and substance abuse. Espionage is clearly perceived to be a serious crime that should warrant severe sentencing after conviction. However, there is mixed and uncertain support for security measures to ensure the continued reliability of cleared employees.

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TR 96-01 March 1996

SSBI Source Yield: An Examination of Sources Contacted During the SSBI

This study was undertaken to provide data on the yield of the sources contacted using the SSBI to policy makers deliberating the feasibility of shortening the scope of the SSBI to 7 years. Arguments for either retaining or changing scoping requirements can be supported by this study. In support of the 7-year scope, it was found that the Subject provides significant issue information in 81% of the cases and that 97.6% of all issues are developed within 7 years of coverage. However, for a small unrepresentative sample, if the Subject is discounted as a source of issue information, between 4 and 13% of denials come from sources beyond 7 years of coverage. Approximately 90% of non-subject disclosed information from the higher yield sources (relatives, employment, developed and listed references, and financial and employment records) was captured with a 7-year scope.

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TR 95-02 February 1995

Appeal Board and Personal Appearance Procedures for Adverse Personnel Security Determinations in the Department of Defense

This study was undertaken to develop: (1) policy requirements for personnel security appeal boards (PSABs), and (2) options for incorporating a personal appearance into the process for appealing an adverse personnel security determination in DoD. Policy requirements for PSABs are recommended. Three options for handling personal appearances are presented and Option 2, which provides an appellant the opportunity to appear before a PSAB, is recommended.

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TR 94-04 September 1994

Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS): Systems Development and Evaluation

The study was undertaken to develop a computer-administered security screening questionnaire for use with applicants to sensitive Navy ratings. A system was designed (Military Applicant Security Screening) and tested and evaluated at nine Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Data is presented concerning the amount of potentially derogatory information disclosed by questionnaire and the reactions of Navy classifiers who administered the system. Based on the favorable findings of the study, the Navy approved the system for implementation at all the MEPS.

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